Mission Experience, the Practical Aspects of Peace Soldiering:
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
Brigadier General Karl-Alexander WOHLGEMUTH Military Advisor to the SRSG and Head of Military
Component, United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a land, hardly matched with any country of the world because of its peculiar and unique characteristics. From socio-economical to geo-political or any other causes make this land very much different from all its neighbors. A lot of experts on Afghan issues believe that the phenomena in Afghanistan shouldn’t be evaluated just on the basis of ordinary logic and approaches. To know Afghanistan one has to do a deep study of all its features. Unless you live among the specific regions and communities, it is not possible to gain any correct information about them.
Average life expectancy for Afghanistan's 28.5 million people is 44.5 years, at least 20 years lower than that of neighboring countries. One of two Afghans can be classified as poor, and 20.4 percent of the rural population does not have enough to eat, getting less than the benchmark of 2,070 calories a day. More than half of the population has suffered from the effects of a prolonged drought. One-quarter of the population has at some time sought refuge outside the country, and 3.6
million remain refugees or displaced people. Most
f s o pect cal As acti he Pr ce, t en eri Exp ion Miss
Peace S old
ierin g:
United N ati
ons Ass ista nce M iss ion in
Afgh anis tan (UNAMA)
Brigadi er Gen eral Karl -Al exa nder WOH
LGEM UTH
Military Advisor to the
SR SG and He ad of
Military Component, United Nations Assistance Mission
Afgha nista n
Afgh anistan is a land, hardl
y m atched with an y countr
y
of the world be cause of its pe
culiar and unique
cha rac teristic s. From socio-
economical to ge o-political or
any othe r causes make th
is land very much diff eren
t from issues perts on Afghan all its neighbors. A lot of ex
believe that the phenom ena in Af
ghanistan shou ldn’t be
evaluated just on the basis of ordinar y log
ic an
d hanistan one has to do a deep approaches. To know Afg
study of all its featur es. Unless
you live am ong the
speci fic regions a nd communitie
s, it is not pos
sible to rmation about them. rect info any cor gain
Average life ex pectancy for Afg
hanistan' s 28.5 million
people is 44.5 ye ars, at least 20 years lower than
that of ghans can be countries. One of two Af g neighborin
classified as poor, and 20.4 percent of the rural population does not have enough to
eat, getting le
ss than n half of e tha day. Mor the benchmark of 2,070 calories a the population has suffer ed from th e effe
cts of a
prolonged drough
t. One-quarter of th
e population has at ge outside the countr efu some time sought r y,
and 3.6
million remain refugee s or displaced people. Most
glaring are the inequalities that affect women and children. One woman dies from pregnancy-related causes about every 30 minutes, and maternal mortality rates are 60 times higher than in industrialized countries. One-fifth of the children die before the age of five; 80 percent of them from preventable diseases, one of the worst rates in the world. Only 25 percent of the population has access to clean drinking water, and one in eight children die from lack of clean water. Afghanistan now has the worst education system in the world and one of the lowest adult literacy rates, only 28.7 percent. Annual per capita income was $190 and the unemployment rate 25 percent.
The modern history of Afghanistan, and especially the experience of Britain and Russia, shows that foreign efforts to create governments in that country can be doomed to failure. Foreign countries and international groups should only define political criteria that would lead to international acceptance and a major redevelopment effort and allow the Afghans themselves to work out political solutions that meet them.
Nevertheless assistance, advice and money are needed.
International environment
Several distinct overt policy interventions have taken place in Afghanistan. Each has different though related goals and leadership.
Operation Enduring Freedom, the first front in the
“global war on terrorism”.
gla rin g are the ine qua lities tha t a ffe ct wom en a
nd
children. One woman die s from pre
gna ncy- related causes
about every 30 minutes, and matern
al mortality rates ar
e One-fifth ialized countries. an in industr 60 times higher th
of the children die before
the ag e of five; 80 percent of
them fro m preve
nta ble d ise ase s, one of the wor
st rate
s in s access ent of the population ha 25 perc the world. Only
to clean drinking w ater, and one in eigh
t children die
fro m lack of clea
n wate r. Afgha
nista n now h as th
e wor st
education system in the world and one of the low
est adult r cap al pe ent. Annu 7 perc s, only 28. ate cy r litera
ita
income was $190 and the unemplo ym
ent rate 25 p ercent.
The modern history of Afgh
anistan, and especiall y the
experi ence of Bri
tai n and R ussi
a, shows th at foreign
efforts to create gove rnments in that countr
y can be ries and intern ign count ore doomed to failure. F
ational
groups should onl y defi
ne political criteria that would
lead to interna
tional a cce pta nce and a major
rede velopme nt ef
for t a nd a llow the Af
gha ns themse
lves et the t me al solutions tha to work out politic
m.
Neverthel ess assi stance,
advice and m one
y ar e needed.
Intern ation
al en viron men t
Seve ral distinc t overt p
olicy interve
ntions ha ve ta
ken
place in Afgh anistan. Each has diffe
rent though related
goal s and leade
rshi p.
Operation Enduring Fre
edom, the first front in the
“glo bal war on terrori
sm”.
The implementation of the Bonn Agreement led by UNAMA
The International Security Assistance Force ISAF
The recovery, reconstruction and development effort,
initially led by UN, international financial institutions and donor agencies, now by the Afghanistan Development Forum and Consultative Groups, chaired by the Afghan government.
The US is in a unique position to provide leadership in any international effort directed towards Afghanistan.
CENTCOM currently has about 19,000 Coalition Forces in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
This total includes some 17,300 U.S. and about 1,700 Coalition personnel from seventeen nations. All are commanded by Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) which assures unity of effort with the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul and manages the military- to-military relationship with the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the NATO-ISAF. Combined Joint Task Force – 76 (CJTF- 76) is a division-level subordinate command with 14 separate task forces; including combat, support, medical, engineering and training units. Linked into CJTF-76 is a robust special operations capability.
In 2005 the Coalition will focus on six imperatives:
1. continued direct pressure against enemy sanctuary
through offensive operations
2. building competent, capable Afghan security forces
3. completing the DDR program
The implementation of the Bonn A
greement led by
UNAMA
The Int
ern ational Securi ty Assi
stanc e Fo rce IS
AF
The recover
y, r econstructi
on and development effort,
initiall y le d by UN, interna
tional f ina ncia
l institutions e Afgh now by th and donor agencies,
anistan
Development Forum and Consultative Groups,
chaired by the Afgh
an go vernment.
The US is in a unique p osition to provide leader
ship in
any interna
tional ef for t d ire cte d towar ds Afg
han istan.
CENTCOM currently h as about 19,000 Coalit ion F
orces
in Afghanistan as p art o
f Oper ation Enduring Fr
eedom.
This total includes some 17,300 U.S. and about 1,700 nteen nations. All are Coalition personnel from seve
commanded by Com bined For
ces Command –
Afgh anist an (C FC-A
) whi ch assures uni ty of e
ffo rt wi
th ry- milita es the nd manag Kabul a r in ssado the U.S. Amba
to-milita ry
rela tionship with the
Govern ments of
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbe
kistan, Tajikistan and the
NATO-ISA F. Combine d J
oint Ta sk Forc
e – 76 (C JT
F- 76) is a division-level subordinate command with 14
separate task forc es; including combat, support,
medical,
engin eering and tr aining units. Linked into CJ
TF-76 is a y. robust special operations capabilit
In 2005 th e Coalition will focus on six imperatives:
1.
continued direct pressu re a
gainst enem y s
anctu ary
through of fensive operati
ons
2.
build ing compet
ent, c apa ble Af ghan se curity
force s
comple 3.
ting the DD R prog ram
4. anchoring Afghan control of the countryside, instilling confidence in the Afghan Government and enabling reconstruction and good governance through PRTs
5. facilitating cooperation with neighboring friendly
states
6. increase Coalition coordination with the expanding
NATO presence
In 2005 the UK leads an accelerating international assistance effort for Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics program. The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) leads U.S. national efforts that partner with the UK-led program, and U.S. forces in Afghanistan are in strong support. To support INL’s assistance of Afghanistan’s counter narcotics fight U.S. established a Counter Narcotics Branch in their Tampa Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to better coordinate Department of Defense’s support for U.S. national efforts.
Training, equipping and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) remains the key component for military activities to stabilize Afghanistan. American field commanders report that ANA companies perform extremely well in combat against insurgents along the Afghanistan’s southern borders.
Reconstruction remains an important part of isolating the enemies and depriving them of their support base. PRTs number nineteen today, with fourteen directed by CFC-A and five under the authority of ISAF. CFC-A and ISAF
anchoring Af 4.
ghan co ntrol of the countryside,
instilling c onfide nce in the Afg
han Governme
nt and
enabling reconstruction and g
ood g overnanc e thro
ugh PRTs
5.
facilitating coop eration w
ith neighboring friendl
y
stat es
incre 6.
ase Coalition c
oordina tion with the e
xpa nding
NATO presenc e
In 2005 the UK lead
s an accele ratin g inter
national -narcotics ghanistan’s counter for Af assistance effort
program. The D epart ment of State’s B
ureau of
Inter nationa l Narcotic
s a nd L
aw Enf orc
eme nt (I NL
) d UK-le with the rtner rts that pa l effo s U.S. nationa lead
program, and U.S. forc es in Afgh
anistan are i n strong
support. To support IN L’s assistance of
Afgha
nistan’s a Counter t U.S. established figh counter narcotics
Narc otics Bra nch in the
ir Ta mpa J
oint Inter age ncy
Coordination Group (JIA CG) to better coordinate
Department of Defens e’s support for U.S.
national efforts.
Training, equippin g and
mentoring the A fgh
an National y component fo he ke ) remains t (ANA Army
r militar y
activitie s to stabilize
Afgha nista n. Ame rica
n f ield
commanders report that ANA companies
perform long nts a t against insurge comba well in ly eme extr
the
Afgh anistan’s southern borders.
Reconstruction remains an impor tant pa
rt o f isola ting th
e of their support base. PRTs hem enemies and depriving t
number nineteen today, with fourteen di
rect ed by C
FC -A
and five under the autho rit
y of ISA F. CF C-A an
d IS AF
plans to expand to another seven sites, producing a total of 26 PRTs by the end of 2007. ISAF will take over three Coalition PRTs in the west during 2005 and up to four more in the south by 2006.
Thanks to the US-led military intervention, a UN- mediated political process and a moderate level of international assistance an international respected and domestically legitimate government increasingly governs a conflict-prone, insecure, slightly less destitute country, still suffering from drought or floods and setting new records in drug trafficking and which is threatened by further conflict due to both domestic issues and regional tensions linked to the US’s Global War on Terror.
Security
Most Afghans say that the security has improved but they also cite it as their principal problem. They cite the general state of impunity exploited by commanders (warlords), not the Taliban or Al-Qaida, as the main source of insecurity and they see establishment of the rule of law and disarmament as the solution. Many militias have been disbanded but some claim that this has actually increased insecurity, especially in northern Afghanistan, as the former fighters still have their personal weapons and are not integrated and the new institutions are not yet effective.
The term “Security - threats” needs to be defined. For the state of Afghanistan it means foreign influence which enables the government to make its own decisions, the
plans to expand to anoth er se
ven sites, producing a total
of 26 PRTs b y the end of 2007. IS
AF
will take over three 2005 and up to four Ts in the west during Coalition PR more in the south by 200
6.
Thanks to the US-le
d milita ry inte
rve ntion, a UN-
media ted political
proce ss and a
modera te l eve l of
intern ationa l assista
nce an intern
ationa l respe
cte
d and gove gly government increasin egitimate domestically l
rns
a conflict-prone, insecur e, slig htly less destitute countr
y,
still suffering f rom dro ught o
r floods and setting
new
records in dru g t
raf ficki ng and whi ch i
s t hreat ened b
y gional domestic issues and re t due to both onflic r c the fur
tensions linked to the US’s Global War on Ter ror.
Secu rity
Most Afghans sa y that th
e security has improved but they
also c ite it a
s their prin cipa l proble
m. The y cite
the
gen eral state of impunit
y ex ploited by
comm anders
(warlords), not the Tali ban or Al-Qaida, as th
e main ent of t ishm abl ee est y s d the ty an nsecuri source of i
he
rule of la w and disa
rm am ent a s the solutio
n. Many
militias ha ve be en disba nde
d but some c laim tha t this ha
s hern ort in n ally , especi curity nse ased i ncre ly i actual
Afgha nista n, as the
for mer f igh ters still have
their
personal weapons and are not integr
ated and the new . ective t eff not ye institutions are
The term “Secu
rity - thr eat s” needs to be de
fined.
For the
state of Afg han istan it me ans f
ore ign in flue nce whic
h rnment to make its own decisions, the enables the gove
lack of ability to get grip over the country outside Kabul, the possibility that public opinion might change against the government if the promises are not fulfilled and the danger that Afghanistan turns into a Narcotic-state.
For the deployed forces, UNAMA and the international community it is the threat from hostile acts carried out by Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Al-Qaida and remnants of the Taliban. For the people of Afghanistan it’s the rape of woman and children, kidnapping, murder, illegal detention by corrupt police force, forced displacement and human trafficking.
Most Afghans as well as human rights organizations, define security as the security of ordinary Afghan civilians from attacks from any quarter. Afghans consistently identify commanders/warlords rather than Taliban or Al-Qaida as the main threat to their security.
No international organization has a mandate to protect Afghans from such insecurity. The partial exception is UNAMA, whose mandate is restricted to monitoring investigating human rights violations. Some Afghans in the main areas of CFC-A’s operation identify the Coalition as a security threat, which has led thousands of people to demonstrate against CFC-A and others to join the Anti- Government-Elements.
Government
The cabinet signals the predominance in the elite of English-speaking Pashtuns with strong ties to Washington and some have argued that it is a sign of the lack of ability to get g
rip over the country outside
Kabul,
the possibility that public opinion mig ht change against
the g ove rnme nt if the
promises a re not f ulf
illed
and the tate. otic-s Narc ns into a n tur anista fgh t A r tha dange
For the deplo yed
forces, UNAMA and the
international s car act rom hostile t f threa y it is the communit
rie d out b y
Hezb-e- Islami Gulbuddin, Al-Qai da and remnants of the
Taliban. For the peopl e of Af
gha nista n it’s the r
ape of
woman a nd childr
en, kidnapping
, murder , ille
gal acem ced displ ce, for lice for rrupt po y co ion b detent
ent
and human traffickin g.
Most Afghans as well as human rig hts organiza
tions,
define se curity
as the securit
y of ordin ary
Afgh an
civilia ns fro
m attac ks f rom any quarte
r.
Afgha
ns er tha rath ds rlor nders/wa omma y c ntif ntly ide consiste
n
Talib an or Al
-Qaida as t he m ain thr eat t o t hei r securi ty.
No intern ationa l organiza
tion has a mand ate to protect
Afgha ns f rom suc h insec
uri ty. The par
tial e xce
ption is stricted to monitoring UNAMA, whose mandate is re
investigatin g human ri ghts violations. Some Afghans in
the ma in are
as o f CF C-A’
s oper ation ide ntify
the thousands of reat, which has led y th Coalition as a securit
people to demonstrate a gainst CF C-A and
others to join
the Anti- Govern
ment-Ele ments.
Gove rnm ent
The c abin et sig nals the pr edomina
nce in the
elite of
English-spe aking Pashtuns with strong
ties to
Washing ton a nd some ha
ve a rgu ed tha t it is a sign of
the
reassertion of Pashtun domination under the sponsorship of the US with the support of Pakistan. The security apparatus has made the first steps away from factional control and towards professionalism based on legal authority, but the newly trained portions of the security forces are still pilot programs confronted with the power of militia groups or drug traffickers.
The trend of demobilization of militias and establishment of new security forces is positive though it is still too early to tell if these will be uniformly accepted across the country. A contrary trend is the formation of unofficial armed groups by drug traffickers and others.
President Karzai’s Transitional Authority of Afghanistan is unstable and weak, in spite of October 2004’s largely successful presidential elections. A lack of military power means the government lacks any authority beyond Kabul, while under funding and inability to enforce taxation collection further reduce the ability of the government to function. The re-emergence of warlords, some of whom were for varying periods supported by bribes and other inducements by US agencies following the invasion of the country in October 2001, has become a major factor in weakening the government. Local chieftains are independent rulers with almost complete loyalty from their tribes and/or clans. They accept the authority of central government only when accompanied by guarantees of non-interference in their regional affairs, including blatant illegality and by grants of money.
reassertion of Pashtun d omination under the spo
nsorship
of the US with the su pport of Pakistan. The
security from fa way ps a irst ste de the f as ma ratus h appa
ctiona l
control and towards p rofe
ssionalism ba sed o
n le gal
authority, but the n ewl
y trained po rtions of the
security d with the powe onfronte rams c still pilot prog are ces for
r
of militia groups or dru g traffick
ers.
The tr end of demobiliza
tion of militia
s and e stabl
ishment
of new secu rity
forces i s positive thoug h it is still too
ear ly to te ll if the
se will be unifor
mly acc epte d a cro ss the
country.
A contrary tren
d is the formation of unofficial affickers g tr oups by dru armed gr and others.
Preside nt Ka rza i’s Tra nsitiona
l Authorit y o f Afgha
nistan largely is unstable and weak, in spite of October 2004’s
succe ssful pr esid entia l ele
ctions. A la ck of
milita ry
power means the gov
ern ment lacks any
authority be
yond enf y to bilit and ina nding fu under Kabul, while
orc e
taxa tion colle
ction f urthe
r re duce th
e a bilit y of the
gove rnment to function. The re-emerg
ence of w arlords,
some of whom were for var yin g p eriods supported b
y ng owi oll encies f ag by US cements bribes and other indu
the invasion of the country
in O ctober 2001, has become
a ma jor f
actor in weakening
the gov ern ment.
L oca
l lmost complete rs with a ule pendent r ins are inde fta chie
loya lty f rom the ir tr
ibes a nd/or c
lans. Th ey ac
cept the
authori ty o f c ent ral g overnm ent only when acco
mpani
ed ion r reg hei n t ence i nterfer ees of non-i rant gua by
al
aff air s, inc luding blatant ille
galit y a nd b y gra nts of
money.
The fact that warlord militias are generally far superior in number, training and motivation to government forces means such violence often goes unchecked.
Security development
Addressing the continuing security shortfalls through:
Configuring PRTs into a more integrated nationwide
stabilization force including both local units and regional mobile units with a more robust mandate
The expansion of ISAF and the transition of CFC-A
to a stabilization rather than war-fighting mission
A potential unification of command should also be
considered.
Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups
A new type of peace-keeper
During the last three years Afghanistan became one test- case for a number of internationally developed concepts in the field of Peace-Keeping, State- or Nation-Building and Democratization. In fact in the field of Peace- Keeping, Afghanistan’s experience might be able to teach a valuable lesson to other missions. With the United Nations having only a “light footprint”, Peace- Keeping relies less on military than on political maneuvers.
The fa ct tha t war lord mil
itias a re gener all y fa r super
ior in
number, training and motivation to g
overnment forces
means such violence ofte n goes un
checked.
Secu rity d evel op men t
Addressing the continuing securit
y shortfalls thro ugh:
Config
urin g PRTs into a more integ
rat ed n
ationwide both local units luding ce inc tion for stabiliza
and
regi onal mobile units with a more robust mandat
e
The expansion of
ISA F and the tr
ansition of CFC-A ghting r-fi n wa r tha tion rathe biliza to a sta
mission
A potential unification of command should
also be
considered.
Disarmament of I
llegal Armed Groups
A new type of
peace-k eeper
During the l ast thre e ye ars Af ghani sta n becam e one t
est -
case for a number of internationally d eveloped c
oncepts Nation-B , State- or -Keeping in the field of Peace
uilding
and Democratiz ation. In
fact in the field of Peace
-
Keeping , A fgh anist an’s experi ence mig
ht be abl e t
o the ith ons. W her missi n to ot esso e l a valuabl teach
Unite d Nations havi
ng only a “lig ht foot print
”, P eace-
Keep ing r elie s less o
n milita ry tha
n on political
maneuvers.
In Afghanistan you find 19.000 troops of the Coalition Force without UN-mandate, 8.000 NATO troops and UNAMA with an unprecedented military component.
What you will not find is any kind of unity of command.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is the first Political Mission with a small military component. The Military Advisory Unit (MAU) of UNAMA consists of one General and 12 Lieutenant-Colonels at the level of Battalion Commanders of 12 different nations. In any of the present UN-Observer Missions this officers would be at least Chief Operational Officers.
As the “War on Terrorism” fought by US-led coalitions is most likely to continue UN will have to find a new role to fit in. UNAMA is often mentioned as a possible future role-model within the new environment of future Peace- Keeping.
Selection and training criteria for the new style of military assistance to missions long the line of UNAMA
The employment for officers on peacekeeping missions has changed significantly over the last few years which mean that a new style of officer is required. The current missions are departing from the traditional Peacekeeping Missions. UNAMA is the first Political Mission with a small military component
In Afghanistan you
find 19.000 troops of the C oalition
Forc e without UN-man
date, 8.000 NA TO troops and edented military compon UNAMA with an unprec ent.
What you will not find is an y kind o
f unit y of comm
and.
United Nations A
ssistance Mission in Afg hanist
an
(UNAMA) is th e first
Political Mission w
ith a sm all
milit ary c om pone nt.
The Milit
ary Advisor y Unit
(MAU) of UN AMA co
nsists of one G
en eral an
d 12 talion vel of Bat e le Lieutenant-Colonels at th
Comm and ers of 12 d
iff erent n ati ons. In any of
the
presen t UN-Ob
server Missi ons th is o ffi cers wou
ld b
e cers. ffi al O eration Op ief at least Ch
As the “ War on Terr
oris m” f ought b y US- led coa litions
is most like ly to c ontinue UN will have
to find a new r
ole to fit in. UNAMA is often mentioned as a possible future
role-m odel wi
thi n t he ne w environm
ent of fut ure
Peace-
Keeping .
Sel ection and train in g cri teria f
or th e new
style of he line missions long t to ance ary assist milit
of
UNAMA The empl oym ent for officers on peac
ekeeping m issi ons
has changed si gni
ficant ly over t he l ast few year
s which The curr red. r is requi office e of styl a new hat mean t
ent
missions are depa rtin g f rom the trad
itional Pe aceke epin g
Missions. UNAMA is the first Political Mission with a
small military component
The new style of officer must have the full range of officer qualities and skills because they are employed independently and an officer with significant weaknesses in any area cannot be employed in most of the positions.
In missions with more officers, one can “hide” the weaker ones but in this mission it is better to have no officer than one who does not fully meet the requirement.
The normal selection for Military Liaison Officers (MLO) and Military Advisers (MA) is based on officers with a sound general military background. This is still required but it is no longer sufficient because the officers are now working under very different conditions under the command of civilians, who in many cases, have not previous experience with the military and where they are required to operate independently and deal with a wide variety of situations and people. In addition to the traditional military skills, the new style of officer must be highly skilled in each of the following areas:
a) Initiative: The most important requirement for
MLOs/MAs is initiative because they will normally be employed individually under circumstances that are both unique and rapidly changing. The MLOs/MAs will have to be able to function effectively on their own with only basic strategic guidance;
b) Interpersonal Skills: The officers are required to
deal with a wide range of civilian and military personnel. This requires an understanding of the cultures, the ability to tolerate different opinions, the sensitivity to make accommodations and the ability to maintain the focus on the mission and build a network of contacts;
The new style of off
ice r must have the full r
ange of
officer qualities and skills because the y ar
e em ployed
independently and an off
icer with signif
ica nt w eakne
sses positions. yed in most of the mplo ea cannot be e in any ar
In m issi ons with
more offi cers, one can “hi
de” t he
weak er one s but in this mission it is be tter to
have
no et the requirement. y me who does not full officer than one
The nor mal se
lection for
Military L iai son Of
fic ers
(M LO ) a nd Military
Advise rs ( MA) is ba
sed on offi
cer s
with a sound general militar y ba
ckgr
ound. This is still ficient be ger suf required but it is no lon cause the
officers
are now working under
very diffe rent conditions under
the c omma nd of civilia
ns, who in ma ny
case s, h ave
not re they and whe military with the nce rie ious expe prev
ar e
required to ope rate inde
pendently and deal
with a wi de
variety of situations an d people. In
addition to the of office yle new st ry skills, the itional milita trad
r must be
highl y skilled in each o f the following
are as:
a) Initiat ive : The most important requirement
for will norm they cause tive be Os/MAs is initia ML
all y
be employe d individually under circumstanc
es that
are both unique and rapidly ch
angi ng.
The to function ble to be a Os/MAs will have ML
effectivel y on their ow n with only basic strat
egi c
gui dan ce;
Inter b)
per sonal Skills :
The office rs are requi
red t o
deal with a wid
e ra nge of civilia
n and military
personnel. This requires an understan ding
of the
cultur es, the ab ility to to lera
te diff ere
nt opinions, the mmodations a cco ke a y to ma sensitivit
nd the a bilit y to
mainta in the f
ocu s on the
mission a nd build a
network of contacts;
c) English: The working language for international missions is English and all MLOs/MAs must be fluent at both spoken and written English. All reports are required in English and even technically competent officers who are not fluent spend a disproportionate amount of time dealing with their reports and they still have problems with providing their higher headquarters with a clear picture of the situation. Therefor it is essential that all MLOs/MAs read, write and speak English fluently;
d) Analytical Ability: The MLOs/MAs will be required to review situations and provide a comprehensive analysis of complex situations. This is required for their personal survival, their assessment of the local situation, their prediction of the future and their recommendations on the best course of action;
e) Staff Work: The MLOs/MAs are required to report almost all of their information in writing and the reports/analysis are often distributed widely.
Therefor, it is essential that the officers are able to prepare coherent logical staff work to support their investigations and analysis; and
f) Character: All officers must have strong character because they are deployed independently under trying physical conditions, real danger and quite often in situations where they are subject to significant financial temptation from bribes or illegal opportunities.
As many of these characteristics cannot be developed during a short course the most effective way of staffing these positions is through a rigorous selection process by
c) English:
The wo rking la ngua
ge f or inter nat
iona l
missions is English a nd all M
LOs/MAs must
be glish. All rep fluent at both spoken and written En
orts
are requir ed in En
glish and ev en technic
all y
compet ent offi cers wh o are not fl
uent spen
d a with their disproportionate amount of time dealing
repor ts and the
y still ha ve pr
oblem s with providing
their high er he adquarters with a
clear pi
cture of the situation. Therefor it is essential that all M LOs/MAs
read, write and spe ak En
glish fluentl y;
d) Analytic
al Ability : The M LOs/MAs will be re
quir ed
to review situations an d provide a comp
rehensive tions. This is requir x situa omple f c lysis o ana
ed f or
thei r personal
survival , thei r assessment
of the local
situation, their prediction of the future and
their course of action; recommendations on the best
e) Staff Work :
The MLO s/MAs are required to re port
almost a ll of the
ir in for mation in wr iting and
the dely. often distributed wi re reports/analysis a
There for , it is esse
ntial that the offi
cers ar e a ble to
prepare coher ent log
ical staff work to support th
eir
investigations and an alys
is; and
Character: f) Al
l offi cers must have stron
g ch aract er
because the y are depl oye
d independent ly und
er try ing
phys ical conditions, real da
nger
and quite often in are subject hey ations where t situ
to si gni ficant
fina ncia l tempta
tion f rom br ibes or
illega l
opportunities.
As many of thes e characteristics ca
nnot be developed
during a short course th
e most effective way o
f staffing orous selection process b these positions is through a rig
y
officers who have been on deployments and are familiar with the requirements. The selection process must include interviews to assess the officers’ ability in English, their management styles, their cultural tolerance and their ability to deal with stress. Once selected the officers should go through a period of training focusing on the requirements for their specific mission:
Pre-deployment Training. Normal Pre-deployment
Training for their Military;
Mission Specific Training. Mission Specific Military
Training aimed at preparing them for this specific mission to include: historical development of the conflict, the major political and military groups, the specific threats to MLOs/MAs, climate, mine awareness and any additional issues required for the specific mission;
Cultural Training. Specific Cultural Training on the
culture and history of the country. The training should focus on the information required to interact appropriately both professionally and socially with the local population of all ages and classes;
Language Training. Officers deployed independently
should go through Language Familiarization Training to allow them to conduct the minimal social amenities in the local language to open doors. There is no requirement for them to be fluent in the local language although this would be a benefit;
Medical Training. Because they are employed
independently, often in areas of significant risk, something along the lines of Combat First Aid/Combat Life Savers Course would be extremely offi
cer s who ha ve b
een on de ploym
ents a nd ar
e fa miliar
with the r equir em ents. Th e selection proce
ss must
include interv
iews to a ssess the
offi cer s’ a bilit
y in rance l tole cultura eir s, th ment style ir manage English, the
and the ir a
bilit y to dea l with str
ess. Onc e se
lect ed the
officers should go throu gh a
period of training f
ocusing on: c missi r specifi s for thei rement on the requi
Pre-deployment Tr
aining.
Normal Pre -deplo yment
Training fo r the ir Milita
ry; ning. Mission Spe Trai fic Mission Speci
cif ic Milita ry
Traini ng ai med at prepari
ng t hem for thi
s speci fic
mission to include: historical dev elopment of
the roups, y g conflict, the major political and militar the
speci fic threat
s to M LOs/MAs, clima
te, mine
awareness and any
additi onal i ssues require
d for
the on; c missi specifi
Cultural Tr
aining . Spe cif ic Cultur al Tr
ainin g on the
culture and history o f the country. The train
ing
should focus on the information required to int
eract ally y and soci essionall appropriately both prof
with
the local population of all ages and class es;
Lan gua ge Training. O
fficers d eplo
yed independen
tly ation Training amiliariz uage F ang h L should go throug
to allow them to conduct the minimal social
am enitie s in the local
lan guage to open
doors.
Ther
e is no requirement for them to be fluent in the local
lang uag e a lthough this would be
a be nefit;
Medical
Traini ng. B ecause the
y are empl
oye d
independently, often in ar
eas o f si gnificant
risk, Combat e lines of g th alon something
Fir st
Aid/Combat L ife Save rs Course would be ex
trem ely
beneficial (some nations already provide this but it should be a pre-requisite); and
Mission Indoctrination. In spite of all of the national
pre-deployment training there must be a general Mission Briefing for all personnel arriving on the mission. The briefing for UNMOs should come from someone with military background and extensive experience in the theatre.
Based on my experience on this mission, I am firmly convinced that we need to adjust our selection criteria for MLOs/MAs and that quality is more important than quantity. One officer who does not meet the standard will not be productive and can create both administrative and operational problems that will take a great deal of effort to resolve.
beneficial (some n ations al
read y provide this but it
should be a pre-requisite)
; and
Mission Indo
ctrination. In sp ite of all of the national
pre-deployment trainin g
there m ust
be a general
Mission Briefin g fo r all personnel a
rriving on
the come from for UNMOs should mission. The briefing
someone with military back ground
and ex tensive
experi ence in t
he t hea tre.
Based on my
experienc e on this mission,
I am firmly
convinced that we ne ed to adjust our selection c
riteria fo
r tant than e impor y is mor ualit t q Os/MAs and tha ML
quantity. One officer wh
o does not meet the standard will
not be productive and c an cre ate both administrat
ive and of e t deal rea a g s that will take oblem tional pr opera
ffo rt
to resolve .
