Norway, Afghanistan in 2013 and beyond

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Norway, Afghanistan in 2013 and beyond

Occasional publication

October 2013

By the Norwegian Expert Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan (NEGAP)

Introduction

The Norwegian Expert Group on Afghanistan and Pakistan (NEGAP) is an initiative that was begun in 2010 by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF) with the aim of promoting debate among Norwegian researchers and observers with expertise on Afghanistan and Pakistan, together with relevant Norwegian Foreign Ministry representatives. The NEGAP seminar Norway, Afghanistan in 2013 and Beyond was hosted by NOREF on April 25th 2013 in Oslo. It took place against the backdrop of the important challenges facing Afghanistan in the years ahead and sought to analyse the lessons learned from Norway’s experience in Afghanistan, as well as discuss the future of Pakistan and the region. Discussions focused on Norway’s present and future role in Afghanistan in the context of NATO’s withdrawal and the transition; Norway’s commitments to economic and social issues in

Afghanistan; and the peace process, internal politics, the insurgency and regional dynamics. This report summarises the key outcomes of the discussions. Contributions have been presented thematically, which represents the actual order of discussion at the seminar.

Session 1: NATO withdrawal and Afghanistan transition

As a starting point for discussion, session 1 of the seminar asked if the Taliban could be hurt by being deprived of a foreign enemy and the value of presenting themselves as nationalists fighting an imperialist occupation.

Shift in strategy

The insurgency appears to have shifted its strategy as it looks to 2014 and beyond: militants now aim to paint the primary enemy as Kabul and the Afghan security forces rather than the International Security Forces in Afghanistan (ISAF). Thus, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are the principal targets for attacks, in large part as a consequence of the reduction of the foreign military presence. The international community, for its part, seems to be following an exit strategy rather than a transition strategy.

‘Calling the other guy’

The Afghan approach to the war tends to be more amena- ble to talking with the insurgents, as opposed to the Western attitude of a good/bad dichotomy between allies and enemies. ‘Calling the other guy’ is a common occur- rence, emphasising the attitude of talking while fighting.

This reveals the traditional importance of Afghan pragma- tism and flexibility; it is crucial that the international community make room for and encourage this tractability in future scenarios. An important question is to determine to what extent the troop withdrawal will reduce the room for such give and take.

Military training programmes

India, Pakistan, China and Turkey are currently interested in hosting military training programmes in Afghanistan, and Kabul has recently agreed to send 1,000 officers to India for training. Islamabad demanded the same agreement, but Afghanistan feels that soldiers returning from Pakistan would be seen as spies. The possibility of training Afghan officers in Turkey is generally seen as a useful development. A current dilemma is that quantity

(i.e. the number of officers sent) seems to be favoured over the quality of the training.

There are many challenges within the ANSF, especially with respect to sustainability. Afghanistan has never had a national government-funded army before. The demobili- sation, disarmament and reintegration programme for former militants has largely been a disappointment, a costly investment that has produced few results. The most important challenge now is to secure continuous funding to maintain the ANSF.

Role of the police

The training of police for combat is being continued, but instruction for civil police is generally ignored. The attitude seems to be to keep Afghan boots on the ground, and worry less about their training and preparation. In addition, the focus for training and maintaining the Afghan police should be extended beyond the security apparatus itself to include those outside the police apparatus, as well as the actors within the formal police network. There is a tendency towards ‘quick fix’ strategies; for example, the current

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training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) has been undertaken as a shortcut to building efficient forces. By focusing on the needs of the Afghans, the ANP can provide a way for the Afghan state to maintain its coercive capacity.

Norway’s commitments to the Afghan civil police mirror the neglect in Kabul, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Defence still underplay this necessary effort. There should be a focus on developing civil security, which, like the local police, needs to be separated from military training and development.

peace and democracy

Although there is a overall Western commitment to peace and democracy in Afghanistan, we should not assume that statebuilding leads to stability or that creating democracy leads to peace. New institutional arrangements always involve some power shifts, and establishing the civil police as an institution and creating an efficient tax collection system may conflict with traditional systems. In

Afghanistan, alliances are constantly renegotiated and the management of power relations is an old tradition that must be taken into account. Likewise, arms distribution and acquisition are also a question of power relations.

Weapons are not just useful for killing the enemy or the opposition; they are assets used to secure a place at the (power-sharing) table. This tradition of continually re- arranged alliances, then, is a further argument for an inclusive peace process.

Civil war and local insurgency

A wide variety of people and interests compete with one another in Afghanistan’s war economy. Currently, the West finances the war: according to the World Bank, 89% of all expenditures in Afghanistan come from foreign sources.

Four sources are likely to finance the war in the future:

(1) plundering the state, (2) the exploitation of natural resources, (3) direct taxation of people (not always trans- parent) and (4) taxation of trade and economic transactions. Two additional sources include the narcotics economy – the opium industry represents 40% of the Afghan gross domestic product – and contributions from regional transfers of money and goods. It has yet to be determined who will control the Afghan narcotics industry and finance local transactions in the future.

Finally, there was a consensus that a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan is not a realistic possibility, but the Taliban may become a serious military force and therefore play a critical role in both a military and a political solution. The issue of local insurgency, led by various groups, is an additional concern among political elites in Kabul now.

Decrease of aid

The main issue for the Norwegian MFA is to prevent a slow reduction of aid from the entire international community.

With this in mind, Norway signed a ‘strategic partnership’

with Afghanistan and promised a significant amount of aid to prevent an economic implosion. Annual assistance of NOK 750 million has been pledged until 2017, and the Afghan authorities will help decide how to spend this aid money.

Norway has a five-year commitment according to the conditions set in Tokyo 2012 (whose follow-up meeting is in July 2013), but the local conditions to deliver money are problematic. Depending on conditions in the provinces, development aid may become emergency aid, but in any case there will be criticism from the media and parliament if Norway gives money to a mismanaged and corrupt country.

Although Western funding for Afghanistan will continue, no single foreign policy actor exercises determinative political power over the Afghan government or the Taliban; the prospects for a peaceful transition in Afghanistan are thus uncertain.

Jirgas

There is a need to look at decentralisation, traditional systems and local dynamics at district and provincial levels to see how they can be developed. Locally organised jirgas (tribal assemblies of elders) may conflict with the practice of taking nearly all political decisions at the national level.

While jirgas still have more legitimacy in some places, the organisation of a national jirga instead of direct elections is not being seriously discussed. There are many constitu- tional constraints on convening such a jirga and some believe that a jirga process – rather than the democratic exercise of the ballot – would set the country back to where it was before the 2001 intervention. Many also view a jirga as a threat to women’s rights issues; the focus, therefore, remains on the forthcoming elections.

Session 2: Norwegian commitments to economic and social issues in Afghanistan

Session 2 focused on the Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan and discussed the development priorities of the Norwegian MFA and NGOs.

Aid transition

After 2013 more money is scheduled to be channelled into the Afghan budget through the World Bank. The Norwegian engagement in Afghanistan is thus part of a huge, coordinated international effort. For its part, Norway recently signed three-year contracts between the MFA and Norwegian NGOs.

The Norwegian government has not indicated any real reorientation of priorities: development, education and good governance, with a greater focus on higher education,

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remain the focus. However, support that previously was specifically earmarked in Afghanistan was deemed coun- terproductive and has been eliminated; direct support for the Afghan budget is now 50% of Norwegian aid. These decisions are part of building the Afghan government’s capacity, which no donor country wants to weaken.

Capacity building

The Afghan government sector has been a disaster in terms of capacity building. In addition, the World Bank has stated that the costs of all Afghan governmental sectors are not sustainable. There have been various governance projects such as the National Solidarity Programme, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in a system that still lacks unity.

Monitoring systems for the Reconstruction Trust Fund (RTF) have been put in place with a ten-year horizon for its goals. Aid in Afghanistan is also characterised by too little Afghan presence and capacity on the ground and at the local level. However, the reason Norway uses the RTF, UNDP and other general funds is because it is easier to relate to authorities through one contact person rather than, say, 50.

Federalism and decentralisation

The question is how to decentralise without promoting

‘federalism’. The use of the term ‘federal system’ is a very sensitive issue in the Afghan debate. Even ‘decentralisation’ has increasingly been understood as fragmentation, and referring to ‘de-concentration of powers’ has become more acceptable. Afghanistan has traditionally been centralised, but with a limited scope. However, in 2001, the first Bonn Conference introduced a strongly centralised system, with the provincial departments controlled from Kabul and the provincial governors possessing only limited power. Little work was done on provincial capacity building;

instead, NGOs were used to achieve local results. The Norwegian MFA should attempt to fix this problem, including promoting a lower-level needs analysis to determine how government ministries create plans at the provincial level, and whether or not there are missing links between Kabul and the provinces. National processes should not conflict with provincial processes.

Education

Norway should give strong priority to supporting higher education in Afghanistan, especially building capacity in applied social sciences research. There is a need for an

‘Afghan Experts Group’ to analyse educational needs.

Currently, Afghanistan is experiencing a problem of ‘brain drain’ as young Afghans with ability are sucked into international institutes or organisations that have the money to hire them. Norway should encourage more opportunities for training under Norwegian auspices, with a view to ultimate employment in Afghanistan. Possibilities include (1) NORGLOBAL, a three-year research programme; (2) the Norwegian Programme for Capacity

Building in Higher Education and Research for Develop- ment (NORHED); and (3) Norwegian universities. There should be a clear emphasis on building Afghan capacity within existing structures. Finally, it is important to support local leaders, because people drawn from the local popula- tion can do fieldwork more easily.

Resource management

The mining industry is underdeveloped and it seems far too early to talk about its future. There is a problem in financ- ing it over the long run. Local contracts have been granted to Chinese companies that, so far, have done little work (at, for example, the Aynak copper mine in Logar Province) because security guarantees are limited. The nature of the sector is inherently dependent on political and social stability and appropriate infrastructure. A strong government with clear governance structures is indispensable to the mining sector. If not well managed and organised, the sector could contribute to increased civil strife and internal war.

There is always a problem of extraction in conflict areas:

during a situation of low-intensity warfare, the parties will avoid state building and continue looting. The risk exists that warlords, commanders and others could enter the vital mining sector. However, warlords are unlikely to consider critical infrastructure projects for mining such as railways and power plants; thus Afghanistan may fail to develop mineral production during the transition, and international intervention may be necessary to build capacity. Nevertheless, Norway has no intention of engaging in this sector, although Oslo has been requested to lend its support to the hydroelectric sector. In the end, Norway needs to focus on a few sectors and carefully manage its contributions to them.

Norwegian assistance

Norwegian assistance to Afghanistan of NOK 750 million (€98 million, $128.5 million) is coordinated with the UN and Afghanistan. The objective now is to rechannel money through the Afghan government. Norway’s decision is not to spread itself too thin in many sectors, and it has therefore decided to focus on ‘big projects’ to make the adminis- trative work more centred and less fragmented. However, nothing too big can be conducted in Kabul for security reasons. Norway needs to show the Norwegian public what progress has been achieved with taxpayers’ money; in the past the government has not excelled at this.

Session 3: The peace process, internal politics and the insurgency

Session 3 discussed the absence of a clear peace and reconciliation strategy from the Afghan government or from the international community.

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Border areas

The NEGAP discussion highlighted the importance of the border areas, where observers offer much speculation about potential conflicts, but fundamental issues such as the Durand line and water management are virtually ignored. This is still a situation in limbo.

pakistan and the Taliban

There was a consensus that, without Pakistan at the negotiating table, talks will go nowhere. The message from Pakistan was equally clear in saying that either the government in Kabul brings Islamabad on board or Pakistan will opt entirely out of the peace process. However, the room for manoeuvre left for the Pakistani sponsors of the Taliban is still unclear.

The Taliban continue to talk about a unified leadership under Mullah Omar, but there is no independent confirma- tion of this. After the decade-long conflict, there are clear divisions among the insurgents and little ability to formu- late a single coherent position. Therefore, participants generally agreed that the peace process should not be just a process of dealing with the Taliban. Other ‘Mullah Omars’

are probably being trained in Pakistan.

Three or four years ago there was genuine Taliban interest in negotiations, but, now that the Afghans are ready, there are some doubts about the sincerity of the insurgents’

interest in talks. They are possibly waiting for ISAF to withdraw in 2014, though that may not be the only reason for not cooperating any more.

The Norwegian MFA insists that negotiations be supported by all the international parties—including, and especially now, the U.S. Currently, the situation is stalemated and it does not seem that there will be a breakthrough before the elections. The UN could conceivably play a role as a facilita- tor, but not a leader, of negotiations.

Elections

There is no candidate in sight who seems capable of achieving a convincing victory in the 2014 elections. The elections are shrouded in uncertainty and may result in increased instability. However, the Norwegian MFA feels that the international governments and their publics could never accept postponement of the elections, with its inevitable postponement of democracy for Afghanistan.

A scenario in which Karzai remained in power would be a major problem. Tokyo 2012 follows the same track as ten years ago and insists on elections, even though the government is perceived as getting weaker by the day and as the window for negotiating with the Taliban grows smaller. The elections may improve the situation in this regard. There is a need for a new government to take action and promote change.

The prospect for a sustainable government is directly linked to successful elections; in addition, a reconciliation process may be better organised after the elections.

Despite a notable lobby in Kabul that argues that Afghanistan is not ready for democracy, public opinion in Afghanistan indicates a majority’s support for elections.

prospects for peace

Although there is agreement within ISAF that the Taliban cannot capture the capital or take control of the country, it is probable that, if there is no negotiated settlement, they will dominate some areas of the country. It is also quite possible that the Taliban will win by default; i.e. through the erosion of government legitimacy and control. However, a collapse of the Kabul government is not considered a serious prospect. The Taliban would be well advised to accept the Afghan Constitution, support the elections process, form a political party and let the people decide.

There is no response yet from the Taliban to these ideas.

Session 4: The peace process and regional dynamics

Session 4 dealt with the critical role of neighbouring countries in negotiations with the Taliban and the peace process, as well as issues related to the geopolitical chess game in the region, which makes it impossible to address one issue in isolation from the others.

Regional integration of South Asia

South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world; indeed, in 2001 Afghanistan was a dangerously isolated entity. Within the Western coalition in Afghanistan there was no vision of the region surrounding Afghanistan and very little interest in it. Recently, some progress has been made regarding integration, but it is still of little political significance. The region remains mainly driven by bilateral agreements concerned with strategic influences, such as those of China, which is investing in infrastructure and road building; this situation is likely to remain the case for some time. Norway’s MFA does not expect increased regional integration in the future, although avenues of cross-border communication other than politics should be explored.

Saudi Arabia and Iran

While private Saudi sources are helping to finance the Taliban, the Saudi government’s influence with the Afghan government is growing and its role in the short term is crucial. Riyadh currently has plans to establish a large Islamic university in Afghanistan with student housing, a mosque and hospital. Considered a strategic investment, the university is intended to host and accommodate some 20,000–25,000 students.

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Iran’s goals in Afghanistan appear to be under reassess- ment and are not easy to read. The emergence of Iran as a major regional power, the ongoing civil war in Syria and the consequences of the U.S. occupation of Iraq all complicate an understanding of Iran’s role in the country. Tehran has established low-key relations with Kabul, but, like Saudi Arabia, is investing massively in Afghanistan and competing to support higher education there, with Iran developing its own project to build a school in Kabul. The Iranian regime is practising a dual strategy: engaging with the government in Kabul while unofficially establishing a presence close to the borders with local branches of the Taliban. It is unclear how far this is endorsed by the security apparatus.

Shia–Sunni divisions

Religion now plays a greater role in in the region than ever before in recent history and the Shia–Sunni division has undeniably increased in recent years. The Shia–Sunni conflict is conditioned by external factors and pressures, including Saudi Arabia’s support to foreign Sunni Muslims and Iran’s support to Shia coreligionists abroad. While the sectarian divide in Syria is not believed to be a factor in the regional response to Afghanistan and Afghan Shias enjoy constitutional guarantees, the Shia-Sunni situation in Afghanistan has the potential to escalate violently at any time, as occurred in Iraq.

India and China

Countries such as China and India, which ignored Afghanistan in the 1990s, are competing with each other for influence in the country. The two nations do not trust each other and the Indian military deployed 50,000 men to reinforce its border with China in 2009. With a strategic partnership in place with Afghanistan, New Delhi is investing money in development and infrastructure projects, Afghan police officers are being trained in India and there are plans for training the Afghan military in the future. Although India is sceptical of the NATO troop drawdown and concerned that the West will abandon Afghanistan, it has also been wary of a long-term presence of the West in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has always had close relations with China for both economic and strategic reasons; the two countries clearly share a common concern over India’s possession of nuclear weapons. Cultural and academic cooperation is also well developed. However, the extent to which China can influence Pakistani policy remains uncertain, and some believe that the Chinese are overrated as players in

Afghanistan.

Russia

Against the backdrop of its negative experience in Afghanistan, Russia maintains a very defensive position.

Currently, Moscow has no card to play in the peace negotiations, and its approach to Afghanistan and the region is aimed at securing control over Central Asia and taking

advantage of new opportunities, especially in the energy and mining sectors. It will undoubtedly compete for pipeline projects. Its security concerns include terrorism and the drug trade, as well as the pending power vacuum after the drawdown of ISAF in 2014. Norway is not working with Russia in terms of the peace and reconciliation process and has no plans to do so at the moment.

Turkey

The role of Turkey is not discussed much in the media, despite the fact that it has been playing an active role in Afghanistan since the Western intervention in 2001.

Afghan–Turkish relations are good, focused on the long term and building on a common cultural and religious heritage shared with two Turkic minority ethnicities in Afghanistan, the Turkmens and the Uzbeks. Afghan public opinion ranks Turkey among the three most favourably perceived foreign countries, and there is an official Afghan–

Turkish friendship day, on the occasion of which this year the Turkish minister of mining and energy was sent to Afghanistan.

An additional striking success for Turkey is the establish- ment of Turkish Airlines in Kabul. In future, the company intends to set up a direct flight connecting Istanbul to Mazar-e-Sharif. Turkey is currently reinforcing its ties with Afghanistan and is expected to play a greater role in that country and the region after 2014. Its participation in regional dialogues is increasingly important, as illustrated by its hosting of the Istanbul Process. Turkey has also offered support for the training of Afghan police officers, yet Ankara should be careful not to alienate Pakistan with its Afghanistan policies.

Heart of Asia

The Heart of Asia Process is a new cooperative initiative involving Afghanistan plus 14 other core countries and a similar number of supporting countries and organisations.

It focuses on cooperation schemes at the practical level, with confidence-building measures and concrete projects conducted in the fields of crisis management, education and infrastructure. In doing so, the objective is to promote cross-border cooperation in order to do away with mistrust and zero-sum thinking. The latest Heart of Asia meeting took place in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on April 26th 2013.

Norway’s current strategy emphasises the Heart of Asia Process, in which Oslo facilitates and funds the organisation’s meetings.

pakistan

Pakistan is very different from Afghanistan: it is a country of 185 million inhabitants with a large and politically important military. It is currently a troubled nation with a weak economy, problems in the energy sector, and eroding institutional structures, especially those of education, finances and health. Militants challenge a central government that does not have full control over its

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territory. The 2010 Eighteenth Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution has mandated more provincial autonomy and devolution of finances to the provinces, but in practice the central government has not given enough money to local governments. The Norwegian MFA would like to focus on these areas – analyse their needs and provide some support to them. However, the MFA is generally pessimistic about Pakistan. Even if the government avoids collapse, the country seems less and less governable.

There are different levels of cooperation between Norway and Pakistan, but Pakistan has little reason to consult Norway and Norway has little influence in Pakistan. There is even a tendency for Norwegian relief workers not to be granted visas for Pakistan. Norway is not alone in this regard: the U.S. has also tried in vain to extend its influence over Pakistan.

Concluding remarks

The seminar Norway, Afghanistan and Beyond 2013 provided a platform for debate where Norwegian experts on

Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as government representatives, could critically assess the current challenges facing Afghanistan and its region beyond 2013. NEGAP experts shared a general concern about the future stability of Afghanistan, which is undeniably linked to the situation in Pakistan, over which no nation exercises definitive influence. The prospects for a political settlement in Afghanistan within the current geopolitical conjuncture are slim. There is also still little notion of an Afghan social contract with accountability to the Afghan people. The real problem may be that the West has tried to impose its ideas and ways of operating on Afghanistan and had unrealistic expectations of success. This was clearly seen in the basic failure of the 2001 Bonn Conference.

Appendix: participants in the NEGAp seminar, April 25th 2013

Norwegian reserchers/journalists

Bauck, Petter, Senior Adviser, Norad – Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

Faizy, Abdul Suboh, Director of Afghanistan Programme, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA), Oslo Harpviken, Kristian B., Director, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo

Nyborg, Ingrid L. P., Associate Professor, Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås

Solberg, Kristin, South Asia correspondent, Aftenposten, Oslo

Strand, Arne, Senior Researcher, CMI, Bergen

Suhrke, Astri, Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), Bergen

Torjesen, Stina, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Agder

Ulriksen, Ståle, Researcher at the Norwegian Naval College (on leave from the Department of Security and Conflict Management, NUPI), Oslo

Norwegian representatives from Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Bjørdal, Paul Øystein, Advisor, Section for Peace and Reconciliation, MFA, Oslo

Ermesjø, Stig, Colonel, Norwegian Army, Defence Attaché, Norwegian Embassy, Kabul

Gimenez, Daniel, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy in Kabul (from September 2013)

Johannessen, Lasse Bjørn, Deputy Director General, Section for South Asia and Afghanistan, MFA, Oslo

Osnes, Ane, Foreign Service Trainee, Section for South Asia and Afghanistan, MFA, Oslo

Schjelderup, Nina, Senior Advisor, Section for Middle East and North Africa, MFA, Oslo

Thue, Olav-Nils, Senior Advisor, Section for South Asia and Afghanistan, MFA, Oslo

NOREF staff

Aguirre, Mariano, Director Mezzera, Marco, Senior Advisor

NOREF consultant Matthews, Robert

Rapporteur

Bernard, Meline, Department of International Environment and Development Studies, UMB, Ås

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NOREF would like to acknowledge the important work carried out by the rapporteur of the seminar, Meline Bernard, and by the consultant Robert Matthews, in writing this report. The report reflects the rapporteur’s personal interpretations of the main points of the discussions at the seminar, and as such it does not represent any policy position of NOREF, nor does it necessarily reflect the individual views of the participants.

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