Has the EU Learnt from the Ukraine Crisis? Changes to Security, Energy and Migration Governance

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Has the EU Learnt

from the Ukraine Crisis?

Changes to Security, Energy

and Migration Governance

Has the EU Learnt from the Ukraine Crisis?

Changes to Security, Energy and Migration Governance

Authors:

Jakub M. Godzimirski, Lidia Puka, Marta Stormowska

Warsaw, February 2015

Content editor Roderick Parkes

Copy editor Brien Barnett

Technical editor and cover designer Dorota Dołęgowska

978-83-64895-12-8 epub 978-83-64895-13-5 mobi 978-83-64895-14-2 pdf

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I. EU Security Governance: A Liberal Player in a Realist World. . . 7

Better Governance as a Security Solution, and Problem . . . 7

Economic Sanctions as a Security Tool . . . 8

The Revival of the Transatlantic Connection . . . 9

Security Challenges in the EU’s New Institutional Cycle . . . 10

II. EU Energy Governance: Trading States in a Mercantilist World. . . 11

Lack of Readiness for a Foreseeable Crisis . . . 11

Securing Winter Supplies to Ukraine . . . 12

Crisis Management and Infrastructure . . . 12

The Need for Strong European Institutions . . . 13

Energy in the EU’s New Institutional Cycle . . . 14

III. EU Migration Governance: Incomplete Drive for Liberal Policy . . . 17

Asylum Policies—Testing EU Solidarity . . . 17

Labour Migration—Testing EU Openness . . . 19

Migration and Development—Testing EU Partnership Building . . . 20

Migration in the EU’s New Institutional Cycle . . . 21

IV. Poland and Norway in the New International Governance Environment . . . 23

Facing Up to the Definitive “End of the End of History” in the Security Realm . . . 24

Coping with the Cleavage between Energy Importers and Exporters . . . 26

Reacting Upstream to an Unclear Refugee Problem in the East . . . 28

V. Things to Watch in 2015 . . . 31

Introduction

“The challenge the Ukrainian crisis poses to the European Union’s foreign and security policy can be precisely measured: 50 metres.”¹ The president of the European Commission, Jean- Claude Juncker, was talking about the distance between the Commission’s Berlaymont head- quarters in Brussels and the Justus Lipsius building where the heads of EU governments hold their regular summits. Juncker’s is a rather technocratic perspective certainly, but the long walk between the two headquarters is a symbol of a political divide, between the European action and particularist national interests, the cause of internal conflicts and probably also lower governance efficiency in the EU.

The Russian-Ukrainian crisis that began unfolding in November 2013 and escalated in February and March 2014 has undermined the unspoken assumption that military conflict in Eu- rope had been confined to the past. The upheaval has been labelled a “return to realpolitik,” “a renewed East-West division,” or “a new Cold War”—terms that directly challenge the EU’s soft and post-modern means of handling international relations. Coinciding with the beginning of a new institutional cycle of the European Union, the crisis has put the bloc’s resilience to external disruptions, as well as its internal efficiency, to the test. And yet, external shocks often result in positive shifts and improvements of internal governance, as they highlight the need to both formu- late and conduct successful policies.

This report, which forms part of a broader project on policy learning and governance in Europe, judges whether the EU has successfully adapted to the Ukrainian crisis. We examine three areas: security, energy and migration. We argue that, although changing conditions have revealed existing deficiencies of the European frameworks, a policy of continuation persists. As such, the report questions the idea that the EU constitutes a positive form of “experimentalist governance,”

a model of governance based on reciprocal interaction and mutual learning between political units in the EU. We conclude our study by exploring the challenges posed to two states, Norway and Poland, which have a particular stake in experimentalist cooperation, before providing a list of issues to be watched in 2015.

1 J.-C. Juncker, “Ukrainian Lessons: What the EU Must Do to Improve Its Foreign and Security Policy,” 15 May 2014, http://juncker.epp.eu/news/ukrainian-lessons-what-eu-must-do-improve-its-foreign-and-security-policy.

I. EU Security Governance: A Liberal Player in a Realist World

The Ukrainian crisis has created pressure in the EU’s security policy—demanding a change in the EU’s usual modus operandi. Firstly, the EU is viewed, especially from Moscow’s perspec- tive, not as a bystander or mediator to events in Ukraine, but as a party to this conflict and a part of the problem. Russia wanted to contain the EU’s influence when intervening in Ukraine, seeing Brussels as a threat to its interests and even its security. Secondly, the EU’s usual reliance on so- -called soft power has clear problems when it comes to dealing with hard security challenges, as the EU lacks traditional hard power instruments, especially when confronted by a player that is both willing to and capable of using military power to pursue its political objectives.² Thirdly, some specific features of its security decision-making have delayed and complicated the EU’s reaction to such a crisis.

It is for that third reason, however, that we cannot expect to see the results of any policy reconsideration from Brussels any time soon. EU decision making processes in this sphere always result from laborious interaction between Member States and Brussels, and tend to favour the status quo. Therefore, as shown by earlier analyses in this project,³ the practice of experimentalist governance (which involves goal-setting, policy formulation and implementation and potential revision as a dynamic, circular process) is even less advanced and less positive in the field of se- curity than in those of energy or migration. This problem is being compounded, moreover, since the lessons to be drawn from the Ukrainian crisis are by no means clear.

Russian actions may, for instance, have an unintended consequence for European securi- ty policy, giving a new boost to traditional transatlantic cooperation. This may help the EU and NATO mend their fences and make them work closer together, undermining Russia’s long-term objective of limiting the United States’ strategic presence in Europe. Russian actions may encoura- ge the EU to develop as a classic security player, pushing Europeans to increase their share of the hard security burden and removing one of the most important causes of tension in transatlantic cooperation. And yet, although the crisis has revealed some weaknesses in the EU’s posture as a classic security player, it has also demonstrated how the EU’s market power and economic weight can still be usefully factored into the European security equation.

It is therefore worth briefly considering this clash of traditional and post-modern security responses, before examining how they could play out in the EU’s new institutional cycle (which began with the election of the new European Parliament in May 2014, and continued with new presidents of the Commission and European Council).

Better Governance as a Security Solution, and Problem

The EU’s neighbourhood policy has been driven by a strong liberal assumption that the best way to secure stability is to improve governance, and to strengthen economic cooperation.

Ukraine was no exception to this rule. When the EU decided to invite Ukraine to strengthen eco- nomic and political ties by signing an Association Agreement with a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area it was made with strong conditionality elements and some important governance- -related strings attached. The goal was not to outcompete Russia geopolitically but to help Ukraine

2 To learn more about this tension shaping EU security policy at the global level see M.E. Smith, “A Liberal Grand Strategy in a Realist World? Power, Purpose and the EU’s Changing Global Role,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 18, no. 2, 2011, pp. 144–163. For more on the EU’s role as a security player see T. Renard, The European Union: A New Security Actor?, EUI Working Papers, 2014.

3 L. Puka, R. Parkes (eds.),“Linking National and European Governance: Lessons for Poland and Norway”, PISM Strategic File, no. 17 (53), 2014, http://goodgov.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17921.

make Ukraine accept the conditions set by the EU and adopt measures that would challenge cor- ruption, the EU made an effort to address questions of the broader security spectrum.

The conflict has not changed that path—indeed, EU financial assistance has continued (further supported by the International Monetary Fund). However, the Eastern Partnership as a security-building measure has been shown to have some real limitations. The field of border management is one example.⁴ The EU launched some border assistance missions in Ukraine and Moldova, and decided to deploy a monitoring mission in Georgia after the 2008 war. However, what became problematic in the case of Ukraine was the EU’s reluctance to promote institutional reforms, for instance in the field of border management and in encouraging the country to drop Soviet-style border control and adopt EU-style border management. The issue of border control turned out to be crucial in the case of Ukraine as weapons, volunteers and regular Russian troops could cross the Russian–Ukrainian border in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions almost unchecked, thus changing the local power balance against the Ukrainian army.

The Ukrainian border police were not prepared for this kind of challenge, therefore it is important to advocate for a stronger security component to EU’s neighbourhood policy as a way of improving its efficiency. The crisis has shown that a state confronted with covert and/or open aggression can only survive if it has the right state structures to deal with such challenges in the first place. The EU needs to help its partners survive and consolidate and in order to do so its po- licy towards them should help them to put in place effective law enforcement, intelligence and defence structures. However, implementation of this type of policy may face some challenges. It could have been argued, prior to the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, that the EU should act extremely cautiously, as adding a security dimension to its neighbourhood policy could provoke negative reactions from Russia and have a negative impact on cooperation between Russia and the EU. The crisis has, however, had two crucial impacts. Firstly, it has revealed that Ukraine is in real need of deep security sector reform, including more efficient management of the country’s borders. This is also important for the EU, as Ukraine’s ties with the EU have been strengthened as a consequence of the crisis, and it is in the interests of the EU that Ukraine’s border is managed more efficiently.

Secondly, the crisis has resulted in an unprecedented worsening of relations between the EU and Russia, which makes the argument about the possible negative impact of adding a security dimen- sion to EU’s neighbourhood policy much less relevant.

Economic Sanctions as a Security Tool

Once Russia resorted to increasingly overt military actions (instigating civil war in Crimea and in the Donbas region, annexing a large section of Ukrainian territory on 18 March 2014, and triggering violent conflict in eastern Ukraine) the EU had to face up to the prospects of traditional military threats emerging in its close vicinity, and in a country that was set to increase the level and the scope of its economic and political cooperation with the EU. The EU decided that, in order to de-escalate the conflict, it should make Russia change its course in favour of a more cooperative approach. As always, however, the EU was reluctant to use military means and went, following the United States’ example, for restrictive economic measures. In other words, the EU conducted its security policy with economic means accompanied by political dialogue.

Although there were some dissenting voices within the EU, Brussels managed to secure formal support from all Member States for several rounds of restrictive measures introduced aga- inst Russia—no mean feat given the diversity of opinions on Russia. The goal of these measures

4 N. Popescu, First Lessons from the Ukrainian Crisis, EUISS Issue Alert, 10 October 2014, www.iss.europa.

eu/publications/detail/article/first-lessons-from-the-ukrainian-crisis.

tive part in the work on the solution of the Ukrainian crisis. In order to achieve this, the EU also de- cided to discuss the questions of mutual interest directly with Russia and Ukraine. Postponement of the implementation of parts of the Association Agreement until 2016 could be interpreted as an attempt at accommodating Russian interests. However, when Russia decided at the end of August 2014 to send its troops into Ukraine to help separatists cope with increasing Ukrainian military pressure, the EU did not hesitate to introduce the next set of restrictive measures.

The Revival of the Transatlantic Connection

Russian actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have provided additional incentives to both the EU and NATO to better coordinate their actions and their policies towards Russia. This coor- dinated Western action has already brought some results. On 17 April 2014 the four parties taking part in the Geneva meeting—Russia, the EU, the U.S. and Ukraine—agreed that all sides must re- frain from violence, intimidation and provocative action of any kind; that all illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to their legitimate owners; and that all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated. It was also agreed that amnesty was to be granted to protestors and to those who had left buildings and other public places and had surrendered their weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of capital offences. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe was to strengthen the role of its special monitoring mission to Ukraine that had been deployed on 21 March 2014 to give it a leading role in assisting the Ukrainian authorities and local commu- nities in the immediate implementation of these de-escalation measures. The EU, Russia and the U.S. committed themselves to support this mission.⁵

Most importantly, it was also announced at the Geneva meeting that the constitutional process would be inclusive, transparent and accountable. Further, all sides underlined the impor- tance of economic and financial stability in Ukraine, and expressed readiness to discuss additional support. To achieve those results, Western leaders decided to exert direct pressure on the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and to keep direct communication channels open. Both U.S. President Barack Obama and European leaders were in direct contact with the Russians and Ukrainians. On 2 July 2014 foreign ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France met in Berlin to discuss ways out of the deadlocked situation and a new round of talks took place in Berlin on 17 August 2014. Those meetings prepared the ground for meetings in Minsk on 26 August and 5 September, which resulted in an agreement on a permanent ceasefire in eastern Ukraine. The same topics were also discussed at meetings in Milan on 16 and 17 October 2014, at which Angela Merkel, François Hollande, Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko could exchange views on the situation in Ukraine and discuss how to address this gravest challenge to European security. Merkel has in addition conducted more than 40 telephone conversations with Putin on the topic of Ukraine, and had a four-hour meeting with him on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Brisbane on 15 Novem- ber 2014, at which she was joined by the new head of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker.

The French president, François Hollande, also decided to meet Putin in Moscow on 6 December 2014, to impress upon him the seriousness of the situation and the need for finding a way out from the current deadlock. Finally, it was announced that the four leaders, Merkel, Hollande, Po- roshenko and Putin, were to meet in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana in January 2015 to discuss how to deal with this grave crisis. However, the meeting did not take place due to the escalation of the armed conflict in Donbass and the fact that the ministers of foreign affairs of the four countries were not able to agree on an agenda for it.

5 More about the OSCE is available at the “Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine” website at osce.org/

ukraine-smm.

but this was hardly the only factor. The Ukrainian crisis thus fell on fertile ground when it comes to strengthening the transatlantic link, and may give a new—and needed—boost to cooperation on security between the EU and NATO. In its declaration from the most recent summit, in Wales, NATO supported the EU’s sanctions against Russia and described the EU as a unique and essential partner, sharing common values and strategic interests. NATO also promised to continue to work side by side with the EU in crisis management operations, to broaden political consultations, and to promote the complementarity of the two organisations to enhance common security and stabil- ity. The declaration stated also that “the current strategic environment has highlighted the need for further strengthening our strategic partnership and reinforcing our joint efforts and our common message.”⁶

Security Challenges in the EU’s New Institutional Cycle

The new European Commission is to pay greater attention to the coordination of the EU’s security policy. The choice of Federica Mogherini as the new EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was originally disputed due to what some Member States saw as her soft line towards Russia, but she managed to secure the support of all of them.

In his so-called mission letter to Mogherini, the new head of the European Commission, Jean- Claude Juncker, described his vision of her role in the new institutional setting.⁷ The new High Representative, who is also Vice-President of the Commission, is to be responsible for the work of all commissioners with regard to external relations, and will also work closely with the other vice-presidents and guide the work of the commissioners for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations; Trade; International Cooperation and Development; and Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management. Juncker meant also that Mogherini should draw on the Commission’s policy instruments and expertise in many areas, including policies under the responsibilities of the commissioners for Climate Action and Energy, Transport and Space and Migration and Home Affairs, which all have a strong external dimension. Although in her prepared written statement during her hearings at the European Parliament on 6 October 2014 Mogherini did not mention the Ukrainian–Russian crisis, she promised “to project a strong and coherent external agenda for the EU” and underlined in her direct responses to questions that the best way of dealing with the crisis and influencing Russia’s attitude was to help Ukraine and work closely with the Ukrainian leadership. Over the last couple of months Mogherini has adopted an active approach to the work on the solution of the current crisis by issuing a number of statements, holding a number of meet- ings with the key players (including with the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, on 4 December 2014), and urging Putin and the rest of the Russian leadership to introduce a radical change in their attitude towards the rest of the world and to switch to a cooperative mode. During the OSCE meeting in Basel on 4 December she also called on Russia for an immediate halt of “the inflow of weapons, equipment and troops from across the Russian border” and for “the withdrawal of any illegal and foreign forces, mercenaries and military equipment from eastern Ukraine.”⁸ It is still too early to see whether this policy and those calls will have any lasting impact, but the new High Representative has managed at least to send a strong signal to the Russian leadership, that Russia’s approach to the crisis has to change.

6 NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration,” 5 September 2014, www.nato.int/cps/po/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

7 J.-C. Juncker, “Mission Letter to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Policy and Security Policy/

Vice-President of the European Commission,” 1 November 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/

commissioner_mission_letters/mogherini_en.pdf.

8 Based on official information on F. Mogherini’s activities, provided by the European External Action Service, at www.eeas.europa.eu/index_en.htm.

II. EU Energy Governance: Trading States in a Mercantilist World

The conflict between Russia, as the main supplier of resources to the EU, and Ukraine, as the main transit country, has become a real test case for the efficiency of the EU’s energy governance. The question of whether the bloc is able to handle external shocks, including a halt in supplies of Russian gas, has come to the fore of discussions in the European Council and the Commission’s works. Apart from the EU’s resilience, the crisis tested the strength of its decision making bodies and the bloc’s unity. It has revealed weaknesses in all three, rather than triggering qualitative changes.

At the same time, it has questioned the EU’s belief in market forces as a panacea for all energy challenges. Internally, the common market is far from completion, and policy formulation and execution is largely dependent on the particular policies of major companies and state inter- ests. Externally, the European Union has become increasingly dependent on imports, and more prone to confrontation with the mercantilist principles of exporters such as Russia.

Lack of Readiness for a Foreseeable Crisis

Had it not been for the Ukrainian conflict, the security of supplies would have been likely to occupy last place in any list of EU energy policy goals, overshadowed by climate and competi- tiveness. That ex ante situation, and the lack of comprehensive scenarios for major supply failures, may come as a surprise provided the extreme resource hunger of the EU (it is importing nearly twice as much energy as the United States, and five times that of China). Of all the gas consumed in the EU, 15% is transited through Ukraine. The 2006 and 2009 transit disruptions have taught the bloc a lesson, though apparently an insufficient one. Although they resulted in the 2010 Regu- lation on Security of Gas Supplies, that measure’s insufficient current level of implementation leaves Central and Eastern European members most vulnerable to the shocks.⁹ Neither did the earlier disruptions result in the creation of crisis prevention mechanisms, let alone a comprehen- sive approach to external energy developments (such as shifting patterns of energy supply and demand, changing roles of global key players, and political instability in key exporting regions).¹⁰

With the current crisis, Russia unwittingly attached a price tag for international security to its gas sales, as its military actions disillusioned even a normally sympathetic European Left, in turn throwing into question the liberal paradigm of EU energy policy. For the first time, the European Commission discussed the vision of Europe making do without Russian gas and it even, despite the high costs attached, thought about substituting Ukrainian transit (approximately 57 billion cu- bic metres of gas). Around $33 billion would be needed to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas dependence by 40% during just one winter.¹¹ In the event, however, economic sanctions were introduced, with the aim of solving, rather than igniting, the problem, and the “nuclear option” of halting gas supplies from Russia was avoided. EU priority became to secure winter gas supplies to

9 European Commission, “In-depth Study of European Energy Security,” SWD (2014) 330, July 2014, http://

ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_study.pdf.

10 K. Szulecki, K. Westphal, “The Cardinal Sins of European Energy Policy: Non-governance in an Uncertain Global Landscape,” Global Policy, 2014.

11 Based on the data of the International Energy Agency and Bernstein Energy, the Commission has listed the top three actions in order to achieve this goal. These are drawing down gas inventories, outbidding Asia on LNG, and switching gas power to oil power. European Commission, “In-depth Study of European Energy Security Accompanying the Document Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: European Energy Security Strategy,” COM (2014) 330 final, Staff Working Document, Brussels, 16 June 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/

doc/20140528_energy_security_study.pdf.

tivity by enabling new directions for the flow of gas, eastwards and southwards (“reverse flows”).

Securing Winter Supplies to Ukraine

Undoubtedly, securing winter supplies of gas to Ukraine and diminishing the risk of dis- ruptions in the supply of Russian gas to Europe became the EU’s priorities. The interruption in Russian gas supplies to Ukraine from June 2014 was a consequence of the dispute on gas prices, debt, and contract provisions between Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftohaz. In May, Gaz- prom unilaterally abolished its previous price discounts to Ukraine, and increased the gas price from $285 to $485, claiming that this was the means of recouping the Naftohaz debt, calculated at

$4.5 billion for deliveries in November and December 2013 and April, May and June 2014, and filed the case before the Stockholm arbitration court. Ukraine, in turn, questioned those actions, requested a review of the pricing formula, and demanded $6 billion compensation from Gazprom for wrongly calculated gas prices going back to 2010.

All this has had real implications for the region’s security of supply. As the arbitration procedures take on average between one and three years, despite political controversies, it was in the economic interests of Naftohaz and Gazprom to come to an agreement, and renew the gas supplies. It was also a condition for undisturbed deliveries of Russian gas to the EU. Therefore, since June, the European Commission has joined the negotiations between the parties. Addition- ally, at the end of September, Commissioner Gunther Oettinger tried to increase gas supplies from Norway.¹² Moreover, Poland, Slovakia and Romania sent small volumes of gas back to Ukraine.

Additionally, Gazprom’s weakening economic results as a result of falling global oil prices con- tributed to an agreement being reached after seven rounds and five months of negotiations. On 31 October, Ukraine, Russia, and the European Commission signed a trilateral protocol¹³ that was the basis for restoring Russian gas supplies to Ukraine from November 2014 until 31 March 2015. The volume is flexible, and Ukraine is free to request according to national needs, without a take or pay clause. The price was set “below $385 per thousand cubic metres.” By the end of 2014, Ukraine had already borrowed, and paid $3.1 billion of debt (subject to verification by the Stockholm arbitrage court).

Still, it is too early to claim that the problem has been solved. The arbitration case is still pending, and the trust between the parties has been undermined after violations of Minsk agree- ment by Russia. Moreover, whether the EU and international institutions will be able to “pay the gas bill” by crediting Ukraine after March 2015 remains a question.

Crisis Management and Infrastructure

The European Commission has also undertaken actions to increase internal security in the EU, recognising that these measures need to include neighbouring and transit countries.¹⁴ For the first time, it conducted gas “stress tests” to check the possible effects of a disruption in Russian

12 L. Puka, “The Paradox of a Stable Supplier: Norway in the European Union’s Gas Strategy,” PISM Bulletin, no. 122 (717), 13 October 2014, www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=18395.

13 Binding Protocol regarding the conditions for gas delivery from the Russian Federation to Ukraine for the period from November 2014 until 31 March 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/oettinger/headlines/

news/2014/11/doc/20141030_trilateral_protocol.pdf.

14 “Report on the Findings of the Energy Community Focus Group, Accompanying the Document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Short-term Resilience of the European Gas System. Preparedness for a Possible Disruption of Supplies from the East During the Fall and Winter of 2014/2015,” Brussels, 16 October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/nuclear/2014_energystresstests_

energycommunityfocusgroup.pdf.

tests included the countries that agreed to follow the EU energy liberalisation regime, through the Energy Community (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine), and the candidate country Georgia.

Other major energy stakeholders (The United States, Canada, Japan, Turkey, ENTSO-G, and the International Energy Agency) were also consulted.

The conclusions highlighted the vulnerability of Eastern and South-Eastern European states to disruptions. The most vulnerable were found to be Finland, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Repu- blic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, each of which would face gas shortfalls of at least 60%.¹⁵ Immediate actions to diminish the negative effect of disruption included the implementation of EU liberalisation legislation (a market-based approach), the maximisation of in- terconnector capacity, the removal of restrictions to cross-border energy trade, especially reverse flows, and shared responsibility between public authorities and industry for behavioural changes (energy efficiency and lower demand).

The dependence on one supplier was highlighted in December 2014, when Russia cancel- led the South Stream project, Gazprom’s alternative route to deliver gas to South-Eastern Europe avoiding Ukraine. It was planned that the pipeline would have run under the Black Sea to Bulgaria, and continue through Serbia, Hungary and Austria. In return, Russia came up with an alternative proposal for a new, 50 bcm gas pipeline, to be constructed under the Black Sea to Turkey’s border with Greece, although this project is at a very preliminary stage. Still, cancellation of South Stre- am shifts the responsibility for strengthening the European infrastructure in South-Eastern Europe onto the European companies, Member States, and not least the European Commission. The latter promised in January 2015 to give priority to energy security and interconnectivity in the region.¹⁶

But interconnectivity is also a prerequisite for the energy to physically move and be traded across the borders.¹⁷ Currently, in Southern and Eastern Europe, less than 10% of electricity and gas can be sent this way. The crisis might result in some of the EU’s infrastructure funds being allocated to this region. To this end, the “key infrastructure gas security projects” in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe could receive priority in the funding, from the €5.85 billion Connecting Europe Facility and, in future, from the European Fund for Strategic Investments. Their list was attached to the Commission’s European Energy Security Strategy from May 2014.¹⁸ Although the projects will face tough competition, as EU direct funding for energy projects between 2014 and 2020 will cover only 5% of the EU’s infrastructure needs, the winners will not only contribute to energy security, but also determine the new shape of gas trading in the years to come.

The Need for Strong European Institutions

As illustrated by the example of gas supply negotiations, the European Commission did not try to hide its ambitions to use its legislative and executive powers to shape the EU’s post-

15 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Short-term Resilience of the European Gas System. Preparedness for a Possible Disruption of Supplies from the East During the Fall and Winter of 2014/2015,” COM(2014) 654, Brussels, 16 October 2014.

16 European Commission, “Energy Security and Interconnectivity in Bulgaria and the Other Countries of South-east Europe—a Priority for the European Commission,” Press release IP/15/3180, Brussels, 12 January 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-3180_en.htm.

17 J. De Jong, J.M. Glachant, M. Hafner, “A Smart EU Energy Policy,” CIEP, EUI, FEEM, Wilton Park, 2010; and European Commission, “Progress towards Completing the Internal Energy Market,” COM (2014) 634 final, October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/doc/2014_iem_communication.pdf.

18 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Energy Security Strategy,” COM (2014) 330 final, pp. 22–23, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_

energy_security_communication.pdf.

the higher the degree of import dependence, the greater the need for resilient institutions to com- pensate for the resource scarcity. In the EU, however, the efficiency of its institutions in the energy field remains limited.The tensions between the national and supranational stakeholders are still vivid. Those weaknesses were effectively inscribed into EU law, in Article 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. On the one hand, the EU has explicit competence to develop energy policy,¹⁹ while on the other, the Member States maintain their rights to decide on their own energy mixes and the energy taxation, thus the decisions falling within these scopes are subject to unanimity.²⁰ Consensus is hard to reach as long as the Member States have differing domestic energy resources, different energy requirements, and large, state-owned, monopolistic energy in- dustries.²¹

The external dimension of EU energy policy, as an extension of internal EU regulations, is prone to the same weaknesses. More so indeed, for the fiercely independent Member State poli- cies have been even more visible than in the internal policy field.²² Strengthening the institutions could be achieved either by altering the foundations of the treaty, or de facto, by more fully de- ploying the tools at hand. The first option is not politically feasible, and nor has it been discussed.

The second has been deployed selectively. Despite the robust powers available to it, in particular in the field of competition law, the European Commission has refrained from actions that could possibly antagonise Russia (competition is the only EU domain in which the European Commis- sion has both exclusive competence and great sanctioning powers).The anti-trust case against Gazprom, accused of the abuse of its dominant position,²³ has been put in the queue.

And here we come full circle: to take proper effect externally, the Commission’s competition powers would also have to be developed internally. Current regulations to liberalise and integrate the internal market are insufficient for that to happen. Taking an example from the electricity market, recent positive market developments such as a drop in the wholesale prices in the EU have not been passed on to customers,²⁴ giving the Member States an argument to introduce protectionist measures that, like a vicious circle, make it more difficult to integrate the markets in the future.

Energy in the EU’s New Institutional Cycle

The European Commission under Jean-Claude Juncker aims to transform energy into a major pillar of EU integration. To that end, the Commission itself has undergone structural re- organisation to reflect the agenda to create an Energy Union. The new post of Vice President for the Energy Union was created as a complement to the (newly merged) Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy. The policy course has been set in Juncker’s guidelines. In theory, the manage- rial competences over conduct of the Commission’s “priority project”—the creation of a resilent Energy Union—are vested with Vice President Maroš Šefčovič. To this end, he coordinates the work of a group of commissioners, including Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete.²⁵ The latter is

19 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in force on 1 December 2009.

20 L. Hancher, F.M. Salerno, “Energy Policy after Lisbon,” in: A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout, S. Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York, 2012, pp. 367–402.

21 N. Nugent, Government and Politics of the European Union, Duke University Press, Durham, 2006, p. 376.

22 R. Youngs “The EU’s Global Climate and Energy Policies: Gathering or Losing Momentum?,” in: A. Goldthau (ed.), The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, 2013, p. 421.

23 Should Gazprom be found guilty, the sanctions could reach up to 10 billion. In the current geopolitical situation, it could have political significance, and additional sanctioning power—a confrontation that the EU would rather avoid. More on the case: A. Riley, “Commission v. Gazprom: The Anti-trust Clash of the Decade?,” 2012, Brussels: CEPS, www.ceps.eu/book/commission-v-gazprom-antitrust-clash-decade.

24 European Commission, “Progress...,” op. cit.

25 Commissioners for Climate Action and Energy, Transport, Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Regional Policy, Agriculture and Rural Development and Research,

depend on the new commissioners’ ambitions and their will to cooperate, not to mention the European Parliament’s support for their ideas. As a result, the efficiency of this system of “overlap- ping competences” is not to be taken for granted.

So far, the ambitions of Šefčovič have been paramount. He is developing the concept of an Energy Union, initially presented by Poland’s then prime minister Donald Tusk, and later in Juncker’s guidelines.²⁷ Both versions highlight the need for market integration (the internal market has to be completed,²⁸ resources pooled, and network infrastructure developed) and increased security of supplies (by diversifying energy sources, reducing the high energy dependency of the most vulnerable Member States, and strengthening the negotiating power vis-à-vis third countries).

In the latter aspect, common purchasing of gas was the most controversial aspect of Tusk’s pro- posal, cautiously embraced by Šefčovič in November 2014.²⁹ The difference between Tusk’s and the Commission’s proposals came in the definition of “indigenous energy resources” that should be developed in the EU. For Tusk, those are primarily fossil fuels, while for the President and Vice President of the European Commission, the role of renewables is paramount. The Commission wants to preserve the EU’s leadership in climate change policy and “the European Union to be- come the world number one in renewables.”

The discussion on the EU’s 2030 targets has not solved this dispute, but rather frozen the existing status quo of different energy mixes (thus, interests) between various EU Member States.

The European Council’s Conclusions of 23–24 October 2014 (2030 Climate and Energy Frame- work), provide for only one binding goal on each Member State, namely of reducing greenhouse gases by 2030, by 40% compared to 1990.³⁰ The main instrument to lead the transformation will be reformed emission trading system. The ten poorest EU Member States, including Poland, have been granted access to an additional crediting fund to modernise their energy systems, and the possibility of up to 40% of free allowances to their power sectors. There is no binding obligation on them with regard to renewables, and no energy efficiency target. In theory, by 2030 there will be room for coal power plants in the EU. In practice, however, much will depend on the price of emission allowances as well as the efficacy of the new governance structure in the EU, where the Commission will work out national renewable goals in a dialogue with the Member States, as well as the governance reform within institutions, and division of powers between the Commission and the European Parliament.

Thus, so far, the Energy Union concept can be viewed as old wine in a new bottle. The Ukrainian crisis has created a necessity to integrate, but has not changed EU energy policy fun- damentals, nor has it solved the underlying diverging interests between the Member States and between them and the EU as whole.

Science and Innovation. J.-C. Juncker, “Mission Letter to Vice-President for Energy Union”, 1 November 2015, http://

ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/sefcovic_en.pdf.

26 J.-C. Juncker, “Mission Letter to Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy”, 1 November 2015, http://

ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/commissioner_mission_letters/arias-canete_en.pdf.pdf.

27 J.-C. Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change.

Political Guidelines for the next European Commission,” http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/docs/pg_

en.pdf.

28 With the European Commission envisaging the €200 billion in added value from the completed internal market, ibidem, p. 19.

29 “Šefčovič: ‚We Should Explore Common Purchasing of Gas’,” EurActiv, 18 November 2014, www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/sefcovic-we-should-explore-common-purchasing-gas-310091?utm_

source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=d82242608b-newsletter_daily_update&utm_medium=email&utm_

term=0_bab5f0ea4e-d82242608b-245671905.

30 European Council, “23 and 24 October 2014 Conclusions,” Brussels, 24 October 2014, www.consilium.

europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/145397.pdf.

III. EU Migration Governance: Incomplete Drive for Liberal Policy

The Russian–Ukrainian crisis has so far had only a limited impact on the EU’s border management and migration policy, the humanitarian dimension of this conflict notwithstanding.

Tellingly, it is a picture of a boat filled with migrants somewhere in the Mediterranean that is featured on the cover of the Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2014, and indeed Europe’s southern border, not the eastern one, seems subject to the highest migratory pressure. Still, independent of geographical locations, the need for better overall migration policy with special emphasis on a Common European Asylum System and modern border management is acute. In principle, the EU’s migratory policy aims, in its external dimension, not only to complement the EU’s internal free movement regime and ensure enhanced security in the Schengen area, but also to strengthen the EU’s neighbourhood strategy. However, with the mounting challenges in the neighbourhood, combined with differences in both migratory governance needs and capacities of the Member States, the EU’s drive for liberal polices remains largely incomplete.

In this context, the Russian–Ukrainian crisis poses just another challenge for the EU’s migration governance. First, in the current, highly uncertain situation, there is a need for contin- gency plans to prepare for a potentially large inflow of forced migrants that would test European solidarity, now so clearly insufficient in the south. Second, Ukraine is likely to become a source of increased labour migration at a time when the European Union is aiming to reshape its migra- tion policy against the background of strong anti-immigration social sentiment among its citizens.

Third, the crisis is affecting existing schemes of cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, such as the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, and may pave the way for new instruments, for instance a Mobility Partnership.

Asylum Policies—Testing EU Solidarity

EU Member States, Switzerland, and Norway have witnessed a substantial rise in the num- ber of Ukrainian asylum applications, especially since the beginning of 2014. In May 2014, 720 new asylum applications were lodged in comparison to 70 in May 2013.³¹ The rise was particu- larly high in Poland, which received almost one third of the total number of applications made in the first half of 2014. In July the European Asylum Support Office organised workshops in Warsaw to discuss Ukrainian arrivals.³² As the possibility of a further rise cannot be excluded, several Member States prepared contingency plans.³³ Poland is particularly prone to a rise in the number, as it is a border state and a country with a high number of Ukrainian migrants (due to social net- works facilitating arrivals).

How well is the EU prepared for the scenario of forced migration from the east? In the wake of the Kosovo conflict, the European Union agreed on a Temporary Protection Directive,³⁴ an instrument for dealing with a mass influx of displaced persons. Yet this directive has never been used, despite large inflows of people following the Arab Spring and the conflict in Syria. Although

“solidarity” is one of the aims and instruments of the EU’s asylum system, its actual meaning re- mains purposefully vague.³⁵ Member States are the players responsible for granting the appropri-

31 In EU-28, Eurostat.

32 Ibidem.

33 Ibidem.

34 “Council Directive 2001/55/EC of July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof.”

35 M. Garlick, Strengthening Refugee Protection and Meeting Challenges: the European Union’s Next Steps on Asylum, Policy Brief, Migration Policy Institute Policy Europe, June 2014.

ate level of protection as defined by recently renegotiated (or “recast”) directives that shape the Common European Asylum System. A potentially higher burden is also placed on frontline states due to the Dublin regulation³⁶ that (if other conditions, such as family reunification, fail to apply) makes the first country of entry responsible for the application. Solidarity mechanisms, namely financial help available through the Asylum and Migration Fund,³⁷ operational help provided by the European Asylum Support Office³⁸ or use of special instruments such as relocation³⁹ are lim- ited in their influence and use.

Nevertheless, despite a high increase in the share of new asylum applications lodged by Ukrainians, their absolute number is relatively small, accounting for 2.5% of all new asylum ap- plications in the EU during 2014.⁴⁰ Moreover, only a few applicants are granted asylum (generally Ukrainians do not meet the criteria for refugee status⁴¹) or some subsidiary forms of protection.

Thus, many choose to use other migration channels to reach third countries or migrate internally,⁴² to other parts of Ukraine. The UNHCR assessed that there are at least 514,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine, many in acute need of support.⁴³

Figure 1. Number of new asylum applications in 2014

Source: Eurostat.

36 Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national as amended by Regulation No. 118/2014, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/

examination-of-applicants/index_en.htm.

37 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on Establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund,” COM (2011) 751 Final, Brussels, 15 November 2011, http://eur-lex.

europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0751:FIN:EN:PDF.

38 “Regulation (EU) No. 439/2010 of the European Parliament and the Council of 19 May 2010 Establishing a European Asylum Support Office,” http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:132:0011:0028:E N:PDF.

39 European Council Conclusions of 18–19 June 2009.

40 Eurostat.

41 Criteria set in “The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees together with 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”

42 For more detailed analysis see: M. Jaroszewicz, “Problem uchodźczy na Ukrainie: ocena sytuacji,” Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 18 September 2014, www.osw.waw.pl.

43 State for December 2014, UNHCR, Briefing note, www.unhcr.org/5481b1896.html.

Source: Eurostat.

Labour Migration—Testing EU Openness

Ukrainian labour migration is directed mainly to Russia, followed closely by a number of workers choosing destinations in Europe (around 40% of Ukrainians who migrate). Poland, where Ukrainians are the most numerous group of migrants, benefited particularly from this trend, with many Ukrainians finding employment in agriculture, construction and household services. Many of them are circular migrants, who work in the EU but often return to Ukraine where they live. A comprehensive forecast presented by Poland’s Centre of Eastern Studies in 2014 estimates that the number of Ukrainians in the EU27 and Norway will reach between 1,150,000 (low scenario) and 2,500,000 (high scenario) by 2050, in comparison to an estimated one million Ukrainian residents now.⁴⁴ The impact of the Russian–Ukrainian crisis is not fully assessed in this study, but provisio- nal estimations suggest that any substantial change in the foreseen volume of labour migration is only possible if the unrest becomes much more severe.⁴⁵ If not, the influence of the situation in Ukraine will be rather indirect, while a further deterioration of the country’s economic conditions may determine the “high scenario.”

In 2013 Ukrainians received the highest number of first residence permits in the entire EU, and Poland was the host country for most of them. Of these applications, 64.1% were issued for employment reasons. Apart from the economic and security situation, much will also depend on Russian policy towards Ukrainian forced and labor migrants, and the possible tightening of the im- migration rules may provoke a re-orientation towards the EU with substantial numbers of qualified workers heading for wealthier EU Member States and Norway.⁴⁶ An increase in the supply of la- bour through migration could be good news for EU economies that have to deal with negative de- mographic changes, but may pose policy challenges at a time of high anti-immigration sentiment

44 M. Jaroszewicz, M. Lesińska (eds.), “Forecasting Migration between the EU, V4, and Eastern Europe. Impact of Visa Abolition,” Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, July 2014; number refers to legal migration and does not reflect circular migration.

45 Ibidem, p. 16.

46 Ibidem, pp. 103–104.

more people settling permanently, followed by a wave of family reunifications and an increase in the number of students.⁴⁷ A rise in the number of migrants may also entail more irregular migra- tion, which is currently estimated to reach between 20–40% of the overall number of migrants.⁴⁸

Migration and Development—Testing EU Partnership Building

Enhancing mobility between Ukraine and the EU was identified by the Commission as one of the most important instruments of the EU’s support for successful Ukrainian development and transition.⁴⁹ Thus, the commission declared its support for Ukrainian efforts to quickly meet the requirements of the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, proposing a Mobility Partnership and un- derlining increased possibilities for the mobility of students and young people under Erasmus+.

Visa facilitation discussions between the EU and Ukraine began in 2008, and the princi- ples were agreed in the 2010 Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. In May 2014, after the adoption of the bulk of new legislation, Ukraine successfully moved to the second phase of the plan, when the Commission assesses the actual functioning of the relevant policies.⁵⁰ Currently, the imple- mentation of the required measures is, unfortunately, still far from satisfactory.⁵¹ The impact of the Russian–Ukrainian crisis on the possible dynamics of visa liberalisation is twofold. First, the crisis makes it much more difficult for Ukraine to reform and for the EU to assess the progress, and second, visa liberalisation has become a more important instrument of foreign policy aimed at enhancing people to people contacts. Thus, before the process of visa liberalisation is concluded, Member States can use the existing possibilities under the Visa Facilitation Agreement and Visa Code to facilitate the entrance of certain categories of migrants from Ukraine.⁵²

Mobility partnerships are non-legally binding political declarations between interested Member States and third countries, aimed at improving migration governance in the mutual in- terests of those states. So far, the commission has led negotiations resulting in seven such agre- ements. The possibility of signing a Mobility Partnership with Ukraine was raised during the Hungarian Presidency, but with no results.⁵³ Nevertheless, in the current circumstances, that form of cooperation could receive a new boost, especially if the EU were to come up with an attracti- ve offer.⁵⁴ This would mean not only facilitating legal migration, but also agreeing on measures aimed at fighting brain-drain and brain-waste effects. As participation in the Mobility Partnerships is voluntary, it would also test individual Member States’ willingness to engage.

47 Ibidem, p. 221.

48 Ibidem, p. 10.

49 European Commission, “European Commission’s Support to Ukraine,” Memo, Brussels, 5 March 2014, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-159_en.htm.

50 European Commission, “Fourth Report on the Implementation by Ukraine of the Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation,” COM(2014) 336 final, Brussels, 27 May 2014. See: Eastern Partnership Visa Liberalisation Index for Ukraine, http://monitoring.visa-free-europe.eu/ukraine.

51 See: ibidem.

52 “Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine on Facilitation of the Issuance of Visas with Amendments” and “Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 Establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code).”

53 E. Guild, S. Carrera, J. Parkin, “What Role for Migration Policy in the Ukrainian Crisis?,” CEPS, 27 March 2014, www.ceps.be.

54 Ibidem.

Clearly it is not the situation in the Eastern Neighborhood that drives the new agenda for the EU’s migration policies, but the new approaches may also help address challenges posed by the Russian–Ukrainian crisis. Both the European Council (in its “Strategic Agenda for the Union in the Times of Change” paper) and the president-elect of the European Commission (in his pre- sentation before the European Parliament on priorities of the new European Commission) reco- gnised migration policy as one of the EU’s main priorities in the coming years.⁵⁵ Priority is given to policies that are useful in dealing with the migratory pressures on the EU’s southern flank, such as improvements in border management and the solidarity component of the Common European Asylum System. The experience from the south could also be useful in the event of a humanitarian catastrophe developing in Ukraine if the situation there were to spiral out of control and trigger mass forced migration from this conflict-torn country.

The announced focus on legal migration channels that are to help the EU deal with demo- graphic tensions and labour shortages could also help to boost and streamline Ukrainian migra- tion. Some new policy approaches are reflected in the institutional framework of the new Commis- sion.⁵⁶ In the new Commission, in which vice-presidents coordinate the work of different groups of commissioners, the foreign policy dimension of the EU’s migration policy will be improved by cooperation between the Commissioner responsible for Migration and Home Affairs and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Supervision by the Vice President for Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is to ensure respect for fundamental rights. The decisive factor in the EU’s ability (or lack thereof) to deal with the migration related challenges caused by the Ukrainian crisis will be not so much the question of policy design, but rather the question of successful implementation of the new policy.

55 Respectively, European Council, “Strategic Agenda for the Union in the Times of Change,” 26/27 June 2014;

J.-C. Juncker, op. cit.

56 See: http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/structure/index_en.htm.

IV. Poland and Norway in the New International Governance Environment

The escalation of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, from popular protests in Ukraine, through Russian intervention to hybrid war,⁵⁷ has created new framework conditions for European govern- ance, with consequences that extend well beyond the security arena. These developments have had an impact on two European countries in particular, Russia’s neighbours Norway and Poland.

Despite their middling size and populations, their political significance in the EU and NATO has recently increased, as indicated by the happy symmetry of the elevation of two former prime ministers to top European posts. Donald Tusk became the President of the European Council, and Jens Stoltenberg is now NATO Secretary General. Not only are the EU and NATO the main governance environments for both countries,⁵⁸ which might look upon the elevations as rewards for loyal cooperation, but Norway and Poland are now expected to influence and generate new ideas for the EU and NATO agendas—Poland, as a neighbour and ardent advocate of Ukrainian interests and the Eastern Partnership in the EU, and Norway, as the next major natural-resource supplier to the EU after Russia.

Not that the interests and priorities of the two countries are wholly congruent of course.

Poland, acutely aware of its domestic vulnerabilities, has focused on the issue of solidarity. War- saw pointed in particular to perceived deficiencies in international security guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe, and increased domestic military spending. It has also highlighted the vulnera- bility of energy systems in this part of Europe, and called for the creation of an Energy Union. That strengthened Poland’s negotiating position in designing the EU 2030 climate and energy strategy, and allowed security concerns to be included. By contrast, the demanding refugee situation in the southern Mediterranean, and the continued lack of clarity about forced migration trends in the east, have left Poland with a difficult hand to play in the field of migration. Calls for solidarity are being directed at Poland by other Member States.

As for Norway, it shares Poland’s concerns about the weakness of international guarantees in this part of Europe, and has increased its own defence spending, as well as aligning its policies more closely with the EU. However, it does so from a stronger budgetary position and amidst speculation that Moscow will not risk jeopardising relations along its northern sea routes, which until now have been quite well regulated. Moreover, in the energy field Norway’s priority is still ensuring that the EU does not move away from gas, which is viewed as less reliable thanks to Rus- sian unpredictability in the security field. There is scepticism amongst Norwegian suppliers about Polish suggestions that EU Member States strengthen their hand by conducting joint purchases of gas, proposal that was a core element of the original Energy Union proposal. As for migration from Ukraine, this is still not regarded as an immediate challenge, though it is likely that this will change due to the magnetic effect of the Norwegian labour market.

This mix of shared and divergent interests between Poland and Norway conforms to an increasingly common pattern of cooperation in current international relations, which might be termed “complex interdependence.” As such, the pair need to develop a common means of deal- ing with three overarching challenges.

57 For more on this type of warfare and the challenges it poses, see F.G. Hoffman, Conflicts in the 21^st Century:

The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, 2007, and F.G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly, 52, 2009, pp. 34–39, and J. Vandiver, “SACEUR: Allies Must Prepare for Russia’s Hybrid War,” Stars and Stripes, 4 September 2014. In the current context, this study is also relevant: M. Galleotti, “The

‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” 2014, http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the- gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war.

58 Poland is a full member of the EU. Norway has special status—more than 70 agreements, including the Agreement on the European Economic Area, link the country to the EU internal market and a wide range of other EU policies.