THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO ITS ENVIRONMENTS

FGG Papers

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung

Veroeffentlichungsreihe der Forschungsgruppe GLOBUS

FGG/dp 86-2

Organising Complexity

Comparative Politics and Global Modelling by

Wolf-Dieter Eberwein April 1986

Revised version of the paper originally prepared for delivery at the Conference on Comparative Research on National Political Systems, Berlin, July 9-12, 1985

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung Publication Series of the GLOBUS Research Group

Steinplatz 2 D-1000 Berlin 12

Die in dieser Arbeit vertretenen Auffassungen sind die des Verfassers und nicht notwendigerweise die des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin fuer Sozialforschung,

Forschungsgruppe GLOBUS.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer Sozialforschung, GLOBUS Research Group.

ABSTRACT

Comparative political research and global modelling seem to be two totally disjunct areas of scientific concern. What the author wants to show is that global models can contribute not only to the theoretical developments of comparative politics but to empirical research as well. Substantively, this is based upon the assumption that only global model's make it possible to order the complexity of real political life because they take into account international interdependence.

Empirically, global modelling leads to much more complex research designs and estimation procedures. At this stage there is, however, only one potential candidate for such a contribution to comparative political research: GLOBUS, a twenty-five-nation global model. A set of complex issues pertinent to comparative political research is briefly il­

lustrated to substantiate the arguments forwarded by the author.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Vergleichende Politikforschung und Weltmodellierung sind zwei gaenzlich unterschiedliche und allem Anschein nach unverbun­

dene Forschungsbereiche. In der vorliegenden Untersuchung zeigt der Verfasser, dass Weltmodelle nicht nur einen Beitrag zur Theorieentwicklung, sondern auch zur empirischen For­

schung leisten koennen. Inhaltlich begruendet er diese Aus­

sage damit, dass nur mit Weltmodellen komplexe politische Zusammenhaenge abgebildet werden koennen und somit die inter­

nationale Verflechtung einbezogen werden kann. Fuer die Empi­

rie erzwingt die Weltmodellierung komplexe Forschungsstrate­

gien wie Schaetzverfahren. Derzeit erfuellt nur ein Modell diese Voraussetzungen: das 25 Nationen umfassende Weltmodell GLOBUS. Der Autor illustriert an Hand einer Reihe komplexer Problemstellungen seine Aussagen.

1. The Issue

For no aspect of political reality that we wish to analyze empirically will simple conceptualizations ever lead to satisfactory explanations. Politics is too complex. From the perspective of comparative politics one major task is to organize the complexity of the problems to be analyzed.

Theory is one necessary tool for organizing the real complexity of political life satisfactorily. But theory itself is not sufficient. One must also use that methodology which adequately allows theoretically complex concepts to be translated into sophisticated empirical research programs.

Comparative politics as a major substantive field of political science is confronted with enormously complex problems. Global developments in recent decades have not only increased the level of international interdependence but have simultaeously led to a situation in which intranational political developments are no longer insulated from those taking place within and between other nations of the international system as well.

In this paper I propose that global modelling can contribute to satisfactorily interrelating some aspects of the complexity involved in the fields of comparative poli­

tics. This conviction results from the methodological ap­

proach inherent in global modelling, computer simulation. It also depends heavily on the substantive focus of the global models considered as candidates for supplementing comparative politics as suggested.

In the following pages I try to show that global modelling can contribute to theoretical development and empirical research in comparative politics. First, the

specific merits of both comparative politics and global modelling are pointed out, with the disucssion being focused on what I believe to constitute the major differences between these two areas of scientific concern.

I then outline those properties of global models that are potentially relevant to comparative political research.

This discussion will focus on three aspects:

1. Theory building 2. Empirical research

3. The policy aspect of social research

The final section of this paper gives a preliminary answer as to how, from my perspective, the global modelling methodology can be combined with the substantive foci of research in comparative politics and what some of the impli­

cations of such an undertaking are. The arguments forwarded here are illustrated with examples drawn from GLOBUS, the first comprehensive political global model known to have been developed (see Bremer, 1984; Eberwein, 1984).

2. Comparative Politics and Global Modelling

Comparative politics focuses on political structures, processes, and behavior at various levels of aggregation. In the words of Dogan and Pelassy (1984: 3) "the comparativist searches for rules and tries to bring to light the general causes of social phenomena." General causes imply some gene­

ral theories about social and political phenomena. General theories, in turn, presuppose innovative ideas that survive systematic empirical testing.

Empirically, comparative politics relies on the methodo­

logy of comparison, which, as stated by Dogan and Pelassy (1984: 9), is the equivalent to the laboratory experiments of the physical scientists. Comparison is by definition an empirical enterprise.

In comparative politics, as in any other area of social science, the process of theory building and empirical testing amounts to what one could call the reconstruction of history.

This activity, in itself, serves a valuable goal, the extens­

ion of knowledge. Yet successful explanations of the past are also useful for making predictions about the probability of future events. Making predictions require the assumption that relationships identified as obtaining for the past will remain unchange for the future about which predictions are made.

Successful explanations have yet another property. They can be logically transformed into prescriptive statements.

The result is what has been called "social engineering," a term implying that we can transform our predictions into statements that tell us which relevant variables to manipulate in order to achieve certain goals in the future within a certain range of probability. Inherent in successful empirical research is, therefore, an element of policy.

Science is an almost natural activity for satisfying our intellectual curiosity about the world in which we live.

This intellectual curiosity may be considered as a value in itself. But scientific knowledge always contributes potent­

ially valuable information to the policy-making process.

This application aspect of social science is not only a correlate of a specific discipline's maturity but also a

factor of the relevance of the knowledge for practical use.

Finally, application depends upon the willingness of the scientific community to take this aspect of research into account.

Before adding some critical remarks, I shall examine global modelling, which is said by some of its advocates to differ drastically from comparative politics. "Global modell­

ing is just computer modelling done to investigate social questions or problems of global scale" (Meadows et al., 1982:

13). Global models differ from other models in that they try to represent the characteristics of global problems, which differ from the many other problems that models are built to deal with (Meadows et a l ., 1982). Global models are not built to reconstruct history but to explore alternative paths of global developments in the future (see Bremer, 1984: 2).

Theoretically, then, the emphasis is not on building theory but rather on applying it.

Global modelling is policy oriented, one consequence of which fact is that existing scientific insights are drawn upon in order to come to grips with the potential future of the world. Once the policy issue has been defined, the model can be constructed. Ideally, the procedure consists in ex­

tracting all those elements from the various scientific dis­

ciplines that are highly relevant for the model under con­

struction.

The emphasis of the research process is not upon intra- disciplinary specialization but rather on interdisciplinary interaction, with crucial significance attached to the fu­

ture. The underlying assumption is that the short-term ef­

fects of a set of relationships may radically differ from its

long-term effects. From a policy perspective, this means that short-term success might be achieved at the price of long-term failures, if not catastrophe.

This involvement with the future is one of the driving motives for building global models. At the same time, it is what constitutes one important distinction between global modelling and traditional research. In that respect, global modelling, building upon the reconstruction of history, at­

tempts to construct futures: likely, probable, or imaginable.

Global models revolve around several questions. For example, which future developments are likely? Which future do we want to have? How can we possibly come close to the desired goal or goals? The application of scientific knowledge for the purpose of dealing more effectively with the future is therefore a central issue for the global modeller. The applicability of global models is usually judged in terms of their contribution to reorienting our perception of reality. Sometimes, however, the global model­

ler might actually go as far as to formulate conditional policy recommendations for political actors.

Comparative politics and global modelling both try to deal satisfactorily with the problem of adequately representing some aspect of the complexity of social systems.

They differ with respect to their solutions. Complexity in comparative politics is dealt with in two ways. One solution consists in the formulation of grand theories, whose translation into a single coherent empirically sound model is usually almost impossible. The other solution consists in the increasing differentiation and specialization, not to say fragmentation, of the discipline. From the analysis of do­

mestic conflict in general, for example, one moves on to the

exploration of different types of conflict manifestation such as coups, revolutions, and rebellions, each of which requires different concepts and explanations. The price for this increase in theoretical complexity is the narrowing of focus, whereas global models lack this precision in the narrow disciplinary sense.

In global models, complexity may be defined provisionally along two dimensions, the actor dimension (i.e., the number of interacting units represented, such as global regions or nations) and the sectoral dimension (i.e., the inclusion of various submodels such as demography and ecology. The complexity of a global model is determined by the meaningful combination of building blocks of knowledge from various disciplines. Complexity stems from the inter­

action between the number of actors or behavioral units and the various sectors. Conceptually, complexity is a function of the interdisciplinary integration of core relationships from various scientific disciplines.

Both types of complexity — that relating to actors and that relating to sectors — cannot be dealt with simultane­

ously. Scientists can only choose which price they are willing to pay, which aspect of complexity they are willing to neglect. Yet the two strategies are not mutually exclu­

sive as far as a specific discipline is concerned. They are fundamentally complementary.

Before drawing conclusions from this cursory, rough review of the major characteristics of comparative politics and global modelling, let me make some short critical comments on each of the approaches discussed. As we stated previously, comparative politics relies on comparative

methodology. Generally speaking, it may be true that comparison is the equivalent of the laboratory experiments of the physical sciences. Yet from a rigorous methodological perspective, this approach is inherently limited (Brunner and Brewer, 1971: 115). The empirical analysis of behavior does not necessarily allow inferences about structures producing these behaviors. Identical structures may in fact produce completely different behaviors (Brunner and Brewer,

1981:88)(1). Therefore one cannot draw compelling inferences from behavior relating to the underlying structure.

According to Brunner and Brewer (1971: 103), statistical analysis might in fact be misleading. The relevant linkage consists in formulating structural relationships, explicitly expressed in mathematical form, with observed behavioral properties of political systems. Methodologically, then, simulation analysis is the methodology adequate for replicating observed past political behavior. The structural conditions producing behavior explicitly represent the theoretical assumptions. But if it is true that identical structures can have different behavioral consequences, then the issue of comparison is not as direct as one might assume.

This issue leads to a second remark related to the assumption of reconstructing history. Taking this assumption for granted, there remains the basic problem of deciding what value empirically validated propositions have. Certainly their explanatory value is unquestioned. Yet this does not necessarily imply that the logical transformation of such

(1) It may also be that different structures produces identi­

cal behavior. This would be the classical case of functional equivalences which I can not deal with in this context.

propositions into prognostic statements leads to reliable re­

sults. Even if a structure remains the same, the parameters determining political behavior may change. We know that they do. Thus, prognostic statements are highly problematic, making the belief in the prognostic quality of knowledge questionable.

One implication of such doubt is that the applicability of research for practical purposes becomes dubious in the sense that one must postulate deterministic relationships, i.e., invariant behavior over time in cases where it is possible that the parameters determining behavior change.

What does this imply? Reduced to its essence, the answer is simple. Structural invariance does not imply behavioral invariance as well. That is to say, structure can remain the same, yet the parameters defining behavior can change, thus leading to different behavior.

If this is the case, then one must abandon the notion of being able to make prognostic statements about the future.

To be more precise, it might be that one is able to make such statements only for the near future or, if we are inter­

ested in longer term developments, that we can offer alternative, but equally plausible, assumptions about the structure and/or behaviorally relevant parameters determining future and longer-term developments.

Turning to global modelling, one might ask if it is in fact so dramatically different from "traditional" social research. First of all, the exploration of future paths of development, be it global or not, is impossible without being based upon a sound reconstruction of history. This is why global modelling per se is not a substantive alternative to comparative political research. Thus, the concern with the

future of global models is a matter of emphasis, not a radi­

cal alternative to comparative political research.

Nor is global modelling's inherent policy concern with the future really an alternative to comparative politics.

One may simply consider it as a different aspect of intellec­

tual curiosity. In other words, what are the implications of interrelated past behaviors in the context of a given struct­

ural network with respect to the future?

By contrast, one could argue that the emphasis on the policy aspect of global modelling completely underestimates the scientific concern with explaining past behavior, unless we base our assumptions about the future on observed systema­

tic interdependencies in the past, our whole endeavor will remain purely speculative. Yet neither global modellers nor comparative political researchers would want to be considered as speculative philosophers.

From what has been said, one can draw four conclusions relating to the different emphasis of comparative political research and global modelling.

1. Each of the two approaches conceptualizes the complexity of social and political systems in a different way.

Whereas comparative politics basically pursues a strate­

gy of capturing specific complexity, global modelling opts for a strategy of integrative complexity and its representation.

2. Time is treated in a fundamentally different way. Com­

parative politics is primarily concerned with time- invariant phenomena, i.e., with generalizations about specific relationships or change in relationships infer­

red from the past. The time horizon is usually either

implicitly defined or explicitly fixed. Global model­

ling, by contrast, is basically devoted to comparing the short-term and long-term dynamic effects of a number of interactive relationships.

3. Comparative politics is interested in the reconstruction of history in terms of its underlying general causes.

Global modelling attempts to identify the short-term and long-term implications of causal, or probabilistic, relationships.

4. The application of knowledge, that is, the policy dimen­

sion of scientific research, is usually treated as a residual category in comparative politics. Global mo­

dels deal with the future. Since the future can never be explained, this perspective is inevitably political.

The alternative futures of any global model cannot be evaluated without reliance on explicit normative consid­

erations. The global modeller cannot withdraw into the ivory tower of pure science.

3. Evaluating the Methodology of Global Modelling

In order to evaluate the potential value of global modelling as opposed to comparative politics, one must demon­

strate its desirable properties basically for two aspects, theory building and empirical research. Nonetheless, the application aspect of knowledge will be briefly discussed as well. One thing to be kept in mind is that I do not postul­

ate global modelling as the ultimate one-way street for research. I argue instead that global models may be extreme­

ly valuable for specific purposes on theoretical and empiric­

al grounds. It should be clear as well that one major limit­

ation is determined by the aggregate level of analysis of which global models take advantage.

(a) The theoretical dimension. Let us first start with the assumption upon which this article is based — that there are groups of countries that, in some important aspects, are more similar than different. Let us assume, too, that the struct­

ures determining the political processes in these groups of similar countries are similar as well, even though there are specific national variations in observed behavior. We could make two mutually exclusive additional assumptions:

(1) In order to study countries, one can ignore the international context because the processes under study are assumed to be indifferent to this context.

(2) The opposite of assumption (a) is true.

We contend that assumption (a) is too heroic. Practitioners and social scientists alike could agree that complexity and interdependence within and between modern societies is in­

creasing in several important dimensions. National boundar­

ies, still important in many ways, are nonetheless being increasingly undermined by concrete political, economic, social, ideological, international, and transnational pro­

cesses. If, for example, the economic situation is the world's economically leading nations deteriorates, then many,

if not most, nations will likely be affected directly with domestic political spin-off effects. The relationship bet­

ween the interest rate for the dollar and the circumstances

surrounding debt payment by Third World countries is an instructive illustration. Morse (1976: 178-194) has aptly characterized this situation in terms of 3 paradoxes (2).

Therefore, it seems theoretically plausible to take those interdependencies into account. Under these conditions glob­

al modelling becomes a candidate for inclusion in comparative political research. The concept of interdependence can be translated directly into the language of global modelling.

It means linking a number of domestic and international factors— political, economic, and social-- that directly or indirectly determine our specific "dependent" variable. Glob­

al modelling is the adequate methodology for combining the different factors to represent the functioning of, and inter­

dependence between, sectors and actors. Selecting these factors and establishing linkages is fundamentally a theoret­

ical enterprise. The methodology of which global models make use, computer simulation, forces us to be explicit about the variables included and the linkages established.

In this case the construction of a global model based upon nation states is even more a theoretical contribution than the use of the model for making projections into the future. Simulation forces us to be explicit about our theoretical assumptions but at the same time allows for a degree of complexity considerably greater than that permitted by traditional methods of social research.

(2) One central paradox is the reaffirmation of the nation state even thoug it has seemingly become obsolete. The second paradox relates to the disjunction of the between reality and perceptions in foreign policy. The third paradox is called the paradox of illusion. The final paradox relates to the primary emphasis placed upon domestic priorities.

A second theoretical result is obtained. Having built such a model, one can go on to study the interactive and dynamic behavior of those various domestic and international factors in the short and longrun. In this case the global modeller does nothing but trace the theoretical implications of the model through time, taking into account the interdependencies included in it. From a systematical empirical perspective, comparative politics can thus far basically study either the dynamic behavior of some actor retrospectively over time or the cross-sectional interaction of a set of variables, not both. Assuming that international

interdependencies are found to be irrelevant for specific national political variables, one need not even decouple the national submodels, something that is always possible.

What has been said so far makes it clear that simulation analysis in the context of a global perspective opens a completely new avenue of research. In theoretical terms it puts one in a position to experiment with competing theoretical assumptions including variables and linkages as well as with competing behavioral assumptions (i.e., parameters). As Bremer (1982: 231) notes while discussing sensitivity testing of global models: "If several competing theoretical explanations exist of how some phenomena are

interconnected, it is good to know whether the overall behaviour of the model is strongly affected by our choice of one rather than another." In general terms, global models represent the first real laboratory instruments that allow the scholars in the field of comparative politics to test theoretical alternatives systematically.

A final consequence that is not obvious at first sight is the implications for theory building. If chosen, the global modelling approach may eventually capture what I have called the integrative complexity of social systems. The disciplinary boundaries of comparative politics would be expanded, with interdisciplinary research as the outcome.

(b) The empirical dimension. Empirical testing plays a cri­

tical role in the growth of knowledge. Empirical research is a powerful tool for discriminating between those theoretical statements that are in tune with reality and those that are not. Given a theoretical structure for a specific global model, it is necessary to validate it empirically before using it for what it is intended, to simulate future paths of development. From the perspective of a social scientist in general, and that of a comparative political scientist in particular, the model must be given an empirical foundation, unless we wish to limit ourselves to a purely theoretical exercise (which is not even desirable from a global model­

ler's point of view).

There are two immediate consequences of empirical testing. The first is that a large set of data accumulates for those variables included in the model. This phenomenon is nothing unique to either global modelling or comparative politics. The second consequence is that the evaluation of a complex model precludes the use of elementary assessment procedures such as simple regression analysis. An entire simultaneous equation system, perhaps broken down into components, must be assessed. This type of operation is

known to pose serious problems and to lead to results that are very likely to differ from those based on single-equation estimation.

In other words, before a global model can be used for the purpose for which it has been designed, theoretical and empirical research is required. Both activities are not specific to any global model but rather to the disciplinary research activities within social science in general. Once one opts for a global modelling approach, not only theoretically but also empirically complex research designs are likely to result.

Let us assume that finally an empirically based theoret­

ical model structure has been derived. In this case, there are, two additional uses of global models for research in comparative politics (Bremer, 1982: 233). The first possibi­

lity is what Bremer calls postdiction (3), the aim of which is to replicate by simulation of some system's real past behavior. If the model is able to reproduce past behavior, the user's confidence in the validity of the model may rise.

If it does not, the user will havg to find out why this is the case. The structurcal representation may be wrong, or the parameters may be faulty.

Postdiction is what one can consider to be one test of those parts of the models that are relevant to comparative politics. Learning to deal properly with postdiction enhan­

ces the second additional use of global models in applying empirical findings: Prediction. So far, prediction has been the almost exclusive focus of global modellers. The pitfalls

(3) For the methodological issues involved see Bremer, 1977

of prediction can best be discovered systematically by post­

diction. To date, no systematic inquiries concerning post­

diction have been conducted, so our understanding of predict­

ion, too, has remained limited.

Why is prediction pertinent to research in comparative politics as well? Making projections, i.e., running the model forward in time, reveals aspects of the long-term dynamics embedded in its structure. These dynamics properties are neither obvious nor directly inferrable from a look at the model's structure or at the results of running it forward in time for a short period. Thus one gains insight into the dynamic effects of supposedly time-invariant (i.e., generalized) relationships. The results can then be evaluated for their plausibility. It must be clear, though, that these results are the product of theoretical constructs and empirical validation. At present this specific aspect is usually completely ignored in the study of comparative politics.

Global models are always based on the conditional. They are not to be mistaken as sources of highly probable predictions about the future. Instead they are instruments to evaluate different futures, with a number of conditions being made explicit. The evaluation of the conditions leading to different futures is thus essential. What do these condit­

ions have in common? In what respects do they differ and why? How probable is each of these conditions and changes in it? The resulting alternative futures represent information otherweise impossible to come by unless one relies on intuit­

ion. These different futures are especially fascinating areas of study in the light of comparison between the short-

and long-term behavior of different variables included. In that sense global models represent an intellectual challenge leading us to the final dimension of this methodology, i. e.

applying the results obtained from global modelling.

(c) The application dimension. Global modelling is policy oriented. This means that policy relevance plays an import­

ant role in this type of scientific enterprise. It is very likely that the policy aspect of global modelling has been overstated in the past; the scientific role, underestimated.

Even so, it still is a fact that global modelling as such is inconceivable without thinking about application. By applic­

ation I mean the translation of scientific results for a wider, nonacademic audience. There is simply no sense to making projections about long-term global developments as a purely academic exercise.

This does not imply, from my perspective, the

"overselling" of scientific results, the adoption of the role of a Cassandra, or involvement in consulting for specific clients. It does imply, however, a basic concern with the future of the human race. There is one central argument why global modellers must not overstate their case — we do not know what the future will look like. This is why results produced by global models must not be misinterpreted as forecasts. Rather, these results can be interpreted as like­

ly futures, given a number of assumptions such as unchanged conditions in the future or changes in a number of situat­

ions. What these results do suggest, though, is that such and such a development will be likely, if the postulated conditions obtain.

This understanding has two consequences. From the scientific perspective in general, every possible problem is worth investigating. From the perspective of global modell­

ing in specific, some issues are much more relevant than others. This standpoint means explicitly adding a normative perspective to the process of accumulating knowledge. The second consequence is that modellers, especially nonglobal modellers, must think about the practical implications of their work. In my view, social science cannot be content to take up permanent residence in the "ivory tower".

4. Using Global Models for Research in Comparative Politics

Before further details are given about the potential value that global modelling has for research in comparative politics a recapitulation of the major points made so far is

in order.

The central assumption is that global models are potent­

ially relevant for comparative politics because they focus explicitly on national and international — i.e., global -- interdepence.

The second assumption is that research in comparative politics, may presuppose structural similarity within, and structural dissimilarity among, specific groups of nations.

The implicit third assumption is that global models represent aspects relevant for the study of national political processes that are of theoretical and empiric­

al interest to the scholar of comparative politics.

The first assumption is certainly uncontested. The second assumption does not present major difficulties either, given the interest in generalizations. The third assumption is by no means substantiated by the global models so far developed and published. With but one exception, which will

be examined shortly, all global models of which I am aware (see Meadows et al., 1982; Eberwein, 1984; Siegmann, 1986) do not focus on political aspects of global developments in the narrow sense and are not based upon nations in which there is only minimal interest in research in comparative politics. Global models eihter use the globe as a unified actor (as is the case with Forrester's and Meadows' World-3) or they use regions (as is true of the Bariloche and the Mesarovic-Pestel models).

So far, the only global model based upon a larger number of nation states using modules for representing the govern­

ment, the domestic political system, and the national econo­

my, including the interrelationships between them, is GLOBUS (see Bremer, 1984). One implication of this approach is that both the theoretical and empirical value that research in comparative politics derives from the construction of global models is based upon expectations and not on one major case of systematic research experience.

Nonetheless, I believe that the propositions outlined above are fundamentally sound, though not yet substantiated by a broader range of research experiences. To summarize briefly, global modelling can contribute theoretically to research in comparative politics by taking the theoretical complexity of the political systems included and explicitly organizing it into a set of complex interdisciplinary propo­

sitions. These can be used for theoretical studies. They can also be used as a point of departure for the empirical assessment of a set, or subsets, of equation systems on which the overall model is based.

GLOBUS does, in fact, have properties that can be exploited for research in comparative politics. One might

certainly think of another global model that is even more interesting to the researcher in comparative politics, but that seems unlikely to happen in the forseeable future.

Global modelling is expensive, requires skill, and needs time, and money, skill, and time are scarce ressources in the social science community concerned with global modelling.

The analysis of all the factors that interact simultaneously and influence each other directly or indirectly is a substantive necessity for comparative politics. For global modelling it is an ideally suited area of application. There are at least two outstanding specific issues that come to mind as frames of reference. The first is the issue of political stability and legitimacy within nations; the second is comparative foreign policy in general, more specifically conflict and cooperation.

These are two foci of GLOBUS. Before going into illus­

trative examples to substantiate the arguments put forth here, I shall briefly describe the overall structure of GLOBUS. This model includes 25 nations which represent 74 percent of the world's population, more than 80 percent of world's armaments and production, about two thirds of the international hostility exchanged, and more than 50 percent of the world's domestic unrest. The core structure of these twenty-five nations is graphically outlined in Figure 1.

The core of each nation is its government, which allocates resources to a variety of purposes (such as investment, the military, and social programs like health and pensions). In addition each government acts upon and/or reacts to national economic problems, domestic political problems, international trade, and international hostility.

The twenty-five GLOBUS nations are grouped into three subsets, the West, the East, and the South, the latter being further subdivided into oil-producing countries and others.

A list of the GLOBUS nations is presented in Appendix I.

It is clear that the selection of countries for GLOBUS is certainly not ideal to those scholars of comparative politics who are interested in regional comparisons. But for the study of the interdependence between domestic stability and international conflict in the context of the interplay between politics and the economy, and for the study of the ability, or inability, of governments to satisfy the various demands made upon them and to solve the various national and international economic and political problems in their countries, GLOBUS is definitely a major step forward.

Given the structure of GLOBUS, which is based on prevailing theoretical insights and, to the largest possible degree, on systematic empirical research, what are some of the topics that might be worthwhile for researchers in comparative politics to analyse in greater depth?

Let us examine the issue of foreign conflict behavior and cooperation first. In GLOBUS, nations react to the flow of hostile and cooperative events emanating from each of the other twenty-four nations. This reaction not only might lead individual governments to respond by either raising or lowering their own conflict activity towards others, but might also affect the allocation of resources to military purposes (i.e., their security). Allocation depends upon the resources available, that is, upon both the economic performance of the nation in question and its dependence upon the economic performance of other nations.

Directly or indirectly, resource allocation will affect the domestic political system as well. Government performance in the domestic sector can lead to either rising protest and violence and, perhaps, increasing sanctions as one instrument to control both behavioral manifestations of the population, or to better governmental performance that might decrease them. The outcome, in turn, might cause the allocation process to change in a way that could also affect the international security of the government(s ) in the model.

Of the first preliminary scenario studies undertaken so far, one will briefly be mentioned. Its authors analyzed the likely effect of different annual rates of real growth in the defense budgets of all the Western countries included in GLOBUS (zero option, 3 percent annual real growth, and 6 percent annual real growth beginning in 1980; see Cusack, 1984; see also Cusack and Hughes, 1985). The direct and indirect effects each rate would have were identified at the global level. One direct effect is the changing East-West balance of conventional military forces. Whereas the 3 per­

cent option does not fundamentally change the military balan­

ce by the year 2010 (rough parity), the zero option would dramatically shift the military balance in favor of the East, the conventional military capability of which would be rough­

ly twice that of the West by 2010. If, instead, the West sticks to the 6 percent option the opposite will hold, with the West having a two-to-one edge in conventional military capability over the East by the year 2010 (see Cusack and Hughes, 1985: Table 6)

Globally, each of these three postulated defense- spending strategies of the West would have profound differential effects upon the global arms race and the

distribution of military capability. Whereas the zero- percent option would in fact reduce overall defense spending in the year 2010 to a level below that of 1970, the 3-percent option would increase the resources spent on military capability in 2010 to an amount slightly above that of 1970.

The 6-percent option would in fact trigger a global arms race (see Cusack and Hughes, 1985: Table 5), with the spending level in the year 2010 being more than 50 percent higher than that of 1970.

In terms of the East-West climate (i.e., the proportion of conflict and cooperation exchanged between the two blocks), only the zero-percent option would improve the situation in 2010 slightly over that in 1970. The 3-percent option will lead to a deterioration of the East-West climate, whereas 6-percent real growth per annum will dramatically worsen the climate (Cusack and Hughes, 1985: Table 6).

The West's various defense-spending strategies also significantly affect the size of the defense sector's share of the GDP in both West and in the East. Whereas the 3- percent option will not fundamentally alter the burdens obtaining in 1980, they will dramatically increase with the 6-percent option in the West and in the East. In the West, moreover, the higher the annual growth rate of the defense budget is, the slower the increase will be in social expenditures (the welfare state aspect). In the East, by contrast, social expenditures as a proportion of the GDP will decline in all three options. In the East, only the zero- percent option will in fact lead to a situation where the share of the GDP devoted to social expenditures in 1970 will be matched again in the year 2010 (see Cusack, 1984).

The scenario just mentioned and a number of others relating to protectionism (see Brecke, 1985), American-Soviet relations (Smith, 1985), population growth, and technology are about to be completed. Yet the process for fully exploiting GLOBUS's potential for such research has only just begun. It is hoped that the preceding illustrative remarks have indicated the relevance of GLOBUS to certain topics of research in comparative politics. Certainly, the range of topics and interests is limited by the present structure of this world model, but those topics remaining are still complex enough to be studied by using it.

What has not been considered at all so far is the use of GLOBUS for either theoretical experimental studies or for postdictive purposes. This is certainly another area for work in the future. In that sense GLOBUS may well represent a major breakthrough in comparative politics as well as in genuine interdisciplinary research.

Global modelling has great potential for use in theory building, empirical research, and application. So far, little of this promise has been converted into practical resources for research. If global modelling is not to degenerate into a multipurpose technology, it needs to be

institutionalised within substantive fields of social science. The high degree of interdependence at the national and the international level makes comparative politics ideally suited for the application of global modelling.

Global modelling offers the possibility of systematically studying the simultaneous interactive direct and indirect

effects of factors that scholars of comparative politics consider important. Whether these expectations will turn out to be realistic is hard to tell. It is up to researchers how they organize complexity.

References

BRECKE, Peter (1985): Who Wins and Who Loses From Protect­

ionism? Science Center Berlin, IIVG/dp 85-103

ture, and Illustrative Results. Science Center Berlin, IIVG/dp 84-104.

BREMER, Stuart A. (1982): Session 5: Testing Models Raporteur and Commentator. In: D. Meadows, J. Richard­

son, G. Bruckmann (eds.): Groping in the Dark. Wiley &

Sons: New York. 223-241.

BREMER, Stuart A. (1977): Simulated Worlds: A Computer Model of National Decision-Making. Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.

BRUNNER, Ronald D . , Complexity velopment.

and Garry D. BREWER (1971): Organized - Empirical Theories of Political De- The Free Press: New York.

CUSACK, Thomas R. (1984): One Problem, Three Solutions: A Simulation Analysis of Alternative Western Defense Policy Options. Science Center Berlin, IIVG7dp 84-109.

CUSACK, Thomas R. and Barry B. HUGHES (1985): Using GLOBUS to explore Alternative Taxation and Security Policies in the West. Paper prepared for the 26th annual convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., March 5-9.

DOGAN, Mattei, and Dominique Pelassy (1984): How to Compare Nations. Chatham House Publishers: Chatham, N.J.

EBERWEIN, Wolf-Dieter (1984): Die Zukunft als Problem der Gegenwart - Weltmodelle - Rueckblick und Ausblick. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte - beilage zur wochenzeitung das pariament. B 34/84, 25. August.

MEADOWS, Donella; John RICHARDSON; Gerhard BRUCKMANN (1982):

Groping in the Dark. Wiley & Sons: New York.

MORSE, Edward L. (1976): Modernisation and the Transformat­

ion of International Relations. Free Press: New York.

SMITH, Dale L. (1985): "Reagan Revisionism" and The Soviet- American Rivalry: A Simulation Analysis of Three Policy Alternatives. Science Center Berlin, IIVG/DP 85-102.

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN RELATION TO ITS ENVIRONMENTS

ECONOMIC

F OR EIGN I D O M ES TI C

Employment,

&

Prices

Mass Protest

&

Organized Violence

POLITICAL

•' Taxing a

Spending Policies Aid, Import,

Political Stabilization Policy

Exchange Policies

X-...

Security a Foreign Policies

...

Export, Import, a

Capital Flows

ECONOMIC

Military Balance;

Hostile

&

Cooperative Flows

Fig. 1: The Structure of the National Actors in GLOBUS. The

Government (GOV) acts and reacts with policies - straight arrows - in four sectors and on both the national and

POLITICAL

FO RE IG N I DOME STIC

APPENDIX : List of GLOBUS Nations and Their Cumulative Weight in the International System for Selected Indicators.

The World’s Nations 150 World Population The Globus Nations 25 1980 The Globus Nations 74%

World Military Expenditures 1980 The Globus Nations 85%

World Political Protest 1974-77 The Globus Nations 57%

World Inter-National Hostility Involement 1970-75 The Globus Nations 68%

REGIONAL GROUPINGS

WEST EAST SOUTH OPEC

Canada Czechoslovakia Argentina Indonesia

Federal Republic German Democratic Brazil Iran

of Germany Republic China Nigeria

France Poland Egypt Saudi Arabia

Italy Soviet Union India Venezuela

Japan Mexico

United Kingdom Pakistan