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Principles of the Austrian Security and Defense Policy and current results for the structure of the Armed

Forces

Captain Rudolf LOGOTHETTI, Austrian Armed Forces Reserve, Senior Researcher, Directorate General for

Security Policy, Austrian MOD

Basic remarks

Nineteen of the member states of the EU are taking part in NATO, while Austria belongs to the 6 member states of the EU which are not members of NATO at the same time. The history and the interests of the 6 members (Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Austria) show very different backgrounds and positions to the question of NATO membership. Austria’s policy of neutrality cannot be compared with the Irish or the Finnish one or with the specific situation of Cyprus or Malta. So you can state that there is no common position and no common strategy of the non NATO members in the EU despite some common initiatives and a “common focus” on ESDP.

Very soon after 1955, the year from which the Neutrality Act dates, Austria left the way of the model of modern neutrality – Switzerland and took part actively in UN peacekeeping operations rather early (e.g. in the early

60th in Congo, in the 70th in Cyprus and the Middle East)

Therefore the Austrian neutrality developed much more in the direction of a non-alignment policy instead of a

Pri nci ples of the Au

strian Secu rity an d Def en se P oli cy

and curren t results f

or th e structu

re of the Ar med

For ces

Captain Rudolf L OG OT HETT I, Austrian A rmed

Forc es

Reserve, S eni

or Res earch er, Dire

ctorat e Gene ral for

Securi ty P oli cy, Austri

an MOD

Basi c rem ark s

Ninet een of t

he m em ber stat es of the

EU are tak ing part

in NATO, while Austr ia be

longs to the 6 me mber

state s

of the EU which

are not m em bers of NATO at

the sam

e mbers the 6 me rests of nd the inte history a time. The

(Sweden, Finland, I rela

nd, Ma lta, C

yprus and Austria)

show very dif fer ent backgrounds and position

s to the question of NATO membership. Austria’s po

licy of

neutrality cannot be co

mpared with the Ir ish or the

Finnish one or with the specific situation of C yprus or

Malta . So you ca

n state tha t the re is no c ommon

position NATO mem gy of the non and no common strate

bers in

the EU de spite some

common init iative

s and a “co mmon

focus” on ESDP.

Very soon after 1955, the year from which the N

eutralit y

Act da tes, Austr ia lef

t the way of

the mod el of mode

rn in UN erland and took part actively neutrality – Switz

peacekeepi ng op

erations rather

earl y (e.

g. i n t he ea rly

th 60 in Cong o, in the 70

in C th

yprus and the Middle East)

Therefore the Austrian neutrality dev

eloped mu

ch more y inste n-alignment polic in the direction of a no

ad of a

(2)

classical policy of neutrality according to the model of Switzerland.

Particularly after the end of the Cold War the position of neutrality was questioned seriously but because of domestic politics, consensus could not be achieved. Since the Neutrality Act of 1955 has the character of a constitutional act any change of this act requires a majority of 2/3 of the members of parliament which doesn’t seem to be realistic at the moment.

Not being a member of NATO which is the traditional and by many decision makers considered as the most efficient regional organization of collective security Austria relates her security and defense policy primarily to the European Union.

One crucial structural aspect in the question NATO – EU cannot be overseen: While NATO is based on the principles of inter-governmentality and consensual decision making by its nature the European Union particularly her “finality” offers the option of a development from inter-governmentality towards integration even for the “core” of national sovereignty - foreign, security and defense policy. Depending on the development of the European Union after an aspired Constitutional Treaty – in the direction of a kind of federal state or a specific kind of confederation – and taking into account that the principle of subsidiarity which is already part of such a possible constitutional framework requires the “unification” of ESDP rather than other fields of politics the European Union is the “more open” institution compared to NATO.

classi cal pol icy of neutra

lit y acco rding

to t he model of

Switzerland.

Partic ularl y a fter the e nd of the Cold Wa

r the position of

neutrality w as questioned se riously but bec

ause of

domestic politics, c

onsensus c ould not be a

chie ved. Sinc

e 1955 has the character of a ct of the Neutrality A

constitutiona l act

any ch ang e of this ac

t req uir es a

major ity of 2/3 of the me

mbers of parlia

ment which

doesn’t seem to be realistic at the moment.

Not being a me mber of NATO whic

h is the tr aditiona l

and by man y de

cision makers conside red

as the most

efficient regi onal or

ganiz ation of col lect

ive

security rimaril y p ense polic and def ity Austria relates her secur y

to the European Union.

One crucial struct ural as

pect i n t he quest ion NATO – EU

cannot be overseen: W hile NATO is based on the

princi ples of i nte

r-gov ernment

ali ty and co nsensual

decision making b y its nature the Europe

an Union the option ers off lity” “fina y her ularl partic

of a

development from inter-governm entalit

y t owards

integr ation e ven

for the “ cor e” of nationa l sovere

ignt

y - Depending on the fense policy. rity and de foreign, secu

development of the Eu ropean Union afte

r an aspired

Constitutional Tr eat y – in the dir

ection of

a kind of c kind of confederat e or a specifi stat federal

ion – and

taking into a ccount that the principle of subs

idiarity

which is a lre

ady pa rt o f suc h a possible c

onstitutional

framewo rk requi

res the “ unifi

cation” of

ESDP rather than opean Union is the “ s the Eur ds of politic iel other f mor

e

open”

institution compa red to NATO.

(3)

Principles of Austrian security policy

Six years after joining the European Union in 1994 and three years before the ESS ‘European Security Structure’

(better known as “Solana Paper”) the Austrian Parliament (Nationalrat) adopted the actual Security and Defense Doctrine (SVD) in December 2001. On the occasion of the membership negotiations with the EU in the early

90th Austria emphasized already her willingness in “full

participation” even in the 2nd pillar of the Treaty of

Maastricht. The former reacting and territorial bound approach towards security policy and defense was replaced by a new comprehensive view of a multinational, active and preventive security policy directed to stabilization of the political (not so much geographic) environment.

General Considerations

Security in all its aspects is a prerequisite for continuance and functioning of a constitutional democracy as well the economic well-being of society and its citizens.

Therefore security policy is a paramount political duty of the state. Under the current circumstances this duty has to be designed and realized as a “comprehensive security policy”. Austria’s effort is aimed at the prevention of violent conflicts. Therefore its security policy is directed at the prevention of war and peaceful coexistence of nations – based on the Charter of the United Nations, on international conventions for the protection of basic- and liberty rights, on the Convention for Protection of Human

Pri nci ples of Austri

an secu rity p

oli cy

Six yea rs a fter joinin g t

he European Union in 1994 and

three years b efor

e t he ESS ‘European S

ecurity Str uct ure’

(better known as

“Solana Paper”

) the Austrian Par

liament and Defens ecurity ual S ed the act ) adopt rat (National

e

Doctrine (SVD) in Dece

mber 2001. On the occas

ion of

the me mbership neg

otiations with the EU in the e

arl

y full s in “ nes her willing ady lre d a phasize em Austria th 90

partic ipation”

ev en in t

nd he 2 pillar of the Treat

y of

Maastricht. The former reacting and ter

ritorial bound

approach towards secu rity polic

y

and defense was ensi compreh a new ed by replac

ve vi ew of a

multinationa l, active

and pr eve

ntive secur

ity policy

direc ted to stabiliza

tion of the politic

al ( not so

much . ) environment graphic geo

General Consi

derati ons

Securi ty in al l it s aspect s is

a prer equisi

te fo r continuance

and f unctioning

of a con stitutional de

mocra cy a s we

ll the itizens. and its c y iet of soc g bein well- economic

Therefore securit

y polic y is a p aramount political

duty o f

the st ate. Under t he curre

nt ci rcumst

ances thi s duty has t

o ty securi prehensive “com ed as a realiz ed and be design

policy”

. Austria’s ef fort is aimed at the preven

tion of

violent conflicts. Therefore its securit y polic

y is

directed tence of exis ful co peace ar and f w evention o he pr at t

nations – based on the C harter o

f the United Nations, on

international conventions for the protection of basic- and

liberty ri ghts, on the Convention for Protection of Human

(4)

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The purpose of security policy is to guarantee the security for preferably all fields of a community. The security and defense doctrine represents the guideline of the Austrian security policy.

Protection of the state structures as well of its citizens against all kinds of threats is the nucleus of the security and defense doctrine. The security situation of an European country cannot be examined isolated.

Instabilities and perils in Europe or its periphery affect the security situation of all European countries. The new threats and risks can not be dealt alone but only through international cooperation and solidarity. On a national basis it is imperative to develop a public understanding for security policy issues.

Paradigm Shift in Europe

In Europe a paradigm shift took place. The process which started with the end of the Cold War in 1989 led over from a concept of deterrence to an understanding of a comprehensive and cooperative security. The bipolar order with a relative stable and therefore manageable constellation of powers and threats was replaced by a new complexity of the world order and new security challenges. Geographical distance of conflicts is no longer a satisfactory protection. At the time there are no aggressive political intentions as well enough military potential for strategic-offensive operations in Europe. A responsible security policy has to be prepared for any changes of political intentions and constellations.

Rights and Fundamenta

l F ree doms and the E

uropean

Charter of F undamental Rights. The purpose of

security

polic y is to guar antee t he securi ty for p

ref erably all fiel

ds doctrine and defense y e securit y. Th of a communit

represent s t he gui del ine of the Aust

rian s ecurity

pol icy .

Prote ction of the sta

te s tru ctur es a s we ll of its

citize

ns against all kinds of threats is the nucleus of the securit y

and defense doctrin e. The secu

rity situatio n of an

European countr y c

annot be ex amined isolated.

Insta bilitie s and pe

rils i n Eur ope or

its peri phery af fec

t new s. The trie oun n c ll Europea tion of a situa ity cur the se

threats and risks can not be dealt alone but only through

international cooperatio n and solidarity. On

a national develop a public understanding basis it is imperative to for securi ty pol icy issues.

Par adig m Shift in Europe

In Europ e a paradi

gm shift took place. The process which started with the end o f the Cold W

ar in 1989 l ed over

from a conc ept of deter

rence to an underst

anding of

a

comprehensi ve and

cooperat ive secu rity

. The bi

polar nage ore ma theref and able tive st rela r with a orde

able

constellation of powers and threat

s was replac ed by a

new complexit y of the world order and new securit

y is no cts fli stance of con l di raphica eog nges. G challe

longer a satisfa ctory prot

ection. At the time there are no

aggressive political intentions as well enoug h military

potential for strate gic-o ffensive op

erations in Europe. A has to be prepa cy y poli responsible securit red f

or an y

cha nge s of politic al inte

ntions a nd conste

llations.

(5)

A modern and forward-looking security policy rests upon prevention of the becoming of risks and threats. There is a new emphasis of the instruments of security policy.

“New” instruments of cooperation and configuration are used today: political, military, police, intelligence, economic, social, education, culture, information, communication and ecological instruments as well such of internal security. For the future of Europe the development of security policy of EU and NATO will be decisive.

New Risks and Threats are replacing clear Security &

Threat Perceptions

The old threat scenarios from the Cold War times are replaced by a new and complex mixture of risks and menaces with a wide variety of reasons. In unstable European regions and its periphery there is still the menace of war and conflict. In case political and economic measures of stabilization are failing we must expect possible escalation of political disputes to the point of armed conflicts. In case of a fundamental change of political intentions in Europe we must admit that an element of military risk remains. At the time this risk is very low due to the presence of a political intact NATO.

The most important challenges of a global security policy are the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism – supported & guided by states or political lobbies, organized crime, destabilizing armament efforts, totalitarian ideologies, fundamentalist religions, population development and migration, energy and

A modern and forward-l ooking secu

rity polic y r

ests upon

prevention of t he b

ecoming of ri sks and thre

ats.

There is instruments of security polic a new emphasis of the

y.

“New” instruments of c ooperation and

configur ation are

used toda y: politic

al, milita ry, police

, intellig ence

, rmation, ucation, culture, info economic, social, ed

communic ation a

nd eco logica l instrume

nts as we ll such

of int ernal security

. For t he fut ure of Euro

pe the will be and NATO of EU y policy rit secu lopment of deve

decisive.

New Ri sks an d T hreats are r ep

laci ng cl ear Sec

uri

ty & s tion reat Percep Th

The old t hreat scenarios

from t he C old War t im es are

replac ed by

a new and compl

ex m ixt ure of risks and

menaces with

a wi de variet y of reasons.

In unstabl

e is still the there phery its peri ons and egi an r Europe

menace of war and c onflict. In

case political and

economic meas

ure s of sta biliza

tion are failing we must

expe ct possible esca

lation of political

disputes to the ase of a fund point of armed conflicts. In c ament

al change

of politic al inte

ntions in Eur ope we

must admit that a

n

ele ment of military

risk r ema ins. At the time

this

risk is ATO. t N al intac a politic e of presenc low due to the very

The most important challenges of a gl

obal securit y polic

y sm – ori l terr ationa WMD, intern ation of olifer the pr are

supported &

guided b y

states or political lobbies,

orga nized c rime , dest

abilizing arma

ment e ffo rts,

totalitarian ideologies , fundamentalist re

ligions, nd migration, energ population development a

y and

(6)

resource shortages, famine and ecological disasters.

Particularly international terrorism in all its characteristics is a main security problem for western civilizations.

A comprehensive understanding of security includes the following basic strategies:

ƒ affirmative action

ƒ securing and restoration of peace and stability

ƒ individual/collective self-defense

The basic principle says: “As much peace encouragement as possible and only so much arbitrary measures respectively sanctions as necessary.” The deployment of military means of coercion is a tool with the character of

“ultima ratio” and should be used only in respect with the Charter of the United Nations. (Nevertheless one should see the relativism of the term “ultima ratio”: in common understanding it means the last measure but the Romans understood it also as ultimate or extreme measure.)

Conclusions

Although the Austrian Security- and Defense Doctrine had been elaborated before the European Security Structure (ESS), objectives and means are rather identically. To a large amount this is due to the fact that the SVD is formulated in a very generalizing manner and on the other hand Austria doesn’t have to obey other international obligations like the NATO Treaty. Austria is interested to be a kind of a “Musterknabe” (model resource shorta

ges, famine and e colog

ical disasters.

Partic ularl y inter natio

nal te rro rism in a ll its

charact eri stic s is a m ain

security problem

for west

ern tions. civiliza

A comprehensive unders tanding of se

curity inclu

des the ies: strateg basic following

ƒ affirm ativ e action

ƒ secu rin g a nd restor ation of pe ace and sta bilit

y se fen -de self ollective individual/c ƒ

The basic pri nci ple sa ys:

“As m uch pe

ace encou rag

ement measures y trar uch arbi e and only so m as possibl

respectiv ely sanct ions as

necessar y.”

The deployment of

military mean s of c oer cion is a tool with the c

har act er o

f ct with the y in respe “ultima ratio” and should be used onl

Charter of the United Nations. (Nev

ertheless one should

see the rela tivism of the

te rm “ultima ratio”

: in c ommon

understanding it means t he last measure but the

Romans re. understood it also as ultimate or extreme measu )

Conclusions Although the Austri an Securi

ty- and Defens

e Doctrine ean S he Europ ated before t had been elabor

ecurity

Structure (ESS), objectives and me ans are rathe

r

identically.

To a la rge am ount this is due to the

fact that

the SVD is f ormula

ted in a ve ry ge nera lizing ma

nner a

nd other on the other hand Austria doesn’t have to obey

intern ationa l obligations like

the NATO Trea

ty.

Austria

is interested to be a ki nd of a “Musterkn

abe”

(model

(7)

child) in NATO’s PfP, UN and OSCE and of course in ESDP. Two items of the document have to be mentioned:

ƒ the strong commitment for Human Rights and Public

International Law, and

ƒ the central role of the UN which is a clear

commitment to multilateralism and that corresponds to the European Security Structure (ESS).

Consequences for the structure of the Armed Forces Following new tasks the structure of the Armed Forces had to be adapted. The so called “Bundesheer Reformkommission” elaborated the cornerstones for the restructuring process.

Phase I (2005) reduction and consolidation

Phase II (2006) establishment of the new strategic

and operational level

Phase III (2007) attainment of the new structure

According to the result of the reform or transformation process the Army Organization AAF 2010 will look like the following structure:

child) in NATO’s P fP , UN and OSC

E and of c ourse in

ESDP. Two items of the document have to be m entioned:

ƒ the str ong c ommitme nt for Huma

n Rights a nd Public

Inte rnational Law,

and

the cent ƒ

ral rol e of t he UN whi

ch i s a clear

commitme nt to multila

tera lism and tha

t c orr espo nds

to t he European S ecuri

ty Struct ure (ESS

).

Conseq uen ces for th

e structu re of th

e Armed Forces

Following ne w ta

sks the struc ture of the A

rme d F orc es

had to be adapted. The so called “B undesheer

Reform komm

issi on” elaborat

ed the corn erstones

for the cess. restructuring pro

Phase I (2005) reduction and con

solidation (2006) establishment of the new strate Phase II

gic

and operational level

Phase III

(2007) attainment of the new structure

Acco rdin g to the r esult

of the ref orm or tran

sfor mation

process the Army Or ganiz

ation AAF 2010 will look like

the fol lowi ng st ructur e:

(8)

Army Organization AAF 2010

Directly subordinated units:

- 1 unit military police

- 2 command and control support battalions - 1 unit special operation forces

- 1 International Operations Basis (incl.

CIMIC)

4 Brigades:

- 4 Headquarters battalions - 4 Infantry battalions

- 3 Mountain Infantry battalions - 1 Airborne Infantry battalion - 2 Mechanized infantry battalions - 2 Tank battalions

- 3 Reconnaissance & artillery battalions - 3 Sapper battalions

Aviation & Air Defense units: aerial surveillance & aerial support command - 1 Radar battalion

- 1 Surveillance squadron - 1 Aerial support squadron - 2 Air defense battalions - Radar & Maintenance units - Imminent units

Arm y Organizat ion A

AF 2010

Directly subordinated units:

- 1 un it m ilitary

po lice

- 2 comm

and an d cont

rol suppor

t battal

ions ces on for erati l op pecia 1 unit s -

- 1 Inter

national Oper ations B asi

s (incl .

CIMIC)

4 Brigade s:

- 4 Headq uar ter s battal

ions alions y batt 4 Infantr -

- 3 Moun tain In fantry battal ions

- 1 Airbor ne In

fantry ba

ttalion y battal antr ed inf niz 2 Mecha -

ions

- 2 Tank bat

talions

- 3 Reco

nna issan ce &

ar tillery ba ttalio ns

- 3 Sapper

batt alions

Avi ati on & A

ir De fens

e uni ts: a eri

al l support command eria surveillance & a

- 1 Radar bat talion

- 1 Survei

llance sq

uadron ort sq supp 1 Aerial -

uadr on

- 2 Air de fense b

attal ions

- Radar & Mai

nten ance uni

ts

- Imminen t units

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