Global Climate Change The International Response

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Research Professorship Environmental Policy Prof. Udo E. Simonis

FS I! 97-401

Global Climate Change

The International Response

by

Richard E. Benedick*

*Former Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and chief U.S. negotiator of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; currently Visiting Fellow at the WZB.

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) Science Center Berlin

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This WZB-paper is also being used by the German Foundation for International Development (Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwick

lung - DSE) in its Diplomatie Training Program for young diplomats from developing countries, as background for a climate protocol negotiation game led by Dr. Benedick in his seminar on environmental diplomacy.

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I Introduction: The Gathering Storm

As recently as the mid-1980s, concern over greenhouse warming was mainly confined to limited parts of the scientific community. An international conference in 1985 in Villach, Austria, convened by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) attracted broader political attention when it concluded that:

„Many important economic and social decisions are being made today on long-term projects ... based on the assumption that past climatic data ...

are a reliable guide to the future. This is no longer a good assumption since the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are expected to cause a significant warming of the global climate in the next century."

The general public was becoming increasingly sensitized to global climate issues by the confirmation in 1988 that the Antarctic "ozone hole"

was caused by manmade chemicals, and by concern over acid rain and forest destruction (Waldsterben) in Europe. Extreme storms and weather conditions in Europe, record-breaking drought and heat in North America, and weather anomalies elsewhere in the world drew public attention to the issue. Scientific theories and debates moved beyond technical journals to become relatively frequent features in press and television, and climate became a cover-story for mass media magazines.

Serious political interest focussed on global warming at the 1988 Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security, a conference co-sponsored by WMO, UNEP, and the Canadian Government. This conference called, inter alia, for negotiation of a global convention to protect the atmosphere, along with specific targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving efficiency in use of energy. Several other important international conferences on the subject followed, and climate change and ozone layer protection were also elevated to priority treatment at the annual "Economic Summit" meetings of the leaders of the seven major industrial nations.

A significant landmark in this process was the creation by WMO and UNEP in 1988 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

This exercise was designed to assess the science and formulate realistic response strategies for managing climate change.

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Prior to this time, and dating back to the 1985 Villach meeting, international scientific statements on climate change had been undertaken primarily by a small panel of eminent but largely self-selected scientists under the aegis of WMO, UNEP, and ICSU. In I987, the author had suggested and promoted the expansion of this group into a larger entity under the auspices of governments. Interestingly, this initiative was opposed by some environmenfai organizations who feared that governments would thereby co-opt the scientific process and distort the findings for political reasons. Supporters of change argued, however, that expansion of the informal advisory group to an official intergovernmental panel would improve the credibility and influence of its findings - and that, moreover, scientists would not permit themselves to be influenced by transitory political or commercial considerations of their governments.

As it turned out, these arguments prevailed, the IPCC was created, and governments could not prevent the scientists from pursuing their independent, and occasionally politically uncomfortable, conclusions.

Drawing on the experience of the ozone negotiations, it became a continuing process of roundtables and workshops involving hundreds of scientists and researchers from many nations, organizations, and industries in a productive, informs! mode of fact-finding, analysis and debate.

In November 1990, the IPCC presented its first comprehensive findings to WMO’s Second World Climate Conference in Geneva.

Representatives of 137 nations, many at ministerial level, issued a strong and detailed declaration on the need for cooperative action by governments to meet the threat of gioba! warming "... without further delay based on the best available knowledge."

Following this, the United Nations General Assembly in December 1990 established the "Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change", aiming at an international treaty to be signed at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development - the "Earth Summit" - in Rio de Janeiro.

Five negotiating sessions were scheduled over the ensuing months, a fast timetable by any standard of diplomacy, especially considering the complexity of the issues. These were big negotiations, involving an average of 120 national delegations (approximately 90 from developing

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countries), plus numerous UN programs and agencies and over 40 environmental, industry, and other citizens' groups.

H Climate Science: Models of Uncertainty

As the state of the science had a profound outcome on the shape of the eventual convention, it would be useful to summarize briefly the existing scientific consensus as well as the unknowns.

Based primarily on complex but imperfect computer models of the Earth system, the generally accepted consensus is that an unprecedented planetary warming lies ahead due to increasing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) derived from human activities. These gases, primarily carbon dioxide originating from fossil fuel combustion and forest destruction, but also including methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), nitrous oxide, and others, have the capability of trapping part of the sun's radiative energy and thereby warming the Earth's atmosphere and surface. Measurements of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases show a pronounced increase since the Industrial Revolution, with a particular acceleration in the past 40 years correlating with the post-war industrial boom and the population explosion in developing countries.

The second IPCG comprehensive report, involving over 2,500 contributors, was completed in 1995 and published in 1996. The scientific community now believes that global warming in the range of 1.0 to 3.5 degrees Celsius over the next century is likely in the absence of major policy changes, with a "best estimate" of about 2 degrees Celsius. This could among other things result in a rise in sea levels of 0.15 - 0.95 meter ('“best estimate" 0.50 meter), in significant modification of weather patterns across the planet, and in potentially disruptive impacts on other parts of the environment. However, the timing and magnitude of these changes still remain uncertain, and the critical question of how global warming will affect particular regions is at present not yet answerable, although a number of analytical projects are under way (among others at the Potsdam Institute of Climate Impact Research, PIK).

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Because of the pervasive influence of dim ate on all aspects of life, major changes in climate could have profound consequences. Coming at a time when human society is already struggling with the consequences of poverty, rapid population growth, and wasteful consumption of energy and natural resources, climate change could not only further damage the environment but also imperii economic and social progress worldwide.

Among the postulated consequences of global warming are changes in rainfall patterns, which could affect crop yields, soil erosion, desertification, pressures on marginal agricultural land, and fresh water supply and hydropower. Sea level rise could threaten small island countries in the Pacific and Caribbean as weli as low-lying river deltas, such as in Bangladesh and Egypt. In addition, fisheries and coastal ecosystems could be disrupted. Biologists point to the dangers of massive extinction of plant and animal species that are unable to adapt fast enough or migrate from changing natural habitats.

These effects could be exacerbated by a possible increase of extreme weather events such as storms, floods, and droughts. Human health could be directly affected by increased heat stress, the advance of disease-bearing pests, and aggravated problems of food availability and water supply. Some analysts (e.g., Norman Myers) note the possibility of large-scale migrations of "environmental refugees," exacerbated by population pressures and potential economic and political instability resulting from climate change.

White these and other impacts are plausible and enjoy a considerable degree of scientific credibility, they remain essentially unproven possibilities. There is also not yet an unequivocal detection of an enhanced greenhouse effect, although evidence of a slight global temperature rise over the past century and a small increase in sea levels is consistent with the global warming hypothesis. Significantly, however, the 1995 IPCC report pointed for the first tim e to a “discernible human influence on global climate.“

Fundamental questions remain unresolved: the role of oceans and clouds as possible offsets or augmenters of the greenhouse effect; the capacity of forests to absorb carbon dioxide; the chemical interactions of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; the amount of methane being released from such widely varied sources as livestock, rice paddies,

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termites, natural gas leaks, landfills, and, possibly, from warming Arctic tundra; and what if anything serious is happening to glaciers and polar ice sheets. Scientists are unanimous on the need for better and more detailed models, and for more comprehensive monitoring of such key parameters as emissions, concentrations, temperature and rainfall trends, and sea level.

To these scientific questions must be added important economic ones: the costs of various alternative policies for reducing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions; the costs of adaptation to different levels of climate changes and impacts; the varying economic burdens on different countries, North and South.

911 Differing National Interests

Against this background, what could be expected from the UN General Assembly's mandate for an internationally agreed Climate Convention?

What measures could be undertaken by the international community of nations to respond to the potential dangers of global warming?

Greenhouse gas emissions are inextricably linked with energy, agricultural, and industrial policies, and with forests, oceans, and biological diversify. Because of the many interconnected aspects of the problem, there are no quick and easy solutions: it is necessary to take actions on different fronts.

It appears essential for modern industrialized societies to reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, which account for more than half of the greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. This involves, in the first instance, measures to conserve the use of energy and improve energy efficiency: changes in the transportation sector, more efficient manufacturing processes, improved construction techniques, low-energy Sighting. As coal produces the most carbon dioxide per unit of energy produced, followed by oil and then natural gas, fuel switching - especially to natural gas - offers opportunities to reduce total emissions. Such renewable energy sources as solar energy, wind power, and geothermal energy must be more aggressively developed and promoted.

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The destruction of forests not only releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere but also diminishes an important sink for absorbing carbon dioxide from other sources. Therefore, programs to reduce deforestation and encourage sustainable forest management, improved agricultural practices, and afforestation are crucial. Because most forest destruction is related to the needs of populations in the poorer countries, solutions to this aspect of the climate problem are intimately connected to measures attacking poverty.

Some of the needed policies appear relatively straightforward, but others will involve substantial changes in the way people live, work, and consume. The need to stimulate research and development of new technologies in the sectors of energy, industry, and agriculture is critical.

The implications of continued rapid population growth in the South also cannot be ignored.

Apart from the mitigation strategies just described, the international community must also cooperate in measures to adapt to some degree of climate change. Such policies would include, among others, contingency plans for dealing with climate-related emergencies, schemes for protection of coastal areas, and development of agricultural practices and crops better able to resist drought and disease.

W idely varying national situations and interests needed to be reconciled in the Climate Convention and in any future international measures to control greenhouse gases, in many respects the negotiators are in uncharted waters. Even though the threats are global and require an unprecedented degree of international cooperation and harmonization, nation-states remain, not unnaturally, preoccupied with traditional attributes of sovereignty - and of accountability to their own public opinion and electorates.

It is clear that regions and nations will differ considerably in their vulnerability to climate change and in their ability to adapt. Prospects are generally less favorable in already ecologically fragile areas, primarily in the poorer parts of the world: arid areas of Africa, parts of South America and Southeast Asia, tow-lying island states.

The industrialized North, including the new "economies in transition"

of Eastern Europe and the former USSR, are the major emitters of greenhouse gases, past and present - particularly carbon dioxide from

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fossil fuels. The wealthier among them now accept a responsibility to undertake stronger abatement measures than the rest of the world. But there are also differences between them in their industrial structure that can influence their position on specific proposals. For example, Australia, the United States, and Eastern Europe/former USSR are heavily dependent on coal; for Norway, Australia, and other countries, fossil fuels constitute a significant share of their export earnings.

Among the developing countries, those that are particularly vulnerable, such as the small island states and arid African countries, join some European nations in advocating strong mitigation measures. At the other extreme are the OPEC oil exporters, led by Saudi Arabia, who see their national patrimony threatened if a climate treaty imposes serious limits on fossil fuels. China, with 1.2 billion people demanding economic growth, sits upon roughly a third of the world’s coal reserves, and is reluctant to forego this energy source in the absence of economical options. Other newly industrializing nations of the South, such as India, Brazil, and Mexico, share similar perspectives on energy. Countries with large forests, including Brazil, Indonesia, Zaire, and Malaysia, are wary of the North trying to impose restrictions on how they can use their own national resources.

IV The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)

The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which was signed in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), has since been ratified by over 150 nations.

Because of the FCCC's global scope and its cross-cutting implications for virtually every sector of the economy and society, the effective implementation of this complex and controversial international treaty is viewed by many observers as a test of the international community's ability to achieve sustainable development.

Some environmental organizations and journalists were disappointed that the FCCC did not legislate stringent international regulations on GHGs comparable to what the Montreal Protocol did for ozone-depleting substances. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, the FCCC is

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a much stronger accord than its actual analogue framework convention:

the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Vienna Convention was basically limited to an agreement for international cooperation in scientific research, monitoring, and exchange of data on the ozone layer, it did not even mention CFCs as possible destroyers of the ozone layer. The Vienna Convention was originally signed by only 20 nations and attracted little attention at the time; only three nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), all from industry, attended the final negotiation. The main significance of the Vienna accord was that it set the stage for the historic 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which did institute strong international commitments to control CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances.

In contrast to the Vienna Convention, the FCCC was accompanied by significant media attention and by the participation of scores of environmental, industry and other NGOs, and it was signed by 154 nations in Rio. It is true that the FCCC’s language is sometimes couched in creative ambiguity. It can be said that this was primarily for purposes of diplomatic face-saving for the United States, which alone among the industrialized nations had held out for a weaker treaty. But in the end the US did cave in, and there is no doubt that the Convention embodies real commitments to policies and programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions -- with specific mention of carbon dioxide. Certainly the powerful US coal and oil interests and anti-environmental ideologues, who had opposed the convention every step of the way, clearly understood what had happened and were furious with the Bush Administration for its last-minute concessions.

A number of factors make the FCCC a strong framework convention.

The “precautionary principle“ is prominently stressed as a guiding principle of the treaty: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such [precautionary] measures ..." (Article 3.3). The FCCC also has a very strong “ultimate objective:“ namely, “the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system“ (Article 2).

The industrialized country (Annex I Parties) commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions are quite convoluted in language, reflecting the hard negotiations on these points. Nevertheless, they are definitely

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required to "adopt national policies and ... corresponding measures" that will "aim" at returning anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other GHGs not already controlled by the Montreal Protocol (mainly CFOs) to 1990 levels by the year 2000 (Article 4.2(a) and (b)). W hile the sensitive words "target" and "timetable," anathema to the United States at that time, were avoided, the effect is the same. By way of reinforcement, the FCCC provides for rigorous and detailed reporting requirements on these national measures and their results (Article 12) and, perhaps most significantly, for periodic reviews of the "adequacy" of these commitments

"in the light of the best available scientific information" (Article 4.2(d)).

Taken together with additional articles dealing with financial assistance and technology transfer to developing countries, research, education and public awareness, and a machinery for amendment, it can be seen that the FCCC was, like the Montreal Protocol, conceived as a long-term and dynamic process. And, again like the Montreal Protocol, it can be expected that the commitments to mitigate and adapt to climate change may be steadily strengthened based on the evolving science and the periodic reassessments of economic and technology factors.

V The Convention After Rio

After a shaky start, this expectation received at least some encourage

ment as a result of the first Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention, held in Berlin in March-April 1995. There was general consensus among the parties to the Convention that, in light of the best available scientific, technical, and economic information, the Article 4 commitments were inadequate because they will not achieve sufficient progress toward the FCCC’s ultimate objective. Clearly, the existing commitments, merely to stabilize and not reduce emissions, will not lead to stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at any level, much less at a level which is not "dangerous". Indeed, the IPCC estimated that stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at even twice pre-industrial levels would eventually require a reduction of global emissions to half of current levels.They also do not address any targets or measures after the year 2000. Moreover they apply only to A nnex I Parties - thereby not taking into account the developing countries that represent

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the vast majority of the Earth's growing population and that are seeking to achieve rapid economic growth, with all that implies for energy use, forest destruction, and GHG emissions.

Despite this, however, governments could not agree in Berlin to undertake immediate stronger actions to mitigate climate change. Since the signing of the FCCC in 1992, governments had learned that limiting carbon dioxide emissions was a more complicated and difficult process than many had expected. It is even doubtful whether some important industrialized nations will be able to meet the article 4.2 "asm" of returning to their 1990 emission levels by the end of the decade, despite earnest efforts.

The main reason for this situation is not a lack of technical means to limit carbon dioxide emissions, nor even the need to assume unacceptable costs at this stage. Rather, it is based upon political difficulties. The judgem ent that stronger measures are needed now to address the potential threats o f future dim ate change is simply not shared by most politicians, by industry, or by the public at large. Despite concerted efforts at public education, the climate change issue is not a currently high priority either in most industrialized or in most developing countries, and this condition is not likely to change in the near future absent some dramatic climatic event or catastrophe.

Underlying the implicit relatively low risk evaluation concerning climate change is a complex of uncertainties and concerns. On the scientific side, most of the public, and most political and economic leaders, appear to accept the greenhouse warming theory. However, the long-term and gradual nature of any climate changes is a deterrent to high-priority treatment of the issue. There is still imprecision and controversy in scientists' predictions of possible future adverse consequences of climate change, notably regarding the severity, timing, and regional and local impacts. Some regions, e.g. Siberia, could conceivably benefit in the medium term from a warming trend.

Moreover, it is not yet sufficiently known what level of atmospheric GHG concentrations would represent "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system," i.e., how much further concentrations could rise consistent with the Convention's article 2

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"ultimate objective." Such lacunae serve to diminish the perceived urgency for short-term preventive measures.

Political opposition to mitigation actions is heavily influenced by economic considerations. There is uncertainty about the economic costs of limiting GHG emissions at different levels, in terms of possible effects on international competitiveness, negative implications for economic growth and employment, and impacts on particular industrial sectors and regions. Concerns about energy security and the availability of domestic fossil-fuel energy sources can also be an important factor. And then there are analytical gaps and uncertainties about the effects on emissions of any given policy measure or instrument, e.g., what level of carbon or energy tax will produce what level of carbon dioxide emissions?

Another limiting factor to stronger international action on climate change is a growing awareness of the differences among nations in their ability to undertake and implement commitments. These differences raise equity issues commonly referred to in terms of "burden sharing" (applying to industrialized countries) and "differentiated responsibilities" or

"differentiation" (applying to developing nations). Such factors include:

stage of development, economic structure, intensity of energy use (especially fossil fuels), domestic availability of fossil fuel and alternative energy sources, political, legal and institutional structure, geography, and

"starting point" in terms of already achieved levels of energy efficiency and conservation. All of these factors make international comparisons and allocation of responsibilities extremely complex and serve as a deterrent to meaningful negotiations.

Midway through the Berlin Conference, a large and broad group of developing countries developed and submitted a negotiating text for the OOP's required decision on the adequacy of commitments under the Convention, as well as proposals related to a Protocol and decisions on follow-up. Up until this point, the negotiations on this most critical issue before the conference had been completely stalemated. Industrialized countries were divided on the need and feasibility of strengthened future commitments by them to further limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Oil producing and exporting countries opposed future action by the COP. Many other developing countries mistrusted new commitments from industrialized nations, with some fearing that stronger measures

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undertaken by the North could represent leverage to make future demands on the South to curb its own use of fossil energy.

The "Green Paper", as it was promptly named, was an unusual document in many respects. It did not represent a Group of 77 (developing country) consensus, as countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Venezuela, and Iran pointedly did not join in co-sponsoring it.

Other influential nations, notably India and China, which had heretofore avoided the debate on strengthened commitments under the FCCC, now stepped forward, supported strongly by many African countries fearing that the consequences of climate change would lead to even greater impoverishment for populations already living at the margin.

Perhaps most interestingly, the draft itself was based on a protocol proposal tabled six months earlier by some of the smallest nations in the world, providing unequivocally for sizeable reductions of carbon dioxide by the industrialized countries within a fixed timetable. A bloc of approximately 40 countries calling themselves the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) had been formed only four years ago during the early phases of the FCCC negotiations. Small island nations, especially in the South Pacific and the Caribbean, were apprehensive that projected sea- level rise occasioned by climate change could imperil their very existence.

Yet another extraordinary aspect of the Green Paper was the strong intellectual input and later, during the arduous negotiations at the COP, political muscle, that was provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from both South and North.

Ironically, the course of the Conference of Parties, and the future direction of the Climate Convention Itself, was being dramatically influenced by NGOs and by some of the least powerful countries in the United Nations. Following hours of infernal negotiations, the OECD countries were compelled to respond to the Green Paper with suggestions of their own, and intensive North-South negotiations began -- negotiations that did not reach a result until 6 a.m. on April 7, the final day of the COP, when assembled ministers had to make a decision or admit failure.

Against this background, the governments at the first Conference of Parties established, through the "Berlin Mandate," a process and timetable for agreeing on further actions to mitigate climate change

"through the adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument" by 1997.

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The Berlin Mandate launched a process wherein Annex I Parties will

"elaborate policies and measures," and "set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020," for their anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. The process will be conducted by an open-ended ad hoc group of parties, aiming to completing their work "as early as possible in 1997, with a view to adopting the results at the third session of the Conference of the Parties" later in 1997.

Following the Berlin conference, several inconclusive months of further negotiations were marked chiefly by obstructing tactics on the part of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other OPEC states, and by indecisiveness on the part of a number of industrialized nations, notably Australia, Russia, and the United States. Events took a surprising turn, however, at the Second Conference of the Parties, held in Geneva in July 1996. In an unexpected policy reversal, the United States delegate announced his country's support for a legally binding agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The US, however, still remained vague on the magnitude of reductions, and placed great emphasis on devising a system of internationally tradable emission permits, which many observers feared would prove too complicated to be workable.

During the closing plenary of COP-2, a "Ministerial Declaration" was adopted that called for rapid completion of negotiations for legally binding and significant reductions in GHG emissions. However, 16 delegations, including Australia, New Zealand, and most of the oil producing states, objected to the declaration.

VI Options for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Broadly speaking, the underlying analysis of approaches to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions, and the negotiations themselves, have focused on two major archetypes of commitments: (1) Targets and

Timetables (TTs), and (2) Policy Measures (PMs).

The industrialized country commitments currently embodied in article 4.2 of the FCCC fall into the category of a somewhat "soft" variant of Targets and Timetables - soft in the sense that they are expressed in

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terms of an "aim". However, as they are also linked to a specific reporting and assessment regime (article 4.2 (b) and (d)), these commitments are more than rhetorical. Under the FCCC, progress made by any Party toward achievement of its commitments will be transparent and under regular international scrutiny, comparison, and evaluation. Possibilities for moral suasion and potential political embarrassment under such a regime should not be underestimated as incentives for governments to act in good faith.

Prime advantages of TTs are:

• they allow flexibility for governments to choose their own preferred mix of policies and measures to archieve the targets;

• they provide a clear definition for controlling the total level of green

house gas emissions.

TTs also have some disadvantages:

• the difficulty of projecting the result of specific measures in terms of specific targeted emission levels;

• the question of burden-sharing, since the differences among countries, including different economic structures and "starting points", mean that a given TT may be much easier for some Parties to achieve than for others;

• the resulting political complexities in negotiating an equitable and meaningful target that avoids the lowest-common-denominator effect.

TTs could also be expressed in terms of upper limits or boundaries, which might moderate some of the disadvantages noted above.

The second prospective category of commitments, Policy Measures (PMs), covers a broad range of possible economic, administrative, and sectoral policies, instruments, and standards, including:

® carbon and energy taxes,

• joint implementation, whereby one country can obtain credit by investing in emissions reductions or enhancement of sinks (e.g., afforestation) in another country,

• tradeable emission permits,

• investment incentives and measures to expand markets for new and renewable energy sources,

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• integrated resource planning,

• least-cost planning, infrastructual and spatial planning,

• subsidies for research and development of energy-saving technologies,

• GHG emission standards for particular sectors or processes,

• energy efficiency standards,

® global product standards (e.g., for automobiles),

• other sectoral strategies directed at energy, industry, transport, forests, agriculture, land use, waste management, etc.

PMs have some advantages compared to TTs :

• they can address the issue of differential competitiveness effects;

• they can be more easily extended to developing countries;

• they can be designed to serve multiple environmental or development objectives, and thereby attract greater political support.

On the other hand, PMs also have disadvantages:

• they may not assure control over global emissions, because of the difficulty of predicting the effect of a given measure on GHG emissions;

• they are technically difficult to negotiate and to harmonize internationally.

A variant of the PM approach is the concept of a "menu" of policy measures and instruments, from which Parties could choose according to their national conditions. W hile this would solve some of the disadvantages of PMs, it might weaken the commitment to such an extent as to be a minimalist approach. Nations would have total flexibility and international harmonization might become irrelevant under this concept (although the menu could be so designed to require that individual PM options be harmonized). But Parties wouid be tempted to choose PMs they would have done anyway and there could be minimal incremental contributions to climate change mitigation. In other words, the menu concept may be too loose to achieve meaningful results in terms of emission reductions, unless it were in some way associated with a target or goal. On the other hand, a pure TT approach implicitly gives Parties total freedom to make up their own menu of measures, as tong as the emission limitation goal is met.

The target and timetable approach was followed by the Montreal Protocol. Admittedly the number of producers of ozone-depleting

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substances was much smaller than the number of emitters of greenhouse gases. However, CFCs alone were used in over 3,500 industrial applications and consumer products. For many uses of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances, it was originally believed that substitutes would be technically impossible or economically unfeasible. Nevertheless, concerted cooperative efforts between industry, governments, and international and nongovernmental organizations succeeded in making the Montreal Protocol an amazing and unexpected success story.

VII North-South Tensions

The Berlin Conference of Parties revealed both the extent of interdependence between industrialized and developing countries and the degree of mistrust and misunderstanding that characterizes their respective approaches to the climate change issue.

The industrialized countries acknowledge that because the North accounts for the lion's share of anthropogenic atmospheric GHG concentrations as well as current emissions, and because of its wealth and technological capability, it has the primary responsibility for taking actions to reduce GHG emissions and to mitigate climate change. Despite this acknowledgement, however, as noted above, the commitments they have undertaken in the FCCC, the measures they have actually implemented, and the results likely to be achieved under current policies, are not impressive. Many Northern countries also resist calls from the South to provide "new and additional" and "non-conditional" financial assistance to aid them in addressing the threat of climate change. Aid malaise among public and parliaments in the North, stemming from an unwholesome record of corruption, undemocratic governance, and excessive armaments expenditures in the South, makes the provision of essentially blank checks for future environmental assistance an unlikely prospect. The North is also reluctant to commit to transfer of technology on non-commercial terms, which could contravene the intellectual property rights of companies investing in costly research and development and thereby discourage the needed innovation. In this connection, the Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund represents a pioneering effort to assist developing countries in meeting environmental treaty objectives, in

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this case the elimination of ozone-depleting substances (cf. »c . Biermann, 1996). However, the amounts involved for climate change would be much greater.

Spokesmen for developing countries have expressed concerns that, based on actual performance by industrialized countries under the Convention, the North appears to wish to preserve its (unsustainable) production and consumption patterns while shifting responsibilities to the South that can adversely affect their primary priorities of economic development and poverty elimination. There is also fear that the North will use global environmental considerations, such as climate change, as an excuse for imposing "green conditionality" on financial assistance and for restricting market access Scepticism about joint implementation proposals from the North is based on concerns that they will merely enable industrialized countries to meet global emission targets while avoiding potentially painful domestic measures, while transferring outmoded technologies to the South. (Some developing countries even oppose strengthened commitments by industrialized countries on the grounds that such measures would make it more difficult for the South to continue to resist actions to curb the rapid rise of their own GHG emissions.)

In actuality, industrialized and developing countries are inextricably bound together under the threat of climate change. The North needs the cooperation of the South: if developing countries continue to follow the historical energy, industrial, and agricultural policies of the North in order to achieve the legitimate economic aspirations of their rapidly growing populations, ail climate mitigation efforts of the North risk being swamped in the not-too-distant future. On the other hand, the South needs to take the climate change issue seriously because their populations are most vulnerable to many of the possible consequences of climate change, notably changes in rainfall patterns, severe tropica! storms, and rising sea levels.

Ironically, the reluctance and/or inability of the North to improve its performance in mitigation policies has the effect of reinforcing concerns of the South and thereby inhibiting the willingness of developing countries to consider commitments that might curb their currently untrammelled use of fossil fuels -- even if such measures might improve their economic well

being and efficiency in the longer term. Conversely, the defensive and

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mistrustful attitudes of many developing countries -- especially the most industrialized among them -underm ines political will in the North to undertake stronger actions unilaterally. There is obviously an urgent need for both sides to squarely address the issue of regaining mutual trust and a sense of shared stewardship in the face of the threat of climate change.

The economies in transition in Central and Eastern Europe present a special case. Through their current priority efforts to restructure their economies, they will, as a side-effect, in most cases easily reach the existing FCCC emission goal for A n n ex I Parties. They will require modem technologies, however, to attain further improvements as their economies begin to expand. They worry about future competitiveness and welcome joint implementation as an aid to restructuring their industrial sector.

VIII The Post-2000 Phase

The following short list of key factors, which is not comprehensive, may be relevant for the development of strengthened commitments by Parties to the FCCC in the period subsequent to the year 2000 target date currently incorporated in the Convention. These criteria for future commitments are in some ways idealistic as they may never be fully satisfied, but their consideration - and possible further elaboration - may be an important part of the process as Parties to the Convention and other groups focus on the next steps forward.

1. Achievement o f progress toward the FCCC ultimate objective

If the Parties to the Convention are serious in their approach to the threat of climate change, future commitments must have an impact on atmospheric GHG concentrations that is commensurate with the state of the science, especially any new evidence of climate trends, insights on anthropogenic and natural sources and sinks, and improved analyses of potential adverse impacts, particularly in the most vulnerable regions.

Future commitments will inevitably be influenced by perceptions of risk

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(which may vary between experts and the general public), and by the political and economic considerations of major players.

2. Equitability

Additional commitments must in some way reflect the different circumstances of countries North and South, including different economic structure, resource base, stage of development, and starting positions.

International coordination and harmonization of emission abatement measures will be important issues. At least some developing country role is called for, especially by such rapidly industrializing (and competitive) countries as Mexico, Brazil, Indonesia, and the Asian "Tigers", as well as by the increasingly powerful China and India (which together account for nearly 40 percent of the world's population). It is worth noting that, under the Montreal Protocol, developing countries have in fact accepted commitments to phase out and/or reduce ozone-depleting substances, albeit on a less stringent schedule than the industrialized countries. Both financial assistance and modern technology will need to be made available to such countries. In fairness, provision must also be made for the welfare of countries that are currently dependent upon fossil fuel exports - including the OPEC states. Adaptation measures should be accelerated for the benefit of such areas as Sub-Saharan Africa and the small island states.

3. Flexibility

Any new international instrument covering the post-2000 phase must be designed to evolve with increasing understanding of scientific, technical, economic, and social aspects of climate change. Progress toward the ultimate objective of the FCCC can be optimally achieved by way of periodic assessment and incremental steps. As in the model of the Montreal Protocol, FCCC Parties could agree on initial commitments with a view to gradually strengthening and expanding their scope as necessary.

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4. Stimulation o f technological innovation

New commitments should be designed to stimulate future-oriented technologies relevant to mitigating and adapting to climate change.

Particularly relevant subject areas include energy conservation and efficiency, new and renewable energy sources, agriculture, forests and land use, transportation, and coastal protection. The Convention should provide appropriate long-term signals to industry that will serve to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and discourage long-lived investments (e.g., in transport, building construction, or infrastructure) that could prove harmful

in the face of advancing climate change.

5. Cost-effectiveness

In order to gain public support and be politically acceptable, measures should be designed to minimize short-term costs and dislocations. Making good use of market mechanisms can improve the efficiency of policies; for this, the cooperation and engagement of industry in the process needs to be expanded. Again, the Montreal Protocol provides useful lessons for fruitful cooperation between industries and governments to achieve environmental objectives.

6. Ease o f administration

New commitment regimes should ideally be simple and workable in form and concept. Transparency is an important factor. The functions of monitoring and evaluation require special attention in designing new commitments.

IX Conclusions

In conclusion, it appears that the international community is serious in its approach to the threat of climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in particular is a well-functioning and vibrant

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institution, involving natural scientists as well as social science researchers from around the world in a concerted analytical effort. The various institutions and subsidiary bodies of the Framework Convention on Climate Change are also going about their work in a systematic manner, bearing in mind the notable differences among the participating governments. Nongovernmental organizations are monitoring the process with vigilance and are undertaking significant public education efforts. And there are signs that industry may be becoming less dominated by the most reactionary elements, as the insurance and financial sector, as weil as manufacturers and even some traditional energy producers, become more concerned about the long-term implications of the growing scientific consensus. AS! of this lends hope for further progress in applying the precautionary principle to the global danger of climate change at the Third Conference of Parties to the FCCC in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997.

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Annex 1 United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change

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UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

The Parties to th is C onvention,

Acknowledging that change in the Earth's climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind,

Concerned that hum an activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that this will result on average in an

additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and hum ankind,

Noting that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs,

Aware of the role and importance in terrestrial and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases,

Noting that there are many uncertainties in predictions of climate change, particularly with regard to the timing, magnitude and regional patterns thereof, Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response,' in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions,

Recalling the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on

16 June 1972,

Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure th at activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environm ent of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,

Reaffirming the principle of sovereignty of States in international cooperation to address climate change,

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Recognizing that States should enact effective environmental legislation, that environmental standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which they apply, and that standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries,

Recalling the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/228 of 22 December 1989 on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, and resolutions 43/53 of 6 December 1988, 44/207 of 22 December 1989, 45/212 of 21 December 1990 and 46/169 of

19 December 1991 on protection of global climate for present and future generations of mankind,

Recalling also the provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/206 of 22 December 1989 on the possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal areas and the pertinent provisions of General Assembly resolution 44/172 of 19 December 1989 on the implementation of the Plan of Action to Combat Desertification,

Recalling further the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances th at Deplete the Ozone Layer, 1987, as adjusted and amended on 29 June 1990,

Noting the Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference adopted on 7 November 1990,

Conscious of the valuable analytical work being conducted by many States on climate change and of the im portant contributions of the World Meteorological Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and other organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system, as well as other international and intergovernmental bodies, to the exchange of results of scientific research and the coordination of research,

Recognizing that steps required to understand and address climate change will be environmentally, socially and economically m ost effective if they are based on relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations and continually re-evaluated in the light of new findings in these areas,

Recognizing that various actions to address climate change can be justified economically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental problems,

Recognizing also the need for developed countries to take immediate action in a flexible m anner on the basis of clear priorities, as a first step towards

comprehensive response strategies at the global, national and, where agreed, regional levels that take into account all greenhouse gases, with due

consideration of their relative contributions to the enhancem ent of the greenhouse effect,

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Recognizing further that low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change,

Recognizing the special difficulties of those countries, especially developing countries, whose economies are particularly dependent on fossil fuel production, use and exportation, as a consequence of action taken on limiting greenhouse gas emissions,

Affirming that responses to climate change should be coordinated with social and economic development in an integrated m anner with a view to avoiding adverse impacts on the latter, taking into full account the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty,

Recognizing that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to resources required to achieve sustainable social and economic development and that, in order for developing countries to progress towards that goal, their energy consumption will need to grow taking into account the possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in general, including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such an application economically and socially beneficial,

Determined to protect the climate system for present and future generations,

Have agreed as follow s:

ARTICLE 1

DEFINITIONS *

For the purposes of this Convention:

1. "Adverse effects of climate change" means changes in the physical

environment or biota resulting from climate change which have significant deleterious effects on the composition, resilience or productivity of natural and managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on hum an health and welfare.

* Titles of articles are included solely to assist the reader.

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2. "Climate change" means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to hum an activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.

3. "Climate system" means the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere and geosphere and their interactions.

4. "Emissions" means the release of greenhouse gases and/or their precursors into the atmosphere over a specified area and period of time.

5. "Greenhouse gases" means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that absorb and re-emit infrared radiation.

6. "Regional economic integration organization" means an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention or its protocols and has been duly authorized, in accordance with its internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the instruments concerned.

7. "Reservoir" means a component or components of the climate system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is stored.

8. "Sink" means any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.

9. "Source" means any process or activity which releases a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.

ARTICLE 2

OBJECTIVE

The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

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PRINCIPLES

1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.

2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full consideration.

3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into

account that policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost- effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into account different socio

economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors. Efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested Parties.

4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development.

Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.

5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open

international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.

In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to

implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:

Global Climate Change The International Response