By Sonja Hawkins and Ingrid Jegou, ICTSD
ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy ICTSD Series on Climate Change Architecture Programme
Linking Emissions Trading Schemes
Considerations and Recommendations for a Joint EU-Korean Carbon Market
Issue Paper No. 3
By Sonja Hawkins and Ingrid Jegou, ICTSD
Issue Paper No. 3
Linking Emissions Trading Schemes
Considerations and Recommendations for a Joint EU-Korean Carbon Market
ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy
Published by
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) International Environment House 2
7 Chemin de Balexert, 1219 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 917 8492 Fax: +41 22 917 8093 E-mail: ictsd@ictsd.org Internet: www.ictsd.org Publisher and Chief Executive: Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz Programme Manager: Ingrid Jegou
Programme Officer: Sonja Hawkins
Acknowledgments
This paper was informed by and builds on previous work by ICTSD on the free allocation of emission allowances and border carbon adjustments. The lead researchers and authors are Sonja Hawkins and Ingrid Jegou. Substantive support and input was provided by the Korea Legislation Research Institute. The authors would like to thank Michael Mehling (Ecologic Institute), Eunjung Kim (Korea Legislation Research Institute), Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz (ICTSD), and Joachim Monkelbaan (ICTSD) for their valuable comments and feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
This paper has been produced under the ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy. ICTSD is grateful for the generous support to the Global Platform from ICTSD’s core and thematic donors, including the UK Department for International Development (DFID);
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (DANIDA); the Netherlands Directorate-General of Development Cooperation (DGIS); the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway.
The Global Platform has also benefited from the support of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB); Oxfam Novib; the Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit (GIZ);
and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).
ICTSD welcomes feedback on this document. This can be forwarded to Sonja Hawkins: shawkins@
ictsd.ch.
For more information about ICTSD’s work on trade and climate change, visit our website:
www.ictsd.org.
Citation: Hawkins, Sonja and Ingrid Jegou; (2014); Linking Emissions Trading Schemes:
Considerations and Recommendations for a Joint EU-Korean Carbon Market; ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy; Climate Change Architecture Series; Issue Paper No.3; International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, www.ictsd.org.
Copyright ©ICTSD, 2014. Readers are encouraged to quote this material for educational and non- profit purposes, provided the source is acknowledged. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial-No-Derivative Works 3.0 Licence. To view a copy of this licence, visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of ICTSD or the funding institutions.
ISSN 1816 6970
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES vi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS vii
FOREWORD viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
1. INTRODUCTION 4
2. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES IN THE EU AND SOUTH KOREA 6
2.1 How Do Emissions Trading Schemes Function? 6
2.2 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 7
2.3 Performance of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 11
2.4 The South Korean Emissions Trading Scheme 15
2.5 Similarities and Differences between the EU and South Korean
Emissions Trading Schemes 17
3. LINKAGE OF EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES 22
3.1 Forms of Linkage 22
3.2 The Rationale for Linking Schemes 23
3.3 Disadvantages of Linkage 23
3.4 Challenges: Differences in Scheme Designs and Policy Priorities 25
3.5 Legal Considerations of Linkage 28
4. LEARNING FROM CURRENT EXAMPLES OF LINKAGE
WITH THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 29
4.1 Norway 29
4.2 Switzerland 32
4.3 Australia 35
4.4 Lessons Learned from Existing Examples of Linkages between ETSs 38
5. LINKING THE EU AND SOUTH KOREAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES 39
5.1 Rationale for a Linked EU-Korean Carbon Market 39 5.2 Existing Facilitators for a Linked EU-Korean Carbon Market 40 5.3 Likely Barriers to a Linked EU-Korean Carbon Market 40
5.4 Acceptable Differences for Linkage 42
5.5 Trade-offs for South Korea 42
5.6 Trade-offs for the EU 44 5.7 Implications for the South Korean Emissions Trading Scheme 44
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 47
ENDNOTES 49
REFERENCES 60
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Development of the EU ETS
Table 2: A comparison of the EU ETS and the South Korean ETS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACCUs Australian Carbon Credit Units BAU Business-as-usual
BCAs Border carbon adjustments CCS Carbon capture and storage CDM Clean Development Mechanism CER Certified Emission Reduction CFI Carbon Farming Initiative
CH4 Methane
CO2 Carbon dioxide
CPM Carbon Pricing Mechanism EEA European Economic Area
EFTA European Free Trade Association EITE Energy-intensive and trade-exposed ERU Emission Reduction Unit
ETS Emissions trading scheme
EU European Union
EUA European Union Allowance GDP Gross domestic product GHG Greenhouse gas
HFC Hydrofluorocarbon
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization JI Joint Implementation
LDCs Least-developed countries
LULUCF Land use, land use change and forestry MBM Market-based measure
MRV Monitoring, reporting and verification
MtCO2e Million tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide equivalent NAP National allocation plan
N2O Nitrous oxide
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PFCs Perfluorocarbons
RMU Removal unit SF6 Sulfur hexafluoride
tCO2e Tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide equivalent UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
FOREWORD
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has recently released its latest findings in its Fifth Assessment Report. It concluded that global warming is unequivocal, human influence on the climate system is clear and limiting climate change will require substantial and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. At a time when multilateral action on climate change is progressing slowly and observers anxiously await the 2015 deadline to reach a new global climate deal, many countries are implementing unilateral mitigation measures. Emissions trading schemes are one popular example.
Parallel to this development, a new phenomenon is emerging: the linkage between different domestic emissions trading schemes. The European Union is a pioneer in the linkage of emissions trading schemes. To date, the bloc has established a link with Norway and is finalizing links with Switzerland and Australia.
Linkage offers many advantages, like greater cost-efficiency, enhanced market liquidity, and, potentially, a lower risk of carbon leakage. However, the gains come at a cost, most evidently a loss of regulatory control. Not only does a country expose itself to developments in the other carbon market, linkage also requires adaptations in the domestic schemes in order to achieve sufficient compatibility between the linking schemes.
Linkage between emissions trading schemes has now been discussed for several years, and a good body of literature exists on the merits, demerits, and requirements for linkage. Building on this largely theoretical literature, this paper contributes to the discussion with a practical perspective and concrete policy recommendations. The authors provide an analysis of current linkage cases between the European Union and third-party countries to draw lessons from the experience to date. This insight is then applied to assess the options and make recommendations for the creation of a linked carbon market between the European Union and South Korea.
The South Korean emissions trading scheme will start in 2015. Policymakers are currently in the final design stages, and some crucial decisions remain to be taken. It is therefore a good time for policymakers to reflect on the linkage question. Considering linkage early on can influence key features of the scheme and facilitate future linkages – not only with the European Union, but also with other existing and emerging emissions trading schemes. This paper offers important insights into a potential link between the emissions trading schemes in the European Union and South Korea by comparing the systems’ main features and identifying challenges and opportunities.
Linkage between emissions trading schemes can play a role in initiating more cooperation on climate change between countries. In the context of the growing emergence of emissions trading schemes, linkage has the potential to create a network of interlinked schemes and can therefore help advance international climate change cooperation.
I hope that the findings of this paper will contribute to the debate about the linkage of emissions trading schemes and help policymakers in countries with existing and emerging schemes identify the potential for and the impacts of linkage. At the international level, I hope that this paper will stimulate further discussion about the role of emissions trading schemes in climate policy cooperation.
Together with the authors, I warmly invite you to read the paper and to provide us with comments and feedback.
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz Chief Executive, ICTSD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Emissions trading schemes (ETSs) are continuing to emerge as a popular climate policy tool as countries look for cost-effective solutions to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In theory, companies with relatively low abatement costs will emit less and sell surplus emissions on the carbon market, whereas companies with high abatement costs will purchase allowances to cover their emissions. As a result, emissions reductions are undertaken in the most cost-effective way.
South Korea is among the world’s top GHG emitting countries. While the country has no binding reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, it has pledged to reduce its emissions by thirty percent relative to its projected 2020 business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. In order to achieve this reduction target, South Korea has decided to implement an ETS from January 2015.
Parallel to the growing number of ETSs, governments are starting to link or consider linking their respective ETSs. Emissions trading schemes therefore have the potential to play an important role in international climate change cooperation.
This paper analyses the possibilities for linking the carbon markets in the European Union (EU) and South Korea. It assesses elements of the South Korean ETS to determine which features have the potential to facilitate or prevent linkage with the EU ETS. The paper draws on lessons from previous linkage examples and makes recommendations for the South Korean case.
Linkage offers several advantages, such as economic efficiency gains; the creation of a broader, more liquid carbon market; a potentially lower risk of carbon leakage; a lock-in of the climate policy;
and support for multilateral climate action via a bottom-up approach. However, linkage also comes with disadvantages, including distributional issues or a loss of regulatory control. Linkage further requires a certain degree of harmonization between some elements of the schemes. Policymakers might therefore have to align certain features of their ETSs. The differences in the design of ETSs largely affect the compromises that linkage would involve. In the end, the decision whether or not to link is a trade-off between the merits and demerits of linkage in light of a government’s priorities.
The decision will also be influenced by the form of linkage, which can be direct or indirect. Direct links require an active decision to accept the other system’s allowances and can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. A unilateral link is a one-way link whereby one system decides to recognize allowances from the other system for domestic compliance obligations, but not vice versa. Allowance trading will only take place if prices are higher in the system establishing the link. A bilateral link, on the other hand, is a two-way link requiring both systems to recognize each other’s allowances.
The higher-price system will purchase allowances from the lower-price system until prices converge at an intermediate level. Multilateral links involve more than two systems. In addition, two systems that do not accept each other’s allowances can become indirectly linked through their respective linkage to a common third system.
Bi- and multilateral linkages require a certain degree of harmonization between the ETSs. Differences in some areas are unlikely to prevent linkage, including monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) rules; registry systems; provisions for new entrants and plant closures; banking rules; trading periods; and allocation methods. However, others have the potential to pose barriers, such as the stringency of emissions caps, penalty regimes, the eligibility of offset credits, cost containment measures, scope and coverage, and the use of absolute versus intensity targets.
The first linkages are starting to take place. The EU ETS has been linked with Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein – although this is a special case that some simply consider an extension of the EU
ETS. Switzerland and the EU are in the final stages of negotiating a link, and Australia and the EU have agreed to link their ETSs in July 2018 – although this depends on whether the Carbon Pricing Mechanism and planned ETS are repealed under Australia’s new Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
Despite their differences, the Norwegian, Swiss, and Australian cases show some common trends and provide interesting practical insights into the linkage issue. They show that linkage requires that the key features of ETSs be sufficiently aligned. Enforcement measures, rules for the use of offset credits, cost containment measures, and scope and coverage are areas where the EU requires sufficient harmonization. However, the cases also show that linkage with the EU does not require complete harmonization, allowing for some differences to persist in the allocation mechanisms, MRV rules, the treatment of new entrants, and trading periods.
South Korea particularly stands to gain from linkage with the EU ETS because of its expected high carbon price. Linking with the EU could reduce the carbon cost for South Korean firms. A decrease in South Korea’s allowance price could in turn help reduce its risk of carbon leakage. Given the absence of a binding reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, linkage would further create an institutional lock-in, thereby sending important investment signals to covered businesses.
The EU ETS and the planned South Korean ETS have some similarities, which could facilitate linkage in the future. Both ETSs are designed as cap-and-trade systems with equally stringent MRV rules and aligned banking rules.
However, there are also differences, some of which have the potential to pose barriers to linkage.
The South Korean plans contain provisions for the readjustment of allocations. While requests by South Korean firms for additional allowances from the reserve pool might lead to competitiveness concerns among their EU counterparts, such concerns would exist irrespective of linkage. The scope for such requests is further very restricted. More importantly, the EU is likely to be alarmed by the ability of the South Korean authorities to increase the total amount of available allowances under exceptional economic circumstances, since this would inflate the total number of allowances in the joint carbon market. Given the EU’s recent proposal for the creation of a market stability reserve that would release or withdraw allowances to prevent significant price volatility, the South Korean provision might be less problematic. The conditions for such an overall allocation readjustment would, however, most likely have to be clearly defined.
Another unique and potentially problematic feature of the South Korean ETS concerns the ability of the Government to intervene with pre-defined market stabilization measures under specified circumstances to prevent significant price hikes and crashes. However, the controversy surrounding the EU’s back-loading measure and the difficulty of passing this policy show that many in the EU oppose interventions in the carbon market. South Korea might, however, have a strong interest in controlling extreme price developments in both directions, pointing to its lack of a binding reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol and the EU’s experience with price volatility. The South Korean market stabilization measures are therefore likely to prove contentious in linkage negotiations.
The wider scope and coverage of the South Korean ETS could pose another barrier. South Korea’s plan to include three additional GHGs might be less problematic, since Australia also plans to include methane, which has not proven to be an obstacle for EU-Australian linkage negotiations. However, the coverage of indirect emissions under the South Korean ETS might prove more problematic. South Korea would certainly have to provide evidence of robust accounting methods to avoid double- counting and misallocating allowances. Scope and coverage could turn into a difficult issue if the EU is unwilling to accept an extended scope and coverage or if South Korea opposes a more limited approach.
Decisions on some scheme elements remain to be taken and could further complicate linkage. The penalty regime could pose a barrier if South Korea does not impose a requirement on non-compliant businesses to surrender missing allowances in addition to paying the fine. In the absence of such a requirement, the price cap on the fine would effectively form a price ceiling for allowances in the joint carbon market.
The issue of international offsets might pose a problem for South Korea, since linkage would lead to the propagation of the EU’s offset rules into South Korea, which plans to impose tighter quantitative offset limits and has yet to decide on the acceptance of Kyoto credits. However, the situation could change completely given the EU’s recent announcement that emissions reductions from 2020 will have to be achieved through domestic actions alone, effectively banning international offsets from its ETS.
South Korea might further face an undesired propagation of borrowing rules into its own scheme.
While it plans to limit the borrowing of allowances at ten percent of a company’s compliance obligations, the EU’s implicit borrowing regulation has no quantitative restrictions. Linkage between the two schemes would extend the EU’s more generous regulation to South Korea.
Linkage between the EU ETS and the South Korean ETS would likely require the latter to align several key features. Previous experience shows that the EU does not implement any changes. Instead, its linkage partners have to work towards sufficient harmonization by aligning their schemes with the EU ETS. As a larger carbon market, South Korea might, however, be able to obtain some concessions, for example regarding scope and coverage.
South Korean policymakers should clearly assess their interest in a link with the EU ETS, as well as the likely benefits and disadvantages it would involve. This could help South Korea take measures to facilitate linkage in the future, either by developing some elements more closely in line with the EU ETS or by identifying a road map to do so in the future.
It is particularly recommended that South Korea and the EU enter a transparent and open dialogue early on in order to specify expectations, requirements, and barriers. This can provide parties with a clearer picture of opportunities and challenges. As the Australian case proves, such an engagement can start even before the ETS is implemented. Prior to a full bilateral link, South Korea could also establish a unilateral link to the EU ETS, just like Norway had done. This would allow the country to achieve some key benefits while its scheme is not yet fully prepared for a two-way link.
1. INTRODUCTION
A growing number of countries are developing and implementing ETSs in an effort to curb GHG emissions. Emissions trading schemes generally take the form of cap-and-trade systems. This means that a cap is in place to limit total emissions and permits – or allowances – for emitting GHGs are allocated to covered entities. Participating firms can freely trade these allowances on a carbon market. Alternatively, ETSs can be designed as baseline-and-credit systems. In this case, firms are rewarded with emissions reduction credits for emissions that fall below their performance targets – or baselines.1 The discussion in this paper focuses on cap-and-trade systems.
Emissions trading schemes are a market-based policy tool aimed at cutting emissions in a cost- effective manner. In theory, cost-efficiency can be obtained as reductions are undertaken by firms with relatively low abatement costs, whereas firms with higher abatement costs will instead purchase additional allowances.2 Emissions reductions therefore take place where the cost of doing so is lowest.
The EU was the first party of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to implement an ETS to curb GHG emissions back in 2005. It was intended to help the EU fulfil its Kyoto commitment of reducing GHG emissions by eight percent below 1990 levels in the period of 2008–12.3 The EU ETS is currently the largest and most significant ETS.
Alongside the growing number of ETSs, linkage between domestic ETSs is starting to take place. The EU ETS has implemented or agreed to linkages with several schemes and has a strong interest in establishing further linkages.
In 2009, the EU stated its ambition to create an OECD-wide carbon market through linkage to comparable cap-and-trade systems and to extend this to major emerging economies by 2020 with the aim of creating a global carbon market.4
To date, the EU ETS has been linked with the three member states of the European Economic Area and European Free Trade Association (EEA-EFTA). The link was, however, not established through the EU’s linkage provision, but through the adoption of the EU’s ETS Directive by these three states.5 The EU ETS is in fact now seen as comprising the twenty-eight EU member states plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.6 This raises the question of whether the EEA-EFTA case should be considered an example of linkage or simply participation in an already existing scheme.
Although the literature is divided on this issue, we consider the Norwegian case an example of linkage for the purpose of this paper.
Negotiations to link the EU ETS with the Swiss ETS are currently under way and expected to be concluded before summer 2014.7 Finally, in a move towards the first intercontinental link, the EU and Australia have reached an agreement to link their respective schemes.8 However, the EU-Australian link depends on whether the planned ETS is scrapped under Australia’s new Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
Linkage offers several advantages, such as economic efficiency gains; the creation of a broader, more liquid carbon market; and support for multilateral climate action via a bottom-up approach. However, linkage also comes with disadvantages, including distributional issues or a loss of regulatory control.9 Linkage further requires a certain degree of harmonization between some scheme elements. Policymakers might therefore find themselves in a situation where they have to align certain features of their ETS with the other scheme. The differences in the design of schemes largely affect the compromises that linkage would involve. In the end, the decision whether or not to link is a trade-off between the merits and demerits of linkage.10 These need to be seen in light of a government’s priorities.
The potential for a linked EU-Korean carbon market
South Korea, which is among the top global GHG emitting countries, has decided to introduce an ETS to curb emissions in major industrial sectors. The scheme will become operational on 1 January 2015. While South Korea has no obligations to reduce GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, in 2012 it passed a bill that paves the way for the introduction of an ETS in an effort to help South Korea achieve new economic growth through the transition towards a low-carbon society.11
The possibility of future linkages has already entered South Korean debates on the ETS.
The potential of some design features to pose barriers to linkage makes it worthwhile to consider possible future linkages of the South Korean scheme early on. The size of the EU ETS, combined with its strong interest and first experience in linkage, makes the EU an interesting linkage partner. Assessing the possible linkage of the South Korean ETS with the EU ETS therefore serves as a good starting point.
Purpose and outline of the paper
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the possibilities for a linked EU-Korean carbon market. It will specifically assess elements of the South Korean ETS to determine which features have the potential to facilitate or prevent linkage with the EU ETS. The paper will draw on lessons from previous linkage examples and make recommendations for the South Korean case. This can serve to inform
policymakers involved in the design of the South Korean scheme by helping them to identify their interest in linkage with the EU ETS and make decisions that would facilitate linkage in the future.
The paper first introduces the concept of ETSs and provides an overview of the schemes in the EU and South Korea, taking into account their main design elements. This serves to determine the similarities and differences between the EU ETS and the South Korean ETS.
Chapter three discusses the concept of linkage, introducing the different forms of linkage, the rationale for linking schemes, the disadvantages, and the barriers posed by design differences. It also touches upon some legal considerations of linkage.
The paper then moves onto specific case studies in chapter four, presenting examples of linkages between the EU ETS and other schemes. The selected cases are based on linkages that have already been implemented or agreed. This involves three countries:
Norway, Switzerland, and Australia.
The previous chapters serve to draw lessons and make recommendations for the potential linkage of the EU and South Korean schemes.
Chapter five analyses the specific rationale for linking these two schemes, identifies existing facilitators and barriers, discusses trade-offs, and makes some policy recommendations.
The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and provides some insight into the role that linkage of ETSs can play in international cooperation on climate change.
2. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEMES IN THE EU AND SOUTH KOREA
This chapter introduces the concept of emissions trading and gives an overview of the EU ETS and the South Korean ETS.
These descriptions will be used to assess the similarities and differences between the two schemes.
2.1 How Do Emissions Trading Schemes Function?
Emissions trading schemes offer a cost- effective solution for achieving emissions reductions. In ETSs, covered entities obtain allowances that they can trade freely on a carbon market.12 Scarcity is the underlying mechanism for the functioning of ETSs.13 The quantitative limit on allowances gives them a value, since firms that use allowances to account for their own emissions lose the opportunity to sell the allowances at the current market price. This opportunity cost creates incentives for firms with relatively low abatement costs to reduce emissions in order to sell permits to firms with relatively high abatement costs. Emissions reductions are therefore undertaken where they can occur most cost-effectively.14
Emissions caps
Most ETSs are designed as cap-and-trade systems. In such schemes, a cap is in place to limit the total amount of GHG emissions for a given period. This cap can be absolute or relative. The former works through total emissions reduction targets, while the latter uses intensity targets expressed as emissions per unit of output or input.15 Within the cap, allowances are allocated to the covered installations.
Allocation mechanisms
Allocation mechanisms can take the form of auctioning, free allocation, or a combination of the two. During the early stage of an ETS, governments often choose to allocate
allowances free of charge in order to gradually introduce the new carbon cost. Free allocation may also be intended to address concerns about the potential risk of carbon leakage and distortions in competitiveness.
Carbon leakage occurs when emissions that have been reduced in one country as a result of climate change regulations move to countries with less stringent environmental regulations. Distortions in competitiveness relate to the concerns of energy-intensive industries in countries with relatively high carbon costs, as they fear a loss of market shares to firms in countries with no or lower carbon costs. In countries where carbon costs are imposed through ETSs, free allocation of emissions allowances can help alleviate these concerns.16 Free allocation is usually a temporary measure that is gradually replaced by an auctioning mechanism.
There are three main methods for distributing allowances free of charge: grandfathering, benchmarking, and output-based allocation.
Grandfathering means that allowances are allocated based on past emissions, using average emission levels for a specific period of years. One associated risk is that installations may see no incentive to reduce emissions if they assume that future allocations will be based on current emission levels. Benchmarking addresses this risk by using an allocation mechanism based on the benchmark of the most efficient installations in a given sector. However, the benchmarking method requires that common definitions, reliable data, and good measurement and verification systems be available. Access to detailed production data is particularly challenging. In an output-based allocation system, the number of allowances a firm receives depends on its output in relation to the industry benchmark. The risk of this method is that it may incentivize entities to produce more in order to receive more free allowances, therefore inducing increased emissions.17
Trading of allowances
Installations covered by an ETS are required to submit allowances for every tonne of GHGs emitted in the previous year. They must therefore obtain enough allowances or reduce their GHG emissions. The choice depends on the relative costs. Permits can be obtained by trading between entities and – in many schemes – temporal trading.18
The opportunity costs involved in using allowances to account for emissions instead of selling them at the market price means that firms with relatively low abatement costs will sell allowances to firms with high abatement costs. The option to sell allowances incentivizes firms with low abatement costs to reduce GHG emissions.
If no restrictions exist for temporal trading within multi-year trading periods, entities can save unused allowances from the current year for compliance in future years and cover shortages in the current year by borrowing allowances from the following year. The so-called banking of allowances is usually possible across trading periods, while borrowing is restricted to the same trading period.19 Borrowing carries the risk that important emissions reductions could be delayed or never implemented if entities can borrow indefinitely. This is why most ETSs limit borrowing to the same trading period and some impose quantitative restrictions on the amount of allowances that can be borrowed.20
Compliance with the ETS
Robust MRV rules are a key component in any well-functioning ETS. It is important for emissions and emissions reductions to be monitored and disclosed in an accurate and transparent manner.21 Covered installations are usually required to monitor and report their emissions on an annual basis. Most schemes additionally require reports to be independently verified, while others request verifications on a case-by-case basis. In order to ensure compliance with the ETS,
penalties are imposed on installations that fail to surrender the required amount of allowances.22 Penalties usually involve a fine, and many schemes additionally require firms to submit missing allowances in the following year.
2.2 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme
The EU ETS is the main pillar of the EU’s climate policy and its key tool for cutting GHG emissions.23 The EU is the world’s largest carbon market, accounting for over three-quarters of the trading volume in the international carbon market. It covers over 12,000 heavy energy-using power stations and manufacturing plants in the EU member states.24 Since 2008, installations in the three EEA-EFTA states – Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway – are also covered by the EU ETS.25 The EU ETS was divided into three initial trading periods. Phase I (2005–07) was a trial period. Phase II (2008–12) introduced some changes to the scheme and coincided with the EU’s first compliance period under the Kyoto Protocol. However, it was Phase III (2013–20) that introduced significant reforms that particularly affect the cap-setting and the allocation of allowances.
Emissions reduction commitment
The EU ETS was introduced in 2005 through Directive 2003/87/EC in response to the EU’s emissions reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, with the objective of helping to achieve reductions in a “cost-effective and economically-efficient manner.”26 In 1997, the fifteen EU member states had committed to reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, agreeing to cut their collective GHG emissions for 2008–12 by eight percent below 1990 levels.
This commitment was translated into national emissions reduction and limitation targets. All of the new member states that joined the EU after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol – except Malta and Cyprus – committed to individual reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.27
In spite of the overall low support for a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, with Canada, Japan, and the Russian Federation
deciding not to commit to any further reduction targets, the EU member states signed up for a second commitment period. The EU agreed to cut emissions by twenty percent over the 2013–
20 period compared to 1990 levels – with the possibility of scaling it up to thirty percent if other major economies made fair contributions to the global emissions reduction efforts.28 In addition to the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU also made a unilateral commitment to reduce emissions by twenty percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, or thirty percent in the case of adequate reduction efforts from the other major economies. Unlike the Kyoto commitment, the unilateral commitment does not refer to the average over 2013–20, but only the year 2020. Moreover, the unilateral commitment covers emissions from international aviation – although this was suspended for one year as of April 2013 – while the commitment under the Kyoto Protocol covers emissions and their removal from land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF), but not vice versa.29
Coverage
The EU ETS covers over 12,000 installations.30 The scope has been significantly increased over the three trading periods and now covers emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from power plants and many energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, such as oil refineries;
steel works; and factories producing iron, coke, aluminium, metals, cement, lime, glass and glass fibre, ceramics, pulp, paper, cardboard, acids, and bulk organic chemicals.31 International aviation was included in 2012 but, following strong international opposition, it was suspended for one year as of April 2013, limiting the aviation scope to intra-EU flights only.32 The recent decision by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to begin talks about implementing a global market-based measure (MBM) to address emissions from aviation by 2016 creates uncertainty about the re-introduction of aviation under the EU ETS.33 When the EU suspended international aviation from its ETS, it said that the requirement for airlines to surrender allowances would be
“reimposed automatically unless the ICAO agrees a robust market-based measure.”34 Recent developments point to the possibility of subjecting only the portion of a flight occurring within EU airspace to the ETS – irrespective of whether it originates inside or outside the EU.35 Since Phase III, the EU ETS also covers nitrous oxide (N2O) from the production of certain acids and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) in aluminium production.36 Forestry, agriculture, and transportation other than aviation are not included in the EU ETS.37 In total, the EU ETS covers approximately forty-five percent of the EU’s GHG emissions.38
Cap-setting
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system with an absolute emissions cap. This means that an absolute quantity limit is in place for the emissions that can be emitted every year by the covered entities. Allowances are distributed within this cap and can be traded freely on the EU carbon market.
In the first two trading periods, the cap was determined by the sum of the member states’
individual caps. Every member state suggested the quantity of European Union Allowances (EUAs) that its covered entities should receive.
This quantity was submitted to the European Commission for review and final approval.
National authorities were then responsible for distributing a nation’s total allowances between its industries.39 The EU-wide cap amounted to 2,181 MtCO2e per year during Phase I and to 2,083 MtCO2e during Phase II. However, Phase II included two additional countries and further installations. Without these additions, the cap would have been at 1,909 MtCO2e per year – a twelve percent reduction from Phase I.40
With the onset of Phase III, the Commission set a single community-wide cap at 2,039 MtCO2e for 2013. Excluding the extended scope, this would amount to an eleven percent reduction compared to the Phase II cap.41 Every year, this cap will be reduced by 1.74 percent, so that GHG emissions in 2020 will be twenty-one percent lower than in 2005. The 2020 cap has been set at 1,777 MtCO2e per year.42
Allocation of allowances
The allocation mechanism under the EU ETS has changed over the course of the three trading periods. During Phase I, at least 95 percent of allowances had to be allocated for free. In practice, free allocation reached over 99 percent.43 Phase II saw a reduction in free allocations, although member states had to allocate a minimum of 90 percent of permits for free.44 During the first two periods, free allowances were distributed using the grandfathering method. The biggest change was introduced with the beginning of the third trading period. Free allocation no longer exists for power and heat generating facilities. These installations must now purchase all of their allowances. Exemptions have, however, been granted to the eight member states that joined the EU after 2004, allowing them to allocate a limited number of free allowances to existing power plants until 2019. In the other ETS sectors, free allocation will be phased out gradually, with the move to full auctioning set for 2027. In the manufacturing sector, for example, the share of free allowances will decrease from 80 percent at the beginning of Phase III to thirty percent by 2020. Free allocation in the manufacturing sector is now based on harmonized rules using the benchmarking method. This system rewards the most efficient facilities and, as such, creates incentives for emissions reductions.45 Additional exemptions exist for industries that are considered to be at significant risk of carbon leakage.In order to fall into this category, businesses must show the following characteristics: (a) a trade-intensity ratio above ten percent and a production-expense ratio of at least five percent as a result of the ETS; (b) a trade-intensity ratio over thirty percent; or (c) a production-expense ratio of at least thirty percent as a result of the ETS. Every five years, the European Commission revises the list that contains all the firms considered to be at significant risk of carbon leakage.46 For the 2013–20 period, such companies will receive free allowances based on a benchmark, using the ten percent most energy-efficient installations in their product group. Installations reaching
the benchmark will receive all allowances for free during Phase III. Those falling below the benchmark will receive a proportionately lower amount of free allowances.47 In total, about half of the EUAs are to be auctioned in the third trading period.48
Rules for new entrants and plant closures The EU ETS includes a reserve to distribute allowances to new entrants. During Phases I and II, member states themselves decided on the size of their reserves. As a result, there was no standardized reserve size. The allocation of reserve allowances, the rules for replenishing the reserve, and the formulas for determining the number of allowances to be allocated to new entrants also varied across member states. The onset of Phase III brought some harmonization, and a common reserve amounting to five percent of the EU-wide allowances was set up.49
When plants covered by the EU ETS close down, they no longer receive free allowances. The downside of this regulation is that it might keep inefficient installations running. Some member states have therefore decided to allow owners to transfer allowances from plants that are being shut down to a new replacement facility.50 Temporal flexibility
Temporal trading is possible under the EU ETS. Covered installations can save unused allowances from the current year to cover emissions in future years or, if needed, borrow allowances issued for the following year to cover shortages in the current year. Borrowing is implicitly possible as allowances for the new trading year are distributed two months before installations have to surrender allowances for the previous year.51 The flexibility offered through borrowing helps control excess demand for allowances around the compliance date, therefore reducing the risk of distortions in the permit markets.52 During Phase I, banking was only possible within the same trading period.
Since Phase II, it is possible in all current and future periods. The change is a consequence of the drastic price crash towards the end of the first trading period, when spot prices
fell to almost zero while contract futures prices for the second trading period were selling at around EUR 20/tCO2. To avoid this problem in the future, banking is no longer restricted to years within the same trading period.53 However, unrestricted banking can also pose challenges. If excess allowances are accumulated in one trading period, they can be carried over into the next period through banking, thereby depressing prices well into future trading periods – a problem the EU is currently experiencing in its transition from Phase II to Phase III.
Rules for the use of international offset credits
Under the EU ETS, international offset credits can be used to meet domestic reduction commitments. Directive 2004/101/EC, also known as the ‘Linking Directive’, provides for the use of credits obtained from emissions- saving projects undertaken outside the EU.
Project-based credits covered by the Directive are those generated by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the scheme for Joint Implementation (JI).54 The CDM and the JI are the Kyoto Protocol’s emissions reduction credit systems. These so-called ′flexible mechanisms′
allow countries with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B countries) to implement emissions reductions through projects in third- party countries and obtain reduction credits.
The CDM is the most significant emissions reduction credit system. Under the CDM, Annex B countries carry out emissions reduction projects in developing countries for which they can receive Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). The CDM is intended to provide Annex B countries with flexibility in meeting their reduction commitments, while stimulating sustainable development and emissions reductions in developing countries.55 Projects include, for example, building wind farms or the installation of more energy-efficient equipment in manufacturing facilities.56 Reductions must be additional to what would have occurred in the absence of the projects, and project qualification is subject to a rigorous public registration and issuance process.57 Joint
Implementation provides Annex B countries with the opportunity to carry out emissions reductions through projects in other Annex B countries for which they can receive Emission Reduction Units (ERUs). Again, projects must meet the additionality criteria.58 During Phase I, covered entities were only allowed to use CERs.
Since 2008, companies can use both CERs and ERUs.59
The use of CERs and ERUs for compliance purposes under the EU ETS is, however, limited, both in terms of quantity and types of projects. For the period 2008–20, the total use of international offset credits is limited to 50 percent of the required aggregate abatement compared to 2005.60 For Phase II, the EU imposed a quantity limit at 13.4 percent per year of the total EU cap. However, the actual use of CERs and ERUs has been below the maximum allowance and is expected to decrease further as a consequence of recent reforms.61 At the company level, the use of CERs and ERUs is, on average, restricted to eleven percent.62 The EU ETS does not accept credits from certain activities, such as those generated from nuclear facilities, LULUCF and – since 2013 – projects related to the destruction of industrial gases.63 The exclusion of industrial gas destruction projects from the EU’s offset eligibility is due to concerns about their environmental integrity.64 Phase III also came with the additional requirement that CERs will only be accepted from least-developed countries (LDCs).
From 2020, the EU ETS may no longer accept international offsets for compliance. The 2030 framework, which lays out the EU’s 2020–30 climate strategy, specifies that GHG reductions have to be achieved through domestic actions.
This ban on international offsets may be lifted if an ambitious global climate deal is reached in 2015, which might lead the EU to increase its 2030 reduction target.65
Ensuring compliance
Covered entities are required to monitor and report their emissions on a yearly basis and have them checked by an independent, accredited verifier. The EU ETS uses common
MRV principles to account for emissions and emissions reductions. These principles are spelled out in the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation and the Accreditation and Verification Regulation. Covered facilities have to submit their verified emissions data by 31 March and sufficient allowances for their total annual emissions by 30 April. Failure to comply with this requirement results in a penalty.66 Firms have to pay a fine which has increased from EUR 40 per tonne in Phase I to EUR 100 per tonne since Phase II. In addition, non-compliant firms must surrender the missing allowances in the next trading year.67
2.3 Performance of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
Over the years, the EU ETS has experienced several hurdles. The main challenges concern the variability of allowance prices, particularly price crashes; low investment incentives; and the occurrence of windfall profits. Nevertheless, some experts argue that the ETS has been effective in inducing abatement activities and driving emissions reductions. However, the impact of the EU ETS on emissions reductions is heavily debated and opinions diverge. Some experts like Ellerman, Convery, and Quirion have more favourable assessments, whereas others like Sandbag, Carbon Market Watch, and the Corner House are more critical of the EU ETS’s contribution to GHG reductions.
Price variability and allowance surplus
Price variability – particularly the problem of low allowance prices – has been responsible for much criticism of the EU ETS. Over the course of nine years, the EU’s carbon price has greatly fluctuated. At the beginning, allowance prices were in the range of EUR 20–25/tCO2, peaking at EUR 30.68 However, in May 2006, prices fell abruptly, declining by more than EUR 10/tCO2, within two days.69 The price crash was the result of the publication of the 2005 verified emissions data which showed that emissions in 2005 were five percent below the allocated amount. The over-allocation was a consequence of a distribution that was largely based on entities’ own estimates of their emissions
because, in many cases, verified data was not available at that point. Once covered entities became aware of the extent of the over-supply, spot prices continued to decline, reaching almost zero at the end of Phase I.70 The price crash was aggravated by the fact that Phase I allowances could not be banked for compliance in Phase II.71 In addition, some studies show that actual abatement took place, thereby further contributing to the allowance surplus.72
For the launch of Phase II, the EU had learned its lessons and the Commission rejected most national allocation plans (NAPs) on the basis that they would have again resulted in an over- allocation of allowances. On the whole, the EU cut allocations by ten percent compared to the submitted draft NAPs. Initially, Phase II prices rose to over EUR 20/tCO2, reaching EUR 29 in July 2008. However, with the onset of the financial crisis in autumn 2008, prices once again dropped, falling to as little as EUR 8/tCO2 in February 2009. Towards the end of the year, prices recovered at around EUR 12–14/tCO2. Despite the low demand for permits during the recession, they did not completely lose their value, since companies were able to carry over allowances into Phase III.73 However, since summer 2011, allowance prices have once again declined steadily, falling to less than EUR 3/tCO2 in April 2013.74 This sharp price drop coincided with the failure of the European Parliament’s vote on the back-loading of allowances.75 Back- loading involves the temporary postponement of 900 million permits from auctions until demand is expected to increase. The postponement of the auctioning of these allowances from 2013–15 until 2019–20 would not reduce the total number of allowances to be auctioned during Phase III, but only the distribution of auctions over the third trading period.76 The measure was intended to help the EU deal with its allowance surplus. Allocations for 2008–12 had assumed higher rates of economic growth, so declining economic activity resulted in an over-supply of allowances. At the same time, there was an over-supply of CERs as a backlog of projects requiring validation had been cleared.77 Overall, the surplus of EUAs reached almost two billion at the beginning
of Phase III. This significant over-supply holds risks for the proper functioning of the EU carbon market and the ability of the EU ETS to meet more ambitious reduction targets in a cost-effective way.78 After the initial failure, the back-loading measure was backed by the European Parliament in a second attempt, and prices have since increased slightly to about EUR 5/tCO2.79
Despite the Phase III reforms, including a tighter cap, an increasing move towards auctioning, and the allocation of free allowances based on best practice benchmarks, the EU is still struggling with low allowance prices. In addition to the short-term measure of postponing the auctioning of 900 million allowances by six years, the EU has therefore started to look for more sustainable solutions to address the over-supply of allowances.80 At the beginning of 2014, the Commission presented a legislative proposal for the creation of a market stability reserve – an automatic stabilizer to be put in place by 2021 that would adjust the supply of allowances in the EU carbon market to be auctioned. This reserve would operate independently under pre-defined rules.81
The price crashes show that the EU has difficulties achieving and maintaining a consistent carbon price signal. The price variability stems from the over-supply of allowances, the initial restriction on inter- phase banking, and the difficulty to adjust to the economic downturn. The problems have been partially addressed through increased auctioning, the use of verified emissions data as a basis for free allocation under the grandfathering method – and more recently its replacement with the benchmarking method – as well as the permission to bank allowances to future trading periods, and an increasing tightening of the cap.82
Low investment incentives
Price volatility has an additional drawback.
The absence of a consistent price signal prevents firms from undertaking investments into relevant technologies.83 A relatively stable
and high price is indeed needed in order to incentivize companies to invest into climate- friendly technologies. The allocation of free allowances based on historical emissions further lowered the incentive to reduce emissions, as higher emissions would lead to greater allocations in the future.84 During the first two trading periods, investment incentives under the EU ETS were therefore particularly low.
Notwithstanding the changes in the ETS since the onset of Phase III, the EU is still plagued by price fluctuations and allowance prices that many argue are too low to stimulate significant investments into low-carbon technologies.
Windfall profits
Several studies suggest that some companies covered by the EU ETS earned windfall profits by passing the carbon price through to consumers although they had received allowances free of charge. While these windfall profits seem to have occurred, they mainly took place in the electricity sector. It also mostly affected countries with little regulatory oversight of their utility sectors. The move to auctioning from Phase III should help to reduce this problem.85 However, some analyses of energy- intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries – who will continue to receive free allowances during Phase III – suggest that some of those sectors will be able to pass through added costs and reap windfall profits.86
Carbon leakage
Concerns about the risk of carbon leakage were frequently voiced in the context of the EU ETS. However, most studies find no evidence of carbon leakage in the first two periods of the EU ETS. In an analysis of several energy- intensive industries, Bolscher et al. find that low allowance prices and free allocations seem to have prevented carbon leakage during Phases I and II. While there is no evidence of production leakage, some sectors may be experiencing investment leakage – a relocation of investments due to the carbon policy – although this requires more detailed analysis.87
Success in spite of challenges
Despite these challenges, some experts claim that the ETS has been effective in helping the EU reach its Kyoto reduction target. Data from 2011 shows that emissions in the EU 15 – i.e. the EU’s member states prior to the 2004 accessions – were 14.9 percent below 1990 levels. Estimates from the European Environment Agency put 2008–12 average emissions at 12.2 percent below 1990 levels. This means that the EU has significantly over-achieved its first Kyoto target.
Similarly, the member states that joined the EU after the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol also met or over-achieved their individual Kyoto targets.88 While it is difficult to attribute reductions to a specific policy and it appears that the recession also contributed to lowering emissions, some studies nevertheless show that the EU ETS has played a role in the emissions reductions. Ellerman, for example, estimates that, during Phase I, the EU ETS was responsible for reductions of 120–300 MtCO2e – or two to five percent below BAU emissions – and from 2008–
09 for reductions of 340 MtCO2e – or around eight percent of BAU emissions.89 However, such estimates depend on the methodology used, and other experts show lower emissions reductions.
Moreover, despite fears that the EU ETS would impede economic growth and involve
significant costs for industry and consumers, the reductions were achieved at a fraction of the predicted cost. Estimates put the costs at 0.01 percent of the EU’s GDP.90
In addition, in spite of the above-mentioned price fluctuations and crashes, some studies show that the EU ETS still managed to spark innovation into low-carbon technologies, pointing out that short-term price variability does not necessarily prevent investments.
Long-term prices were relatively stable in the EU ETS, and some argue that they are more influential for investment decisions than short-term prices. Moreover, price volatility is part of the functioning of complex markets, and allowance prices are influenced by several factors, including changes in economic activity, weather events, fuel prices, and technological developments.91 Nevertheless, some studies show that the impact of the EU ETS on investment decisions has been moderate: it has had an influence on low-carbon investments, but not enough to spark long-term projects at the level that is needed to meet the EU’s long-term targets cost-effectively.92
Table 1 provides a summary overview of the EU ETS across its three phases, showing its main developments, challenges, and performance.
Phase I Phase II Phase III
Years 2005-07 2008-12 2013-20
Cap-setting Sum of the caps of member states
Sum of the caps of member states, although the
Commission rejected most initial NAPs for a lack of ambition
Single community- wide cap set by the Commission
Cap-level 2,181 MtCO2e 2,083 MtCO2e (equivalent without additions: 12% below Phase I)
2,039 MtCO2e, declining by 1.74% annually (equivalent without additions: 11% below Phase II)
Gases covered CO2 CO2 CO2, N2O, PFCs
Table 1: Development of the EU ETS
Phase I Phase II Phase III Sectors
covered
Power generation and energy-intensive industrial sectors (ferrous metals, cement, refineries, pulp and paper, glass, ceramics, all combustion facilities >
20MW), some opt-outs
Same as Phase I but no opt-outs, plus aviation since 2012
Same as Phase II but international aviation suspended from April 2013, plus additional sectors (non-ferrous metals; rock wool, stone wool and gypsum;
chemicals; PFCs for aluminium; N2O for acid;
CCS-related emissions) Free
allocation ratio
Minimum 95% Minimum 90% Power generation:
no free allocation;
Industrial sectors: 80% to decrease to 30% by 2020;
EITE industries: 100%
based on benchmark Free
allocation method
Grandfathering Grandfathering Benchmarking
New entrants Reserve size and rules set by member states
Reserve size and rules set by member states
EU-wide reserve at 5% of the cap
Banking Within trading period Within and across trading periods
Within and across trading periods
Borrowing Implicitly within trading period
Implicitly within trading period
Implicitly within trading period
Kyoto offsets CERs, excluding nuclear facilities and LULUCF;
limited at 50% of a country’s reductions compared to BAU, but none were used
CERs and ERUs, excluding nuclear facilities and LULUCF;
limited at 13.4% of EU cap
CERs and ERUs, excluding nuclear facilities, LULUCF, and the destruction of industrial gases; CERs only from LDCs Penalty Fine of EUR 40/tCO2e
and surrender of missing allowances
Fine of EUR 100/tCO2e and surrender of missing allowances
Fine of EUR 100/tCO2e and surrender of missing allowances
Performance Initial allowance prices of EUR 20-25/tCO2e with a spike at EUR 30, before price crash in spring 2006 – reaching almost zero at the end of 2008 – when verified emissions data showed an over-supply of allowances, caused by allowances being allocated based on entities’
own estimates, the inability to bank allowances to Phase II, and the implementation of actual abatement.
After the price crash in Phase I, prices climbed to more than EUR 20/tCO2e in summer 2008. Prices crashed to
EUR 8/tCO2e with the onset of the financial crisis. Towards the end of 2009, prices recovered at around EUR 12–14/tCO2e.
Since summer 2011, prices have once again started to fall steadily.
Persisting over-supply of allowances despite reforms. Prices dropped to less than EUR 3/tCO2e following the negative April 2013 vote on the back-loading approach.
Prices recovered only slightly to about EUR 5/tCO2e after a successful second vote.
Table 1: Continued
2.4 The South Korean Emissions Trading Scheme
South Korea has seen several decades of fast economic growth and is now among the world’s top GHG emitters. Within the OECD group, South Korean emissions are set to grow the fastest.93 While South Korea has no binding reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, the country intends to curb emissions as part of its recent green growth agenda. The Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, enacted in 2010, forms the foundation of South Korea’s transition towards low-carbon, sustainable development. The Framework Act sets out an emissions reduction target and provides for the introduction of an ETS.94 An ETS was drafted over the following years, and the bill to enact the scheme was passed almost unanimously by the National Assembly. With the enactment of the presidential decree in November 2012, the final step towards the introduction of the law was taken.95
The Framework Act put into place some temporary mechanisms that are of use for the future ETS. Since 2011, South Korea has been operating the GHG and Energy Target Management System, which can be seen as a predecessor to the ETS. It covers more than 450 large emitters and energy consumers from the power, industry, waste, and agricultural sectors. Under the current scheme, covered entities must submit data on GHG emissions and energy to the Government on a yearly basis and are subsequently assigned an emissions/
energy reduction target for the following year.96 By operating this scheme, the South Korean Government and covered businesses were able to gain some valuable experience prior to the introduction of the ETS. Thanks to the current scheme, a national inventory covering 60 percent of South Korea’s emissions is already in place.97 The collection of verified emissions data for several years prior to the start of the ETS can help reduce the risk of over-allocation of allowances – a problem the EU experienced during the first trading period of its ETS.
Several elements of the South Korean ETS have yet to be finalized and will be revealed in the
NAP, to be published in June 2014. The NAP will contain the detailed rules for the operation of the ETS, including the total emissions cap per allocation period, the reserve amount, and allocation standards.98
Emissions reduction commitment
The emissions reduction target set out in the Framework Act reflects South Korea’s pledge under the Copenhagen Accord to lower GHG emissions by thirty percent relative to its projected BAU levels by 2020. According to current government projections, the 2020 BAU emissions are estimated at 776 MtCO2e, an increase of sixteen percent from the 2010 level of 669 MtCO2e. Under this projection, the thirty percent reduction target would put 2020 GHG emissions at 543 MtCO2e, a reduction of nineteen percent from 2010 levels. The level of ambition of the commitment is, however, dependent on the BAU prediction.
A lower BAU scenario would decrease the ambition implied by the reduction target.
Many observers expected that the South Korean Government would revise its 2020 BAU scenario with the release of the ETS Master Plan.99 However, the Master Plan, published in January 2014, does not show any changes in the above figures.
Coverage
According to the current draft proposal, the ETS will apply to individual installations emitting over 25,000 tCO2e annually or entities whose combined installations emit over 125,000 tCO2e. In addition to the mandatory participation of businesses and installations falling under the above category, firms can join the ETS voluntarily. As such, the South Korean ETS will cover approximately 470 firms and over 1,600 installations.100 The ETS is set to include all six Kyoto Protocol GHGs. In addition to CO2, N2O, and PFCs, it will therefore also cover methane (CH4), hydrofluorocarbon (HFC), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). The scheme will further be applicable to both direct and indirect emissions.101 Under the current plans, approximately 60 percent of the country’s GHG emissions will be covered by the ETS.102
