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Interdependencies of Production and Perception in Signaling Games

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Interdependencies of Production and Perception in Signaling Games

Roland M¨uhlenbernd

The application of signaling games (Lewis, 1969) to explain conventional language use is man- ifoldly examined by employing various dynamics that generate cultural evolution in a multi-agent setup (as an overview see Huttegger and Zollman, 2011). Particularly prominent in combination with repeated signaling games are thereplicator dynamics (cf. W¨arneryd, 1993; Huttegger, 2007), differentimitation dynamics (cf. Zollman, 2005; Wagner, 2008) and learning dynamics (cf. Young, 1993; Skyrms, 2010). In contrast to the standard ’two players one shot’ game here in most of the studies agents play a symmetrized game by switching between sender and receiver role. In such a scenario agents use a strategy pairhs, ri of sender strategy sand receiver strategy r. In all refer- able accounts known to me agents’ sender role and receiver role behavior are isolated from each other. Concerning this issue I claim that it is much more plausible that agents’ sender role and receiver role behavior are influenced by each other. For that purpose I define the set of plausible strategy pairs for static signaling games. Furthermore for dynamic signaling games I present a learning dynamics account that considers interdependencies of production (sender role behavior) and perception (receiver role behavior).

References

Huttegger, S. M. (2007). Evolution and the explanation of meaning. Philosophy of Science, 74(1):1–

27.

Huttegger, S. M. and Zollman, K. J. S. (2011). Signaling games: dynamics of evolution and learning.

In Benz, A., Ebert, C., J¨ager, G., and van Rooij, R., editors, Language, games, and evolution, pages 160–176. Springer-Verlag.

Lewis, D. (1969). Convention. A philosophical study. Havard University Press.

Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning and Information. Oxford University Press.

Wagner, E. (2008). Communication and structured correlation. Erkenntnis, 71:377–393.

W¨arneryd, K. (1993). Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability. Games and Economic Behaviore, 5:532–546.

Young, H. P. (1993). The evolution of conventions. Econometrica, 61(1):57–84.

Zollman, K. J. S. (2005). Talking to neighbors: The evolution of regional meaning. Philosophy of Science, 72(1):69–85.

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