Boko Haram and the prospects for a negotiated settlement
Jonathan N. C. Hill
N O R E F E x p e r t A n a l y s i s
October 2012
Executive summary
Over the past three years Boko Haram has grown ever more dangerous and now poses the most serious threat to Nigeria’s stability. So far, the Nigerian Federal Government’s efforts to contain and defeat the group have seemingly achieved little. Moreover, there is more than a suspicion that some of its actions, such as the summary execution of Mohammed Yusuf, and failures, such as to combat corruption and develop a comprehensive and effective strategy to reduce poverty, have actually helped the group. The Federal Government’s interactions with Boko Haram continue
to take two main forms – direct military operations against it and more covert, indirect negotiations. The military response has been uncompromising and, in part, self-defeating. And the negotiations have also struggled to have much effect, mainly because the Federal Government has been unable to fully co-ordinate its efforts with other important stakeholders in northern Nigeria. While these attempts may persuade some parts of Boko Haram to put down their weapons, they are unlikely to change the minds of more radical and committed elements.
Jonathan N. C. Hill is a senior lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. He has published widely on security issues in Nigeria and the Maghreb, including the failure, yet continued unity of the Nigerian state; the efforts of Sufi Brotherhoods to prevent radicalisation in northern Nigeria; the conduct of Nigeria’s peacekeeping troops during operations; Islamism and democracy in Morocco and Algeria; and post-independence nation-building and the endurance of Islamist terror groups in Algeria.
Boko Haram and the prospects for a negotiated settlement
The danger from Boko Haram has grown exponentially over the past three years to the extent that it is now the most serious threat to Nigeria’s security and stability. The summer of 2009 marked the birth of this new, more lethal organisation. Prior to that it mostly resembled a commune, made up of 3,000 men, women and children living in devout isolation in the wilds of northern Nigeria. Gunmen belonging to the group did launch armed assaults, most notably in December 2003, and September and October 2004. Yet these attacks were infrequent, together resulted in the deaths of no more than 40 or 50 people, and were directed only against police stations. The running gun battles fought between the group and security forces in late July 2009 were of an altogether different intensity, transforming the cities of Maiduguri and Bauchi, and the nearby towns of Potsikum and Wudil into war zones and claiming the lives of over 700 people.
Critical to both the high death toll and Boko Haram’s subsequent development was the response of Nigeria’s Federal Government; the Bauchi, Borno and Yobe State governments;
and the security forces. Their determination to restore order at all costs and, if possible, break Boko Haram in the process led them to take an uncompromising approach that culminated in the summary execution of the group’s leader, Mohammed Yusuf, while in police custody. Yet their hardline stance and unapologetic trumpeting of Yusuf’s death helped ensure that theirs was a pyrrhic victory. For not only did they antagonise what remained of Boko Haram sufficiently to drive it to greatly expand its armed campaign, but they outraged popular sentiments in the north to such an extent as to ensure that the group had a steady stream of volunteers to its banner.
Since the summer of 2009 Boko Haram has expanded its goals (its members no longer want to live in isolation, but to turn Nigeria into an Islamic state); its target range (which, in addition to soldiers and police officers, now includes politicians; community elders; religious leaders; anyone engaging in what it considers to be un-Islamic behaviour; Christians; foreigners;
international organisations; and ordinary men, women and children); its area of operations (it has successfully carried out attacks throughout northern and central Nigeria); and its operational capabilities (it can now mount ambushes, frontal
assaults, lightning raids, prison breakouts, mass- casualty strikes, suicide bombings and targeted assassinations). It is the pace and scale of these changes that have so alarmed the Nigerian authorities and the international community.
Both the breadth and speed of Boko Haram’s transformation speak of an organisation moving in multiple directions at once. Indeed, it appears to be so dynamic that it is scarcely credible that all these changes are being instigated and directed by a small group of clearly defined leaders. It seems far more likely that it is currently a collective made up of factions each with their own fighters, leaders, agendas and capabilities. Certainly, this would explain the speed and unpredictability of the changes in its operational direction; why one day (August 25th 2011) it is attacking police stations and banks in Adamawa State and the next (August 26th 2011) sending suicide bombers against the UN’s headquarters in Abuja.
Boko Haram’s evolution from July 2009 onwards is mainly due to its growing links with al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM).
Following Yusuf’s death, many of the group’s remaining senior members fled to neighbouring Niger and Chad, where they received money, weapons, training and other help from AQLIM agents, who were directed to provide such help by their commander-in-chief, Abdelmalek Droukdel.
In recognition of this assistance and support, Boko Haram’s then-head, Abu Bakr Bin Muhammed al- Shakwa, swore an oath of allegiance to Droukdel on October 2nd 2010. The links he established with AQLIM have been maintained by Boko Haram’s new leaders, Abubakar Muhammad Shekau and Mamman Nur.
The fighters under Shekau and Nur’s command form the hard core of Boko Haram and are responsible for many of the most audacious and violent attacks carried out by the group, including the suicide bombing of the UN’s headquarters.
There is also, however, a significant periphery made up of bands of militants who either claim membership of Boko Haram or are described as belonging to it by the Nigerian authorities and media. The existence and activities of this periphery make it difficult to identify exactly who the Federal Government should seek to negotiate with and what might actually be achieved should it do so.
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Boko Haram and the prospects for a negotiated settlement
Engagement with Boko Haram
The Federal Government’s interactions with Boko Haram have been both direct and indirect, public and private. Broadly speaking, the direct interactions have been conducted in public and have taken the form of uncompromising military action. Many senior Nigerian officers look to the example of the Sri Lankan armed forces in their dealings with the Tamil Tigers for guidance on how they should tackle Boko Haram. Should they adopt this hardline model, which, on the basis of their past actions, they already have, then the struggle against Boko Haram will be bloody and leave little room for compromise.
The Nigerian military’s interest in what its Sri Lankan counterpart has done is based, in part, on its realistic appreciation of the difficulties it faces in adopting the more cautious counter- insurgency strategies of Britain and the U.S.
Central to the latter approaches is human terrain mapping, involving the careful building of a detailed understanding of the local population.
For this to succeed, junior officers must be empowered to use their own initiative and work closely with the police, who are assumed to have a better understanding of the community.
In Nigeria, however, junior officers are given no such licence, while military-police relations are so poor that there are occasionally deadly clashes between the two. And more fundamentally, the
“Oga” or “big man” mentality that pervades not just the armed forces, but the whole of Nigerian society means that often only passing interest is taken in the well-being of ordinary people. Finally, the military cannot rely on the federal and state authorities to resolve the huge economic and social problems that are helping to sustain Boko Haram’s campaign.
The indirect interactions, on the other hand, have been conducted in private by intermediaries and have taken the form of negotiations. As a Christian Ijaw from Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta, President Goodluck Jonathan is at an immediate disadvantage when it comes to trying to talk with Boko Haram. He commands little popular support in the north and news of his victory in the 2011 presidential election sparked days of rioting throughout the region that resulted in the deaths of around 1,000 people. He depends very heavily, therefore, on the senior northern politicians in his
administration and party, traditional rulers like the sultan of Sokoto, and the emirs of Kano and Zaria.
So far, however, these negotiations have been beset by problems, not least because the traditional northern leaders are reluctant to act as intermediaries between the Federal Government and Boko Haram. The Federal Government is keen to enlist their support so that it can demonstrate solidarity with these well-respected and important religious figures, and boost its Islamic and northern credentials. So too, there are parts of Boko Haram that want to raise their legitimacy and gain whatever concessions the sultan and emirs can wring out of Abuja on their behalf. Perhaps understandably, though, the traditional leaders are reluctant to become too closely associated with any one side. They do not want to appear too subservient to the government, headed as it is by a southern Christian, or expose themselves any more than they must to accusations of religious fanaticism by speaking with Boko Haram.
Lessons from the Niger Delta
Boko Haram is not the only home-grown insurgent group currently operating in Nigeria. In the far south of the country the security forces are also battling a number of other factions, most notably the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). MEND poses a different type of threat to Boko Haram. Firstly, it is not seeking to seize control of the entire country, but to win what it sees as environmental and economic justice for the inhabitants of the Niger Delta; secondly, it rarely conducts operations outside the Delta region; thirdly, it seldom launches mass-casualty attacks; fourthly, it is keen to win international support for its cause; and, fifthly, it has a much shorter list of targets.
Yet despite these differences, elements of the Federal Government’s campaign against the Niger Delta insurgents have been transposed to its struggle against Boko Haram. In some ways this is both to be expected and desirable. For a start, the insurgency in the south is older than that in the north, while the rotation of military units and personnel from one theatre to another inevitably means that practices and behaviours are transported around the country. Moreover, it is absolutely right and proper that the Federal - 3 -
Boko Haram and the prospects for a negotiated settlement
Government and the security forces apply the lessons they have learned in the south to the campaign they are mounting in the north.
Certainly, other governments and militaries set great store by building on what has worked well previously.
But there is increasing evidence that the Federal Government and security forces might also be applying bad southern practice. In particular, the Federal Government is encouraging the governors of some northern states and the sultan of Sokoto to offer known Boko Haram leaders money and other incentives to stop fighting. And other governors are making such approaches without Abuja’s approval. Offering such payments may have short-term benefits, but as events in the Niger Delta have shown, there are profound longer-term disadvantages.
For not only does this practice incentivise taking up arms against the state, but whatever peace it achieves is only temporary and quickly ends once the flow of cash stops. And just as crucially, it delays the implementation of the vital reforms that are needed to address the grievances of the insurgents and their supporters.
At present, it is not at all clear whether Boko Haram’s armed campaign can be brought to a negotiated end. Certainly, buying the group off does not represent a long-term solution and there is absolutely no guarantee that the hard core of
fighters would allow themselves to be bought off in this way. The strength of their ideological fervour suggests that they are unlikely to be swayed by offers of money, while the financial support provided by AQLIM means that they are able to refuse payments from the Federal Government. And perhaps just as critically, the Federal Government is no closer to resolving the fundamental political, economic, and social problems that drove the group to take up arms in the first instance and are helping to maintain its base of support.
Vital to any attempts to talk to Boko Haram, both its core and periphery, are the sultan of Sokoto, the various emirs, and the heads of the Sufi Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya Brotherhoods. While these are undoubtedly establishment figures, their Islamic credentials, historical authority, and formal separation from the secular federal and state governments mean that they are in a unique position to act as intermediaries and honest brokers. Yet at present there are few indicators that they want to perform this role. Arguably, a more promising route for the international community to take in its efforts to reduce the level of violence is to talk to the Nigerian security forces about how they conduct themselves. Even though this dialogue is unlikely to lead directly to a negotiated settlement, it may help create more propitious conditions in which talks between the two sides can take place.
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