Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin
IIM/LMP 81 - 18
Industrial Relationsand Structural.Change in the International Automobile Industry
by
Wolfgang Streeck Andreas Hoff
A Proposal for an International Research Effort in the Context of the Project on ''The Future. of the Automobile"
ISSN Nr. 0720-4914
Paper presented to the Future of the Automobile Warking Conference, Paris, Novembe~, 1980
Revised version, August 1981 Platz der Luftbrücke 1 - 3
1000 Berlin 42 Telefon (030) 69041
Vorgestellt wird der Entwurf für ein Forschungsprojekt, das sich mit den Interdependenzen von industriellem Wandel und Systemen.industrieller Beziehungen (IRS) am Beispiel der internationalen Automobilindustrie
befaßt. Hintergrund der Studie sind sich gegenwärtig andeutende Tendenzen verschärfter internationaler Konkurrenz einerseits und von "Deindustriali- sierung" andererseits. Da beide Trends wahrscheinlich zu einem Rückgang der Beschäftigung führen, werden Anpassungsprozesse notwendig, in denen die Akteren der nationalen IRS eine wesentliche Rolle _spielen. Die These ist, daß unterschiedlich strukturierte IRS in unterschiedlicher Weise Geschwindigkeit, Richtung und soziale Folgen des industriellen Wandels beeinflussen. Zugleich werden jedoch auch die IRS durch den industri- ellen Wandel selbst verändert.
--~·-,.-.~.- -·-·
Das geplante Forschungsprojekt soll im Rahmen des internationalen Pro- jekts "The Future of the Automobile" durchgeführt werden, das vom Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT·) initiiert wurde und koor- diniert wird; eine Kurzbeschreibung dieses Forschungsvorhabens befindet sich im Anhang.
Abstract
The paper presents the design of planned research into the interdependencies of industrial change and industrial relations systems (IRS) using the
example of the international automobile industry as its empirical reference.
The Background of the study are recent developments of growing international competition and tendencies towards "de-industrialization" in the old
industrial countries. As both of these tendencies may negatively affect employment, adaptation will be necessary which will have to be responded to by the actors of national IRS. The thesis is that differently structured IRS differently influence speed, direction, and social consequences of
industrial change and are, in turn, affected by it differently.
The research will take place in the framewerk of the international research effort "The Future of the Automobile", initiated and coordinated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); the general project description
is also enclosed.
l. Introduction
2. The Situation
3. Industrial Relations Systems and Industrial Change:
Research Perspectives
3.1. Industrial Relations Systems as a Factor Conditioning Industrial Change
3.2. Industrial Change as a Factor Influencing Industrial Relations Systems
3.3. Industrial Relations as a Global System 4. Research Design
5 . Timetable 6. Literature
Appendix I: Summary Program Description of "Future of the Automobile" Research Project
Appendix II: Wolfgang Streeck, Labor Relations and Industrial Change, Presentation given at the First Policy Forum of the "Future of the Automobile" Project, Philadelphia, Penn., July, 1981
Appendix III: Recent Developments ~n Automobile Industrial Relations. Announcement of an international workshop to be held in Berlin on
February S-6, 1982
dustry (United States, Japan, West,Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Sweden), the industry occupies
a
key economic position and employs a significant share of the national workforce. The central role of the auto- mobile industry in the economies of these countries is reflected in an equally central position in the national industrial relations system. Typic- ally, the unians organizing a country's automobile workers are among theleading and most powerful forces of its trade union movement, and many im- portant innovations in the joint regulation of working ~onditions have been introduced first in the automobile industry. Thus, the effects of changes in the automobile industry -- in particular those tauehing upon employment are normally not confined to this sector but tend to spread to the national economy as well as to the national industrial relations system as a whole.
In the following, we will develop a proposal to study the interrelat- ionship between the process of technological and economic restructuring under way in the world automobile industry, and the structure and per- formance of (national as well as transnational) industrial relations systems
(IRS) . The general theoretical theme of the proposed research is that of the interaction between social institutions on ~he one hand and economic interests/imperatives/rationality on the other. Our proposal starts with a brief summary of the changes presently taking place in the world automobile industry. It-then discusses in more detail the perspectives from which the relations between such changes and the affected IRS will be analyzed.
Finally, the proposal presents a tentative research design and makes a sug- gestion for the organization of the work.
The proposed study is conceived as a part of the international research project on "The Future of the Automobile". + Same of the relat:i.onships, and
possibilities of mutual exchange, between the industrial relations subpro- ject and other parts of the overall project are briefly mentioned below, but it is expected that more such linkages will be discovered as the work pro- gresses.
2. The Situation
In the near future,--the world automobile industry will undergo a num- ber of fundamental structural changes the symptoms of which have been visi- ble for some t:i.me:
1. As a result of increased energy costs and Saturation of the tradi- tional markets automobile sales will rise -- if at all -- at a much lower rate.than was predicted a few years ago. At the same time, while the world automobile industry already seems to have considerable excess capacity, additional capacity is introduced steadily. Thus the intensity of worldwide competition will.increase.
2. The development of production technology in the automobile industry is moving towards a much higher level of autom~tion (cf. introduction of industrial robotics) . In combinat:i.on with the stagnation or even shrinkage of the market, this is likely to result in a considerable reduction of em- ployment opportunities and, at least in some countries, in large-scale re- dundancies.
+ See Summary Program Description in Appendix I.
3. 'I'he increa.se in the price of gasoline has led to growing demand for automobiles with. low fuel consumption,. especially since the late seven- ties. Seme of the. major car producers in developed industrial countries were not sufficiently prepared for this chanqe. 'I'o be able to meet the new
structure of demand, they had (and still have) to invest heavily in the development and introduction of new models. In the meantime, producers from other countries, notably Japan, who have lang concentrated on small economy cars, have been conquering growing market shares in West~rn Europe and the United States.
4. 'I'he increasing integration of the world automobile market in the last few years has brought to the fore considerable differences in national productivity and l~our costs, in particular between the Japanese on the one side and American and European producers on the other. 'I'he resulting differences in product price and quality facilitated the intrusion of Japanese cars into the home markets of the rest of the Western automobile industry and gave rise to demands for protectionist and semi-protectionist policies.
5. Partly in reaction to and partly in anticipation of protectionist reactions to the changing situation at the world market, almest all major European and American automobile producers have in recent years set up sub- sidiaries in other industrialized countries or have entered into cooperation agreements with other automobile companies. As a result, the Western auto- mobile industry has become even more international than it already was a decade ago.
6. Another aspect of the industry's growing internationalization is the transfer of automobile production to the newly industrializing and, in particular, the "threshold" countries (Mexico, Brazil, Spain, South. Korea).
Partly, this is a consequence of changes of production technology which have made it possible to build cars without much skilled labor. Advanced production technology enables automobile producers from the old industrial areas to relocate production to low-wage and, frequently, labor-repressive countries (e.g., South Africa). At the same time, i t makes it feasable, at least in principle, for countries. without an industrial tradition to deve- lop their own automobile industries and to compete successfully with pro- ducers in industrialized countries. The possibility for auto producers in industrialized countries to use cheap labor worldwide has undermined the position of workers and trade unians in the old industrial areas.
Whether or ~ot it will be possible in the future for the automobile industry in its traditional areas to remain competitive seems to depend primarily on its ability to undergo fundamental technological change. This ~
applies to both production and product technology. While changes in pro- duction technology are necessary to increase productivity, changes in pro- duct technology are required to meet rising safety and environmental standards, reduce 'fuel consumption, and make automobiles for domestic markets more sophisticated and superior in performance to the eheaper pro- ducts of the new competitors.
The way the automobile industry, and its institutionalized system of interest politics in particular, will respond to the new economic situation will be of general significance. The automobile industry is not the first in Western Europe and the United States to face the threat of "de-industri- alization". But unlike the textiles industry, market Saturation and the tendency to relocate production to low-wage areas (facilitated by improved production technology and. declining transportation costs) hit the automo- bile industry at a time of general economic stagnation, high unemployment
and few prospects for renewed growth. Losses of jobs to other countries are thus not likely to be offset by a general increase in demand for labor, whether in the world auto industry as a whole or in the economies of indus- trialized countries at large. Moreover, unlike steel, the simple solution of outright protectionism or direct subsidization of non-competitive produ- cers may be difficult to legitimate for an industry producing expensive mass-manufactured consumer goods not least because it would inevitably lead to demands by other sectors of the economy for similar treatment. For these reasons, the response of the "political economy" of old industrialized Countries to the ongoing process of economic change in the world auto indus- try may well be indicative of how such countries will generally react to, and try to cope with, low growth and a declining demand for labor.
One possible response to employment problems, especially those caused by structural economicchange, is an·"active", state-guided industrial and labor market policy built on the cooperation and the support of the "social partners". To many, tripartite macro-economic management of economic restruc- turing and employment bears the promise of permitting positive economic a- daptation at comparatively low costs to social peace and political stability.
One of the central assumptions underlying this study is that a cooperative economic policy at the societal level is dependent, among other things, on the structure of a society's system of industrial relations. The present study will make an attempt to c.larify the poli tical, economic, insti tutional and organizational conditions of a cooperative approach to "de-industriali- zation" and under-employment; to analyze its costs and consequences in terms of international competitiveness and relative efficiency; and to compare these to the consequences of alternative responses taken by other, competing countries. In particular, the study should be able to specify the constraints
and opportunities created by differently structured systems of industrial relations for_ an active, cooperative employment policy in industrialized countries, and to determine the institutional conditions regulating the exchange between capitaLand laborthat are necessary, though not suffi- cient, for such a policy to be successful.
3. Industrial Relations Systems and Industrial Change:
Research Perspectives
The proposed study will analyze the interactions between the ongoing and expected changes in the world automobile industry on the one hand, and the systems of industrial relations in the auto industry both of individual countries and at the world level on the other. It will pay particular
attention to the problems created by increasing international competition and technological change for the actors in the IRSs of the old industria- lized countries. Countries included in the study will be the United States, Japan, Sweden, Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy. The study will be partly a cross-national comparison and partly a single-class mono- graph on the automobile industry as a global system.
In the proposed study, the interaction between industrial relations systems and industrial change will be analyzed from three main perspectives. First, the study will look at the institutional structure of industrial re- lations systems as a factor conditioning the speed of introduction, the di~
rection and the social consequences of economic and technological change in an industry. Secondly, the study will analyze the impact of pressures for in- dustrial restructuring and technological innovation on existing industrial relations systems. Thirdly, the study will make an attempt to place the events in national automobile industrial relations systems, and their vari-
ous interdependencies into a broader analytical context.and view national in- dustrial relations systems as elements of a global, transnational IRS. The rest of this part .of the proposal will try to elaborate these three perspectives.
3.1. Industrial Relations as a Factor Conditioning Industrial Change
The hypothesis underlying the first part of the analysis is that differ- ent systems of industrial relations are differently receptive to technolo- gical and economic change. While some industrial relations systems may im- pede or retard, or even be resistant to, industrial change, others may be able to absorb it with little or no friction. To the extent that such differ- ences exist, the structure of national industrial relations systems can be expected to be one important factor among others determining the internation- al distribution of employment in a multinational industry as an outcome of worldwide competition. This holds the more so the more production technology and -- perhaps -- products in different countries come to resemble each other.
The proposed study will compare different industrial relations systems in terms of their ability to respond to the technological and economic chal- lenges faced by the world automobile industry today. Systems of industrial relations are institutionalized mechanisms of joint regulation of interest conflicts involving employers (or employers associations) , unions and the state. They are conducive to industrial change to the extent that they are capable of generating effectively binding decisions increasing the indus-
try's productivity, competitiveness, and profitability. The study will try to identify the properties of industrial relations systems that facilitate technical and. economic change, either by excluding the interests of groups which are negatively affected by it (certain categories of workers, small
employers) or by permitting consensual, planful adaptation through compen- sation for short-term losses, reconciliation of short-term and long-term interests, etc.
The reasons why one might expect different systems of industrial re- lations to be differently receptive to economic and technical change is the character of industrial relations systems as institutional mechanisms defining, processing, regulating and accomodating collective interests.
Social groups have different interests in relation to industrial change.
Such interests may be, and usually are, diverse and contradictory not only between groups but also in themselves. Groups developing interests in res- ponse to industrial change are not only the various categories of workers and employers who are directly affected, but also workers and employers in other industries and, not least, the community at large. Interests articu- lated within a given system of interest-political institutions undergo a process of definition, clarification, aggregation, accomodation and trans- formation. Different institutional frameworks include, select, and empha- size different interests and have different capacities to accomodate between them. The way a-group is organized determines to an important extent what it articulates as its collective interests, and the institutionalized link- ages between different interest-political actors -- and the way such rela- tionships are linked into the state -- affect the outcome of the confron- tation between divergent interest definitions. This relationship between economic interests on the one hand and the structures of functional repre- sentation and political aüthority on the other -- what one could call the political economy of organized interests in general and of industrial re- lations in particular -- is at the very center of the proposed research.
Special attention will be paid in the study to the relative suscepti- bility teehange of a particular institutional form of interest representa-
. +
tion which has been termed "corporatist". According to Schm~tter , corpo~
ratist systems of interestrepresentation differ from pluralist ones by their more orderly and planful structure and their more intimate, and more depend- ent, relationship with the state. In particular, pluralism and corporatism, in Schmitter's ideal-typical definition, are distinguished in the following way:
Pluralism Corporatism
(is) a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an
unspecified
multiple voluntary competitive
non-hierarchically erdered self-determined (as to type or scope of interests)
number of
limited
singular compulsory non-compet4,tive
hierarchically erdered functionally differentiated
categories which are not specially licensed
recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection
by the State
recognized or licensed (if not created)
•
and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their
respective categories.
and granted a deliberate repre- sentational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on
+
their selection of leaders and articulation of demands.
Ph.C. Schmitter,'Still the Century of Corporatism?', The Review of Politics, 36 (1974): 85-131.
The ideal-typical distinction between pluralist and cerparatist struc- tures of interest representation and intermediation can be used to character- ize and classify systems of industrial relations. ·rndustrial relations sys- tems are cerparatist to the extent that they are horizontally and hierarchi- cally integrated. Horizontal integration means that interests are represent- ed by a small number of broad, encompassing organizations grouping tagether a wide range of diverse special interests, and that joint regulation extends to a wide variety of interests and situations. Hierarchical integration
means that different levels of joint regulation are so institutionally linked that regulations made at higher and more general levels set effective limits for regulations made at lower and more specific levels. Cerparatist indus- trial relations systems produce centralized joint regulation for broad inter- est aggregates and have a capacity to make lower-level bargaining agents comply with centrally determined general standards; their structure and
functioning are directly or indirectly guaranteed by the law. Pluralist IRSs, on the other hand, consist of a large nurober of independent bargaining are- nas producing highly specific regulations for narrowly defined situations and interest constituencies; bargaining systems are not hierarchically ordered, their structures a:re strictly voluntary, and collective bargaining is "free"
in that there is no interference by the state with its institutions or its outcomes.
A central hypothesis of the theory of corporatism is that cerparatist systems of inte:rest representation a:re more "governable" -- more accessible for central "concertation" -- than plu:ralist ones. The notion of "neo-cor- poratism" or "liberal corporatism" implies that cerparatist structures of functional representation can co-exist with liberal-democratic systems of territorial representation, and that liberal-democratic states can strength- en their governing capacity by restructuring functional representation in a
cerparatist direction. Applying this hypothesis to industrial relations, it would mean that the governability of an industrial relations system, and consequently the public and private manageability of an economy, increases with the degree of horizontal and hierarchical integration of joint regu- lation. This point has been argued by one of the authors of this proposal in a recent paper. The arqument implies that cerparatist industrial re-+ lations systems may be better able to absorb fundamental industrial change •
and to manage economic restructuring than pluralist systems. In particular, the assumption is that in cerparatist industrial relations systems, general interests in high productivity, low inflation, long-term employment security, etc. are emphasized while specific "opportunistic" interests in the preserva- tion bf the status quo are submerged in broadly defined interest-political aggregates; that macro-economic considerations can be effectively trans- mitted through the system's hierarchical structures to its lower-level regu-
lation arenas; that the costs of change can be centrally pooled and equally distributed within broad interest categories; that collective self-govern- ment is more able to create the confidence necessary for the acceptance of
change than the ma~ket or a state bureaucracy; that opportunism can be more legitimately and more effectively prevented by collective "self-administra- tion" than by the state; that interest aggregation can change local zero- sum Situations into a general positive-sum situation in which conflicts of interests can be regulated by collectively negotiated compromises; etc. It is one of the objectives of the proposed research to put these hypotheses to an empirical test.
+ W. Streeck, 'Qualitative Demands and the Neo-Cerparatist Manageability of Industrial Relations. Trade Unions and Industrial Relations in West Germany at the Beginning of the Eighties', British Journal of Industrial Relations, 14 (1981) 1 PP• 149-69,
Of the countries included in the project, West Germany and Sweden in general as well as in the automobile industry in particular -- have an IRS that comes clOsest to the cerparatist model while Britain resembles most closely the pluralist model. Italy seems to lie somewhere in between;
its IRS is less horizontally and hierarchically integrated than the German and Swedish ones but more than the British one, and the degree of state, or political, control. over industrial relations is higher than in Britain and lower than in Germany and Sweden. The three other countries cannot be easily located on a continuum between "pluralism" and "corporatism". In all- of them, intermediary Systems of functional representation are in general relatively weak. The United States probably comes closest to a pluralist pattern -- the difference to Britain being that unians and collective bargaining are much more weakly institutionalized. (Note, however, that in the United States the automobile workers union, UAW, is one of the best organized and strengest unions.) In France, an the other hand, there is a long-standing tradition of pervasive direct state interventionism into the economy, including the auto industry, and of industrial paternalism C"paternalistic etatism") . As far as industrial relations are concerned, functional representation and collective bargaining playonly a minor role, and trade unians tend tobe more oriented
'
towards political than towards industrial action. Finally, in Japan, indus- trial relations are almest exclusively enterprise-based and reflect the pe- culiar Japanese traditions of life-long employment and personal loyalty be- tween worker and employer. Here, one could speak of a system of "paternalis- tic syndicalism".
The selection of countries included in the proposed study offers enough variation to allow for meaningful comparison. The problern to which the ana-
lysis will pay particular attention is whether cerparatist systems of tri-
partite interest intermediation can, under critical economic conditions, compete with, and maintain comparable working conditions to, pluralist sys- tems (where union influence is highly sensitive to the economic and politic- al conjuncture and may sharply recede under market pressures and as a con- sequence of a monetarist, "supply-oriented" economic policy); etatistic systems (where change is sponsored by a powerful state interacting directly with individual firms or national cartels); and syndicalist systems drawing an streng personal identification of workers with their "enterprise commu- nities". In an economic situation in which the ability to absorb rapid tech- nological change has become a key factor in competition at the world markets, a world-wide study of the automobile industry provides a good opportunity to examine these and related problems empirically.
3.2. Industrial Change as a Factor Influencing Industrial Relations Systems Economic a~d technical change may not only be conditioned by but may also have repercussions an the structure of industrial relations systems.
Effects of <industrial change an industrial relations may include changes in the organizational structure of trade unions_and employers' associations, shifts in the locus or the subjects of joint regulation and intervention, and other developments. Under the impact of industrial change, pluralist and fragmented industrial relations systems may become more hierarchically and
horizontally integrated, or, conversely, cerparatist systems may disinte- grate and become more unmanageable. Systems dominated by autonomaus and in- dependent unians and employers' associations may become increasingly tri- partite, with the state assuming growing responsibility for procedural re- gulation and substantive problern solutions. Vice versa, tripartite systems may be reduced to bipartite ones, with either capital or labor being ex-
cluded from meaningful participation by a coalition between the -two other participants (for an example of an exclusion of capital, see the early phase of the British "Social Contract", which was an agreement between the state andthe unions only), or the state may become so powerful that tri- partism is in effect replaced by etatism. The study will discuss, on the basis of empirical evidence, the possibility of changes of this kind in automobile industrial relations systems, and it will try to relate such changes to the ongoing structural change in the industry.
The consequences of industrial change for industrial relations in the automobile industry are likely to be different in the old and in the new industrial countries. In the latter, growing demand for labor and rising Standards of living may increase the bargaining power and raise the aspi- rations of workers. The result may be rising levels of unionization and successful collective interest representation which may eventually reduce the competitive advantage of developing over developed countries. It is for this purpose, to a great extent, that unions in the latter countries assist, either directly or through international trade union federations, their Counterparts in industrializing countries.
In the old industrial countries, on the other hand, the changed situ- ation in the world automobile industry implies the threat of a significant and lasting decline of employment opportunities in the manufacturing sector. This is in principle not a prcblem for capital -- for it, it is rather the solution of a problem -- but it does fundamentally concern labor and, to different degrees, the state. Since capital is much less bound to a parti- cular territory than labor, it has always, and with present automobile pro- duction technology more than ever, the choice to exit - which, among other things, enables it to wait for labor and, perhaps, the state to offer it
special incentives for not exiting. Generally, capital in the old industri- alized areas can deny workers further improvements of wages,. conditions, em- ployment security, etc. on. the grounds of growing international competition.
The possible consequence of the reduced willingness --.ar indeed ability -- of employers to pay high wages and to maintain present levels of employment may be a higher level of industrial conflict in general and a breakdown of hitherto cooperative industrial rel~tions systems in particular.
While this is .what some observers would expect and perhaps hope, the event may actually turn out to be rather the opposite. A conflictual res- ponse by.unions of automobile workers to the problems created by the inter- natipnalization of the industry may be counterproductive unless the inter- national environment can be organized in the same way, along class lines, as the national IRSs of developed countries (cf. 3.3., below). However, so- lidarity between workers in low-wage and low-employment countries and workers in high-wage and high-employment countries may not be easy to mobilize and may in particular require considerable .sacrifices by the latter which they may not be willing to make. Thus, unions and workers in industrialized coun-
tries may rather prefer to close ranks with capital at the national level and under the guidance of the national state, and to work out some kind of compromise with capital owners which protects at least part of the country's domestic employment. In this case, the result of industrial change would be that pacific industrial relations systems would become even more pacific, and that. conflictual systems shift, under the impact of external competition in the direction of peaceful "class collaboration".
National coalitions between capital, labor and the state in industries challenged by external competition can be of three kinds: (1) they may be aimed at protecting the status quo; (2) they may involve a concerted manage- ment of decline; and (3) they may be geared towards improving productivity and increasing the industry's international competitiveness.
(1) The first and, in many ways, most. obvious option -- the preservation of the status quo -- involves the subsidization of non-competitive and stag- nating industries with resources extracted from other parts of the economy.
An indirect form of subsidization is through tariff barriers enabling do- mestic industries to make customers pay higher than world market prices.
Direct subsidization involves covering the lasses of non-profitable firms by public funds. States may take to protect non-competitive industries as a way of preserving employment if there is no possibility of either making the industry more competitive or creating alternative employment opportuni- ties. While pretectionist tariffs may violate international agreements or invite retaliation by other countries, direct subsidization can often be presented to the public as a form of "industrial policy". For unions, sub- sidization tends to be the more easily acceptable solution of an industrial crisis; it saves them from both the agony of mass redundancies and the or- ganizational risks of participating in a concerted effort at industrial re- structuring. In fact, it is often at union pressure that states decide to protect employment through one or another form of subsidization. For capi- tal, the strings attached to public subsidies, especially if they relate to investment_ and employment, may be intolerable in the long run, and indeed the ultimate form of public protection of non-competitive industries is
. h' + their transfer to publ~c owners ~p.
Unlike the·status ·qua strategy, the two other options involve joint efforts at restructuring the industry in response to the changes in the world market. The basic decision here is between a grad~aL reduction of output and capacity an the one hand and an introduction of new and more competitive production methods an the other. The first, passive and de- fensive, strategy we refer to as "joint management of·decline"; the second, active and aggressive, approach we call the formation of a "productivity coalition".
(2) A tripartite "management of decline" aims at a deceleration of in- dustrial contraction to allow for. the simult~eous creation of new employ- ment opportunities in other industries. A concerted management of industrial decline may spring from the joint realization by capital, labor and the state that the industry in question will not again at present capacity be economically viable. For the state, the advantage of managed as opposed to uncontrolled decline is that it is less likely to lead to social disruptions.
•(
For the unions, participation in decline management may mean increased in- fluence an state economic and industrial policy as well as gains in insti- tutionalization. Ta the extent that the state is in fact able to provide for their membership adequate employment alternatives, unians may be prepared to ensure industrial tranquility during the period of transition, and to make
+ A weak ve,rsion of the protectionist strategy is public "moral suasion"
campaigns to "buy British" (American, French, Italian, German, etc.).
Economic nationalism may be promoted not only by capital or the government but also by•the unions, and'frequently it is supported by all three together.
their members accept the burden of moving to new workplaces. Finally,
capital may take part in concerted decline management to help prevent social disorder, to protect its relationship with government, and of course, to collect the material compensations affered by the state as incentives for participation.
(3) Finally, in a tripartite "productivity coalition" the role of the state is limited to serving three principal functions: the creation or the maintenance of a legal framewerk of industrial relations permitting high rates of technological change; the facilitation of private investment and the sponsoring of research and development; and the individual compensation of workers negatively affected by the process of change (social policy, labor market policy) • Unions may be willing to participate in concerted efforts to increase an industry's productivity and competitiveness in the interest of long-term employment security for their core membership.
However, to be actually able to do so, they need the assistance of the state in containing the negative short-term effects of change on their members. To the extent that such assistance is given -- for example, that the state takes on responsibility for adequate retraining of redundant workers; that tempo- rary unemployment does not lead to lasses of income; that the costs of mobi- lity for workers are borne by the community as a whole -- unians may be able to accept managerial prerogatives and to support rather than fight technolo- gical innovations. Usually, acceptance of managerial prerogatives will not mean that unians give management a completely free hand; rather, it will be conditional upon management observing institutionalized rules of information, consultation and Co-determination. It is only to the extent that unians
feel able to safequard, through such mechanisms, the basic short-term inter- ests of their members that they can afford to support management efforts to
increase productivity. Management, in turn, may prefer a tripartite approach to industrial change because this. makes-.i t . easier_ to bri.ng.. about. changes in the institutional structure of industrial.relations. In fact, re-designing industrial relations procedures at the firm and workplace level in order to make them mor~ conducive to technological change may become one of the cen- tral objectives of tripartite "productivity coalitions".
Tripartite protectionism and. tripartite rationalization efforts have many things in common. In bo.th cases, the tradtional line of conflict be-
tween capital and labor is replaced, at least in tendency, by conflicts be- tween consensually organized national economies. Both protectionism and concerted rationalization are attempts to shift the unemployment resulting
from. overcapacity to other countries. While in the first case this is
achieved by excluding foreign competitors from the domestic market, in the second case it is achieved by out-competing them on the world market. In the first case, domestic employment is preserved by influencing domestic patterns of consumption whereas in the secend case i t is protected by chang- ing domestic patterns of production. Either way, the share of the domestic labor force in the jobs available in the industry as a whole is increased.
Depending partly on existing institutional structures and partly on an industry's position at the world market, IRSs can be expected tobe affected by industrial change in many different ways ·and degrees. The proposed study will be less interested in the strategies developed by the different parti- cipants in national IRSs or in substantive policy outcomes (although both dimensions will of course have to be integrated into the analysis) , than in the institutional structures underlying, and to an extent conditioning, such strategies and outcomes. Thus, one major question asked in the project will
be wether there are tendencies in industrial relations systems like the British or the Italian one to move, under the impact of adverse world mar- ket changes, into a more cerparatist direction and become as horizontally or hierarchically integrated as the Swedish or the German system. Similarly, the project will try to determine whether there are indications of corpo- ratist systems under pressure disintegrating (corporatism as a "good weather sys:tem") and either relapsing into a pluralist pattern of interest frag- mentation (the "Englishdisease"); being taken over by a powerful state bu- reaucracy (the etatistic solution); or becoming subverted by the forces of the market (with the consequence of a return to some form of "market liber~
alism"). Likewise, the study will discuss the possfbility of an IRS like the Japanese one developing interest-political structures that transcend the boundaries of individual enterprises and define and aggregate interests on a more general level.
3.3. Industrial Relations as a Global System
The third focus of the proposed research is on the emergence of a sys- tem of industrial relations at a transnational, global level. In principle, one could speak of a transnational IRS wherever the outcomes of joint regu- lation_in one country affect the amount and the conditions of employment a- vailable in another. In most industries, however, such international inter- dependencies ha~e up to now been streng enough to be reflected in more than ephemeral institutional structures, and most or all transnational systems of industrial relations have remained so fragmented and so loosely connected that they could for all purposes be taken to be not more than the sum of their component national industrial relations systems.With growing integra- tion of national economies into the world market, however, this may no langer
be appropriate. Rather, it may become necessary to conceive of national IRSs as of elements of. a broader political and institutional context including national as well as international interest associations, national and multi- national firms, and different national states as well as international or- ganizations. While a transnational IRS will generally be less densely inte- grated institutionally and less formalized than national ones, it is much more complex than the latter, and it may gradually develop a dynamic of its own which may significantly affect the functioning of its national (sub-) systems ("world politics of industrial relations"). The formation of an inte- grated, self-determined transnational IRS is particularly likely in a highly·
internationalized industry like automobiles, and i t is in industries of this kind that the application of a transnational system perspective to industrial relations and industrial interest politics appears particularly adequate and promising.
Basically, a transnational IRS can be structured araund three major lines of interest differentiation:
(l) Araund the classical division between capital and labor. In this case, the main actors in the transnational system WQuld be in~ernational as- sociations of capital and labor and, perhaps, some kind of international gov- ernmental authority. International interest associations would unite the various national fractions of capital and labor, respectively, and would have
at least some degree of control over their national constituents.
(2) Araund the divisions between multinational companies. The main actors in the system would be the.managements of multinational corporations on the one hand and joint committees of the unians representing a corporation's international workforce on the other. Since joint union committees are organ- ized on a (multinational) company basis, the system would be tantamount to an (internationalized) form of company unionism. The transnational character
of the system would depend on the extent to which both the central manage- ments of multinational companies. and the multinational j~int union. committees
acquire some deqree of. decision-makinq power. and authority over their respec- tive national sub-units (manaqement and workers'representatives in national subsidiaries). As far as the state element of this kind of IRS is concerned, it would basically be represented by the home states of the multinational companies and by international institutions regulatinq the structure of such companies (e.g., European international company law).
(3) Araund the divisions between national states. The main actors in the transnational system would be national coalitions of capital and labor sponsored and represented by their national states. Joint regulation at the international level would be effected through international agreements and intergovernmental orqanizations. The units of international integration would be nation-states rather than, as in the first case, social classes, or as in the·second case, multinational production units.
It should be emphasized that the possible modes of organization of a transnational IRS -- which could be referred to as transnational "classism", transnational syndicalism, and transnational etatism -- are in no way thought to be mutually exclusive. In fact, we expect that each empirical transnation- al IRS will reflect in its structure all three lines of interest differenti- ation and will incorporate, in one way or another, all three organizational principles. What should distinguish between different types of transnational IRSs is the way in which the organizational reflections of the different interest cleavages are related to each other and, in particular, which is the most prominent and dominating one. The proposed study will make an attempt to determine, on the basis of the strategies of the actors in the various
national IRSs and of the structures of existing national and supra-national organizations, in which direction. the emerging IRS of the world automobile industry is likeLy to develop.
4. Research Design
An empirically based discussion of the relationship between industrial relations and industrial change in the world automobile industry requires
the following kinds of data: )
(l) a comparative inventory of the structure of national automobile IRSs;
(2) an inventory of the international relations of actors in national automobile IRSs, and an account of the structure of supra-national IR actors and of their relations with each other and with national actors;
(3} industrial profiles of national automobile industries, covering sub- jects like the degree of concentration, patterns of vertical integration, the role of multinational companies, the extent of public ownership, market shares, production figures, productivity, profitability, etc.;
(4) employment statistics, including number of employees, composition of the workforce, level of pay, frequency and intensity of labor conflicts, etc.;
(5) detailed accounts of the way in which employment-related problems resulting from industrial change are handled in the different national indus- trial relations systems and in the international system.
National and international IRS inventories, industry profiles and employ- ment data -- (1) to (4) -- should not be limited to the situation existing at the time of the research. To enable the study to assess ongoing trends of de- velopment,. it is necessary that observations cover a period of time rather than focus on a single moment. As major technological and economic changes that are affecting the industry today have started in the early seventies --
e.g., the revolution of production technology by the introduction of robotics, or the continuing increase in_fuel prices -- the study will deal with the period from 1970 to the present.
As to (5) , the study will concentrate on selected cases that can be ex- pected to yield general insights into the way a country's IRS typically pro- cesses, and is affected by, industrial change. In particular, it is planned to carry out three case studies in each country, analy~ing specific decisions that have confronted one or more important car manufacturing companies, one each in the following three areas:
- rationalization of production technology, especially the introduction of robotics in welding;
- reduction of employment, especially in response to declining demand or increasing competition on traditional markets;
- relocation of production to countries with lower labor costs ("job export") .
Case studies should describe the circumstances under which the need for the decision under study arose; identify the actors involved; pay special at-
• tention to the role of trade unians and the state; lay out the options avai- lable to the parties; and give an account.of how the final decision was arrived at. Information will be collected through semi-structured interviews with ma- nagers, representatives of trade unians and employers associations, and govern- ment officials on all relevant levels of the IRS: plant, enterprise, corpora- tion headquarters, national unians and employers associations, national and supra-national government agencies, international union and employers federa- tions, etc. In addition, as much. use as possible will be made of published documents of all kinds, newspaper reports and published work by other research- ers.
·•
Not all of the data needed for the study of the relationship between automobile industrial relations and industrial change will have to be collect- ed directly in the context of this subproject. For example, the data mention- ed under (3) are likely to be more central to other sections of the study on
"The Future of the Automobile" than to the present one. This could make it possible for the industrial relations subproject to rely partly on data col- lected in other areas of the overall project, e.g., on the likely technolo- gical development in the automobile industry or on government regulation. On the other hand, some of the industrial relatioris data in a narrow sense may also be of interest to other groups working on the project, and this may create a chance for fruitful mutüal exchange.
Within the industrial relations subproject itself, there will be need for collaboration between a number of research teams specializing on different countries. The optimal arrangement which at the present stage is highly likely to come about -- is to have national research teams in each of the countries included working along the same lines. The German teamwill take responsibility for international coordination of the project in the frame- werk of the general "Future of the Automobile" research effort.Basically, this will involve the following tasks:
- finding partner teams who are capable and willing to contribute to the project;
- taking the lead in drafting common research guidelines as required to ensure cross-national comparability;
- organizing workshops for discussion of draft research guidelines, ex- change of data, discussion of initial results, and preparation of final re- ports;
making provisions for organizing part of the project output into a
joint, comparative report contributing to the general "Future of the Auto- mobile" program.
In principle, participating teams will have to raise their own funds and finance their werk independently. For international coordination pur- poses, the German team will, in addition to the funds required for the German study, try to get financial support for international travel, meet- ings of participating teams, and werk contracts to cover research areas not sufficiently funded.
Project output will be of three different kinds. First, there will be national country studies for each of the countries included, and to the ex- tent that country studies will be conducted along similar lines, they will constitute a series of parallel monographs that are closely related to each other. Secondly, there should be a number of comparative analyses of the material collected, and these could be done by different authors and pub-
lished tagether in a joint volume. Thirdly, there may be all kinds of side- products, like discussion papers or monographic articles, which project par- ticipants are encouraged to produce -for their mutual banefit and that of the
"Future of the Automobile" research group as a whole.
5 . Timetable
At the present stage, a tentative timetable would provide for an initial period of fund-raising and organizing in the secend half of 1981. Substantive research in this phase will focus on the preparation of a series of reports on the major developments during the seventies in automobile industrial relations in the participating countries. The reports will be presented and discussed at an International Workshop in Germany in 1982 (see Appendix III) . The workshop will serve as an opportunity to organize the cooperation between the national
research teams that will carry out the project. On the basis of the discus- sions at the workshop, it should be possib1e to agree, in the ensuing months, on a common 1ist of subjects and a standardized. data col1ection program for the national case studies. Fieldresearch could take off.in June, 1982 and it could be completed, after another workshop in November devoted to improv- ing coordination between.the teams, by May, 1983. First drafts of research reports could be discussed at the third workshop schedu1ed for September 1983, and most of the reports should be finished by the end of the same year.
July-December, 1981
September- December, 1981
February 5-6, 1982
March-May, 1982
May, !982
June-October, 1982
November, 1982
December, 1982 - May, 1983 September 1983 December, 1983
Tentative Timetab1e (August 1981)
Fund-raising, organizational preparations, review of existing literature, search for partner teams
Data collection for, and preparation of, papers for international workshop on "Recent Developments in Auto- mobile Industrial Relations" (see Appendix III).
Workshop on "Recent Developments in Automobile Industrial Relations" in Berlin; discussion of papers, organization of future cooperation
Preparation of joint research guidelines for country studies
Second policy forum, Lake Ashinoko, Hakone National Park, Japan
Field research
Workshop in Berlin; discussion of first results, coordi- nation of further research
Campletion of research
Workshop in Berlin; discussion of first drafts of research reports
Campletion of research reports
---·---·--····
·-··-6. Selected Literature
(a) Trends and Perspectives in the World Automobile Industry
Abernathy, W.J., 1978: The Productivity Dilemma: Roadblock to Innovation in the Automobile Industry. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Bhaskar, K., 1980: The Future of the World Motor Industry. London: Kogan Page.
Burchard, K".-D., 1974: Die Automobilindustrie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Bedeutung, Struktur, Lage und Aussichten. Bonn-Duisdorf:
Der Bundesminister für Wirtschaft.
Cole, R.E., 1979: work, Mobility, and Participation: A Comparative Study of American and Japanese Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Commission of the European Communities, 1981: The European Automobile Industry. Commission Statement. COM (81) 317 final. Brussels (mimeo).
Dettloff, A. and. H. Kirchmann, 1981: Arbeitsstaat Japan. Exportdrohung gegen die Gewerkschaften. Reinbek: Rowohlt.
Dore, R., 1973: British Factory- Japanese Factory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Dunnett, P.J.S., 1980: The Decline of the British Motor Industry. London:
Croom Helm.
Ettlie, J.E. and A.H. Rubenstein, 1981: 'Stimulating the Flow of Innovations to the U.S. Automotive Industry' , Technological Forecasting and Social
Change 19: 33-55.
Finsinger, J. and K.-H. Neumann, 1981: Wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen und die Opposition der Verlierer. Discussion paper IIM/IP 81-9, Wissenschafts- zentrum Berlin.
Gempt,
o.,
1971: Zukunftsperspektiven der europäischen Automobilindustrie - Zwang zu weiterer Konzentration? Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.Ginsberg, D.H. and W.J. Abernathy (eds.), 1980: Government, Technology, and the Future of the Automobile. New York: McGraw Hill.
Goldschmidt, N. , .. 1981: The
u.s.
Automobile· Industry, 1980. Report to the President from the Secretary of Transportation. Washington (mimeo) . Hild, R., 1981: 'Industry Report: The German Automobile Market', ifo- digest 1/81: 28-35.Hild, R. and J. Müller, 1975: Fahrzeugbau. Berlin,München: Duncker &
Humblot.
IG Metall, 1975: Die Lage der Automobilindustrie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Tendenzen, Perspektiven, Maßnahmen. Frankfurt (mimeo) • Jenes, D.T., 1980: Maturity and Crisis in the European Car Industry:
Structural Chanqes and Public Policy. Werking Paper, Oni versi ty of Sussex (mimeo) •
Kalmbach, P. et al., 1980: Bedingungen und soziale Folgen des Einsatzes von Industrierobotern. Forschungsbericht der Oniversität.Bremen-
Kooperation Ar.beiterkammer .. Bremen, Göttingen.
Koopmann, G., 1980: 'Probleme und Anpassungsstrategien der europäischen Automobilindustrie', Wirtschaftsdienst 1980/XI: 553-557.
r
Mendius, H.-G. and R. Schultz-Wild, 1976: 'Personalabbau und Interessen- vertretung durch den Betriebsrat - zur Krisenbewältigung in der Automo- bilindustrie' , Leviathan 4 : 465-484.
Meyer-Larsen,
w.
(ed.), 1980: Auto-Großmacht Japan. Reinbek: Rowohlt.Michalski,
w.,
1978: Leng Term Perspectives of the wor1d Car Industry.Paris: OECD (mimeo) •
Neef, A. and P. Capdevie1le, 1980: .'.International Comparisons of Pro- ductivity and Labor Costs', Monthly Labor Review 103: 32-39.
Phillips, R. and A. Way, 1980: The West-Eurooean Automobile Industry:
Where now in the 1980s? London: Economist Intelligence Onit.
Schultz-Wild, R., 1978: Betriebliche Beschäftigungspolitik in der Krise.
Frankfurt: . Campus.
Strange,
s.,
1979: 'The Management of Surplus Capacity: or aow DoesTheory Stand Op to Protectionism 1970s Style?', International Organization 33: 303-334.
Sweeney, M.T., 1980: 'The Balance of Payments and Unemployment Impli.cations of the Declining Motor Industry in Britain', Management Decision 18, 4:
173-186.
Toder, E.J., 1978: Trade Po1icy and the
u.s.
Automobile Industry. New York, London: Praeger.VDA.(Verband der Automobilindustrie e.V.): Tatsachen und Zahlen aus der Kraftverkehrswirtschaft. Frankfurt: VDA (yearly)
Whi te, L.J. , 1971: The Automobile Industry Since 1945. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.
WSI. (Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliches. Institut des DGB), 1974:
~ranchenanalyse Straßenfahrzeugbau', WSI~Mitteilungen 27: 353-390
(b) Industrial Relations, Economic Change, and the. Political System
Adams, R.J. and C.H. Lummel, 1977: 'Participation in Management in
West Germany: Impact on the Worker, the Enterprise and the Trade Union', Industria1 Relations Journal 8: 19ff.
Anderson, Ch.W., 1977: 'Po1itica1 Design and the Representation of Interests', Comparative Political Studies 10: 127-52.
Bergmann, J., 1973: 'Organisationsinterne Prozesse in kooperativen Ge- werkschaften', Leviathan 1: 242-77.
Von Beyme, K., 1980: Chal1enge to Power: Trade Unionsand Industrial Relations in Capitalist Countries. London:·Sage Pub1ications.
B1ain, N., 1978: 'Approaches to Industrial Relations Theory: An .Appraisal and Synthesis', Labour and Society 3.
Cawson, A., 1979: Representational Crises and Corporatism in Capitalist Societies. Paper for Discussion at the Joint CPSA/ECPR Conference on
"Authority in Industria1 Societies", Brusse1s, 17-21 April, 1979.
Clegg, H.A., 1976: Trade Unionism Under Collective Bargaining. A Theory Based on Camparisans of Six Countries. Oxford: Basil Blackwel1.
Collier, B. and D. Collier, 1979: 'Inducements vs. Constraints .:
Disaggregating ."Corporatism"', American Politica1 Science Review LXXIII:
967-86.
Crouch, C., 1977: Class Conflict and the Industria1 Relations Crisis.
~ondon: Reinemann Educationa1 Books.
Crouch, C., 1980: 'Varieties of Trade Union Weakness: Organised Labour and Capit.al Formation in Britain, Federa.l Germany and Sweden',
West European Politics 3: 87-106.
Crouch, C. and A. Pizzorno, eds., 1978: The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western Europe Since 1968. London: Macmillan.
Czada, R. and G. Lehmbruch, 1981: Economic Palieies and Societal Consensus Mobi1ization.Paper prepared for the workshop on "Interest Representation in Mixed Polities", European Consortium for Political Research, Lancaster, March 29 - April 4, 1981. Typescript.
Eng1and, J. and B. Weekes, 1981: 'Trade Unions and the State: A Review of the Crisis', Industrial Relations Journal 12: 11-26.
Esser, J. and W. Fach, 1979: Internationale Konkurrenz und selektiver Kor- poratismus. Beitrag für die 10. Tagung des Arbeitskreises "Parteien -
Parlamente - Wahlen" der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft, Neuss, 23./24. Februar.
Esser, J., W. Fach, G. Simonis, 1979: Öffnung oder Spaltung der Gesellschaft:
Grenzprobleme des "Modells Deutschland". Universität Konstanz, Fachbereich Politische Wissenschaft, Diskussionsbeitrag 9/79.
Goldthorpe, J .H., '1974: 'Industrial Relations in Great Britain. A Critique of Reformism', Politics and Society: 419-52.
Hanson,
c., s.
Jackson and D. Miller, 1981: The Closed'Shop: A Comparative Study in Public Policy and Trade Union Security in Britain,· the USA and West Germany. Farnborough.Hartman, H., 1979: 'Works Councils and the Iran Law of Oligarchy'. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 12~
Hayward, J., 1979: Towards a Framewerk for Studying the Relationships be- tween Trade Union Movements and Pluralist Systems. Paper prepared for the ECPR Workshop an Trade Unions and the Political System, Brussels, April 1979. Typescript.
Hemingway, J., 1978: Confli~t and Democracy. Studies in Trade Union Govern-
~· Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hibbs, D.A., 1978: 'On the Political Econ~my of Lang-Run Trends in Strike Aktivity' , British Journal of Political Science 8: 153-78.
Hyman, R., 1979: 'The Politics of Workplace Relations', Capital and Class:
399-415.
Jacobs, E. , S. Orwell, P. Paterson, F. Weltz, 1978: The Approach to Indus- trial Change in Britain and Germany. London: Anglo-German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society.
Korpi, W., 1978: 'Social Democracy in Welfare Capitalism- Structural
Erosion, Welfare Backlashand Incorporation?', Acta Sociologica: Supplement, 97-111.
Korpi, W., 1978: 'Workplace Bargaining, the Law and Unofficial Strikes:
The Case of Sweden' ,British Journal of Industrial Relations 16: 355-368. Korpi, W. and M. Shalev,l979: 'Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Con- flict in Capitalist Societies', British Journal of SociolOTJ 30: 164-87.
Lehmbruch, G. and
w.
Lang, 1978: 'Die "Konzertierte Aktion". Ansätze zu einem neuen Korparatismus in der Bundesrepublik.' In: H.G. Wehling (ed.) , Arbeitskonflikte in der Bundesrepublik, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.Lehmbruch, G. and Ph. C. Schmitter, 1981: Patterns of Cerparatist Policy- Making. New York, London: Sage.
Le·ijnse, F. , 1978: Workplace Bargaining · and Trade Union Power. Paper for the EGOS Workshop an Labor Unions in a Comparative Perspective, Berlin, November 1978. Typescript.
