United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548
August 1, 2012
The Honorable Claire McCaskill Chairman
The Honorable Kelly Ayotte Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Jim Webb United States Senate
Subject: Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to help carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between fiscal year 2002 and fiscal year 2011, these agencies reported combined obligations of approximately $159 billion for contracts with a principal place of performance in either country. Contractor personnel have provided a range of services related to supporting troops and civilian personnel and to overseeing and carrying out reconstruction efforts, such as interpretation, security, weapon systems maintenance,
intelligence analysis, facility operations support, advice to Iraqi and Afghan ministries, and road and infrastructure construction. The use of contractors in contingency operations such as these is not new, but the number of contractors and the type of work they are performing in Iraq and Afghanistan represent an increased reliance on contractors to support agency missions.
Congress established the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) in 2008 to assess contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and provide recommendations to
Congress to improve the contracting process.
1The CWC was directed by Congress to assess contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan for reconstruction, logistics, and security functions;; examine the extent of waste, fraud, and abuse;; and provide recommendations to Congress to improve various aspects of contingency contracting, including defining requirements and identifying, addressing, and providing accountability for waste, fraud, and abuse.
Led by six commissioners appointed by congressional leadership and two commissioners
appointed by the president, the CWC conducted its work between 2008 and 2011.
2In a series
of interim and special reports and in a culminating final report, the CWC made multiple
recommendations about contracting practices in current and future contingency environments.
3The recommendations in the final report were organized into 15 strategic areas related to improvements in contingency contracting. Some recommendations were made specifically to DOD, State, USAID;; others were made to Congress;; and the remaining recommendations were not made to a specific entity. Only one recommendation from the final report included a date by which implementation should be completed, with the CWC noting that some reforms will take many years for agencies to fully implement because of the complexity of the issues involved.
DOD, State, and USAID have taken different management approaches for addressing the CWC’s recommendations. For example, at DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) established a senior-level board that used a formal process for determining which recommendations DOD would address and assigning responsibility for addressing them to specific DOD offices. The board also monitors the status of efforts to implement the recommendations. At State, officials told us that the Office of the Under
Secretary for Management has general responsibility for coordinating the department’s efforts to address the CWC’s recommendations. These officials explained that when the CWC’s final report was issued, the Office of the Under Secretary for Management assigned responsibility to bureaus and offices with related portfolios for determining and reporting on how the department was addressing the recommendations at a strategic level. They explained, however, that State does not have a formal process for assigning responsibility for or monitoring the implementation of the specific recommendations. USAID has taken a decentralized approach to the CWC recommendations. The agency does not have an office designated for addressing or monitoring the efforts to address the CWC’s recommendations. According to a senior USAID official, the Office of Acquisition and Assistance is responsible for addressing recommendations related to agencywide procurement policy. However, USAID officials explained that efforts to respond to other CWC recommendations are more appropriately addressed at the individual mission level, as each country has specific needs and circumstances.
In response to your request, we determined whether DOD, State, and USAID have taken or planned actions that directly align with recommendations the CWC made in its final and last two special reports—including those recommendations directed to one or more of the agencies and those recommendations not directed to a specific entity but that one or more of the agencies considered applicable to them. We also described agency positions on recommendations the CWC made to Congress when the agencies provided their positions to us.
For our review, we analyzed the CWC’s final report and last two special reports to identify the total number of recommendations made. That total comprises the (1) 48 recommendations that the CWC made in the August 2011 final report, some of which were based on recommendations the CWC made in its interim and special reports and (2) 3 recommendations that the CWC made in Special Report 4 (issued in March 2011) that related to the transition to a civilian-led
3Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report—At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 10, 2009);; Interim Report 2—At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations (Feb. 24, 2011);; Special Report 1: Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse (Sept. 21, 2009);; Special Report 2:
Lowest-Priced Security Not Good Enough for War-Zone Embassies (Oct. 1, 2009);; Special Report 3: Better Planning for Defense-to-State Transition in Iraq Needed to Avoid Mistakes and Waste (July 12, 2010);; Special Report 4: Iraq—
A Forgotten Mission? (Mar. 1, 2011);; Special Report 5: Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk New Waste (June 3, 2011);;
and Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress (Aug. 31, 2011).
presence in Iraq.
4Of these 51 total recommendations, 19 were directed to DOD, State, and/or USAID;; 15 were directed to Congress;; and 17 were not directed to a specific entity. For the recommendations not directed to a specific entity, we relied on each agency to identify which recommendations were applicable to it. In total, 30 recommendations were identified as applicable to DOD;; 27 as applicable to State;; and 25 as applicable to USAID. We did not evaluate the CWC’s recommendations;; our focus was on the actions the agencies took related to the recommendations. Specifically, we categorized the agencies’ respective efforts to address each applicable recommendation as either (1) “actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” or (2) “no actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation.” To determine whether each agency had taken or planned actions that directly aligned with each applicable recommendation, we collected the agencies’
self-reported information using a data collection template;; corroborated reported actions with related documentation, when available;; and conducted structured interviews with
knowledgeable agency officials to clarify responses. We categorized the agencies’ efforts as
“actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” even when the agencies’ actions (1) were started or completed before the issuance of the CWC’s final or last two special reports or (2) only partially addressed the recommendation, such as when an agency took an action that directly aligned with the recommendation in either Iraq or
Afghanistan but not agencywide, or when an agency took an action that directly aligned with a portion of a recommendation but did not address another portion of the recommendation. For instances in which agencies reported not having taken or planned actions that directly align with a specific recommendation, we documented the rationale for this course of action and reviewed available documentation. However, we did not assess the appropriateness or sufficiency of any actions taken or planned by the agencies. Finally, we did not assess the agencies’ positions on the CWC’s recommendations to Congress, although we included the agencies’ positions on those recommendations when the agencies provided them to us.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2012 to August 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In summary, DOD reported having taken or planned actions that directly align with about half of the CWC recommendations applicable to it, and State and USAID each reported having taken or planned actions that directly align with about one-third of the recommendations applicable to each of them. Officials from the three agencies explained that for the remaining
recommendations no actions were taken or planned that directly aligned with the specific recommendation. This was because, for example, the agencies had determined that existing policies or practices already meet the intent of the recommendations or had disagreed with the recommendations. The following are examples of actions that DOD, State, and USAID have taken or planned that directly align with specific CWC recommendations:
x DOD issued a final rule to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) in February 2012 to improve the oversight of contractor business systems,
including the ability to withhold a percentage of payments on certain covered contracts when
a contractor’s business systems contain significant deficiencies. This action aligns with the
CWC’s recommendation to strengthen authority to withhold contract payments for inadequate business systems.
5x State issued guidance in October 2011 describing a process for drafting a determination memorandum each time the potential need to suspend or debar a contractor arises, including for those cases in which no action against the contractor is ultimately recommended. This guidance aligns with a CWC recommendation to strengthen
enforcement tools by requiring a written rationale for not pursuing a proposed suspension and debarment.
6
x USAID issued guidance in January 2012 that requires sustainability analysis for all projects and developed a tool that contains questions, issues, and examples to help USAID project design teams think through project sustainability objectives and maximize sustainable outcomes. This guidance aligns with a CWC recommendation related to project sustainability (i.e., ensuring that host nations will be able to operate and maintain U.S.-
funded projects on their own).
7
The following are examples of instances in which DOD, State, and USAID reported not having taken or planned actions that directly align with specific CWC recommendations:
x The three agencies generally have not and do not plan to elevate the positions and expand the authority of officials responsible for contingency contracting as recommended by the CWC. Officials from DOD, State, and USAID explained that they regard existing
organizational structures as meeting the recommendations’ intent. For example, DOD officials stated that the CWC’s recommendation to create a new directorate for contingency contracting is not needed because DOD already has a significant amount of senior
leadership involvement and support for operational contract support. Similarly, State officials stated that there were no plans to establish a separate bureau led by an Assistant Secretary for Acquisition as recommended by the CWC because their current organizational structure, in which contingency contracting is overseen by the Assistant Secretary for Administration in coordination with the Under Secretary for Management, is sufficient to meet the
department’s needs. USAID officials stated that there were no plans to make the chief acquisition officer position a non-career appointment as recommended because they believe that having a career foreign service officer in that role provides the necessary knowledge of the agency’s unique mission and acquisition needs.
x None of the three agencies agree with the recommendation requiring performance incentives and performance assessments as tools for preventing human trafficking by contractors. Officials from each agency explained that contractors should not need
incentives to comply with anti-trafficking laws and other ongoing initiatives, such as training for contract administration personnel, were better tools to help combat human trafficking.
In enclosure I, we list the 51 CWC recommendations and describe and categorize DOD’s, State’s, and USAID’s specific efforts to address each applicable recommendation as either (1) “actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” or (2) “no actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation.” We also
5DFARS;; Business Systems-Definition and Administration (Case 2009-D038). 77 Fed. Reg. 11,355 (Feb. 24, 2012).
6Department of State
Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin 2012-01, Contractor Suspension and Debarment, October 3, 2011.
7USAID Automated Directives System Section 200.3.1.5, Policy Directives and Required Procedures, Build in Sustainability from the Start (Feb. 10. 2012).
summarize the positions provided by the agency for these recommendations and for the recommendations to Congress for which the agencies provided positions.
Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and USAID. The three agencies informed us that they had no comments on the draft’s findings and provided us with technical comments that we incorporated into the final report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as interested congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions, please contact us at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov or (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in enclosure II.
John P. Hutton Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Cary B. Russell Acting Director
Defense Capabilities and Management
Enclosure I: Summary of Agency Actions Related to Commission on Wartime Contracting Recommendations
Between March 2011 and August 2011 the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) issued two special reports and a culminating final report to Congress, making multiple recommendations about contracting practices in current and future contingency environments.
8In the March 2011 Special Report 4, the CWC addresses the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq and makes 3 recommendations. In August 2011, the CWC issued its final report in which it built on recommendations made in the interim and special reports it had issued since 2009, including recommendations made in Special Report 5, which it issued in June 2011.
9In the final report, the CWC made 48 recommendations across 15 strategic areas.
Of the 51 total recommendations that the CWC made in Special Report 4 and in the final report, 19 were directed to the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (State), and/or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID);; 15 were directed to Congress;; and the remaining 17 were not directed to a specific entity. For the recommendations not directed to a specific entity, we relied on each agency to identify which recommendations were applicable to it. In total, 30 recommendations were identified as applicable to DOD;; 27 as applicable to State;;
and 25 as applicable to USAID.
In this enclosure, we summarize the actions that DOD, State, and USAID took that are related to the CWC recommendations. We did not evaluate the CWC’s recommendations;; our focus was on the actions the agencies took related to the recommendations. Specifically, we categorize the agencies’ efforts as either: (1) “actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” or (2) “no actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation.” To determine whether each agency had taken or planned actions that directly aligned with each applicable recommendation, we collected the agencies’ self-
reported information using a data collection template;; corroborated reported actions with related documentation, when available;; and conducted structured interviews with knowledgeable agency officials to clarify responses. We categorized the agencies’ efforts as “actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation” even when the agencies’ actions (1) were started or completed before the issuance of the CWC’s final or last two special reports or (2) only partially addressed the recommendation, such as when an agency took an action that directly aligned with the recommendation in either Iraq or Afghanistan but not agencywide, or when an agency took an action that directly aligned with a portion of a recommendation but did not address another portion of the recommendation. For instances in which agencies reported not having taken or planned actions that directly align with a specific recommendation, we documented the rationale for this course of action and reviewed available documentation.
However, we did not assess the appropriateness or sufficiency of any actions taken or planned by the agencies. We also summarize any agency positions on recommendations the CWC made to Congress if they were provided to us, but we did not assess these positions.
8Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Report 4: Iraq—A Forgotten Mission? (Mar. 1, 2011);; Special Report 5: Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk New Waste (June 3, 2011);; and Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Final Report to Congress (Aug. 31, 2011).
9Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Interim Report—At What Cost? Contingency Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (June 10, 2009);; Interim Report 2—At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations (Feb. 24, 2011);; Special Report 1: Defense Agencies Must Improve Their Oversight of Contractor Business Systems to Reduce Waste, Fraud, and Abuse (Sept. 21, 2009);; Special Report 2:
Lowest-Priced Security Not Good Enough for War-Zone Embassies (Oct. 1, 2009);; Special Report 3: Better Planning for Defense-to-State Transition in Iraq Needed to Avoid Mistakes and Waste (July 12, 2010).
In tables 1 through 15, below, we:
x list the 48 recommendations the CWC made in its final report, grouped by the 15 strategic areas identified by the CWC;;
x note the entity to which the recommendation is directed;;
x indicate when a recommendation is not applicable to a particular agency, either because the recommendation was directed to Congress, the recommendation was specifically directed to another agency, or the agency reported the recommendation was not applicable to it;; and
x summarize related information provided by the agencies.
Table 1: CWC Strategic Area 1—Use Risk Factors in Deciding whether to Contract in Contingencies Recommendation
directed to agency heads involved in a contingency
DOD State USAID
1a
Issue and ensure implementation of policy guidance for using risk factors such as those listed above, as well as those described in the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) draft policy letter of March 2010 and
Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22 to provide guidance on what functions are appropriate to contract for in a
contingency setting
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
a
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD has issued guidance for
operational contract support planning applicable to contingency settings,
providing for risk assessments as part of the operational planning process. Specifically, considerations for contracting risks, such as proper vetting, are included in joint doctrine and DOD instructions.b
State officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that existing guidance and practice meets the intent.
State issued guidance in May 2012 on inherently
governmental functions that the department considers applicable to both non-
contingency and contingency contracting, although the guidance does not directly address the risk factors cited by the CWC.
DOD also established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office in part to assist combatant commands in planning for and assessing risk of contracted support.
c
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation. According to USAID officials,
the agency is reviewing its policies on inherently governmental functions in light of the OFPP policy letter. However, USAID officials stated that they do not expect any changes to their policies will be specific to contingency settings.
Department officials further noted that measures have been incorporated into contract terms and operating procedures that address risk factors. For example, State officials noted that the department’s Worldwide Protective Services contract, awarded in September 2010, includes contract terms, such as standards of conduct and training, aimed at improving professionalism and lessening the risk of offending the sensibilities of the local population.
1b
Provide funding and direction for agencies involved in contingency operations to identify a trained, experienced, and deployable cadre for stabilization-and-
reconstruction functions in areas of contingency operations so that the government has an alternative to contracting for performance of critical or sensitive functions
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD officials stated that the
department established a working group in February 2012 to address deployable cadre manpower
requirements using civilians in support of contingency operations. The goal is for this civilian workforce to be pre-
identified, trained, cleared, equipped, and ready to deploy to the extent practical in support of combat operations by the military;; contingencies;;
emergency operations;;
humanitarian missions;;
disaster relief;; restoration of order;; drug interdiction;; and stability operations.
Implementation of this civilian program model is set to begin in fiscal year 2013.
State officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that the department’s existing organizational structure meets the intent. State identified its establishment of the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations in November 2011 to focus on conflict
prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities as responsive to the
recommendation, although officials noted that State does not plan to formally establish a deployable cadre as recommended by the CWC.
State officials added that they do not believe that the department’s contracting for support in Iraq or Afghanistan has resulted in a loss of organic capability.
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that the agency’s existing organizational structure meets the intent. Specifically, a senior official noted that USAID’s Bureau for
Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance’s Office of Civilian Response provides for reconstruction and stabilization support.
1c
Provide a strategic plan for deploying these cadres that includes provisions for mandatory deployability of civilian members, and is supported by a back-up capability for rapidly making temporary hires for large-
scale or long-term contingency operations
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD officials stated that the
development of this strategic plan would be considered as part of the related effort identified above in 1b.
State officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that the department’s existing practices meet the intent.
State officials noted that while the department is not
developing a specific strategic plan, all foreign service personnel can be deployed to contingency locations.
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that the agency’s existing organizational structure meets the intent. Specifically, a senior official noted that USAID’s Bureau for
Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance’s Office of Civilian Response provides for reconstruction and stabilization support.
Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
aIn its final report, the CWC outlined characteristics of risk in contracting for a contingency, focusing on the broad areas of operational, political, and financial risk. According to the CWC, operational, political, and financial risk factors include risks to: (1) maintaining agencies’ critical organic or core capabilities;; (2) U.S. goals and objectives, such as from behavior that injures innocent members of the local population or outrages their sensibilities;; (3) the
government’s ability to control costs, waste, fraud, abuse, and conflicts of interest, among others. In its final report, the CWC also outlined situational risks, which it described as factors that could affect risk assessment and should be considered by the government along with operational, political, and financial risks. Situational risks include:
(1) operating in a combat zone or insurgent-threat area;; (2) lack of effective federal oversight in the area of
operations;; and (3) inadequate accounting, financial, and business systems among contractors and subcontractors, among others. See also, OFPP Policy Letter 11-01: Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,227 (Sept. 12, 2011). Department of Defense Instruction 1100.22, Guidance for Determining Workforce Mix, April 6, 2007.
bInternational Security Assistance Force Joint Command Operations in Afghanistan, Construction Contracting Guidelines for Afghanistan (Oct. 9, 2010);; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2008);; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Notice 4130.01, Guidance for Combatant Commander Employment of Operational Contract Support Enabler—Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (Dec. 20, 2011).
cDepartment of State
Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2012-11, Preventing Contractor Performance of Inherently Governmental Functions, May 9, 2012.
Table 2: CWC Strategic Area 2—Develop Deployable Cadres for Acquisition Management and Contractor Oversight
Recommendation
directed to agency heads DOD State USAID
2a
Provide funding and direction to establish a trained, experienced, and deployable cadre for acquisition-management and contractor-oversight functions in areas of contingency operations so that the government has an alternative to relying on contractors for acquisition management and oversight
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD officials stated that
resourcing and direction to establish a deployable cadre for acquisition-management and contractor-oversight functions is currently being considered as part of the related effort identified in 1b above and will be addressed in a comprehensive
operational contract support action plan, scheduled for completion in September 2012, to guide capital planning and budget preparation.
State officials stated the department does not plan to implement this
recommendation. A State official testified in September 2011 that the department does not see a separate contingency contracting acquisition cadre as an efficient or necessary model and the department’s existing acquisition structure and working capital fund provide sufficient expertise and funding for contingency operations.
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that the agency’s existing organizational structure meets the intent. USAID officials stated that the agency’s contracting and agreement officers currently have the capability to be deployed and work in contingency
environments. The Office of Acquisition and Assistance maintains a foreign operations unit responsible for supporting overseas contracting efforts, and USAID’s preference is to strengthen this unit rather than direct resources elsewhere.
Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Table 3: CWC Strategic Area 3—Phase out the Use of Private Security Contractors for Certain Functions Recommendation not
directed to specific entity DOD State USAID
3a
Phase out the use of host-
nation private security contractors in Afghanistan for the convoys on high-
volume roads that the insurgency controls or contests
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Not applicable Actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation Pursuant to Afghan
government requirements, the department is in the process of transitioning selected private convoy security contracts to the Afghan Public Protection Force.a
State officials stated that this recommendation is not applicable because they interpreted it being directed towards DOD.
Additionally, DOD officials stated that U.S. Central Command and U.S. Forces-
Afghanistan policies and guidance require
consideration of the likelihood of private security contractors becoming involved in combat or situations likely to escalate into combat when determining the appropriateness of using contractors.
Officials from the Office of Acquisition and
Assistance/Afghanistan reported that as of March 20, 2012, all USAID awardees are required to use the Afghan Public Protection Force for all security services.a
3b
Evaluate each static-
security site to assess the risk associated with the use of contractors. Where the military commander determines there is a high risk, use military forces.
Where the commander determines the high risk is specifically the result of using local-national contractors, use military forces or third-country national private security contractors for security
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
Not applicable Not applicable
DOD officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation. While DOD officials stated that the department expects contract static security guards to transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force in 2013 and that U.S. Forces-Afghanistan is monitoring the transition effort, officials did not identify specific efforts to evaluate each static security site to determine whether military forces should provide security at specific, high-risk sites.
State officials stated that this recommendation is not applicable because they interpreted it being directed towards DOD.
USAID officials stated that this recommendation is not applicable. They explained that the protection of USAID personnel and facilities is managed by State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and the agency does not directly contract for security services.
Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
a
In August 2010, the President of Afghanistan issued Presidential Decree 62 (PD 62), which directed the dissolution of private security contractors. In the wake of the decree, a bridging strategy was developed to facilitate the transition away from private security contractors in Afghanistan to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), which existed within the Ministry of Interior prior to PD 62. The APPF is a Ministry of Interior security force organized under the Deputy Minister and consists of a national headquarters and seven zone headquarters. As a fee-for-service government owned and operated security force, it secures international, governmental, and non-governmental operations, sites, and facilities.
Table 4: CWC Strategic Area 4—Improve Interagency Coordination and Guidance for Using Security Contractors in Contingency Operations
Recommendation directed to entity specified
DOD State USAID
4a
Hold the ambassador, USAID mission director, and military commanders responsible for making, publicizing, and revising their determinations of security-contracting appropriateness as conditions change, giving particular consideration to the geographic, temporal, and organizational proximity to armed conflict
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation In July 2009, DOD published
guidance for all U.S.
government private security contractors working in contingency operations. The guidance, updated in August 2011, requires Geographic Combatant Commanders in contingency environments to issue guidance and
procedures for the selection, training, accountability, and equipping of private security personnel.
State officials stated the department does not plan to implement this
recommendation. Department officials explained that contracting decisions are made with input from across the department, including the ambassador and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
a
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation. Officials explained that security issues at the mission level are the responsibility of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
4b
When private security or other contractors are to be armed, they should be overseen by government employees and tracked in a centralized system, as is done in Iraq
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Not applicable
In 2007, DOD designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker system as its primary system for collecting data on
contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces. Currently, DOD requires the use of the system for all personnel performing private security functions in Iraq or Afghanistan. Additionally, DOD policies generally discuss the oversight of private security and other contractors by military or DOD civilian personnel.
Under State policy, all applicable contracts for private security in Iraq and Afghanistan are required to include a clause requiring personnel to be entered into the Synchronized
Predeployment and
Operational Tracker system.b
USAID officials stated that this recommendation is not applicable because the agency does not directly contract for security services.
State contract oversight planning documents also call for these contractors to be operationally supervised by direct hire government personnel.
4c
Reliance on private security contractors should be accompanied by greater use and emphasis on vetting, training, authorizing arms, and weapons control;;
post-convoy debriefing, locational tracking, and video monitoring;; and more thorough and
comprehensive management
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Not applicable
DOD has issued and updated DOD Instruction 3020.50, which provides instructions to geographic combatant commanders on their requirements to address some of the issues specified in the recommendation.a Additionally, DOD directed use of a new quality management standard for private security contractor operations that includes specific measurable elements for vetting, training, and procurement and
management of weapons.
Further, in June 2012, DOD finalized a regulation that establishes minimum processes and requirements for the selection,
accountability, training, equipping and conduct of personnel performing private security functions under DOD contracts.
Officials from State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security stated that all of State’s private security contractor personnel working under its Worldwide Protective Services contract are vetted and must be trained in accordance with the terms of the contract.
According to the department, operational control and monitoring exceeds the CWC recommendation.
c
USAID officials stated that this recommendation is not applicable because the agency does not directly contract for security services.
4d
Execute an interagency agreement to provide guidance on security contracting
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD officials did not identify
actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation. However, DOD officials stated that the recommendation has been addressed through Section 159 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which requires coordination between DOD and State to establish processes for the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of private security personnel in combat
operations or other significant military operations.d
State officials stated the department does not plan to implement this
recommendation. Officials explained that State does not concur that an interagency agreement is necessary to provide guidance on security contracting. Department officials stated that the Overseas Security Policy Board, which State chairs and of which both DOD and USAID are members, was a more appropriate forum for addressing the use of security contractors in future
contingencies.
These provisions are applicable to all future areas of operations that require enhanced
coordination of private security contactor personnel.
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation.
4e
DOD, State, and USAID should develop and enter into a standing interagency memorandum of
agreement, incorporating lessons and best practices learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, to provide guidance in use of private security contractors in future contingencies
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD officials did not identify
actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation. However, DOD officials stated that the recommendation has been addressed through Section 159 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which requires coordination between DOD and State to establish processes for the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of private security personnel in combat
operations or other significant military operations.d
State officials stated the department does not plan to implement this
recommendation. According to officials, a specific
memorandum of agreement is not necessary to share best practices, lessons learned, or other information between agencies colocated overseas.
The department stated that existing mechanisms, such as the Overseas Security Policy Board, and standing working groups integral to overseas missions, such as the Country Team and Emergency Action Committees, provide effective forums for the sharing of information, best practices, and lessons learned.
These provisions are applicable to all future areas of operations that require enhanced
coordination of private security contactor personnel.
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation.
4f
This standing memorandum of agreement should be modified within 90 days of a declared combat operation or other contingency to specifically address the needs and circumstances of that operation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation DOD officials did not identify
actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation. However, DOD officials stated that the recommendation has been addressed through Section 159 of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which requires coordination between DOD and State to establish processes for the selection, training, equipping, and conduct of private security personnel in combat
operations or other significant military operations.d
State officials stated the department does not plan to implement this
recommendation. As noted above, department officials stated that a specific
memorandum of agreement is not necessary to share best practices, lessons learned, or other information between agencies colocated overseas and that existing mechanisms for sharing of information, best practices, and lessons learned are sufficient.
These provisions are applicable to all future areas of operations that require enhanced
coordination of private security contactor personnel.
USAID officials did not identify actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation.
Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
aDOD Instruction 3020.50, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises, July 22, 2009. The regulation was updated in August 2011 to incorporate changes made in the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 853 (2008) and the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub.
L. No. 111-383, § 832.
bDepartment of State Office of the Procurement Executive, Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2008-15, Use of Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) for Contractors Supporting and Diplomatic or Consular Mission Outside the United States, March 25, 2008.
cDefense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS);; Contractors Performing Private Security Functions (Case 2011-D023). Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 35,883 (June 15, 2012).
d
32 C.F.R. § 159.
Table 5: CWC Strategic Area 5—Take Actions to Mitigate the Threat of Additional Waste from Unsustainability
Recommendation directed to officials at DOD, State, and USAID
DOD State USAID
5a
Examine both completed and current projects for risk of sustainment failure and take appropriate action to cancel or redesign programs and projects that have no credible prospect of being sustained
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation DOD officials did not identify
actions taken or planned that directly align with this recommendation but stated that existing policies meet the intent. For example, while it has not examined completed or current projects, DOD has addressed sustainability considerations in joint doctrine published between 2009 and 2011 on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and foreign humanitarian assistance.a
Although State did not identify any departmentwide efforts that directly align with this recommendation, the Embassy in Kabul has taken such actions. Specifically, the Embassy has taken steps to identify projects that need to be sustained in order to position itself to make
decisions about which projects will be sustained and how they will be sustained going forward. Department officials stated that State does not generally have large construction or infrastructure projects that would lend themselves to an analysis of sustainability.
According to a senior development official at the Embassy in Kabul, in response to Afghan-specific
sustainability guidance issued in June 2011, USAID
conducted an analysis of 67 different projects for sustainability in Afghanistan, which should be finalized by the summer of 2012.b For this sustainability analysis, officials from USAID’s Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs reported that the agency identified operating and maintenance costs, prospects for sustainability by the Afghan government, and options for cost recovery.
These officials stated that if projects did not appear sustainable, USAID
considered options to cancel or provide additional
assistance. Officials from the Office of Iraq and Arabian Peninsula Affairs reported on a recent analysis the Iraq Mission completed for Congress that highlights Government of Iraq contributions to ongoing USAID projects.
5b
Ensure that any new requirements and acquisition strategies for projects or services to be handed over to a host nation include a detailed assessment of long-term costs and of host nations’
ability and willingness to meet those costs
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation DOD officials stated that by
early 2013 the department plans to establish clarifying policy and guidance for setting acquisition strategies that must include long-term project sustainability for the host nation. Additionally, DOD officials stated that the department follows International Security Assistance Force Contracting Guidelines issued in October 2010 that require Afghan National Security Forces facilities to be sustainable in accordance with Afghan construction and maintenance capabilities.
Although State did not identify any departmentwide efforts that directly align with this recommendation, the department has taken such actions in Iraq. Specifically, guidance was implemented in Iraq in 2009 that generally required cost-sharing with the Government of Iraq for new projects. The guidance also generally required the development of advance agreements with the
Government of Iraq to ensure the host nation is able and willing to contribute financially to projects and to establish plans for transitioning
responsibility for projects to the Government of Iraq or other Iraqi entities. Embassy officials in Afghanistan stated that they do not have such guidance.
USAID updated its agencywide project design guidance in January 2012 to require sustainability analysis for all projects.c
5c
It also developed a tool that contains questions, issues, and examples to help USAID project design teams think through project sustainability objectives and maximize sustainable outcomes.
Report to Congress by December 31, 2011, and annually thereafter, on analysis and proposed actions for mitigating sustainability risks
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
Actions taken or planned that directly align with the specific recommendation DOD officials stated the
department does not plan to implement this
recommendation unless directed to do so by Congress, citing concern over the number of existing reporting
requirements and congressional inquiries.
State officials stated the department does not plan to implement this
recommendation unless directed to do so by Congress.
Department officials stated that State does not generally have large construction or
infrastructure projects that would lend themselves to an analysis of sustainability.
USAID is currently required to certify to the Committees on Appropriations before certain funds appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 may be obligated for assistance to Afghanistan.d
Source: GAO analysis of agency documents and interviews with agency officials.
Also, according to officials, USAID briefed its committees of jurisdiction on analysis and proposed actions for mitigating sustainability risks in its Afghanistan programs in 2011 and in its Iraq programs in May 2012.
Note: The CWC’s Special Report 5, Sustainability: Hidden Costs Risk New Waste included the same recommendations. Therefore, we have not listed recommendations from Special Report 5 separately.
aChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2011);; Joint Publication 3-24, Counter-insurgency Operations (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2009);; Joint Publication 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009).
bUSAID, Administrator’s Sustainability Guidance for USAID in Afghanistan (June 2011).
cUSAID Automated Directives System Section 200.3.1.5, Policy Directives and Required Procedures, Build in Sustainability from the Start (Feb. 10. 2012).
d
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74 § 7046 (2011).
Table 6: CWC Strategic Area 6—Elevate the Positions and Expand the Authority of Civilian Officials Responsible for Contingency Contracting at DOD, State, and USAID
Recommendation directed to entities as specified below
DOD State USAID
6a
The CWC endorsed the House version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, which would have amended section 138(b) of Title 10 U.S.C, in part by (1) establishing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Contingency Contracting;;
and (2) establishing an Office for Contingency Contracting headed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Contingency Contracting
Not applicable Not applicable
Not applicable
While this recommendation relates to a congressional action, DOD officials stated they do not believe that consolidation of operational contract support responsibility in an Office for Contingency Contracting or an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Contingency Contracting is necessary because each DOD organization brings unique subject matter expertise to the oversight of contingency contracting. Additionally, DOD officials stated that senior leadership acknowledge the importance of operational contract support and are taking steps to communicate that message throughout the organization, with the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) monitoring progress.
6b
State should:
(1) ԝestablish a separate Bureau of Acquisition led by an assistant secretary for acquisition who has a background as a qualified acquisition professional and who would be designated as the agency’s chief acquisition officer, (2) ensure that the new bureau would have acquisition as its singular focus and primary mission, and (3) establish additional Senior Executive Service positions to support the bureau’s work.
Not applicable No actions taken or planned that directly align with the
specific recommendation
Not applicable
State officials stated the
department does not plan to implement this
recommendation. Officials explained that the
department’s current structure, in which contingency
contracting is overseen by the Assistant Secretary for Administration in coordination with the Under Secretary for Management, is sufficient to meet the department’s needs.
