Interdependencies of Production and Perception in Signaling Games
Roland M¨uhlenbernd
The application of signaling games (Lewis, 1969) to explain conventional language use is man- ifoldly examined by employing various dynamics that generate cultural evolution in a multi-agent setup (as an overview see Huttegger and Zollman, 2011). Particularly prominent in combination with repeated signaling games are thereplicator dynamics (cf. W¨arneryd, 1993; Huttegger, 2007), differentimitation dynamics (cf. Zollman, 2005; Wagner, 2008) and learning dynamics (cf. Young, 1993; Skyrms, 2010). In contrast to the standard ’two players one shot’ game here in most of the studies agents play a symmetrized game by switching between sender and receiver role. In such a scenario agents use a strategy pairhs, ri of sender strategy sand receiver strategy r. In all refer- able accounts known to me agents’ sender role and receiver role behavior are isolated from each other. Concerning this issue I claim that it is much more plausible that agents’ sender role and receiver role behavior are influenced by each other. For that purpose I define the set of plausible strategy pairs for static signaling games. Furthermore for dynamic signaling games I present a learning dynamics account that considers interdependencies of production (sender role behavior) and perception (receiver role behavior).
References
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