Opening Presentation: Peace Operations: A Dynamic Concept
Prof. Erwin A. SCHMIDL, Senior Researcher, Austrian Defense Academy
There can be little doubt that peace operations (as they are usually called in UN documents) or peace support operations (a term increasingly used in the context of NATO) have developed considerably over the past fifteen years. At the same time, their appreciation by the public (and in publicized opinion) has oscillated between their appraisal as a nearly universal miracle medicine for crises worldwide, and their (and the world organization’s) damnation as insufficient and failures.
Success stories (such as the operations in South West Africa/Namibia, in 1989-90, or on the Macedonian- Serbian border, from 1992 to 1999) were easily forgotten or ignored, while less successful missions (such as those in Rwanda in 1994, in Somalia in 1993-95, or in Bosnia- Herzegovina in 1992-95) were seen as complete failures, which keep bedeviling the international organizations involved. The truth, as usual, is not to be found in images of stark contrast between black and white, but rather in varying shades of gray. It should not be denied that very few missions, if any, can qualify as total success stories, nor were there many total failures. Most operations succeeded in some of their tasks while failing in others.
Some missions – because of realistic mandates, good management and leadership, and a sound portion of luck – resulted in lasting improvements, while others – even if apparently successful for contemporary observers –
Opening Pre sent
ation: Peace Op erations: A
Dyna mic Co ncept
Prof. Erwin A. SCHMID L, Senior Res earcher,
Austrian
Defense Ac ademy
There can be little doubt that pea
ce oper ations (
as the
y documents) or peace support called in UN are usually
operations (a te rm incre
asing ly us ed in the
contex t of
NATO) have dev elope
d considerably ov er the past
fif teen ye ars. At the same
time, the ir a pprecia tion b
y the d betwe illate has osc ized opinion) and in public public (
en
thei r apprai
sal as a nearl
y uni versal mir
acle m edi cine fo r
crises worldwide, and their (and the
world nd fa nt a cie insuffi organization’s) damnation as
ilures.
Success stories (such as the operations in Sout h West
Africa/Namibia, in 198 9-90, or on the Macedonian- Serbian border, from 199 2 to 1999) were easil
y fo rgotten
or igno red, while less successful missions (such
as those
in Rwanda in 1994, in Soma lia in 1993-95, or in
Bosnia-
Herzeg ovina in 1992-95)
were s een as complete fa
ilures, ganiza tional or rna g the inte devilin ep be which ke
tions
involved. The truth, as us ual, is not to be found
in imag es
of stark contrast betwee n black and white, but r
ather in It should not be denied that ver gray. g shades of varyin
y
few missions, if any
, c an qua lify a
s total su cce ss stor ies,
nor we re the re m any tota l failur es. Most ope
rations others. g in their tasks while failin e of succeeded in som
Some missions – because of realistic mandates
, g ood
manage ment and le
adership, and a sound portion of luc
k
– resulte d in lasting
improve ments, while others – e
ven
if ervers – ary obs or contempor ccessful f apparently su
brought no lasting peace to the region concerned. The following presentation provides an overview of international peace operations as they stand in late 2005, roughly fifteen years after the end of the East-West conflict of the ‘Cold War’ years.
What are International Peace Operations?
Peace (support) operations are international missions to stabilize trouble spots or prevent the outbreak of new conflicts. There are so many different terms (often confusingly) used in this context that it appears useful to start this text with some ideas at definitions.
The terms ‘peace operations’ and ‘peace support operations’ are indeed synonymous, both used to encompass the whole range of international operations described in the following paragraphs. The United Nations Organization as well as United States parlance at this moment still favors ‘peace operations’ as an
‘umbrella term’ for international missions of the
peacekeeping, peace enforcing, or humanitarian variety.5
Because the term ‘peace operations’ is rather vague, the British (Interim) Manual 5/2 (‘Operations other than War/Wider Peacekeeping’) of 1994 introduced the term
‘Peace Support Operations’ (PSO) to better describe the aim of such missions: to support the preservation or restoration of peace in an international context, usually under a mandate from the United Nations or another international body. Since then, the term ‘peace support
brought no lasting pe
ace to the regi
on conc erned. The
following pres entation provides an overview of
international peace opera
tions as they st
and in late 2005, end of the E fter the rs a yea fifteen y roughl
ast-W est
conflict of the ‘Cold War
’ y ears.
What are In ternati
on al P eace O pera
tion s?
Peace (support) ope rations are international missions t
o of new ak ent the outbre r prev stabilize trouble spots o
conflic ts. There a re so
man y di fferent term s (oft en
confusingly ) us ed in this cont
ext tha t it a ppear
s useful to initions. t def eas a th some id xt wi start this te
The terms ‘peace op erations’ and ‘pea
ce support ous, both used to ym synon operations’ are indeed
encompass t he whol
e range of intern
ationa l oper
ations
described in the follo wing p
ara graphs. The United
Nations Organi zat
ion as well as Uni
ted S tat
es parlance at rations’ ce ope s ‘pea avor this moment still f
as a n
‘umbr ella term
’ f or i nte rna tional missions
of the
peacekeepi ng,
peace en forci
ng, or humani
tari an variet
5 y.
Because t he t
erm ‘peace operations’ i
s rat her vagu e, the
British (I nterim)
Manu al 5/2 (
‘O pera tions other tha
n
War/W ider P eacekeeping’
) of 1994 introduced the term upport Operations’ (P ‘Peace S SO
) to better describe the
aim of such missions: to support the pr eservation or
restoration of peace in an international contex
t, usuall y
under a mandate from the Un
ited Nations or another Since then, the term ‘peac international body.
e support
5
See, fo r example, the U.
S. A rmy Field M anu al FM
100-2 23 ‘Peac e Operat ions’
of Dec ember 199 4.
5 See, for example, the U.S. Army Field Manual FM
100-223 ‘Peace Operations’ of December 1994.
operations’ is increasingly used in NATO documents. In non-anglophone countries such as Austria or Switzerland, PSO are sometimes misinterpreted to refer only to more robust (‘enforcement’) missions, not to traditional ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping (such as separation of forces, or monitoring of an armistice agreement). But this is an incorrect interpretation, not consistent with relevant UN, U.S., or NATO documents.
Other terms used in this context are less precise, and usually refer to a wider spectrum than peace operations.
The concept of ‘low-intensity conflicts’ (LIC) was popular in the eighties, and more or less replaced the earlier term ‘small wars’. It included peacekeeping operations besides other missions such as counter- insurgency or guerrilla warfare. In the nineties, when peace operations became more numerous, the U.S.
military often used the term ‘(Military) Operations other than War’ (MOOTW, OOTW) as being synonymous with peace operations. This was not the case, however, as (M)OOTW always referred to unilateral as well as to international actions, and included such diverse tasks as counter-drug operations or purely humanitarian relief missions in addition to peacekeeping. Therefore, since 1995, use of the term (M)OOTW has been ‘de- emphasized’ as too imprecise although it is still
occasionally used, especially among U.S. Marines.6
operations’ is increasingl y used in NATO docum ents. In
non-angl ophone countrie
s such as Austria or Switz
erland, o mor y t r onl d to refe rete terp s misin sometime PSO are
e
robust (‘enforc ement’) missions, not to traditio
nal ‘blue
helm et’
peacekeepi ng (s
uch as separation of for
ces, or s i thi ent). But greem tice a an armis ng of tori moni
s an
incorrect interpret ation, not c
onsistent with relevant UN,
U.S., or NATO documents.
Other t erm s used in t
his contex
t are l ess preci
se, and
usually r efe r to a wider spectrum than pea
ce oper ations.
The concept of ‘low-i ntensity conflicts’ (
LIC) was and more or less replaced the popular in the eighties,
ear lier te rm ‘ sma ll wars’
. It inc luded pea
ceke epin g
operations besides other missions such as counter-
insurge ncy or gu
err illa wa rfa re.
In the ninetie
s, whe n
peace ope rations beca
me more numerous, t he U.S.
military ofte n use d the ter m ‘(M ilitary ) Opera
tions other syno ) as being , OOTW than War’ (MOOTW
nymous
with peace oper
ati ons. This was not
the c ase, how ever, as
(M )OOTW a lways
ref err ed to unila tera
l as w ell a s to
intern ationa l actions, a
nd inc luded such diverse
tasks as y humanitaria erations or purel counter-drug op
n relief
missi ons in addi
tion to peac ekeeping
. Th erefor
e, since
1995, use of the term (M)OOTW has been ‘de-
em phasize d’ a s too impr eci
se a lthough
it is still
occasional ly used, especial
ly am ong U.S
. Ma rines
6 .
6
See al so Jo hn Mackin lay (ed.), A G uide to P
eace wn : Bro ce RI den (Provi s pport Operation Su
Univ ersi ty/T ho mas J . W ats on J r.
In stitu te f or I nter nat
ional . 1996) dies Stu
6 See also John Mackinlay (ed.), A Guide to Peace
Support Operations (Providence RI: Brown
University/Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies 1996).
In Europe, peace operations are sometimes referred to as
‘Petersberg Missions’. This name is derived from the German government guest house on the Petersberg near Bonn, where, on 19 June 1992, the Council of Ministers of the West European Union (WEU) declared its willingness to extend the scope of its activities beyond European defense and ‘to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures, including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security Council’. (CSCE refers to the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which in 1994 became the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE). These missions were specified as ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.
This formulation was incorporated into the EU Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. It is open to interpretation, however, as this definition – like LIC or (M)OOTW – goes beyond peace operations and could also cover campaigns such as Operation Allied Force (the air war against Yugoslavia in 1999) that clearly went beyond the scope of peace operations.
Like the Petersberg Tasks, the term ‘Crisis Response Operations’ (CRO) increasingly used in NATO parlance actually goes beyond the range of peace operations and includes humanitarian and disaster relief operations as well as combat missions. Therefore, in these pages, I will stick to the term ‘peace operations’.
In Eu rope, peace op
erations are sometimes ref err
ed to as
‘Petersberg Missions’.
This name is derived f rom the
German go vernment gu
est house on the Petersberg nea
r une 1992, the Council of Ministers re, on 19 J Bonn, whe
of the W est
European Union (W EU) declared i
ts
willingne ss to exte
nd th e sc ope of its activitie
s bey
ond case by- and ‘to support, on a case- European defense
basis and i n accordan
ce wi th our own procedures, t he
eff ective impleme
ntation of conf
lict- preve ntio n and
crisi s-m anagem ent m
eas ures, incl
uding peace keepi
ng ity cur tions Se United Na CSCE or the s of the activitie
Council’. (CSCE refers to the Confe
renc e for S ecurity
and Co-operation in Europe, which in 1994 became the
Orga nization for Security and Co-oper
ation in Europe,
OSC E). These missi
ons were speci fied
as ‘human ita rian
and rescue t asks, pe acekeepi
ng t asks and t asks of
combat cem gement, including pea risis mana forces in c
aking’.
This for mula tion was incor
porat ed into the EU
Treat y of
Amsterdam in 1997. It is open to interpretation, h
owever,
as this definition – like L IC or (M)OOT
W – g oes
beyond gns pai am so cover c could al rations and peace ope
such as
Opera tion Allied
Forc e ( the air wa r agai nst Yugo
sla via in
1999) that clearly wen t be
yond the scope o
f peace operations.
Like the Petersber
g Tasks, the term
‘Crisis Response used in ngly asi ncre O) i (CR Operations’
NATO parl ance
actually goes be yond
the range of pe ace oper
ations and
includes humanitarian and disa ster rel
ief op erations as
well a s co mbat missions. The ref
ore, in the se pages,
I will . rations’ ope ace ‘pe term stick to the
Attempts at a Definition
Peace operations are a political instrument to stabilize crisis regions. The concept was developed gradually in the 19th and 20th centuries at the same time as the international system of states took on its present form. In principle, peace operations can be divided into two main categories:
those established to deal with conflicts between states
(‘inter-state conflicts’), e.g. to monitor troop disengagement’s after a war or prevent the outbreak of fresh fighting, and
operations dealing with internal conflicts (‘intra-state
conflicts’).
The number of operations in internal conflicts caused by ethnic, religious or political disputes has increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War, although this does not mean that inter-state conflicts have become a thing of the past. In fact, one of the more recent UN missions was established as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the cease-fire between two states, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
While peace operations vary dramatically in their practical implementation – ranging from unarmed observers or police officers to heavily armed combat forces – they generally share the following five characteristics:
1. an international mandate,
2. a multi-national composition,
Attem pts a t a Def in iti on
Peace oper ations ar e a
political instrument to s tabiliz
e
crisis regi ons. The con
cept was d eveloped
gr aduall y in
the 19th a nd 20th cen
turie s at the same
time as the em of states took on its pres international syst
ent form.
In
principle, peace operatio
ns can be divided into tw
o main
categories:
those e
stablishe d to deal
with conf licts be tween st
ate s
(‘inter-state conflicts’), e.g. to monitor tr
oop
diseng agem ent’s
after a war or prevent
the out
break g, and htin of fresh fig
opera tions dealin
g with i nte
rna l c onflic ts (‘intr a-s tat e
conf licts’
).
The number of operations in in tern
al c onflic ts cause d b y
ethnic , r eli gious or p olitic
al dispute s ha
s inc rea
sed h this ar, althoug end of the Cold W dramatically since the
does not me an tha
t inte r-s tate conf licts ha ve bec
ome a
thing of the past.
In f act, one of the more r ece
nt UN
missions was e stablishe d as a
trad itional pea
ceke epin
g ates, wo st ween t re bet ase-fi r the ce onito o m operation t
Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Whi le peace operat
ions var y d
ram atic ally in t hei r
prac tical impleme
ntatio n – rang
ing f rom u nar
med
observers or police offi cers to heavi
ly a rm ed
combat ng fi lowi are the fol ly sh general y forces – the
ve
cha rac teristic s:
1.
an inte rna tional ma
ndate ,
a multi-national composition, 2.
3. a mandate to preserve or restore a status quo or to administer a territory during a transition period (i.e. a colony in the lead up to independence),
4. deployment with the agreement of the host
country, or at least in the interest of the population, and
5. the use of measured force only to ensure
minimum (collateral) damage.
All these principles apply to the background of the mission rather than to its execution – they are the common denominator of peace operations. In their practical implementation, these missions range from unarmed civilian observer missions, to police or military observers and the deployment of lightly armed forces, to major military operations carried out by combat forces, in response to the individual situation.
A second major defining factor is whether the peacekeeping troops are supposed or will be obliged to use force. For this reason, peace operations generally fall into one of three major categories:
Classic or traditional peacekeeping missions to
monitor cease-fires and troop disengagement’s in conflicts between states (or state-like entities) with the agreement of the parties to the conflict.
International personnel include military observers (usually unarmed) and/or lightly armed troops.
Generally, weapons may only be used for self- defense.
‘Wider peacekeeping’ operations with a similar
mission in internal conflicts. In addition to the
a mandate to preserve or 3.
restore a status quo or to
administe r a
terr itory d uri ng a tran sition peri
od
(i.e. a colony in the le ad up to independenc
e),
deplo 4.
yme nt with the a
gre em ent of the host
country, o r at least in the interest of the
population, and
the use of m 5.
easured force onl y t
o ensur e
minimum (colla tera l) dama ge.
All these principles appl y to the back
ground of the cution – the its exe n to r tha mission rathe
y are the
common denominator of pe ace oper
ations.
In their
practical implementation, these missions ran
ge from e or er missions, to polic n observ ivilia ed c unarm
military
observers and the deplo
yment of li ghtl
y a rmed f orces, to
major military
oper ations car rie d out b y c omba t f orc
es, in response to the individual situation.
A second major defining factor is wheth er the
peacekeepin g troops are
supposed or will be oblig
ed to rally ations gene ason, peace oper or this re use force. F
fall
into one of three major ca tegor ies :
Classi
c or tradi tional peacekeepi
ng m issi ons to
monitor cease-fires and troop disenga
gement
’s in
conf licts be tween sta
tes (or state -like en tities)
with conflic s to the rtie the pa ment of ree the ag
t.
Inter nationa l pers
onnel include military
obser vers
(usually una rmed) and/or lig
htly armed tro ops.
Generall y, w eapons may onl
y be used for
self- defense.
‘Wid er peacekeepi
ng’
operat ions wi th a si
mila r
mission in intern al c onflic ts. In addition to the
military presence, civil and administrative duties can include organizing elections and rebuilding police and judicial systems or caring for refugees and returning them to their homes.
‘Robust peacekeeping’ or ‘peace enforcement’
operations. These are also deployed in internal conflict situations, but have a mandate to use force if necessary.
Incorrectly Referred to as Three ‘Generations’ of
‘Peace Operations’
These three types of mission are sometimes referred to as three ‘generations’. This is historically incorrect however – a point which cannot be emphasized too often: They developed parallel to one another and continue to exist side by side. They represent different operations answering different challenges – not a generation-type sequence. In fact, historically speaking the ‘third type’
(robust intervention in internal conflicts) is older than the second type of ‘wider peacekeeping’, which in turn pre- dates ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions. Also, all three types continue to exist side by side.
One should remember that existing definitions are often vague and terms are frequently used inconsistently, often giving rise to misunderstandings. The term ‘peace making’, for example, usually refers to diplomatic mediation efforts or peace negotiations – but is sometimes also employed to mean the use of military force. The operation in Somalia in 1992-94, for example, was referred to as a ‘peace enforcement’ mission in the
military pre sen ce, civil a nd administr
ative duties
can
include organizing elections and rebuilding
police gees refu ring for r ca ems o syst cial and judi
and
retur nin g the m to the ir h ome s.
‘Robust peaceke eping’
or ‘pea ce enfo
rcement’ in internal yed re also deplo operations. These a
conflict situations, but have a mandate to
use for ce if
necessary .
Incorrec tly Ref
erred to as T
hree ‘ Gen
erati on s’ of
‘Peace O perati ons
These three type s of mis
sion are sometime
s ref erre d to as
three ‘ gener
ations’. Thi s i
s hi stori cally incor rect
however be emphasized too often – a point which cannot
: The y
developed parallel to one another and continue to ex
ist
side by sid e. The
y represent diffe
rent operations lenges – not a ge erent chal answering diff
nerati on-type
sequence. I n fa ct, historical ly sp
eak ing the ‘ third t
ype
’
(robust intervention in internal conflicts) is older than the
second type o f ‘ wider p eacekeepin
g’, which in turn pre
- ll three ing missions. Also, a ekeep eac l’ p aditiona s ‘tr date
types continue to exist si
de by sid e.
One should remember that ex
isting definitions a re oft
en
vague and t erm
s are freq uently
used inc onsistently
, of ten
givin g rise to misund erstandings. The te
rm ‘pea
ce tic rs to diploma refe lly r example, usua making’, fo
mediation efforts or peace ne
gotiations – but is
sometime s also e
mploye d to me an the
use of military
force. The operation in Somalia in 1992-94, for ex
ample, on in t issi ent’ m enforcem ‘peace ed to as a was referr
he
U.S.A., while in Canada it was called a ‘peace making’
mission (as opposed to peacekeeping in the traditional sense). While NATO uses the term ‘peace making’ to describe mediation efforts, the WEU tended to use it in the sense of ‘enforcement’. In the sixties, robust operations like the UN operation in the Congo (1960-64) were sometimes called ‘peacekeeping-enforcement’.
The UN Charter and the ‘Agenda for Peace’
Although United Nations peace forces, with their typical blue helmets, are often regarded as the very symbol of the work of the UN, neither they nor the term peacekeeping are referred to in the United Nations
Charter.7 As Chapter VI of the Charter discusses settling
international conflicts without force, while Chapter VII includes provisions for the use of force, traditional UN peacekeeping missions were often referred to as ‘Chapter VI’ operations, while the term ‘Chapter VII’ was occasionally used for wider or robust peacekeeping missions. In recent years, this has changed. Traditional peacekeeping missions are now described as ‘Chapter VI operations’, while operations requiring the use of force are referred to as ‘Chapter VII operations’ because their mandates are based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
However, in practice it is impossible to draw a clear-cut distinction between Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions, and the borders between the different types of
U.S.A., while in Ca nada it was ca
lled a ‘ pea ce making
’
mission (as opposed to peac ekeeping in the tra
ditional
sense). Whi le NATO u ses t
he t erm ‘peac e maki
ng’ t
o EU tended to use it in forts, the W describe mediation ef
the sense of ‘enforc em ent’. In
the sixties, robust operations like the UN operation in the Congo (1
960-64) nt’ rceme nfo g-e pin kee ace d ‘pe s calle sometime were
.
Th e UN Charter an
d th e ‘Agend
a f or Peac e’
Although United N ations peace
forces, with thei r typic
al
blue helmets, are often rega rded as the v ery
symbol of y nor th r the , neithe the UN k of the wor
e te rm
peacekeepi ng
are r efe rred t o i n t he Uni ted
Nations
Charte
7 r.
As Chapter VI of the Charte
r discusse s se
ttling ithout force, while Chapter V international conflicts w
II
includes provisions for t he use of forc
e, traditional UN
peacekeepin g missions were often r
efe rred to as ‘C
hapter
VI’ oper ations, while the term ‘Chapter V
II’
was ekeepin eac wider or robust p ed for occasionally us
g
missions. In r ece nt ye ars, this has chan ged. Tra
ditional
peacekeepi ng m
issi ons are now
describ ed as
‘Chapter VI requiring the use of force operations’, while operations
are refer red t o as ‘C hapter V
II ope rations’ bec
aus e thei r
mandates are based on Chapte r VII
of the UN Chart
er. ear-cut o draw a cl ble t mpossi t is i ice i n pract However, i
distinction between Chapter V I and Chapt
er V II
missions, and the borders between the diff erent ty
pes o f
7
Th is a pplies to th
e En glish text.
In the F re nch
ver sion , th e phra se ‘ main tien de la pa
ix’ is fo un d, bu
t it ath ’ r ility tab nd s ce a al pea ion nat g inter to ‘keepin ers ref
er
th an t o peace o pera
tio ns as su ch
.
7 This applies to the English text. In the French
version, the phrase ‘maintien de la paix’ is found, but it refers to ‘keeping international peace and stability’ rather than to peace operations as such.
missions are often vague. It is more important to have a proper mandate suited to the specific requirements of a mission than to worry about its labeling. After all, Chapter VII was originally intended to justify operations of a major scale, such as in the Second World War, and not for the sake of comparatively minor operations.
A systematic approach of a different kind formed the basis of the document written in June 1992 by the then Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Originally a report submitted to the UN Security Council, his ‘Agenda for Peace’ detailed the possibilities of UN action to protect and restore peace, especially in internal conflicts. In this report he specified four phases of international conflict management:
conflict prevention, with the aim of preventing a
crisis from developing into an open conflict. The instruments range from preventive diplomacy to the preventive deployment of troops along, for example, a disputed border,
peace making, i.e. intervention to end wars with
instruments ranging from mediation and negotiation, to sanctions and the use of fighting forces (‘peace enforcement’),
peacekeeping, i.e. maintaining a cease-fire through a
military or other UN presence, and eventually
peace building, denoting the long period required to
rebuild a civil society after a conflict. This process is vitally important to prevent fresh fighting, but also demands a strong political will on the part of the international community.
missions are often vagu e.
It is more important to have a
proper mandate suited to the
specific requireme
nts of a fter . A eling mission than to worry about its lab
all,
Chapte r V II wa s orig
inall y inte nded
to justify op era tions
of a major scale, such as in the Second W orld
War, and erations. y minor op rativel not for the sake of compa
A syst emat ic appro ach of a di
ffer ent ki nd form
ed the y the then basis of the document written in June 1992 b
Secretary Gene ral of the United Nations, B
outros
Boutr os-Gh
ali. Or igina
lly a r epo rt submitte d to the
UN
Security Council, his ‘ Agenda fo
r Peace’ d eta
iled the e pe estor and r otect UN action to pr possibilities of
ace ,
espe cia lly in intern
al con flic ts. In this repor
t he s pec ifi ed
four phase
s of inte rna tiona l conf lict ma nageme
nt:
confl ict p reventi
on, with the a im of pr
eve ntin g a
crisis f rom de
velopin g into a n ope
n conf lict.
The the y to rom preventive diplomac instruments range f
preventive deployment o f tr
oops along, for ex ample,
a disputed border,
peac e m aking , i.e. inte
rve ntion to e nd wars
with ation, diation and negoti om me ing fr nts rang instrume
to sanctions and the use of fi ghtin
g for ces (
‘peac e
enforcem ent’),
peacek
eepin g, i.e. ma
intaining a c eas e-f ire thr oug h a
military or othe r UN pre sen
ce, and e ven tual ly
peac e buildi ng
, denoting the long period requir
ed to cess i s pro . Thi ict a confl after ety vil soci a ci rebuild
s
vitall y impor tant to pr
event f resh f igh ting, but a lso
dema nds a str
ong political
will on the pa rt of the
intern ationa l communit
y.
Mr. Boutros-Ghali’s report, published under the title
‘Agenda for Peace’, has often been misunderstood as a definition of different types of peace operations. In fact, it was an attempt to provide a chronological approach.
The supplement to the ‘Agenda’ that was published in 1995, however, deviated from this systematic approach in a number of respects and thus only increased the confusion.
Some of the terms used by NATO to define peace or crisis response operations have been borrowed from the
‘Agenda for Peace’. In addition to peacekeeping and enforcement, NATO lists preventive deployments, peace making in the sense of negotiations, peace building and humanitarian missions such as disaster relief or refugee assistance.
Peace Operations during the Cold War
A more detailed study of the development of peace
operations through the 19th and 20th centuries has been
provided elsewhere and needs no repetition here.8 UN
operations in particular have experienced their ups and downs in almost regular sequence. Following their
‘success’ in the fifties in the Middle East, UN blue helmets were sent to the (former Belgian) Congo in 1960 to keep (or, rather, restore) law and order and to prevent the country’s fragmentation. This demanding task and the
Mr. Boutros-Gh ali’s repor
t, published under the title
‘Age nda for Peac
e’, has often been misundersto od as a
defini tion of di fferent t
ypes of peace ope rations.
In fact
, pproach. ical a ovide a chronolog it was an attempt to pr
The supplement to the ‘A genda
’ that was published in
1995, however, deviat ed from this s
ystem
atic approach in and thus only in respects a number of
creas ed the
confusion.
Some of the terms used b y NA TO to define peac
e or from the en borrowed s have be crisis response operation
‘Age nda for P
eac e’.
In addi tion t
o peacek eeping
and
enforcem ent, NAT O lis
ts prevent ive d
epl oym ent
s, peace ldi ons, peace bui ati oti e of neg he sens n t ng i maki
ng and
humani tari an missi
ons such as di saster rel
ief or refuge
e
assist ance.
Pea ce Operations durin
g the Cold War
A more detailed study of the development o f peac
e
operations through the
th 19
and 20
centuri th
es has been
provide d else
wher e a nd ne eds no re petition her
8 e.
UN ed their ups and have experienc operations in particular
downs in almost reg ula
r se quen ce.
Followin g th
eir
‘success’ i n t he fi ftie s i n t he Mi ddle East
, UN blue gian) Con rmer Bel e (fo helmets were sent to th
go in 1960
to keep (or, rath er, restor
e) law and ord er
and to prevent
the country’
s fra gm entation. This demanding task and the
8
See es pecia
lly my article:
‘T he Ev olution of P eace
Op era tio ns fr om th e Ni nete en th Cent ury’
, in : Er win
A. d Pe ar an een W etw e Operations B Peac ed.), midl ( Sch ace
(Ilf ord, E ssex : F rank Cas s 2000) , 4- 20.
8 See especially my article: ‘The Evolution of Peace
Operations from the Nineteenth Century’, in: Erwin A.
Schmidl (ed.), Peace Operations Between War and Peace (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass 2000), 4-20.
ensuing growth of forces (before, UN peacekeepers numbered some 6,000 men, while the Congo operation alone called for up to 18,000 troops) overextended UN resources. Following the Congo debacle and the ignominious withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from the Sinai in 1967, UN peace operations were reduced in scale, being limited to the force in Cyprus (established in 1964) and a couple of observer missions.
In the early seventies, parallel to the years of détente in the Cold War (at the same time, major disarmament negotiations started and the CSCE was successfully preparing the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), the UN went through another phase of optimism. Two new UN missions were established in the Middle East: the new UN Emergency Force in Egypt in 1973, and the UN Disengagement Observer Force on the Golan Heights in 1974. Both went so well that the UNO embarked on yet another more demanding mission in South Lebanon in 1978, which in turn (and predictably) proved far less successful. The difference was that both post-Yom- Kippur War missions operated under strict limitations, but with the full support of the governments involved, establishing a ‘thin blue line’ between the Israeli and the Egyptian and Syrian forces. In Lebanon, the parties to the conflict were armed bands difficult to control, rather than regular armed forces, and the two regional powers (Syria and Israel) were less than enthusiastic about ending the fighting. As a consequence, UN peace operations experienced yet another phase of stagnation. Two new UN observer missions were established in the eighties in Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, but two larger multinational operations – the Multinational Force and Observers in the
ensuing gr owt h of for ces (before,
UN peace keepers
numbered some 6,000 men, wh ile the Congo
operation erexten troops) ov alone called for up to 18,000 ded
UN
resources. F ollowin
g t he Cong o debacl
e and the
ignominious withdraw al of the UN Em
erge ncy For
ce tions we era ce op 7, UN pea i in 196 m the Sina fro
re
reduc ed in s cal
e, be ing limite d to the f
orc e in Cyp rus
(established in 1964) and a couple of obs erver missions.
In the earl
y se ventie s, par
alle l to the y
ear s of détente in
the Cold Wa r (
at the sa me time , major
disarma ment
negotiations sta rted
and the CSCE was successfull
y N went 1975), the U elsinki Final Act of preparing the H
throug h anoth
er pha se of optimism. Two n
ew UN
missions were esta blished in the
Middle Ea st: the
new ypt in 1973, and the UN n Eg orce i F ncy UN Emerge
Disengage ment Observer
Force on the Golan H eig
hts in
1974. Both went so well
that the UNO embarked
on ye
t anon in Leb g mission in South another more demandin
1978, which in turn (and predictabl y) prov
ed far less
successful. The diffe rence was that both po st-Yom-
Kippur War missions o perated
under strict lim itations, rnments involved, but with the full support of the gove
establishing a ‘thin blue line’ between the Isr
aeli and the
Egyptian and S yrian fo
rces.
In Lebanon, the pa
rties to the rat ontrol, ult to c fic nds dif d ba rme e a lict wer conf
her than
regu lar armed forces, and t he t wo re gional powers (S
yri a
and Is rael) wer e less than en
thusiastic about ending the uence, UN p a conseq g. As tin figh
eace ope rations
experienced yet anothe
r phase of stag nation. Two new
UN observ er missions we re
esta blished in the
eightie s in
Ira n, Ir aq, a nd Pakista
n, but two la rge
r multina
tional rs in the nd Observe ce a l For tiona tions – the Multina opera
Sinai, which still exists, and the ill-fated Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1982-84 – were created outside the UN system.
Peace Operations after the End of the Cold War With the end of the Cold War, a new chance appeared to have come to renew the ‘spirit of the UN Charter’ and Sir Brian Urquhart, one of the father figures of UN peacekeeping, called for new UN missions to be better organized, to go ‘beyond the sheriff’s posse’ concept, as he wrote. Successful operations, like the observer mission in Angola in 1989 which paved the way for the settlement in (formerly German) South West Africa which became independent as Namibia with the help of another UN mission in 1989-90, followed by the UN- authorized coalition campaign to liberate Kuwait in 1991, and the ensuing UN operations in Iraq, appeared to open the door for new international co-operation under the blue flag. The ‘Agenda for Peace’ already mentioned was authored under the presumption that henceforth the UN would be in the lead of international efforts to end conflicts and assist peaceful transition, by all necessary means including forceful interventions.
Alas, this was not to be. The number and scope of UN missions rapidly expanded as new (and old) conflicts continued to erupt all around the globe. The ‘New World Order’ envisaged by U.S. President George Bush Senior in 1991 quickly became the ‘New World Disorder’. New UN peace operations were duly established (critics spoke of the ‘mushrooming’ phase of peacekeeping), often with Sinai, whic
h still exists, and the
ill-fa ted Multina tional
Forc e in L
ebanon in 198 2-84 – were cre
ated outside the
UN system.
Pea ce Op
erati ons af ter the E
nd of t he Col d War
Wit h t he end of the C
old War, a new ch
ance app eared to
have come to rene
w the ‘spir it of the
UN Charte r’ a nd Sir
Brian Urquhart, one
of the f ather
figu
res of UN new UN missions to be better called for g, peacekeepin
organize d, to g o ‘be yond the sheri ff’s posse’ concept, as
he wrote. Succ essful operations, like th
e observer way for th 89 which paved the mission in Angola in 19 e
settle ment in ( for
mer ly Ge rm an) South West
Afri ca
which becam e indep
end ent as Nam ibi
a wi th t he hel p of he UN- another UN mission in 1989-90, followed by t
authorized coalition campaig n to liberate Kuwait in 1991,
and the ensuing UN op erations in
Iraq, appeared
to open
the door for new internati
onal co-operation u
nder the ioned was ent y m ’ alread r Peace nda fo Age ag. The ‘ blue fl
authored under the pres umption that henceforth the UN
would be in the lead
of inte rna tional ef
for ts to e
nd cessary transition, by all ne conflicts and assist peaceful
means including forc eful interventions.
Alas, this was not to be. The numbe r and scope
of UN
missions rapidly ex panded as n
ew ( and old) conflicts
continued to erupt all around the globe. The ‘New World
Order’ envisa ged b
y U.S. Pr esident George
B
ush Senior orld Disord w W came the ‘Ne in 1991 quickly be
er’. N ew
UN peace operations w
ere dul y established (criti
cs spoke
of the ‘mushrooming’
phase of peaceke
epin g), oft en with
insufficient mandates and lacking the necessary force to
fulfil their tasks.9 Within few years, UN peace operations
expanded rapidly, from about 10,000 in 1991 to nearly 80,000 in 1993-94. These high numbers could not be sustained, and the UN lacked the structures necessary for directing more robust ‘enforcement’ operations. Missions like Somalia or Bosnia called for military, not diplomatic command structures.
Although the blame for these ‘failed’ operations should go to the Powers in the Security Council which issued insufficient mandates, and to the states which refused to commit sufficient troops, the UN as an organization was continually accused of failure. The UNO celebrations of
its 50th anniversary in 1995 were overshadowed by these
accusations, worsened by the world organization’s worst financial crisis since the sixties. Also, the consensus among the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the early post-Cold War years soon gave way to new rivalries. The most blatant case was when China refused in 1999 to extent the mandate of the successful UN mission on the Serbian-Macedonian border, only because
Macedonia10 had signed a trade agreement with Taiwan.
insuffi cie nt ma ndate
s and la cking the ne
cessa ry for ce to
fulf il their
tasks.
Within few 9
yea rs, UN pea
ce operations rom about 10,000 in 1991 to y, f expanded rapidl
nearly
80,000 in 1993-94. These high numbers could not be
sustai ned, and the UN l
acked the st ructures ne
cessar
y for ations. Missions cement’ oper for re robust ‘en directing mo
like Soma lia or
Bosnia calle
d for military
, not diplomatic
command structures.
Although the blame for these ‘failed’ op
erations should
go to the Powers in the Security Council which
issued
insuffi cie nt ma ndate
s, a nd to the state
s whi ch re
fused to ation was an organiz commit sufficient troops, the UN as
continually accused o f f
ailure. Th e UNO c
elebr ations of
its 50
anniversary in 1995 were ove th
rshadowed b
y these tion’s worst niza d orga he worl ened by t accusations, wors
fina ncia l crisis sinc e the
sixtie s. Also, the c
onsensus
among th e Permanent Members of th
e Security
Council ay to w ave s soon g ear ar y y post-Cold W of the earl
new
rival rie s. The most
blat ant case was when C
hin a refused
in 1999 to extent the mandate of the success
ful UN
mission on the Serbian-Macedonian bo rder, only becaus
e Taiwan. with ement gre ed a trade a had sign 10 Macedonia
9
Fo r an ov erview of th e su bjec t, th e reader is ref
erred
to the v olu me of th
e Hen ry L.
Stims on Cen ter edited
by Cas ekeeping: Peac of UN tion e Evolu Th : rch . Du iam J Will
e rtin Ma St. (New York: ysis e Anal mparativ s and Co die Stu
1992); as well as the (
now
rd 3 , un fort unate ly r ath er u nhand
y eview R : A e Helmets e Blu Th k: boo UN cial offi he) f t on o iti ed
of Un ited Nati
ons P eace- keeping
(New York: Un ite d Nat io
ns the der ed un gnis eco is r donia ace , M ally ici Off 1996). 10
acr onym FYROM
(the Form er Y ugoslav Repu
blic of a). oni Maced
9 For an overview of the subject, the reader is referred
to the volume of the Henry L. Stimson Center edited by William J. Durch: The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin
1992); as well as the (now 3rd, unfortunately rather unhandy
edition of the) official UN book: The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations 1996).
10 Officially, Macedonia is recognised under the
acronym FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
In the field of peace operations, more demanding operations were increasingly taken over by other organizations or ad-hoc coalitions even though usually acting under a UN mandate (the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center introduced the term ‘peacekeeping by proxy’). Following the Dayton accords, the UN mission in Bosnia was replaced by a major NATO-led operation (although in fact, many contingents already present in Bosnia just changed headgear). Likewise, interventions in South Eastern Europe – such as the coalition force organized by Italy and sent to Albania in 1997, or the NATO-led Kosovo Force established in 1999 – were carried out by non-UN forces, even though police components and some civilian administration missions were still provided by the UN. In East Timor (Timor-Leste), an Australian-led force established law and order in 1999 before handing over to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor which governed the country until 2002. Generally, a division of labor came into being: more robust missions were carried out outside the UN system (though usually based on UN mandates), while the UN was reduced to ‘traditional’
peacekeeping, civilian administration, and police tasks.
Consequently, the numbers of UN peacekeepers dropped, from the 80,000 of 1994 to less than 30,000 by January 1996, and further to 12,000 by May 1999 – which was not much higher than the figures for the late years of the Cold War.
This picture is incomplete, however, for two reasons.
First, it forgets some of the more successful UN missions like the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium which lasted In the
field of peace operations, more demanding
operations were incr easing
ly taken ov er by
other
orga nizations or ad-
hoc coa litions eve
n thou gh usua
lly Pearson r a UN mandate (the Canadian acting unde
Peacek eeping Center introduced the term ‘pe
ace keeping
by proxy’).
F ollowing the D ayt
on acco
rds, the UN jor N a ma by ced epla was r mission in Bosnia
ATO- led
operation (although in fact,
man y cont ing ent s al ready
present i n Bosni a j
ust change
d headgea r). Li
kewise,
interventions in South Eastern Europe – such
as the nd sent to Alb y a tal y I nized b ce orga lition for coa
ania in
1997, or the NATO-led Kosovo F orce
established in
1999 – were carried out by non-UN for ces, even thoug
h stration police components and some civilian admini
missions were still provide
d by the UN
. In East Timor
(T imor-L este ), a n Austra lian-
led f orc e e sta blished la
w g over to the UN and order in 1999 before handin
Tran sitional Administr
ation in Ea st Timor which
gove rned the country unt
il 2002. Generally, a divi sion of
labor came into being:
more robust missions were
carried y based (though usuall em yst out outside the UN s
on UN
manda tes) , while the
UN was r edu ced to ‘tr
aditiona l’
peacekeepin g, civilian a
dministration, and police tasks. Consequently, the numbe rs of UN peacekeep
ers dropped,
from the 80,000 of 1994 to less than
30,000 by Januar y
1996, and further to 12,000 by Ma
y 1999 – which was s for igure than the f her not much hig the la
te y ears of the
Cold War.
This picture is incomplete, howeve r, for two r
easons. ul UN missions cessf e suc of the mor ts some st, it forge Fir
like the UN Tran
sitiona l Administration f
or Ea stern
Slavonia, Bar anja and Western Sirmium which lasted
from 1996 to 1998. This interim administration of the last Serb-controlled region in Eastern Croatia included a strong military component; military, police and civilian administration components functioned under a centralized UN command, thus avoiding many of the problems which had arisen in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere, where different components were split between various organizations.
Second, it ignores the rise of UN operations in Africa since the late nineties. The catastrophe in Rwanda in 1994 had repercussions for the whole Great Lakes and Congo region, leading to more than ten years of bitter civil war in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with involvement from nearly all of the country’s neighbors. In 1999, a significant UN operation has been established in the Congo which in 2003 was briefly supported by an EU mission (‘Artemis’). Since 2004, another UN mission is active in Burundi. In West Africa, smaller UN missions were established from 1993 to support and to monitor the peacekeeping efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This eventually led to major UN operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and in Côte d’Ivoire. Finally, a traditional inter-state peacekeeping mission was established for the Eritrea-Ethiopian border in late 2000, and a UN mission for the Sudan started in 2004.
A dramatic increase in UN Peace Operations
While hardly noticed by the public, these efforts again led to a dramatic increase in UN peace operations.
from 1996 to 1998. This interim administration of the last
Serb-controlled reg ion in Ea
stern Croatia included a nt; militar y compone strong militar
y, polic e and civilian
administration components functioned under a
centralized UN comma nd, thus avoiding man
y of the ego -Herz osnia sen in B problems which had ari
vina and
elsewhere, wh ere diff
erent components w ere
split
between various or ganiz
ations.
Second, it ignores the rise of UN operations in Africa since the late nineties. The catastrophe in Rwanda in
1994 had reper cussions for the whole Great
Lakes and rs yea o more than ten on, leading t egi Congo r
of bitter
civil wa r in Z
aire , no w the Democr atic Re public of the
Congo, with involvemen t from ne
arly all of the countr
y’s nificant UN operation has been In 1999, a sig neighbors.
established in the Cong o which in
2003 was briefly
supported by an EU mission (‘Artemis’). Since 2004, another UN mission is active in B
urundi.
In W est Africa,
smaller UN missions were established from
1993 to
support and to monitor the peacekeepin g efforts
of the
Economic Community of W
est African States ed to ma ly l tual ven COWAS). This e (E
jor UN op era tions
in Sierra L eone, L
ibe ria, and in Côte d’Ivoire.
Finall y, a
trad itional inte
r-s tate pe acek
eeping mission wa
s thiopian border in late 2000, established for the Eritrea-E
and a UN mission for the Sudan started in 2004.
A dra mati c in crease i n UN
Peac e Op eration s
Whi le hardl y not
iced b y t
he publ ic, t
hese effort s agai
n ions. ce operat ease in UN pea incr atic o a dram led t
Military, police and civilian personnel together again number some 70,000 men, close to the figures of a decade ago. This also means that more than half of the personnel in peace operations worldwide serves in UN operations, with the balance being provided by NATO- led forces (as in the Kosovo), EU-led forces (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the end of 2004), African Union (AU) forces (as in the Sudan) or coalition forces of varying types (as in Afghanistan or in post-war Iraq).
More often than not, different organizations co-operate in these missions, usually catering for different components of peace efforts.
Possible Future Developments
More robust and complex peace operations have become the norm, but this has often obscured the fact that
‘traditional’ observer and peacekeeping missions are still necessary – from Cyprus and the Golan Heights to Ethiopia/Eritrea. It would be wrong to say that traditional peacekeeping missions have been ‘replaced’ by more robust ones – the fact is that the scope of international, multinational interventions has widened considerably.
More actors are involved than in the past, adding to the complexity of the picture.
What has remained constant, are false concepts and irrational expectations. One of these concerns is the duration of peace operations. Especially the more complex peace building missions, with their demanding tasks of re-establishing a functioning administration, take time – and it would be futile to expect short-term ‘exit Military, police and ci
vilian personnel togeth er again
number some 70,000 men, close to the figu
res of a
decade ag o. This al
so means t hat
more t han hal f of t
he in UN personnel in peace operations worldwide serves
operations, with the balance bein g p
rovided b y NATO-
led forces (as in the
Kosovo), EU-led fo rces (as
in African end of 2004), ovina since the erzeg Bosnia-H
Union (AU) for ces (a s in the Suda
n) or coa lition for
ces
of varyin g t ypes (as in Af ghan
istan or in post-wa
r I raq ).
More often than not, different o
rga nizations co-op erate
in erent components ng for diff cateri these missions, usually
of peace e fforts.
Possi ble F utu re D evel op men ts
More robust and complex peace operations have become
the norm, but this has often obscured the fact that
‘tr aditiona l’ obser
ver a nd pe acek eepin g missions a re still
necessary – from C
ypr us and the Golan Heights to would be w Ethiopia/Eritrea. It ron
g to sa y th at traditional
peacekeepi ng m
issi ons have been
‘replaced
’ by more
robust ones – the fact is that
the scope of international, ons has wide enti l interv multinationa ned c
onside rab ly.
More actors are involve d than in the past, adding to the
complexit y of the pi cture.
What has remai
ned const ant , are fal se con cep
ts and
irrational expectations. One of these conce rns
is the
duration of peace op erations. Especially th
e more r demandi thei ons, with missi ng ldi ex peace bui compl
ng
tasks of re-establishing a f
unctioning administration, take
time – a nd it would be
futile to expe
ct shor t-term ‘
exi t
dates’ for these. Here, of course, different priorities prevail – no military commander, and no finance minister, is happy to commit forces for long-lasting missions with an open end, and for good reasons.
However, premature withdrawals might eventually lead to renewed peace operations becoming necessary. This has recently been illustrated by events in Haiti, where the U.S. and later UN-led intervention of 1994 was at first deemed a major success. However, ten years later the situation in Haiti had worsened to such a degree that a new (and even more robust) peace operation became necessary.
Another issue is that the real demands of the crisis region or the host country might differ from what contributing countries are willing to commit. Public interest in the Western world wanes quickly, while peace restoration and development efforts are by necessity long-term projects. To maintain commitments even if they are not always popular remains a major challenge for democratic governments.
A final point should be mentioned here, again concerning false expectations. International peace efforts are often expected to ‘solve’ conflicts. But this is exactly what they are not able to do. The international presence can help to find a solution, it can stabilize a situation, it can help (or force) the parties to the conflict to stop fighting and start talking. But the real solution can only be arrived at by the parties to the conflict themselves. There is no substitute for this. Peace operations – and the whole spectrum of them – will continue to be a major tool of crisis management in the future. Different organizations
date s’ f or the se.
Here , of cour se, dif fer ent p rior ities
prev ail – no military
comma nder, a
nd no fina
nce astin g-l or lon es f orc commit f y to is happ minister,
g
missions with an open end, and for good r
easons.
However, prem ature wi
thdrawal s mig
ht event ual
ly l
ead y. This necessar e operations becoming to renewed peac
has r ece ntl y bee n illustr ate
d by e ven ts in Haiti, w
her e th e
U.S. and later UN-led i ntervention of 1994 was
at first ate years l r, ten cess. Howeve or suc maj deemed a
r the
situation in Ha iti had w
ors ene d to suc h a
deg ree that a
new (and even more r obust) peace operation became
necessary .
Another i ssue is t
hat the real dem ands of the crisis regi
on
or the host country might di ffer from what cont
ributing to commit. Public interest in the countries are willing
Western world wanes q
uickl y, while peac
e restoration
and development ef forts are
by ne cessity lo
ng-te
rm re not they a n if nts eve ommitme intain c cts. To ma proje
always popular remains a majo
r challenge for d emocratic
gove rnments.
A final point should be mentioned here, a
gain co ncerning
false ex pectat
ions.
Int ern ational peace effo
rts are oft en
expe cte d to ‘ solve’ c
onflic ts. But this
is exa ctly wha
t an ence c l pres ationa intern to do. The ble re not a they a
help to find a solution, it can stabiliz e a situation, it can
help ( or for ce) the parties to the
conf lict to stop
fighting n only be al solution ca re ut the B lking. rt ta and sta
arr ive d
at b y the par ties to the conf
lict the mse lves. Ther e is no
substitute f or this. Pe ace
opera tions – and
the whole
spect rum of them
– will continue to be a
major
tool of aniza ent org . Differ uture e f ent in th nagem crisis ma
tions
besides the UN will continue to be involved. It will certainly take much longer than hoped for in 1991 to establish a new, more peaceful ‘world order’.
besides the UN will continue
to be involved.
It will
certainly take mu ch longer
than hoped for in 1991 to
establ ish a new, m ore p
eaceful ‘worl d ord er’.
