W issenschaftszentrum Berlin
IIUG pre 86-2
POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
The S ta te of th e A rt by
Philip D. Lowe* and Wolfgang Rüdig**
* B a rtle tt School of A rch itectu re and Planning, U niversity College, Wates House, 22 Gordon S tre e t, London. In 1984 Visiting Fellow a t IIUG.
**D epartm ent of Science and Technology Policy, The U niversity of M anchester, M anchester.
To be published in: British Journal of P o litical Science
IIUG, P o tsd am er Str. 58, 1000 Berlin 30, Tel. 030 - 26 10 71
In this paper the authors take issue with a number of re
search approaches which play a dominant role in the field of environmental sociology. The most important of them, the
"value change" approach, has its limitations. It is always necessary to explain how values are created and sustained, and it is therefore not appropriate to regard them as inde
pendent variables. The focus should rather be upon the ways in which resources are mobilised in pursuit of particular interests generated by the structural context; and the ways in which that context is maintained or transformed by the struggles which it facilitates.
The authors argue for a revived case study approach supple
mented by survey analysis of the general public and of en
vironmental groups and their members. In the past, surveys have grossly neglected the situational context of environ
mental attitudes and action. However, the case study approach is also beset by several shortcomings. Case studies will have to be guided by theoretical approaches which put the indi
vidual case into a broader perspective. Furthermore, the authors have noted that the concept of political power is conspicuously absent from much current work in environmental sociology.
The second major new impetus to the case study approach should be a stronger emphasis on comparative work. Environ
mental conflicts in different areas, from air pollution to liquified natural gas and nuclear energy, should play a big
ger role; and the studies should emphasize different cultural and political patterns. This has generally not been done in comparative research. The authors believe that these short
comings can to some degree be explained by the gap between researcher and research object.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Autoren setzen sich mit einer Reihe von Forschungsansät
zen kritisch auseinander, die in der Umweltsoziologie eine dominierende Rolle spielen. Der wichtigste unter ihnen, der
"Wertwandel"-Ansatz, stößt in vielerlei Hinsicht an Grenzen.
So ist es beispielsweise stets erforderlich zu erklären, wie bestimmte Wertvorstellungen geschaffen und erhalten werden.
Aus diesem Grunde können sie nicht als unabhängige Variablen betrachtet werden. Der Fokus sollte eher darauf gerichtet
sein, wie Ressourcen in Verfolgung bestimmter Interessen mobilisiert werden, die sich aus dem strukturellen Kontext ergeben, und darauf, wie dieser Kontext durch die Konflikte, die er bewirkt, aufrechterhalten oder transformiert wird.
Die Autoren plädieren für eine Wiederbelebung des Fallstudien
ansatzes, ergänzt um Meinungsumfragen in der Bevölkerung so
wie bei Umweltschutzgruppen und ihren Mitgliedern. Solche Um
fragen haben in der Vergangenheit den situativen Kontext von Umweltverhalten und -handeln grob vernachlässigt. Der Fall
studienansatz ist seinerseits ebenfalls mit einigen Unzuläng
lichkeiten behaftet. Fallstudien bedürfen einer besseren
theoretischen Basis, damit die individuellen Fälle auch in
einem größeren Zusammenhang interpretiert werden können.
Darüber hinaus haben die Autoren festgestellt, daß in vielen neueren Arbeiten zur Umweltsoziologie der Begriff "politische Macht" auffallend häufig fehlt.
Ein weiterer neuer Impuls für den Fallstudienansatz sollte von einem vermehrten Einbezug komparatistischer Aspekte aus
gehen. Analysen von Umweltkonflikten sollten mehr als bis
her in unterschiedlichen Bereichen vorgenommen werden, z.B.
von Luftverschmutzung zu Flüssiggas und Kernenergie, und sie sollten stärker auf kulturelle und politische Unterschiede abheben. Dies hat die komparatistische Forschung im allge
meinen nicht zufriedenstellend geleistet, was nach Meinung
der Autoren zum Teil dadurch erklärt werden kann, daß die
Distanz zwischen Wissenschaftler und Untersuchungsgegenstand
zu groß ist.
I. Introduction
The ’environment' as a political issue has had a mixed history. Its sudden upsurge in the late 1960s was followed by many ups and downs. It has, however, continued to press itself onto the political agenda in various forms. Most recently, the rise of green parties in Western Europe has demonstrated that the environment is not one of many issues which come and go but has led to more fundamental political change.
The phenomena of environmental politics have attracted considerable attention from social scientists and in this paper we address some of the resulting literature. In general, the standard of scholarship has not been high, and our objective is to bring a sharper intellectual and methodological focus to the task of explaining the social and political manifestations of environmental concern. In summary, our objections are that the literature is divided between too much uninformed and heavy-handed empiricism, on the one hand, and too much grand theorising and pontificating on the other. We would argue that there has been insufficient attention to the specifics of environmental problems and conflicts, and insufficient, intelligent use of middle-range social and political theories.
The literature can broadly be split into two areas: the first covering primarily the attitudes and values of the mass public; and the second examining environmental groups, activists and actions. After reviewing each of these, we will then examine what potentially can be learnt from comparing environmental politics in different countries.
II. Environmental Attitudes and Value Change
Most of the empirical research conducted internationally on environmental movements has assumed that the key causal factor is a widespread change in values, i.e. that the environmental movement arises from a secular shift in popular attitudes. The explicit assumption is that values determine behaviour.
Survey research on environmental attitudes has been one of the most frequent approaches taken by environmental sociologists, particularly in the United States. A stream of surveys has been carried out, trying to establish the size and social characteristics of support for environmental protection measures (see Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978a, for a comprehensive compilation of the earlier studies in this field). Most of this research, though usually quite atheoretical, is within an empiricist tradition of political psychology.
Many studies have been little more than crude opinion polls. As Heberlein (1981) comments: "The literature on environmental attitudes broadly defined is remarkably atheoretical and ad hoc. It neither builds on nor, with several exceptions, contributes to attitude theory".
Even so, there have been a number of interesting findings. Firstly, despite variations in the degree of concern, there appears to be a relative stability of attitudes to environmental protection. A number of longitudinal studies initially seemed to suggest that in the U.S. popular concern for the environment had peaked in the early 1970s only to decline sharply in subsequent years. Recently, this has been called into question. Drawing on more comprehensive survey data collected on a nation-wide basis and requiring respondents to make trade-offs rather than merely identify problems, Mitchell (1979a;1984), Lowe and his colleagues (1980) and Lake (1983) have shown that environmental attitudes are much more stable and have remained widespread. Indeed, it has been argued that the superficial beliefs that most other surveys have tapped are merely a
reflection of the immediately prevailing preoccupations of the mass media (Heberlein 1981). There has been much less survey work in other countries, though a series of surveys has shown that the relative importance popularly accorded to the protection of the environment by the West German public is high and stable over time (Rat von Sachverständigen für Umweltfragen 1978).
The other main thrust of attitudinal research has been to correlate
pro-environmental beliefs with demographic characteristics. From a review of 21 separate Amecican studies, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) conclude that the data consistently support three empirical generalisations: that "younger people, well educated people, and politically liberal people tend to be more concerned about environmental quality than their older, less educated and politically conservative counterparts". No consistent relationships were found for party identification, rural-urban residence, and occupational status.
The variation in concern with age has been explained in terms of the young being less integrated into the dominant social order and therefore
more ready to accept solutions to problems which may require substantial changes in traditional values and behaviour (Hornback 1974). A rival explanation is that these age differences are not life-cycle effects but arise from the
historically-specific, formative experiences of distinct age-cohorts, such as the anti-Vietnam protest (Buttel & Flinn 1978; Malkis & Grasmick 1977). Variations in concern with levels of education have been explained by reference to the concept of relative deprivation. The better educated, it is suggested, experience superior environmental conditions at work and in their leisure
time, and are therefore likely to be more sensitive to environmental deterioration (Morrison et al. 1972). Finally, variations in concern with left or right
political leanings.have been explained on the basis that support for more strenuous environmental protection implies a lack of trust in the capacity of
business or industry to act responsibly, and a preference for more interventionist government (Dunlap 1975; Buttel & Flinn 1976).
The search for more profound theoretical explanations than these low-level hypotheses has gone beyond the narrow confines of attitudinal studies. The question of the widespread value changes amongst Western publics underlying new social movements has been centrally addressed in the writings of post-industrial society theorists. The most influential author has been Ronald Inglehart,
who, in a series of writings (1971, 1977, 1981), formulated his thesis of
"post-materialist value change". Inglehart diagnosed a widespread shift away from the unquestioned predominance of economic and basic security values
towards an increasing emphasis upon what Maslow had characterised as "higher order" needs (i.e. the needs for love, esteem and status and for intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction). The former, Inglehart termed "materialist values";
and the latter "post-acquisitive" and, later, "post-materialist" values.
Inglehart’s explanation originally rested on two propositions: firstly, that basic needs have to be met before non-material needs can play any role, and, secondly, that value systems are acquired in the formative years of childhood and youth, and tend to remain relatively stable thereafter. These account for the different priorities represented among people raised amidst post-war prosperity and security. Unlike their parents or grandparents who grew up during the Depression or one of the World Wars when scarcity and physical danger posed such immediate threats, the post-war generation, it is suggested, has been freed to demote safety and material needs among their personal priorities and concentrate instead upon fulfilling their belonging needs and intellectual and aesthetic drives. In more recent writings Inglehart (1979, 1981) has added a scarcity hypothesis to tie up with Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Similar to the economic theory of diminished marginal utility, this
proclaims that people accord a higher priority to whatever needs are least met.
Initially, Inglehart did not refer to the environmental movement as an expression of post-materialist value change. Indeed, the only relevant item on his scale - "Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful” - proved to be unrelated to the materialist/post-materialist divide. Hildebrandt and Dalton (1977) were perhaps the first to identify environmental concern and protest against nuclear energy with post-materialism. The connection became more suggestive through the work on "unconventional political participation"
by Barnes and Kaase and their colleagues (1979). Inglehart himself first
addressed the connection in 1979 and has devoted more attention to it in later papers (1981, 1983a) in which he advances the claim that post-materialists
"furnish the ideologues and core support for the environmental, zero-growth and anti-nuclear movements; and their opposition to those who give top priority to re-industrialisation and re-armament constitutes a distinctive and persistent dimension of political cleavage" (Inglehart 1982).
Recently, there has been a wave of articles drawing on the concept of 'post-materialist value change' as a major explanatory factor for the rise of environmentalism, though some of them do express reservations about one or other element of Inglehart's theory (Watts 1979; Watts & Wandesforde-Smith
1981; Müller-Rommel and Wilke 1981; Handley and Watts 1981; Müller-Rommel 1982a, 1983b). Corroborating survey data suggest that 'post-materialists' are more likely than 'materialists' to:
- support environmental protection measures;
- be opposed to nuclear energy and "stronger military defence efforts";
- have a high opinion of the environmental movement (Inglehart
1981, 1983);
- Support actively the ecological, anti-nuclear energy and peace movements (Müller-Rommel 1984a, 1985); and - vote for a green party (Müller-Rommel & Wilke 1981;
Müller-Rommel 1983b, 1984b; Schmidt 1984).
One author has summarised the argument in the following terms:
environmentalist politics arise because of the growth of a new generation of well-educated and materially-secure activists with a taste for direct action politics and a very basic disposition to devalue unfettered economism in favour of higher-order goals that naturally include greater social integration, democratic partici
pation, and aesthetically pleasing surroundings (Marsh 1981, p.136).
Other writers associate post-materialism with the more radical expressions of environmentalism. For example, Watts and Wandesford-Smith (1981) argue that:
The ideological shift characteristic of post-materialists is not found among all environmentalists, some of whom are quite comfortable with the dominant values of the system. The overlap is rather between post-materialism and those recently developing elements of the
environmental movement that have begun to articulate a critique of the techno-scientific rationale of industrial society.
This links up with other theories which see radical environmentalism as being motivated by a distinct world view, termed the New Ecological (or Environmental) Paradigm, at odds with many of the core values of industrial society, such as economic growth, material progress and technological optimism (Dunlap and Catton 1980; O ’Riordan 1981; Dunlap and Van Liere 1978b; Cotgrove 1982).
A major problem in assessing the relationship between ’post-materialism’ and
’environmentalism’ is the danger of tautology. Originally, 'post-materialists’
were defined as those who give priority to "protecting freedom of speech” and
"giving people more say in the decisions of government” over the "protection of order in the nation" and the "fighting of prices" (Inglehart 1971). The term 'post-materialism', however, is increasingly used not exclusively as an analytical concept in connection with Inglehart's original scale, but
heuristically to characterise a generic set of values and attitudes which include environmental ones (Fietkau 1982a; Fietkau et al. 1982). Inglehart's original theory is thus not necessarily accepted by authors who seek to explain
'post-materialist value change'. Fietkau (1982a), for example, draws on a
number of psychological explanations to suggest that environmental consciousness is a reaction to the experience of loss of control over one's immediate
surroundings through the emergence of new - ecological - problems not amenable to established processes for problem solving.
A theory can be evaluated at different levels: are its assumptions plausible? is it logically consistent? and how well can it explain social reality? Inglehart's theory has come under attack on all three counts:
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, or Inglehart's use of it, is by no means
universally accepted (Herz 1979; Fietkau 1982a; Flanagan 1982). Similarly, the assumption that values acquired during adolescent socialisation remain
I
relatively stable throughout life has been seriously questioned (Lafferty
1976; Herz 1979; Lehner 1979). Some authors see a contradiction in Inglehart’s combining of the hierarchy of needs/scarcity hypothesis with the socialisation hypothesis: the former assumes that people change their values according to the relative fulfilment of different needs; whereas the latter proclaims the stability of a value system once it has been acquired.
This theoretical challenge has been backed up by empirical studies in Western European countries which have shown that worsening economic conditions led to dramatic swings in value orientations among all age cohorts during the late 1970s (Böltken and Jagodzinski 1985; Van Deth 1983). These findings of significant intra-individual value change cast doubt on the dominant cohort effect implied by Inglehart's theory. Others have reassessed Inglehart's findings on value change in Japan, arguing that ageing rather than generational
change is wholly or partly responsible (Flanagan 1982; Jagodzinski 1983).
Inglehart (1985a & b) has dismissed some of these results as sampling
anomalies or misunderstandings of his theory, and has accounted for fluctuations in support for post-materialism by reference to changes in the infation rate.
Though this appears empirically convincing, it renders talk of value change trivial if its index is so dependent on the erratic movements of one parameter.
It would also seem to represent a weakening of Inglehart's original socialisation hypothesis; and his more recent clarification of his position — that value change can be explained by short-term period effects superimposed on long-term cohort effects (1983) — • appears to be sufficiently imprecise to make a final falsification of his theory difficult. It thus appears questionable to make Inglehart's theory of value change the basis of environmental sociology.
Indeed, we have fundamental misgivings about the general enterprise to conceptualise environmentalism purely in terms of value change. One of our main reservations is that this effectively divorces environmental concern from ecological problems. The environment is seen as just one among many
"post-materialist" issues which suddenly emerged to prominence, unrelated to any change in the environment, through a shift in values among people who had nothing else to worry about. Such a line of thought can lend itself to the view that environmentalism is not only a luxury, but is socially pathological.
For example, starting from the unsupported assumption that environmental concern in America has emerged at a time when environmental hazards are objectively at their lowest level, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue that there is no causal relationship between environmental problems and the environmental movement;
and they proceed to analyse it as a form of sectarian protest with origins in peculiar features of American culture (see Holdren 1983 for a thorough critique).
Equally, within the value change tradition, the form and content of political action are regarded as essentially epiphenomenal. Survey research on
post-materialism and unconventional political action carried out in the 1970s conspicuously lacked any reference to concrete conflicts but rather dealt with the 'potentials’ identified in the sampled attitudes of mass publics, thereby neglecting the context in which actions do or do not occur and through which values are mediated. Whatever the relative merits of sampling methods and data analysis of the different studies, the crucial question is whether the immense effort committed to this form of research is of any use in the explanation of real political phenomena. Depite the arbitrary connections various investigators draw between particular parameters of their survey material and actual events, it appears to us that the enormous literature generated around Inglehart’s theory deals essentially with research artefacts whose relevance to the analysis of political reality is at best tenuous.
Moreover, the derivation of belief systems from questionnaire responses conveys the impression that values are distinct, absolute and timeless entities, even though people are ambivalent about many of the attitudes they hold and
draw (often quite eclectically) on specific and evolving traditions of argument to defend or promote their positions. Ihdeed, after a decade of research little is known about popular environmental attitudes. There are few systematic
studies that describe how people feel towards different environments, nor is there much information about how these feelings are organised into belief systems. There is a clear need for basic research on the significance people attach to changes in their own environment and what makes some translate concern into action. The relation between environmental problems and environmental attitudes is, in our view, one of the major research topics which has not been adequately addressed. What is needed instead of large-scale, mass opinion surveys
are detailed studies of local responses (or non-responses) to specific problems in order to elucidate the determinants of concern and action.
Here research has been rather sketchy. A review of surveys on attitudes towards nuclear installations shows quite clearly that concern is greatest before construction, and that host communities develop a positive attitude to plants in operation (Rüdig 1983a). Similarly, surveys of communities with polluting industries show that people employed by or living close to the plants express less concern about environmental conditions than do others (Evans &
Jacobs 1981; Francis 1983). These responses can best be explained as a process of ’adaptation’ involving denial and suppression of the environmental hazards.
Recent studies of the perception and politics of hazardous working conditions reveal similar processes at work (Kazis & Grossman 1982; Prescott-Clarke
1982; Nelkin & Brown 1984).
There are many other factors which could influence the formation of environmental attitudes; two of the most important being the education
system and the media. Through television and newspaper coverage, for example, nature and the countryside have become key aspects of popular culture; public opinion has been alerted to various environmental hazards; and a succession of environmental issues has been placed on the political agenda. This raises important questions about the attitudes of journalists and broadcasters to environmental issues, the editorial constraints they face, and the impact of environmental reporting on popular and elite opinion (Lowe & Morrison 1984).
There is also a need for research on the history of ideas and cultural tastes, to put present environmental ideas into a broader context and to
establish a deeper understanding of environmentalism’s historical role. Right from its earliest stages, industrialism has provoked popular reactions which have been partly nostalgic for the disappearing, pre-industrial world, partly
eschatalogical (fearing the outcome of the Faustian bargain of technological society), and partly utopian in seeking to recreate community and human solidarity out of the dislocation and fragmentation wrought by industrialism (see Kumar 1978 for some suggestive insights).
In America, environmental history is a well developed field with its own special journal, Environmental Review. A recent edited compilation also provides a useful point of entry into the literature and some of its key themes (Bailes 1985). Thewritings of Samuel Hays have been particularly influential in relating the development of environmental values and institutions to broad social and economic changes (Hays 1958; and forthcoming).
In Europe, interest in the history of ecological ideas, though much less developed, has been mounting. Thomas (1983) provides an exhaustive account of changing attitudes to the natural world in England between 1500 and 1800.
Pepper (1984) concentrates on the historic-philosophical roots of the various strands of modern environmentalism, a valuable contribution marred by a rather simplistic and orthodox marxist interpretation. Wiener's (1981) celebrated account of the roots of anti-industrialism in English culture also represents a stimulating, if unintended, contribution to the history of environmentalism.
He fails, however, to reflect on his central assumption that British anti-industrialism is an essentially irrational and costly aberration: by comparison with the role of anti-industrialist ideology in Germany, the integration of these strands of thought within English society should be evaluated somewhat more favourably.
Rather than concentrating on literary or philosophical sources, it would be more fruitful to focus on the actual social and political manifestations of the precursors of environmentalism from the 19th century onwards. A modest start has already been made with some studies of this type on France (Vadrot
1978; Duclos & Smadja 1985), Germany (Wey 1982; Conti 1984; Rothschuh 1983), Britain (Sheail 1976; Marsh 1982; Lowe 1983) and Japan (McKean 1983).
In contrast to studies which have values as both their central object of enquiry and the main concept in their explanatory scheme, other traditions of interpretative sociology have emphasised the ways in which people present their actions as being in conformity with norms which are, in turn, presented as embodying values. The concern, in short, is to demonstrate the processes by which the general is generated from the particular. It follows that it is inappropriate to see the beginnings of social action in values. Rather, as Barnes (1982) has argued, ’’Any general sense of value must be maintained by the continuing, active, revisable clustering of particular instances. Values must be the products of communal activity, not part of the basis of community."
Such an orientation is at one with a concern to emphasise the mutually determining relationship between agency and structure whereby structure has both a constraining and an enabling role in relation to action and the exercise of power. In order to avoid the danger of lapsing into a tautology - where the evidence for a 'value* is simply a description of the behaviour it is then used to explain - it is always necessary to elucidate how values are created and sustained through actions and this means that though they may feature as
intervening variables, it is seldom appropriate to regard them as independent variables. The focus should rather be upon the ways in which resources
(conceived in the broadest possible sense to include historical traditions, modes of political argument, the political skills of actors and so on) are mobilised in pursuit of particular interests generated by the structural con
text; and the ways in which that context is maintained or transformed by the struggles which it facilitates. This directs attention specifically to rela
tions of power - a concept conspicuously absent from environmental sociology
within the value change tradition.
In short, values abstracted from context are relatively meaningless. This is not to suggest, however, that people react mechanically to external problems.
On the contrary, environmental ideas and actions are responses on the part of people with particular aspirations and perceptions about their lives and
surroundings. Analysis needs to understand how these aspirations and perceptions interact with changing environmental circumstances. At the heart of the matter are the critical choices people make in specific contexts and the way these choices are structured and constrained.
III. Environmental Action
Environmental attitudes' are not the only, and arguably not the most important, environmental phenomena the social sciences are called upon to explain. More or less powerful pressure groups, movements, and parties have emerged in this field representing a variety of political action.
Four main methodologies have been used to approach environmental political action:
(i) surveys of members of environmental groups;
(ii) action research/ sociological intervention;
(iii) group surveys; and (iv) case studies.
These four approaches are not exclusive of each other. Often mixed
methodologies are used. Each approach has its methodological shortcomings which in themselves are pertinent to a discussion of future research strategy, but which in the case of the first and second approach, also implicate the theoretical perspectives connected with them.
Research pursuing the first approach has predominantly been influenced by the work on "value change" discussed above and has tended to focus on mass publics and to lack reference to concrete political conflicts. It must be accepted as a step forward therefore when researchers in West Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. in a collaborative effort, turn their attention to the characteristics of actual supporters of environmental groups and compare their surveyed opinions with those of the general public and other groups which included samples of industrialists, politicians and trade unionists (Fietkau et al. 1981a,b; 1982a,b; Kessel 1982, 1983a,b,c; Cotgrove 1982;
Milbrath 1981, 1984). However, with still no reference in this International Environmental Survey to "situational” factors and concrete political conflicts,
and relatively scant attention paid to the particular development and characteristics of environmental movements in the different countries, we feel that the move
to study concrete political action has not gone far enough. Indeed, one of the researchers, Fietkau (1982b, p. 5) warns that due to different political systems and the distinct organisation of environmental groups in the three countries, the responses from politicians and environmentalists are not readily comparable.
Given this inherent shortcoming, one wonders why so much effort was spent on gathering and interpreting data of doubtful value while no attempt was made to reach a more substantive understanding of the political, cultural, and
organisational background of environmental groups in the countries concerned.
To come to a more Immanent assessment of this work, the researchers confirmed the thesis that environmentalists are more inclined to
’post-materialist’ values than the general public, but demurred at Inglehart's explanation. Cotgrove and Duff found that it is not young middle-class people in general who are involved in environmental groups, as would be expected from Inglehart’s socialisation hypothesis, but, more specifically, that activists are mainly employed in the personal service sector.
Cotgrove and Duff put forward two separate explanations (1980,1981);
and they are unsure which is the more important and to what extent they are compatible. The first rested on the notion that early political socialisation might influence career choice; in particular, that environmental or
anti-industrial values acquired at an early stage of socialisation would
subsequently lead to occupational choices which avoided a clash between personal values and workplace values. Their alternative explanation was that
environmentalism is "an expression of the interests of those whose class position in the non-productive (sic) sector locates them at the periphery of the institutions and processes of industrial capitalist societies”.
A number of writers have similarly located the shift in values represented by environmentalism in the secular changes which are occurring to the structure of advanced industrial societies. Explanations typically link environmentalism with the rise of a 'new (middle) class' (see e.g. Berger 1979; Inglehart 1981;
Nelkin & Poliak 1981; Gouldner 1979). Bürklin (1983), for example, argues that the voters for the German Greens predominantly represent a social group which has the educational prerequisites of a new political elite but which has not yet managed to establish itself (see also Marsh 1981). Drawing on Pareto's notion of elite circulation, Bürklin identifies the new elite's ecological inclinations with their objective self-interest in the maintenance and extension of the
welfare and regulatory states. A similar argument is put forward by Ward (1983) who equates environmental regulation with an expansion of the state sector.
One difficulty with this approach is that there is much disagreement over who belongs to this new class, and whether they do constitute a class (see,
e.g. Poulantzas 1975; Crompton & Gubbay 1977; Bruce-Briggs 1979; Walker 1979;
Parkin 1979). There are also problems in identifying the pro-environmental action of the new class with its own, well-understood interest. The demands of radical political ecology for fundamental change to industrial society do not accord with this model. The financing of the welfare state is dependent on continued economic growth - why should it be in the interests of those who work within it to demand the end of economic growth and a halt to major
technological projects?
The political programme of the German Greens, which combines demands for curbs on industrial expansion with an extension of the welfare state, is thus highly contradictory. This being the case, there must be doubts about the adequacy of a 'class interest interpretation' both at the subjective level of political motivations as well as the objective level of political outcomes.
Of course, in some cases, environmental conflicts may reflect the special interests of the middle classes to the detriment of the lower classes (see Lowe 1977; Morrison & Dunlap 1985), but the larger ecological problematic is not amenable to such an interpretation (provided one accepts that there are ecological problems and does not see environmentalism as an irrational aberration or a conspiracy of the ruling classes). As these problems potentially affect everybody, and as working class people are usually more exposed to environmental hazards than others, the fact that these issues are taken up by a particular social group cannot lead to the conclusion that they are doing so out of interests that are exclusively their own.
Theoreticians of the ’new social class' are not, however, alone in their emphasis on the self-interested nature of environmental activists. Olson's rational choice theory has recently been invoked to explain U.S. environmental lobbies and their pursuit of public goods. An empirical test by Tillock and Morrison (1979), involving a survey of members of the group Zero Population Growth, did not support the theory. Mitchell (1979b), however, attempted to reformulate it in a way which reconciles the social reality of major support for environmental associations with the view of individuals acting in an
egoistic, rational, utility-maximising manner. He argues that in an individual's calculus of the personal costs and benefits of contributing or not-contributing to the efforts of public interest lobbies, the cost of supporting environmental organisations could well appear relatively trivial against the enormous potential benefits (the prevention or amelioration of pervasive environmental threats) to which these organisations allude. A further elaboration of the rational
choice approach has been proposed by Smith (1985) in a study of U.S. environmental groups using complex economic models.
Rational choice models of human behaviour easily attract a charge of
tautology. The assumption of the ’rationality' of individual behaviour appears to elude empirical testing, and a posteriori practically any action can be characterised as ’rational’. Leaving such fundamental problems aside, are rational choice models likely to add significantly to our understanding of environmental action? Olson’s work remains an impressive source of ideas. It may be particularly suited to the U. S. context where the environmental movement consists mainly of institutionalised groups pursuing litigation or lobbying
with the role of individual members restricted largely to financial contributions or, at most, participation in letter writing campaigns. In utilising it, however, we would proceed somewhat differently from Mitchell.
Firstly, Olson’s analysis should direct our attention to the personal costs of participation and their varying significance for different social groups.
For example, effective involvement in environmental politics usually demands a large time commitment but this may not be a significant cost for those with time on their hands. Secondly, the function of what Olson called "selective incentives" should not be overlooked. In the case of certain established environmental organisations, it may well be that the reasons for joining are not to be found in their broader aims but in the essentially private benefits they offer to their members (Lowe & Goyder 1983, pp. 39-40). The British National Trust is perhaps a prime example: its members enjoy the benefit of free access to the enormous range of country estates and historic buildings owned by the Trust.
In the case of the more activist groups, participation offers a range of non-material incentives such as social contacts and a sense of togetherness and purpose (Wilson 1973). Cohen (1981) found these motivations to be
particularly pertinent in a study of the Clamshell Alliance, an anti-nuclear protest group which tried to stop construction of the Seabrook nuclear power
station in New Hampshire with various acts of civil disobedience. Those participating in site occupations appeared particularly attracted by the strong feeling of togetherness and common purpose experienced during these actions.
Such findings might stimulate a reconsideration of the general theory proposed by K o m h a u s e r (1960) that social movements are formed and run by alienated individuals in search of social integration, and are therefore
pathological forms of human behaviour (this theme of the essential irrationality of social movements has been a persistent strain in American sociology - see Sammstedt 1978). Many studies have shown, on the contrary, that protest groups emerge far easier if social cohesion in the relevant community is high (cp.
Isaacs et a l ., 1980; Useem 1980). Moreover, even if the attractions of
sociability and companionship play a part in recruitment, explanation is still required of why people join environmental groups rather than sports or social clubs.
We would thus agree with Mitchell's assertion that environmental activity must be explained as rational behaviour. At the same time, from an international perspective, it appears problematic to conceive this rationality narrowly in terms of either individualistic, self-interested, utility-maximising individuals or the objective self-interest of a particular section of the population.
Far more convincing to us is an approach which focusses on the affinity with or distance from the industrial production process. Drawing on the finding that most radical environmentalists are either still in education or working in the personal service sector, Fietkau (1981, pp.7-8) interpreted environmental conflict as an antagonism not between generations nor between social classes, but between those inside and those outside the industrial process. We have already suggested a re-interpretation of these and other
results in terms of industrialism's political power forcing those groups most immediately threatened by environmental hazards to 'adapt' and 'cope'.
The surveys of environmental activists reported so far suffer a common drawback in their lack of reference to 'situational' factors and concrete experiences of conflict. This, however, is not inherent in the method but rather reflects the concentration on the value-change approach. A different approach could well survey activists ' history of involvement and
self-understanding of their role, as in Parkin's (1968) and Taylor and
Pritchard's (1980) studies of the British peace movement. McKean (1981) adopted this approach in his 1972 survey of Japanese environmental activists. Other, similar studies have been conducted in the U.S., though on a smaller scale, including a survey in the late 1960s of members of the Sierra Club (Devall 1970); a national telephone poll of 1974-5 which relied on the respondent’s self-reported membership of an "environmental group” (cp. Mitchell & Davies
1978, pp. 31-2); interviews conducted in 1973 with some 30 leaders of anti-nuclear organisations (Mazur 1975); a series of interviews with participants at a
national anti-nuclear demonstration in 1979 (Van Liere et al. 1979; Hood et al. 1982; Ladd et al. 1983); and a survey of members of the Clamshell Alliance (Cohen 1981).
The question arises, though of how far should the researcher move away from classical survey analysis based on random samples and standardised
interviews. At the furthest extreme stands the work of Alain Touraine and his colleagues presented in the book Anti-Nuclear Protest. Touraine's methodology was to instigate a process of discussion and reflection inside the French
anti-nuclear movement. Selected anti-nuclear activists were first confronted with various opposing views (e.g. from nuclear managers and engineers, trade unionists, the military, and representatives of different factions within the
anti-nuclear movement). The ensuing discussions were followed by the
'intervention' when Touraine and his co-workers presented their own analysis of the movement's social role. They seem, however, to have left too many principles of empirical enquiry behind. Indeed, they do not appear to have been genuinely interested in explaining why distinct factions in the movement adopt different strategies and forms of protest. Instead, the purpose of the exercise appears to have been in the dissemination of Professor Touraine's ideas of the "true destiny" of the anti-nuclear movement — as, potentially, the vanguard social movement in leading the way to the post-industrial society -- and to "convert", to use his own vocabulary, as many of its activists to that view (for a more detailed critique, see Rüdig and Lowe 1984).
Early work on the anti-nuclear movement in West Germany pursued a less pretentious approach - that of ’action research' (Sternstein 1978; Ebert et al. 1978; Schroeren 1977; and many contributions to the journal Gewaltfreie Aktion). While Touraine's methodology maintains a definite distance between the researcher and the research object, this is totally abandoned in action research not only to achieve a more profound understanding of the phenomena but also to intervene in favour of underprivileged groups (Kramer et al. 1979), Here the investigators are part of the movement, gather their data by
participant observation and present their findings in a way the anti-nuclear movement can make practical use of. They have the opportunity to develop a deep understanding about the motivation, the outlook and experiences of the protest groups, gaining first-hand knowledge which is too often lacking in conventional case studies.
The closeness to the research object, however, has several disadvantages.
Action researchers may be unable to analyse the phenomena in a broader context, the identification with a protest group being so strong that they are unable
Co transcend or reflect upon the activists' point of view. Everything tends to be judged on its merits for the political work of the group. It is this lack of distance which characterises much of the German action research on environmental conflicts. While it provides a wealth of interesting factual information, it remains rather atheoretical and somewhat partisan.
Having found action research and membership surveys more or less flawed, what are the alternatives? One other approach is to survey environmental groups rather than individual members. Organisation, size, membership, and patterns of political action of different environmental groups are scrutinised to establish their political role. In the U.K. there have been only two major surveys of this kind: one a large-scale survey of local amenity societies (Civic Trust /Barker 1976; Barker & Keating 1977); the other a survey of
national environmental groups carried out in 1979-80 (Lowe & Goyder 1983). For France, there is nothing apart from Vadrot’s (1980) small and unsystematic survey. In Germany, plenty of survey material is available for the period between 1972 and 1977 (for an overview, see Rildig 1981), most of it not
specifically on environmental groups but citizens action groups (Bürgerinitiativen) in general; and since 1977, the emphasis of empirical research has shifted away from the apparently declining Bürgerinitiativen to "self-help organisations"
(Beywl & Brombach 1984), other "new social movements" (Brand et al 1983) and the supporters of green parties. Von Moltke and Visser (1982) conducted a survey of Dutch environmental groups, paying particular attention to the legal framework in which they operate; and Roddewig (1978) covered residents action groups and
"green bans" in Australia. We are not aware of any group surveys conducted in any other countries.
Finally, there is the traditional case study in which individual conflicts are investigated through various means including archival investigations,
scrutiny of published material such as newspaper and parliamentary reports, participatory observation, and intensive interviews with participants. The British and American literatures are perhaps richest in this regard (for book-length studies, see Gregory 1971; Kimber & Richardson 1974; Hall 1976;
Smith 1975; Boyle 1978; Wynne 1982; Blowers 1984; Lowe et al 1985; Talbot 1972; Brodeur 1973; Egginton 1980; Casper & Wellstone 1981). Particularly interesting as well are studies of the historical roots and genesis of contemporary conflicts and issues (e.g. Rickwood 1973; Sheail 1976, 1981;
Ashby and Anderson 1981; Nash 1967; Schrepfer 1983; Dunlap 1981).
In an impressive study of opposition to the Narita Airport near Tokyo, Apter and Sawa (1984) not only carried out intensive interviews but also sought to comprehend environmental protest from first-hand experience, including
living with the protesters in their "fortresses". Their approach sprung from disillusionment with the mainstream theories and methodologies used by social scientists to study public protest:
One of the problems of contemporary social science is the over
generalized nature of its theories and the overkill quality of its categories.... There is a need, then, to go back to the drawing boards, to cases, to field studies, to observation of multiple perspectives and contexts, (p.245)
Such an attitude could run the risk of an atheoretical empiricism, but Apter and Sawa's book tells us far more about environmental protest in Japan than surveys of value change or the "rational choice" motivations of protesters.
We do not want to suggest that group surveys and case studies provide all the answers, though it does appear to us that these two methodologies are more appropriate to an integrated environmental sociology. However, previous work employing these methodologies was significantly short of such an integrated perspective. Survey work on environmental groups, though able to extract
much valuable information on the strategies, actions and resources of individual
groups, has a number of significant weaknesses. Surveys tend to rely on one or two informants within each group. This might introduce a bias as group spokesmen tend to present the group in the most favourable light, to gloss over any internal differences, and to express the official view from the centre or headquarters rather than grass-roots or branch opinion. Secondly, surveys tend to concentrate on formal well-established organisations rather than on temporary and spontaneous groupings or loosely-structured, informal groups and networks even though this may give a false picture of the coherence, formality and incorporation of the environmental movement. Thirdly and finally, group surveys are restricted in the extent to which they can cover the dynamics of a group’s involvement in conflicts and therefore can make only limited assessments of a group’s power and effectiveness.
Some of these shortcomings can be off-set by combining group surveys with other methodologies. As to the first, to establish an accurate picture of a group’s internal politics would require a detailed case study including
interviews with a wider range of leading group members as well as a survey of the membership. Secondly, more ephemeral, collective responses to environmental problems have already been the subject of a few case studies (e.g. Hall 1976;
Mutch 1977). A comparative survey of such responses in different areas would be highly desirable though would require a major effort. The comparative case study approach would be more economic and might be preferable, provided it were guided by a sophisticated theoretical framework.
Thirdly, the conflict dynamics of environmental groups are mainly accessible through the case study approach. Comparative case studies over a range of
issues would be desirable. Such studies have been rare. One possible approach is the quantitative analysis of a large number of cases using information collected from press reports. For example, from an analysis of 587
environmental conflicts between 1970 and 1978 implicating the chemical industry, Gladwin and Walter (1980) identified a number of important trends: in the U.S., conflict areas broadened and conflict arenas moved more to the local level;
litigation played a very important role, but increasingly governmental
administrative action became more important; and potential environmental impacts raised more concern than existing ones.
Another, even more interesting, example comes from a research group at the University of Zurich who examined 6,211 "activation events"’ i.e. all the events they could identify which led to sustained, collective political action in Switzerland between 1945 and 1978 (Kriesi et al. 1981). The topics, forms, participants and ’situational’ contexts of protest activities were
systematically compared. Levy’s (1981) analysis of the data provides a very stimulating example for the study of environmental action. Traditional class conflicts have gradually become less salient in Switzerland. The major new source of political activity has been 'consequential problems’ (Folgeprobleme) of economic growth, with environmental problems the most significant: the number of such events rose steeply from the late 1960s to a peak in 1973, then temporarily fell behind ’class problems’ (which experienced a resurgence with the economic recession), until a revival in 1977/8. Most of those who
participate in environmental conflicts (90Z) are directly affected by the problem at issue and ad-hoc groups play a very important role. Levy concludes that environmental problems are generally pursued by organisationally weak groups with established political organisations playing a relatively minor role compared with other problem areas. The survey also confirms that
’unconventional’ forms of articulation such as public protests, direct actions, and violence are on the increase historically, particularly where new and ad- hoc groups are concerned. Levy interprets this as a result of inadequate
responsiveness by the political system.
Such a survey of several thousand events over a long period of time
necessarily entails serious limitations on the detail and quality of information available for analysis. Consequently, over-reliance on the quantitative analysis of aggregate data sets - as, for example, in many U.S. studies of political
violence (Zimmerman 1979) - can be of rather doubtful value, unless supplemented with case studies of particular conflicts. The Zurich group’s survey of
"activation events” was indeed followed by 10 detailed case studies; one of them, for example, on the protest against the Swiss nuclear power power station of Graben (Kriesi 1981). This type of approach, intelligently combining
quantitative and qualitative analysis, appears to offer great promise.
Certain institutionalised forms of conflict, such as public inquiries and law suits, lend themselves more readily to' systematic comparative analysis than do others. An interesting example is Wenner's study (1982,1983) of U.S.
environmental litigation in which she examined 2,178 cases filed in federal courts between 1970 and 1980. The level of litigation increased significantly over the decade and involved three major groups — business organisations, environmental groups and federal agencies — though the first two rarely
confronted each other directly. Environmentalists initiated the largest number of suits until 1975, but business legal activity increased dramatically through the decade especially in the appeals court. Of the three groups, government agencies had the highest success rates, and whereas environmental and business success rates were almost balanced at the trial and appellate levels, business did substantially better in the Supreme Court. National environmental groups were more successful than local or ad-hoc groups. The early part of the decade was marked by a period of judicial activism favourable to environmental interests and values but this was subsequently attenuated.
Our argument that case studies of groups and conflicts should play a more central role in environmental sociology should not be taken as an expression of satisfaction with existing work in this field. At least in the U.K. and the U.S. , case studies tend to be very descriptive. Where theoretical
approaches have been used, they have not been specifically geared to reach a better understanding of environmental politics, but rather of other processes, such as the conduct of public inquiries, agency decision making, or the role of pressure groups. Environmental conflicts have not so far been regarded by researchers as expressions of a new political cleavage, nor has there been significant effort to elucidate the social interests they express.
The other major drawback of issue case studies as a genre is their tendency to focus only on matters of controversy and therefore on the influence of
groups on overt decision making - what Lukes (1974) termed the first face of power. They usually overlook the other two faces of power: the control of political access and agendas, whereby certain groups are excluded from decision making and certain issues and policy options from consideration; and ideological control, whereby certain interests in society enjoy an overriding legitimacy.
Admittedly, it is usually easier to discover why something did happen than why something did not, though international comparative analysis should provide an ideal opportunity to test hypotheses concerning the occurrence of non-events and non-decisions.
There is also a need to move our attention from the single decision to the structure of the relationship between participants and the norms which serve to maintain or change the relationship through time: in other words, to shift our focus from decisions to systems of decision-making (and non-decision making) (Bachrach & Baratz 1970). What is so interesting about environmentalism in this respect is the challenge it has posed to existing political structures
oriented as they are to conventional conflicts between economic classes and the functional accommodation of producer interests.
The systematic comparison of case studies of conflicts over power stations, waste dumps, liquid natural gas installations, chemical and other polluting industries, coupled with survey research of the ’h o s t ' communities, including cases where no protest has emerged (cf. Crenson 1971), would overcome the prevailing focus on one particular case or industry. One promising approach would be to begin classifying environmental problems to identify those
dimensions which serve to facililate or retard the mobilisation of opposition:
e.g. is the threat a future or existing one? is its impact site or non-site specific? is its incidence chronic or episodic? does it unify or divide the affected population in terms of its economic implications? is it a risk to
health or to amenity? Such an analysis would also be a significant contribution to the literature on issue making and agenda building which so far has neglected the important role of protest movements in forcing ecological issues onto the political agenda and the conditions under which such movements arise (Downs
1972; Solesbury 1976).
Once environmental protest over particular issues has emerged, the way these demands are processed should be the focus of analysis. To varying degrees, Western governments have responded to environmental pressures by adopting new procedures for consultation and the evaluation of policy options. Participation in government involves costs as well as benefits for environmental groups and these will vary according to the form and extent of participation (Olsen.1977;
Richardson & Jordan 1979; Lowe & Goyder 1983). Naturally, group leaders will seek to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs. However, as Marsh (1983, p.9) comments "while incorporation does not ensure influence, outsider status does not preclude influence". Elaborate and formal consultative procedures may
in fact be a sham, or be for symbolic rather than substantive purposes. On the other hand, political behaviour outside the conventional channels of participation can produce tangible, procedural and structural changes in the policy process, as demonstrated by the anti-motorway protests in Britain and protests against nuclear power plants in various countries.
A critical decision facing pressure group leaders, therefore, is whether and on what terms to participate in government, if indeed this is an available option, as some political systems and certain policy communities within them have proved more open to external pressures than others. What seems to have
emerged in Britain, at least, are two distinct 'policy styles' (see J. J. Richardson 1982) for different fields of environmental concern. Some fields conform to a
model of corporatist interest accommodation in which peak environmental groups are incorporated into the policy process and integrate divergent environmental demands in a consensual manner, filtering out any considered 'extreme' or
'irresponsible'. This style has been dominant for many years in the areas of air pollution and nature conservation (Ashby & Anderson 1981; Sanderson 1974;
Rickwood 1973; Sheail 1976). More recently, an alternative policy style of a more adversarial nature has been developing focusing on the public enquiry.
The reasons and conditions for the historical development and political application of these two styles would be a stimulating research object,
particularly if related to theories of corporatism which so far have only been employed with reference to economic interest groups.
Environmental groups might raise an issue, participate in decision making, and even influence the formulation of policy. Environmental action will only
'make a difference' if policies are actually implemented and if this
implementation leads to a material change which removes the original grievance (see Schumaker 1975). The growing international literature on the impact of
environmental controls and regulations identifies a considerable "implementation deficit" between policy results and legislative intent (Downing 1982; Knoepfel and Weidner 1980, 1982; Lundqvist 1980).
Analysis of the implementation of environmental policy should therefore shed light on the "symbolic use of politics" (Edelman 1964, 1971, 1977; Dabelko 1981). Governmental action, for example, may only remove the most prominent and controversial forms of pollution while leaving untouched other, perhaps far more dangerous, hazards or the underlying causes of the problem. Moreover, through their economic and political power and close contacts with regulatory officials, industrial interests may be able to frustrate, delay or otherwise contain the implementation process, whereas environmental interests often lack effective leverage over the relevant administrative agencies (Sabatier 1975,
1977; G. Richardson 1982; Hawkins 1984).
From a comparative research project, Jänicke (1978) concluded that efforts to remove the most immediately apparent pollutants, such as dust and sulphur dioxide, had been relatively effective; but that the resulting 'blue skies' had defused much of the concern over air pollution which would have had to be mobilised to attain other than symbolic policy responses in controlling less visible pollutants. A critical question, therefore, is what effect different implementation styles and outcomes have on environmental protest and attitudes.
Dye's (1976, ppl9-20) comment may be pertinent here, to the effect that
"individual groups and whole societies frequently judge public policy in terms of its good intentions rather than its tangible accomplishments".
One cause and consequence of this state of affairs is that much of the activity of environmental movements has been reactive. Activity is often fitful, triggered by particular conflict situations or immediate crises but then subsiding or turning to other issues even if the underlying conditions
addressed by the original protest have not been alleviated. These remarks
apply with less force to institutionalised environmental groups but even they, with worsening economic conditions, have had to devote more of their energies to the defence of earlier legislative achievements and have found it increasingly difficult to formulate and pursue a positive political vision transcending the reactive politics of single issue campaigning.
Environmental policy making, in turn, has also failed to promote
comprehensive solutions, with governments preferring instead a muddling-through approach. Such an approach faces two potential pitfalls. Unco-ordinated
reactions to different problems and political pressures could result in
contradictory, costly and possibly dysfunctional policy outcomes. It is also a politically vulnerable course as environmental problems are left to evolve in an uncontrolled fashion with new issues and sources of public protest liable to emerge at any time and in an unpredictable manner. It remains an open
question whether a piecemeal approach can successfully contain both the
ecological and the political problems or whether a more comprehensive strategy, such as "a preventive environmental policy", is required (Küppers et al 1978;
Jänicke 1979; Simonis 1984).
The degree of political responsiveness to protest demands will affect the development of the environmental movement. A major issue for research is under what conditions do environmental groups begin to regard themselves as
representative of a social movement aiming at broad structural change rather than merely a change of government policy on a particular issue. One way of making progress along such lines is through internationally comparative studies.
