Intro
Picot, A., H. Dietl, E. Franck, 2002, “Organisation—Eine ökonomische Perspektive,”
Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, Stuttgart
Hart, O., 1989, “An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm", Columbia Law Review, Vol. 89, 1757-1774
THEMA 2: Decision Making in Firms (NK; June 11, 8:00AM) Helena Herrmann
Lisa Marie Schwarzenthal Justus Hans Winkelmann Sonja Yahiaoui
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole, 1997, “Formal & Real Authority,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 105, No. 1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 1-29
Friebel, G. and S. Guriev, 2005, “Earnings Manipulation And Incentives in Firms”, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Stein, J., 1997, “Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 1, March 1997, pp. 111-133 Scharfstein, D. and J. Stein, 2000, „Herd Behavior & Investment,“ American Economic Review, Vol. 80, pp. 465-479
THEMA 3: Incentives & Knowledge Hierarchies Within Firms (AW; June 18, 8:20AM) Nurcan Gürses
Philipp Jaschke Fabian Tessendorf
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, K.J. Murphy, 2002, “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm,” QJE, Vol. 117, pp. 39-84
Garicano, L., 2000, “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,”
Journal of Political Economy., Vol. 108(5), pp. 874-904
Levin, J., 2003, “Relational Incentive Contracts,” American Economic Review, Vol.
93, pp. 835-857
THEMA 4: Measuring an Agent’s Performance (NK; June 25, 8:20AM)
Marc-Steffen Mayer Lars Schröter
Sebastian Markus Wachter
Baker, G., R. Gibbons, K.J. Murphy, 1994, "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109 (4), pp.
1125-56
Prendergast, C. and R.H. Topel, 1996, “Favoritism in Organizations,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, No. 5 (Oct 1996), pp. 958-978
Lazear, E. and S. Rosen, 1981, “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,” Journal of Political Economy 89 (5), pp. 841-64
THEMA 5: Incomplete Contracts (AW; July 9; 8:20AM) Mehmet Zafer Haligür
Adrian Haubrich Janina Ott
Grossman, S. and O. Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Aug., 1986), pp. 691-719
Hart, O. and J. Moore, “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,” Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Jul., 1988), pp. 755-785
Nöldeke, G. and K.M. Schmidt, “Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem,” The RAND Journal of Economics 26 (1995), pp. 163-179
