The Intention

(1)

(vyäkhyä) of

a

Text, and the Authorlessness of the Veda 1

By

KiYOTAKA

YosHiMizu,

Send

ai

As the most orthodox group of brahmin scholars, the Mïmâmsakas, namely, the scholars occupied with the exegesis (mïmdmsd) of Vedic scriptures, con¬

sider the Veda

as a

revealed corpus without human origin (apauruseya). They reject the possibilities assumed by other schools that the Veda was composed by

a

certain author. The Mïmâmsakas refuse to admit any kind of author for the Veda because

of

their skepticism towards the trustworthiness

of

the state¬

ments made by human beings. Nevertheless, the Mïmâmsakas discuss about what

is

intended to be expressed (vivaksyate) in the Vedic injunctions (vidhi) they quote as example sentences. In this case, one can hardly imagine ascer¬

taining what is intended to be expressed without assuming an author who signifies an intention by composing the injunction. In this article, I would like to elucidate how Kumârila

(ca.

600 ad), in

a

section

of

his Tantravdrttika, makes the Mïmâmsâ thesis that the Veda has no human origin compatible with the reading of the intention (vivaksd) expressed in

a

Vedic text. The re¬

sult of my investigation will additionally contribute towards the understand¬

ing of the opening verse of Kumârila's first work, the Slokavdrttika. 2

1. Intention and human statements

In the Slokavdrttikaj Kumârila finds the reason for the untrustworthiness of the statements made by human beings, on the one hand, in their inabil¬

ity to become omniscient (sarvajñaf and, on the other hand, in the false¬

hood

of

human statements due to the nature of "intention of expression", or briefly, "intention" (vivaksd).

4

When one has

a

communication with others,

1 I wish to thank Dr. Laurence McCrea lor reading through a previous version of this article, correcting English expressions and giving valuable suggestions.

2 For the chronological sequence of Kumârila's works, see Yoshimizu 2007, section 2.

3 SV Codanäsütra vv. 110cd-155.

4 The speaker's intention of expression iscalled "tdtparya" by later Naiyâyikas. Along with syntactic expectation (dkañksd), semantic suitability (yogyata) and temporal conti¬

guity (samnidhi), which Mïmâmsakas enumerate as requisites for the comprehension of

(2)

one makes a statement by putting words together (racand), whereby one takes care to signify one's intention.

5

As regards human statements, how™

ever, it is alleged that one sometimes becomes dishonest and intentionally gives distorted information that does not represent what one really knows. 6 Even if one has

a

mind to tell the truth, the statement does not signify one's intention enough when one's mind

is

confused at the time of utterance.

7

Ad¬

mitting these possibilities of falsehood in human statements, Kumärila says that what is known through the statement of an honest person is only the intention, in other words, the thought

of

the speaker (vaktrdhï).

8

Even

if

the hearer knows that the speaker is honest, the hearer understands from the speaker's statement merely "This

is

what the speaker knows," but not "This

is

the case."

9

The truth of the statement

is

established only when

it is

empiri¬

cally proved that the thought of the speaker

is

based on the reality. 10

sentence meaning, they hold "tdtparya" as the fourth requisite. Cf. Raja 1977, pp. 176-187.

T. Fujii (2001, n.9)points out thatJayanta Bhatta ascribes tdtparyasakti not to the speaker but to each word in a sentence. This may be influenced by the Mïmâmsâ usage of the Bahuvrïhi compound "tat-para" to indicate a subsidiary element (se sa) related to a pri¬

mary in the structure of asacrifice. The hierarchical relation defined in MmS 3.1.2 "sesab pardrthatvdt" is ascertained within a text by means of exegetic devices without reference to its author.

5 SV,Codanäsütra v. 163: "The comprehension of the meaning ofa sentence is formed [in the consciousness of the hearer] in accordance with the arrangement of the meanings of words, and the effort of arrangement is influenced by [the speaker's] knowledge based on in¬

tention." (paddrtharacandyatto vdkydrthapratyayodbhavab / vivaksdpür vav ijñdnav asdc ca racandkrtib //)

6 SV, Codanäsütra v. 160: "Despite noticing one thing, one occasionally intends to tell something else. A human statement, therefore, does not necessarily give [us] access to the thought of the (speaker)" (anyathd samviddno 'pi vivaksatj anyathd yatah / tasmad ekdntato ndstipumvdkydt taddhiydm gatih //)

7 SV,Codanäsütra v. 161:"We observe that someone who isina state of confusion says one thing despite intending something else. There is also such acase that [one speaks] in conformity with one's intention. Therefore one never takes action [complying with oth¬

er's statements]." (bbran tasydnyav ivahsaydm any ad vdkyarn ca drsyate / y athdv ivaksa m apy etat tasman naiva pravartate //)

8 SV, Codanäsütra v. 162ab: "The thought of the speaker is comprehended if hu¬

man statements originate from trustworthy persons; otherwise aconfusion would arise."

(vaktrdhir dptavdkyesu (SVas printed in SVT: dptavakyena) gamyate 'nyatra viplutih /) 9 SV,Codanäsütra v. 165: "Therefore, evenifthe hearer becomes aware that information about something (art hapra tyaya) has been derived from a statement, [the hearer] would at¬

tain [only] the comprehension of the speaker's knowledge like 'Thus he knows'." (tendrtha- pratyayotpdde srotur jdte 'pi vdkyatab /jñdto nunam aneneti vaktur jñdne matir bhavet II) 10 SV, Codanäsütra v. 167: "The statements [of human origin] remain neutral [on va¬

lidity] at first because [their reference] is confined to the [speaker's] knowledge. Their validity, however, would be confirmed if it is proved that the thought of the speaker has

abasis." {tajjñdn dntarita tvdc ca sabdds tdvad uddsate / pramdnyastbdpa nam tu sydd (SV as printed in SVT: tasmad) vaktrdb ïbetusambhavdt)

(3)

Thus the trustworthiness of

a

human statement

is

restricted due to the in¬

tention of the speaker no matter whether the speaker

is

honest or dishonest.

When one attempts to know something from

a

statement made by someone else, the intention

of

the speaker intervenes between the given statement and the comprehension of the reality to be described thereby. In the case of the Veda, however, there is no possibility of this kind of intervention because the Veda has no human origin. From the Mïmamsa viewpoint, the Veda is entirely free from the influence of human defects because of its authorless¬

ness, and thus one can directly recognize the reality by textual comprehen¬

sion of Vedic statements alone. 11

2. Three ways of explaining the intention expressed in

a

Vedic injunction

In spite of the negative evaluation of "intention" of a human statement, Mïmâmsakas occasionally take up the problem of how to find the exact meaning "intended" in

a

Vedic injunction. For example, Sabarasvämin con¬

siders, in his commentary on the seventh section of the Mïmdmsdsutra 3.1, whether the grammatical number

of

the singular noun "graham"

is

intended (vivaksyate, vivaksita) in

a

Vedic injunction, "He wipes a goblet" (graham sammdrsti), which describes

a

scene of the handling of several goblets to be used for the soma offerings in

the

Jyotistoma sacrifice.

12

In the introduction to this section, Kumärila investigates why

it is

possible to ask the "intention"

(vivaksd) of

a

Vedic injunction although the Veda

is

held to be an authorless corpus, by offering the following three explanations. 13

11 SV, Codanäsütra v. 170: "Because there isno intervention (antaraya) by the thought of a (speaker) [when one hears a Vedic injunction], one grasps the reality through the meanings [ofthe words that form the injunction]. Thus [the Veda] neither presupposes the thought [of a speaker] as its foundation nor has any inconformity with the reality." (tad-

b uddbya ntarayo (SVas printed in SVT; SV and SVasprinted in SVK: ant amy or)* ndstïty artho 'rtbais capratïyate / ato na jñdnapürvatvam apeksyam näyathärthatä //)

*Cf. NR p. 71,31: vaktrbuddhyan taray äbhävät ; SVK p. 149,17: vaktrbuddhyantarayor vyavadhdnam api nästiti. Because Sucaritamisra glosses "antaraya" with "vyavadbdna", the "r" after "antarayo" should be deleted.

12SB h p. 716,15-16: SBh' pt. 4, p. 86,13-14: tasman nait at kimeid api kart um vivaksyata iti sarvesdm grab ddi nam sammdrgddi kartavyam iti; SBh p. 723,6-7: SBh' pt. 4, p. 94,6-7: avivaksita ekatve kdrakasarnbandhdrtham asyocedranam bbavisyati;

SBh p. 724,14-15: SBh' pt. 4, p. 4-6: satyam, yatra srauto 'bhisambandho vïvaksyate.

avivaksyamdn e ca vdkydvagatah sann aparyudastavyo bbavât i.

13 L. McCrea (2000, n. 61) concisely summarizes three explanations. U. Jha (2002, pp. 36-41; 2003, pp. 26-31) talks about the first two with her own free words.

(4)

In the first explanation, Kumärila appeals to the figurative usage of the de¬

siderative expression "vivaksd" adducing

a

secular sentence, "The riverbank

is

about to collapse" (külam pipatisati). This sentence was already adduced by Patafijali

in

his explanation

of

desiderative conjugation. The desiderative suffix, saNy is attached to

a

verbal root that denotes an action that the agent (kartr) desires (icchd) to

do.14

In addition, Kätyäyana admits that one can add saN to

a

verbal root that expresses an action of an inanimate being (acetana) if the speaker has some expectation (dkdñksd), and Patafijali quotes "The riverbank is about to collapse" (külam pipatisati) as an instance for this usage.

15

If the speaker wants to express the expectation that

a

riverbank

is

about to collapse on account of erosion caused by heavy rain, it is allowed to use desiderative conjugation. Furthermore, Kätyäyana admits that one can use desiderative conjugation when one describes the action of an inanimate being comparing (upamdna) to the action

of a

living being.

16

From this point

of

view, Kumärila explains, "The riverbank is about to collapse" (külam pipatisati) figuratively (upacarya) describes the collapse of

a

riverbank as

if

it desires the collapse by itself because the time of the collapse is drawing near (pätakälapratyäsatti) just

as a

living being

is

about to take an action on an urgent need. 17

The expression, "The Vedic injunction has such and such intention (vivaksd)" too, can be an example of desiderative conjugation based on a comparison. Kumärila explains this comparison as follows: When the speaker intends to express the meaning of

a

word, the speaker composes a statement that would comprise (parigraha) that meaning. When the speaker, however, does not intend that, the speaker composes another statement that does not comprise (aparigraha), in other words, rejects (parity dga) that meaning. What is brought about as a result of the intention of the speaker, after all,

is a

textual structure focused on the meaning

of a

particular word. 18

14 A 3.1.7: "[The desiderative suffix 'saN'] is occasionally attached to averbal root in order to denote desire, whereby [the action denoted by the verbal root] is the object [of desire] and has the same agent [as that of desire]." (dhdtoh karman ah samdnakartrkdd

icehay dm vd)

15 Vt 12: dsañkdydm a cetan esupasamkhydna m; VMBh pt. 2, p. 14,14: dsañkdydm

a cetan e supa s a m k h yanam kartavyam. asma lulutisati külam pipatisatïti.

16 Vt 14:upamdnad vd siddham; VMBh pt. 2, p. 14,25-26: upam anad vd siddham etat, katham. lulutisata iva lu lutisate. pipatisatïva pipatisati.

17 TV p. 700,20-21: TV pt. 4, p. 67,13-14: "For example, one utters The riverbank is about to collapse' attributing the desire [to the riverbank] figuratively on account of the proximity of the time of the collapse." (yathaiva külam pipatisatity evamddau pdtakdlapratydsatter icchdm upacaryaivam vyapadeso bhavati.)

18 TV p. 700,21-22: TV pt. 4, p. 67,14-15: "In the case of the statements that have hu¬

man origin, too, whether or not [the meaning of aword] is comprised [in an injunction]

is recognized to be the result of whether or not it is intended [by the speaker]." (tathd pauruseyesu vdkyesu parigrahdparigrahau vivaksdvivaksayoh phalatvena prajñdtau.)

(5)

Then, we can assume this causal relation in the process

of

the comprehension of

a

Vedic injunction, too. Even if we cannot find anyone who composed a Vedic injunction, we find in the injunction

a

textual structure focused on the

meaning of a particular word. In this case, if we speak as if this structure were

a

result of the utterance by someone in ancient times, we could figura¬

tively say that the meaning of the word

is

intended (vivaksita). 19

Kumärila finds

it

convenient to figuratively use the term "intention" on ac¬

count

of

the difficulty

in

making ordinary people comprehend

a

Vedic text

in

a manner unaccustomed to them. Because ordinary people can hardly imagine a text without

its

author,

it is

necessary to assume

an

author

of

the Veda for them.

Kumärila says: The scholars make figurative explanation based on

a

compari¬

son (upamdnagaunavrtti) to everyday discourse in order to make the Veda accessible to their students

of

less brilliant intelligence (mandabuddhisisya). 20 If one compares

a

Vedic injunction to everyday discourse, one can speak

as

if the verbal suffix

in

the optative and the like were

a

speaker and the enjoinment issued thereby were the intention

of

the speaker. 21

19 TV p. 700,18-19: TV pt. 4, p. 67,11-12: "Because it is established that whether [the meaning ofaword is]comprised or rejected [in a secular sentence] isthe result of whether or not [the speaker] desires [it], whether or not [the meaning of aword] is intended here (i.e., in aVedic injunction) must be indicated by that (i.e., the comprising or the rejection within the text)." (parigrahaparitydgdv iccbdn icchdphale sthite / taHaks a narthata tv atra sydd Vivaksdv ivaksayoh//)

20 TV p. 701,13-17: TV pt. 4,p. 68,13-16: "Because, indeed, itis impossible to explain the meaning of aVedic injunction in an unfamiliar manner that goes beyond the custom (alaukika), it is necessary to indicate a similarity to the expounding of a human state¬

ment. For this reason, we find a similarity of the result [of utterance between a Vedic injunction and ahuman statement] having recourse to the figurative expression based on comparison. The authors of [ritual] works and the expounders of [the Vedic scriptures]

utter the expressions, 'This is intended' or 'This is not intended,' only with reference to the [textual] comprising or rejection, which are dependent on the fact whether or not [the referent] is enjoined. [They use figurative expressions] in order to make their students of less brilliant intelligence understand [what isenjoined inaVedic injunction]." (tad etad ap~

rasiddhdlaukikavedavdkydrthavydkhydnaprak

dsddrsydpddandrtham antarn It opam dnaga unav rttydsraya nena phalasdmdnyadarsandd

Vidhi sa ktya sa ktya dhin apar ig ra h dp a?' ig ra hay or eva vivaksitdv ivaks it avacoyuktyu cearan- am mandahuddhisisyapratipddandrtham grant hak dran dm vydkhydtfnam ca.)

21 TV p. 700,24-26: TV pt. 4, p. 67,17-19: "Just as hi the case of human statements it is the person (i.e., the speaker) that urges [the hearer] to the performance of what is told [to do], so here [in the case of Vedic injunctions] the optative and some other [verbal endings urge the hearer] due to the denotative power of enjoinment. In the Veda, indeed, [the verbal endings that have the denotative power] of enjoinment take the position of the person [i.e., the speaker, in the case of a human statement]; and the enjoinment [issued from the optative and some other verbal endings] takes the position of the desire of the person." (yathaiva pauruseyesu pur uso hipravartakah / ukte 'py arthe tathaiveha lind dir vidhisaktitah // purusasthdnïyo hi vede vidhdyakah. purusecchdsthdn ïyam vidhitvam.)

(6)

In the first explanation,

a

Vedic injunction is only figuratively spoken of as an agent who expresses an intention although there is, in fact, no such an agent. Although the speaker's intention to express something brings about

a

textual structure focused on that thing, the latter is not necessarily brought about by the former. In the second explanation, however, Kumärila affirms the existence

of

the agent, who

is

the teacher in the study

of

the Veda, namely, ritual specialists expounding (vydkhyd) the Veda. He thereby sepa¬

rates the origin of the Veda from human beings granting that the Veda has been handed down only through the generations of teachers and students. 22 Among the expounders of the Veda, exegetes (mïmdmsaka) and ritualists

(ydjñika) are to be distinguished. The exegetes explain the Veda by means of reasoning while the ritualists do by tradition.

23

But both of them desire to give their students some information comprised by the denotative power of injunction and also not to explain anything rejected by

it. 24

Thus, if the stu-

22 The distinction between the composer and the expounder of atext was already men¬

tioned in A 4.3.101: "[The taddh ita suffixes introduced from 4.1.83 onwards occur after a nominal stem that ends in the instrumental] to denote [a text] promulgated by him."

(tena proktam) and 4.3.116: "[The taddbita suffixes introduced from 4.1.83 onwards oc¬

cur after a nominal stem that ends in the instrumental] to denote a text composed [by him].M(krte granthe). Patafijali distinguishes two types of intention, namely, "the speak¬

er's intention" (prayoktri vivaksä) expressed in an utterance of a person who deliber¬

ately chooses suitable words and "the public intention" (laukikï vivaksä) expressed in a statement generally accepted (yatra prayas ya sa rnp ratyayah) in the world (loka). See VMBh pt. 2, pp. 342,26-343,3 (on A 5.1.16); van Nooten 1983, p. 50. The Nyäya school

of the post- Kumärila times asserts that scriptures have authority because they are ac¬

cepted by major people (mahajana) who represent various classes, ages and districts (NM p. 638,10-11). For the Nyäya concept "mahajana", see Che mpa rath y 1983, pp. 58-64.

The term "mabdjanaparigraba" is used in SV Codanäsütra v. 98. Kumärila, however, op¬

poses the authority of social rules as based on the custom adopted by Aryan people. He thereby takes precautions against the ethical relativism. According to him, social rules must be based on the Vedic scriptures (vedamula/ sdstramula). See SV, Autpattikasütra vv. 6cd-7; TV p. 194,27-28: TV pt. 2, p. 113,11-12; TV p. 195,1-2: TV pt. 2,p. 113,16-18;

Hal beas s1991, p. 111.As regards the authority of the Veda itself, Kumärila expresses his distrust of the proof of the Vedic authority based on its acceptance by successive genera¬

tions of human beings appealing to the maxim of a succession of the blind's testimony (andbaparampardnydya; cf. SBh pp. 162,4-163,1: SBh' pt. 2, pp. 73,1-74,2; Harikai 1974, p. 46) in TV p. 113,9: TV pt. 2, p. 11,3-4 (cf. Harikai 1990, pp. Ill, 325). For another ver¬

sion of the andb apar ampara tale, see TvS 15; PVSV p. 167,4-5; Wakahara 1900, p. n.5.

23 TV p. 701,18-19: TV pt. 4, p. 68,18-19: "Or, these (expressions 4being intended' and not being intended') are used with reference to the intention of those exegetes and ritual¬

ists who respectively expound the Veda by means of reasoning or in accordance with tra¬

ditions." (nydyena sampraddydd va ye m ïma msakaydjñ ik ah / vedarn vydcaksate te sdm abhiprdyo 'yam ucyate //). Cf. PVSV p. 168,3-4: na sampraddydn na yukter na lokdd hi.

24 TV p. 701,20-22: TV pt. 4, pp. 68,20-69,1: "They make explanations of a Vedic injunction in conformity with the denotative power of words. They wish to expound those meanings that are compliant to their denotative power, whereas they do not wish

(7)

dent finds in

a

Vedic injunction

a

textual structure focused on the meaning of

a

word, the student should understand that

it is

intended by the teacher. 25

The expounders of the Veda, however, do not spontaneously decide on which word the structure of

a

Vedic text is focused. A student has to learn how to interpret

a

Vedic text from his teacher, who also previously, as

a

stu¬

dent, learned the interpretation from the teacher's own teacher. Thus every expounder has

a

preceding expounder from whom he inherits the method of how to interpret the text.

26

Therefore, it

is

possible to say that the intention that a person signifies in expounding

a

Vedic text is, contrary to the inten¬

tion of the speaker in everyday discourse, not the cause that establishes the meaning of the text, but the effect evoked by the self-determining text of the Veda. Expounders may make an earnest effort to inform their students of the sentence meaning, which was, however, already established within the text in advance.

In the third explanation, contrastively, Kumärila asserts the existence of an agent who signifies his own intention in a Vedic injunction. According to this explanation,

a

supreme self (param dtman) has its body in the sphere of space (vyoman).

27

Sounds (sabda) are the quality (guna) characteristic of

to expound those meanings that are left by their denotative power (sabdasaktyanusdrena vdkydrtham gamayanti te/ tatra yah saktyupdrudhah sa tair vydkhydtum isyate // yas tu

sa ktyd parity akto na vydcik hydsyate sa tai h /)

25 TV p. 701,23-24: TV pt. 4,p. 69,2-5: "Therefore, the meaning [ofaword] they want to expound is said to be intended, whereas [the meaning of a word] they do not want [to expound] is said not to be intended for the reason that [the sentence] does not afford [the expression of it]. Thus, what is called 'intended' [in a Vedic injunction] is that which was desired [to be expounded] by those expounders who graduated [the course of study]

(samdvrtta, cf. Mn 3.4) in earlier times, whereas what is called 'not intended 'is that which was not desired [to be expounded] by them." (tena vydkhydtum ist o yrtho yas tesdm sa vivaksitah // anisto yas tv asaktitvdd avivaksita eva sah / atah p ürvasamdvrttavydkhy - dtristarn (TV: purta-) vivaksitam // tenocyeta tathd tesdm tv anistarn tv avivaksitam/);

TV p. 702,3: TV pt. 4, p. 69,6-7: tasm ad vydkhydtrgatam eva vivaks itdv ivaks it atva m upanyasya vicdrandd vede 'py avirodhah.

26 It is a standard method for Mïmâmsakas to distinguish the user of a language from its originator and thereby to prove its eternity lor the reason of its beginning- less usage in the society. Cf. SBh(F) p. 46,2-5; SV, Sambandhäksepaparihära v. 41; SV, Sabdanityatâdhikarana v. 293.

27 TV p. 702,23: TV pt. 4, p. 70,3: tathd vyomasariro 'pi paramdtmd sriitau srut ah I Although "vyoman" in Vedic texts means "heaven" (cf. Mayrhofkr, Bd. II, p. 594), Kumärila identifies vyoman with space (dkdsa). In averse of the Vyäkaranädhikarana, he refers to vyoman asan example of eternal (nitya)entities, which he, in its prose explanation, enumerates in the style of Vaisesika, namely, space (dkdsa), direction (dis), time (kdla), the sell (diman) and atoms (paramdnu) (TV p. 285,10-12: TV pt. 2, pp. 223,25-224,2).

In a section on dtman as the abode of apürva, he uses "vyoman 1in the sense of the all- pervading space: "[Opponent:] If the dtman is all-pervading, there could be only one dtman common to all bodies, just like space. [Proponent:] There is no such a fault."

(8)

space, and the Veda is

a

scripture consisting of sounds that have orally been handed down forever. Kumarila, accordingly, imagines that one and the same supreme self

is

embodied in all

of

the oral scriptures

of

the

Veda. 28

What this supreme self intends to instruct

is

comprised by

a

Vedic injunction, whereas what he does not intend to instruct is rejected by

it. 29

The term "intention", in this case, is applied not figuratively but primarily (mukhyavrtti).

30

For this remarkable idea that the Veda is the body (deha, sartra) of the supreme self, see another article of mine. 31

3. The formation of a textual structure centered on the enjoinment No matter how the Vedic agent

is

considered,

it

remains unchanged that the

structure

ofa

Vedic injunction

is

focused on the meaning

of a

particular word by its own denotative power (svasakti). That means, we are not allowed to in¬

terpret the text arbitrarily according to our own convenience (asmadicchd) 32 With this, however, Kumarila only puts off the solving of the problem be¬

cause it remains to be explained why

a

Vedic injunction does not comprise, in other words, rejects the meaning of

a

certain word although all

of

its com™

ponent words equally denote their own meanings.

33

Because each section in the third volume (adhydya)

of

the Mïmdmsdsutra deals with the structure of an example sentence, Kumarila, here, confines the discussion to the general relation between the enjoinment (vidhdtrisrutih

)

and other functions of the words that constitute

a

Vedic injunction.

34

These functions (sruti) are classi-

(TV p. 403,20-21: TV pt. 2, p. 376,21-22: nanu ca sarvagatatve vyomavat sarvasarïresv eka evdtmd prdpnoti. nais a dosah). Mabdbhdrata (MBh) 12.211.47ab includes vyoman in the enumeration of the constituents of a body along with other four material elements (bhüvyo mat oydnalav aya vo hisadà sarïram paripdlayanti /).

28 TV pp. 702,23-703,9: TV pt. 4, pp. 69,8-70,10.

29 TV p. 703,12-15: TV pt. 4, p. 70,13-16.

30 TV p. 703,16-17: TV pt. 4, p. 70,17-18.

31 See Yoshimizu 2007, sections 3,4and 5.

32 TV p. 701,3-4: TV pt. 4,p. 68,1-2: "For the sake of enjoinment, it is only by means of their own denotative power that the words of enjoinment [in Vedic injunctions] are directed to those meanings carried by suitable words; they are not [directed] to every¬

thing in accordance with our wish." (vidbdndya pravartante svasaktyaiva vidhdyakdh / yogyasabdopanïte 'rthe sarvasmin ndsmadicchayd //)

33 TV p. 700,22-23: TV pt. 4, p. 67,21-22: "[Question:] How could there be non-com¬

prising of what is directly expressed? [Answer:] this (question) does not affect [our posi¬

tion], because ithas already been pointed out that the comprising depends on enjoinment."

(katham sr utasydparig rahah sydd iti cet. nais a dosah. vidhyadhïnah parigraha iti präg evoktatvdt.)

34 For the linguistic argument of the grahaikatvanydya ,that is, the main issue of the present section (adhikarana), see Yoshimizu 2006.

(9)

fied into three kinds, namely, the direct denotation (abhidhàtrï) by the stem and the ending of

a

word, the assignment (vinïyoktrï) by the case-suffix of

a

noun and, lastly, the enjoinment (vïdhàtrï) by the optative and some other verbal endings. 35

Among these three, the enjoinment is the most fundamental function because the optative verb in an injunction arouses in the hearer the aware¬

ness of the obligation to perform an action denoted by the verbal root. The other two kinds of functions, namely, the direct denotation and the assign¬

ment, cannot urge the hearer to perform an action. The direct denotation (abhidhàtrï) of a word makes one notice "This exists here" (idam ihdsti), whereas the assignment (vinïyoktrï) of case-suffixes makes one notice "This is subsidiary to that" (asyedam). However, insofar as the direct denotation and the assignment are not related to the enjoinment, the reader does not be¬

come aware of the obligation to take an action that deals with their referent (tadvisayakartavyatdbuddhi)

. 36

Whether the meaning of

a

word

is

intended depends on the fact whether the enjoinment is focused on that meaning (vidhitsita-avidhitsita)? 7

Moreover, the function of enjoinment is not brought to completion within a single injunction. Instead, it repeatedly makes a transition from

one object to another within

a

Vedic text that consists of an aggregate of sen¬

tences.

38

First, the optative ending

of

the verb in the fundamental injunction (codand) of

a

Vedic sacrifice, for example, "One who desires heaven should perform (yajeta) the Jyotistoma sacrifice," issues an enjoinment focused on the "bringing into being" (bhdvand) of the hearer.

39

"Bringing into being"

is the general form of intentional action of human beings. Urged by the

35 TV p. 700,6-7: TV pt. 4, p. 66,21-22: abhidhàtrï srutih kdcid viniyoktry aparä tathd / vidhdtrt ca trtlyoktd prayogoy annibandhanah //

36 TV p. 700,12-13: TV pt. 4,p. 67,5-7: "This (person: purusa), indeed, isurged to per¬

formance neither by [denotation] nor [by assignment]; because [what denotation and assign¬

ment dois]respectively only to determine 'This exists here' and 'This is subsidiary to that', they do not make [the hearer] aware that it has to be performed" (na hy asdv anusthdnam prati tayor ekaydpi preryate. idam ihdsti, asyedam iti caitdvanmdtrapariccheddd [IO 2158; Anandäsrama ed.: caitanmàtra] t adv i saya-[IO 2158; Anandäsrama ed.: visaya-]ka- rtavyatdbuddhyanutpatteh)

37 TV p. 700,13-15: TV pt. 4,p. 67,7-8: "Therefore, what is denoted or assigned turns to be intended or not intended if itisrelated to the enjoinment [ofthe injunction] and to the performance [of the hearer], namely, whereby it substantially turns to be enjoined or not, in other words, to be performed or not." (tendbhihitaviniyuktasydp ividhim anusthdnam capratïtya vivaksdv ivaksevidh its itav idh its it acikïrs it acik ïrs itdtm ike bhavatah.)

38 For the transition (samkrdnti, same aran a) of enjoinment, see Yoshimizu 2004.

39 TV p. 701,9: TV pt. 4, p. 68,8: "First, the bringing into being is directly enjoined by the [verbal] suffix." (srutyd tdvat pratyayena bhdvand hi (IO 2158; Anandäsrama ed.:

t àva t pray ojanabhàvana) vidhïyate.)

(10)

enjoin ment of the fundamental injunction, the hearer, at the outset, exerts his "bringing into being" to undertake

a

sacrifice in the form of an action of offering denoted by the verbal root of the injunction "should perform

a

sac¬

rifice"

(y aje

ta). When one performs an action (kriyd) of offering, however, one needs various necessities called "formative factors" (kdraka) without which one cannot perform an action. On the side of the Veda, the funda¬

mental injunction requires subsidiary injunctions called "injunctions of as¬

signment" (Viniyogavidhi), in which the enjoinment of "bringing into being"

becomes redirected into the formative factors (kdraka) denoted by various nouns within the context of the sacrifice.

40

In this way, the Vedic text forms an autonomous structure in which each of many injunctions is respectively focused on the meaning of

a

particular word.

4. The texts named after a person: Were they revealed or composed?

Rumania's first explanation is that one can figuratively use the term "inten¬

tion" for the expounding of an injunction of the authorless Veda. He may offer this explanation from expediency to counter the criticism that one has to assume

a

human author of the Veda insofar as

a

Vedic injunction causes the comprehension of an intention.

41

Because he restricts the figurative use of the term "intention" to the scene of education where

a

teacher instructs students of less brilliant intelligence (mandabuddhisisya)*

2

he seems to ad¬

mit that this is not

a

convincing rejoinder but just

a

provisional one. Owing to this figurative explanation, the student might be inclined to believe the existence of

a

person who composed the Veda in ancient times. This expla¬

nation is, therefore, disadvantageous to the Mimämsä standpoint and thus should be given up by other ways of explanation. 43

40 TV p. 701,9: TV pt. 4,p. 68,8-9: "The formative factors other than [the meaning of the verbal root] are, however, indirectly [enjoined] for the reason that it (i.e., the bringing of the purpose into being) would not be otherwise established." (tada nya thanupapatt es tv arthät kärakäntaräni); TV p. 701,12-13: TV pt. 4, p. 68,11-13: "If the singleness and other [qualities ofa substance] qualify the 'bringing into being' by working as aformative factor, then they turn to be intended because they are touched by the enjoinment. If, how¬

ever, they [only] qualify a substance, then they do not turn to be intended" (tat ra yady ekatvddi kdrakatvena bhävanävisesanam tato v id hisamspa rsä d vivaksitam bhavisyati.

atha dravyav isesa nam tato na vivaksitam iti.)

41 As a reason for the human origin of the Veda, Bhäviveka points out that the Veda produces in the hearer the comprehension of the meaning intended by aspeaker (vivak sit¬

ar th adh ïja nmakdranatva) .See MT v.30.

42 Cf. footnote 20.

43 Dharmakïrti accuses Jaimini of deceitfully (tadvy ajena) ascribing (samar opa) his own views to the Veda (PVSV p. 171,20-22) adding an ironical remark in PV I v. 325:

(11)

The second explanation

is

that

it is

the expounder (vyakhyatr)

of

the Veda who expresses his intention through

a

Vedic injunction. With this explana™

tion, Kumarila adopts

a

traditional method, whereby the Mïmâmsâ school defended the authorlessness

of

the Veda against the criticism that some scrip¬

tures of the Veda, for example, the Käthaka, are named after an individual person such as Katha.

44

Mimämsäsütra 1.1.30 states that what the person whose name

is

prefixed to

a

Vedic text did

is

only to promulgate (pravacana)

a particular text among the vast Vedic corpus.

45

In the last section of the Slokavärttika, the Vedanityatädhikarana, Kumärila tries to strengthen the traditional differentiation between the expounder and the composer.

46

He defends this theory against an opponent who argues that the text called

"Käthaka" was expounded not only by Katha but also by other scholars and thus Katha must be the author

of

the Käthaka. Kumärila answers: Although

"[Asked for direction,] someone answers 'This post says that this is the way [you should go].' Another person answers '[After having confirmed the way] by myself, I will tell you.' You should investigate the difference between these two persons." (esa sthdnur ayam marga iti vaktlti kascana / any ah svayam bravlmlti tayor bhedah pariksyatdm //). Cf.

Wakahara 1990, pp. 21-22. Dharmakïrti's criticism is based on a figurative explanation from the opposite standpoint, whereby it is pointed out that the Veda appears as if it is revealed without its author although it is, in fact, nothing but camouflaged statements of someone with wicked intention. This criticism might have some relation to TvS 14,where Buddha criticizes some brahmins acquainted with the three Vedas for instructing away (magga) to Brahma although they have never seen him.

44 The name "Katha" is mentioned together with "Caraka" in A 4.3.107. According to Patafijali, Katha is adisciple of Vaisampayana and the teacher of Khädäyana. Cf. VMBh pt. 2, p. 316,4-5; Weber 1973b, pp. 437-438; Tsuji 1982, p. 36; Gonda 1975, p. 326.

45 MmS 1.1.30: "[Some scriptures of the Veda are] named after a person because of promulgation." (dkbyd pravacandt); SBh p. 102,5-8: SBh' pt. 1, pp. 122,6-123,3: "Even without assuming any author, indeed, it is possible to explain the fact that [a certain Vedic scripture is named after a person like Katha]. It may be the case that Katha and

others so prominently promulgated [a particular scripture] as matched by nobody else;

such being the case, indeed, they are expounders. They say that Vaisampayana stud¬

ied [the Vedic scriptures] of all branches, whereas Katha instructed only this particu¬

lar branch." (akartrbhir api hy enatn (= samdkhyd) dcaksïran. prakarsena vacanam ananyasddhdranam kathddibhir anus th itam sydty tathdpi hi samdkhydtdro bhavanti.

smaryate ca va i sa mpdyan ah sarva sdkha dhydy ï, kathah punar imam kevaldm sdkhdm

adhy dp aydm ba bh ü veti). For the usage of the word "käthaka," see Tsuji 1982, n. 357;

VMBh pt. 2, p. 329,5: katbdndm dharma dmndyo vd kdthakam. For the teacher-student relationship between Vaisampayana and Katha, see footnote 44.

46SV,Vedanityatädhikarana v.4: "Because this [name like 'Katha' prefixed to aVedic scripture] may be explained otherwise, that is, as aresult of [Katha's] promulgation, it can¬

not become the reason for his being the author. And it istraditionally established [in gram¬

mar (A 4.3.101: tena proktam) that the suffix vuN (A 4.3.126: gotracarandd vuN, cf. 7.1.1 and 7.2.115) in 'Käthaka*] denotes apromulgated text." (anyathdpy upapannatvdd iyam pravacanddind / na saktd kartrmüldya prokte ca smaranam sthitam //). For A 4.3.101, see

footnote 22.

(12)

there may be many expounders of

a

text, it can be named after

a

particular person (eka isyate) on behalf of others (pdrdrthya) who also have expounded the text.

47

He adduces some cases of such

a

representation. 48

The differentiation of the expounder from the composer, however, is not convincing on the authorlessness of the Veda because there is another genre of ritual literature, called

"

kalpasütra,"

49

each of which is not only a detailed description of Vedic sacrifices but also named after a person. If the Kdthaka is accepted as a revealed scripture (sruti) in spite of the per¬

sonal name "Katha" prefixed to the title, one cannot but admit that all the kalpasütras, too, are revealed scriptures because they are, in the same man¬

ner as the Kdthaka, named after particular persons, such as Masaka,

50

who we could say did nothing but the explanation of a revealed scripture.

51

The

47SV,Vedanityatädhikarana v.9.

48 The Jyotistoma sacrifice is called "vairüpasdmd" although many other sdmans are chanted in the sacrifice (v. 7). A woman is called "mother of Dittha" even if she has not only Dittha but also other children (v. 8). A place of pilgrimage (tïrtha) is named after a particular person although many people visit there (v. 10).

49 In TV p. 229,10-20: TV pt. 2, p. 155,8-18, Kumärila distinguishes kalpa and sutra.

Kalpas are those treatises that follow the fixed procedure of sacrifices (siddbarüpab prayogo yaih karmandm anugamyate / te kalpdb). Because of laying down (kalpana) the proce¬

dure, they are used as means for the performance of a sacrifice (anustbdnasddbana). The works of Baudhäyana, Varäha and Masaka are enumerated as examples of kalpa (baudbd- yanïyavdrdhamdsakddiprabandhavat). Sutras are, on the other hand, those treatises that systematically describe the sacrifices (laksandrtba). They describe them applying their own technical terms and metarules (svasamjñdparibhdsd), differentiating general rules and exceptions (utsargdpavddana) and adducing reasons and examples (betudrstantavat ) for rules. The works of A svalây ana, Baijaväpa (Tsuji 1982, pp. 81-82; Gon da 1977, p. 603), Drâhyâyana, Lâtïya and Kätyäyana are enumerated as examples of sütras. Later, Kumärila adds Äpastamba to the list of the authors of kalpasütras (TV p. 239,24: TV pt. 2, p. 167,8; TV p. 240,4: TV pt. 2, p. 167,15). The Ba udbdyan a s ra utasü ira (Tsuji 1982, p. 17;Gon da 1977, p. 514) and the Ärseyakalpa (Gon da 1977, p. 535) are recognized as old kalpasütras. Moreover, the method of description Kumärila finds in sütras is system¬

atical as if influenced by the Päninian school of grammar. Thus, except for the VärSS included in kalpas, the kalpas and the sütras Kumärila enumerates can be held as forming an old group and a new group of srautasütras. Kumärila might consider the traditional appellations "prava canakara " given to Baudhäyana and "sutrakdra" to Äpastamba. Cf.

Bodbayanagrbyasütra 3.9.6 (ed. Shama Sast ri); G onda 1977, p. 514. It is, however, hard to understand why Kumärila does not classify the Vara basra utasü tra (VärSS) into sütras although VärSS 1.1.1 isaparibbdsd section. Does Kumärila refer to aversion of the VärSS totally different from the existent one, or, could it be the Vddb ülasrautasü tra , namely, the Taittirïya srautasutra being as old as the Baudhäyana (Tsuji 1982, p. 30;G on da 1977, p. 522)?

50 For Masaka as the author of the Arseyakalpa, seeGon da 1977, pp. 534-535. Accord¬

ing to LSS 7.9.14, Masaka is Gärgya, i.e., a descendent of Garga. Cf. Weber 1973a, p. 384;

Caland 1908, p. VII.

51 TV p. 230,29-30: TV pt. 2, p. 157,7-8.

(13)

Mïmàmsdsûtra 1.3.11-14 forms

a

section called "Kalpasuträdhikarana," on which Sabara wrote only

a

brief

gloss. 52

Kumärila, however, writes

a

large sub-commentary on

it

to demonstrate that the kalpasütras are not to be held

as

revealed scriptures.

According to Kumärila, what distinguishes kalpasütras from the author- less Veda and makes them man-made compositions in spite of the common feature as ritual texts is "the firmness of the memory of the author"

53

or, in other words, "the firm memory of the author"

54

among Aryan people.

It has been fixed in the memory of many generations

(pur us

apar

amp

ara) of teachers and students that the text is a work composed by a person. 55

52 The proponent sutras are MmS 1.3.12 " nasa m niyamat", 13 "aväkyasesäc ca" and 14"sarvatra caprayogat samn idhdnasdstrac ca." Sabara glosses "asanniyama" as "nait at samyagnibandhanam " and explains that kalpasütras are not accentuated (svardbhdva).

Kumärila, however, points out that even the eight brdhmanas ofthe Chandogas (cf. Gonda 1975, pp. 320, 347) are not accentuated, and he asserts that no-restriction (asamniyama) in this case indicates that the study of kalpasütras is not prohibited (anadhydya, cf.

Mn 2.107-106; 4.101-127) on account of ominous incidents (TV p. 240,6-16: TV pt. 2, p. 167,17-26). Sabara considers the "rest of a sentence" (vdkyasesa) asarthavdda. Kumärila adduces some examples of Vedic myths and declares that one who would compose and teach those tales would be treated like an idiot (TV p. 240,16-24: TV pt. 2, p. 168,4-11).

He remarks that no kalpasütra contains such vdkyasesas ignoring the fact that some older srautasutras, e.g., the Baudhäyana (Tsuji 1982, p. 17;n. 131;Gon da 1977, p. 515), contain myths. According to Sabara, MmS 1.3.14 refers to the case that a rule prescribed in a kalpasütra is contradicted by an existent injunction of the Veda. It is, therefore, Kumärila who introduced into the Kalpasuträdhikarana the discussion about the significance of the personal names prefixed to the titles of ritual texts.

53 TV p. 239,18: TV pt. 2,p. 167,2:kartrs m rtidra dhimnah (IO 2151; Änandäsrama ed.:

-drdhimnah).

54 TV p. 239,22: TV pt. 2,p. 167,6: drdhakartrsmrtes. Cf. NSu p. 238,21: svatantrat à kartrsmaranena pratyäkhyätä.

55 TV p. 239,23-24: TV pt. 2, p. 167,7-8: "Just as, indeed, students and teachers learn texts of kalpasütras and other ancillary smrti literatures in memory, they fix Asvaläyana, Baudhäyana, Äpastamba, Kätyäya and others as the authors of those texts [in memory]."

(yathaiva hi kalpasütragranthdn it ardñgasmrtin ibandha ndni cd dhy etradhydpay itdra h smaranti tathdsva layan aba udhaya ndpastambakd tydyapra bhrtïn granthak dratve na.); TV p. 239,27-28: TV pt. 2, p. 167,11-12: "We do not say that these (kalpasütras) have authors for the mere reason of the names [being prefixed to the titles], because the proponent [of the authorlessness of the Veda] answers [in MmS 1.1.30 'The Kdthaka and other texts of the Veda have] names of aperson because [the person] promulgated [the text]'. [The main reason for their being authors of the kalpasütras is that] they are fixed as the authors by a series of human generations in memory. Itisonly when this reason is given that their name [prefixed to the title of the texts] is brought forward as an additional reason." (na cai sdm

sa mdkhydm dtraba Idd eva kartrmattvam (IO 2151; Änandäsrama ed.: kartrtvam) ucyate, yendkhyd pravacandd ity uttaram ucyate. p urusapara mpa raya iva hi smrtesu kartrsu

samdk hydbhy uceayahetut ven ajñaya te.)

(14)

Compared with this main reason, the title of a kalpasutra named after a person is nothing more than an additional reason (abhyuccayahetu) for the kalpasütra having been composed by the person. 56

The "firmness of the memory of the author," however, cannot be the sufficient reason for making kalpasutra^ ancillary to the revealed Veda because, Kumärila admits, there are actually some schools that recog¬

nize a particular kalpasutra as an authority equal to the Veda.

57

Within these schools, such a kalpasutra is handed down as a text the valid¬

ity of which does not need to assume (anumdna) a corresponding Vedic text.

58

Nevertheless, Kumärila assigns foremost priority to the Veda. If there is a coincidence (samvdda) between a kalpasutra and a brdhmana text of the Veda, he categorically says, the former must be a reiteration (anuvdda) of the latter because the latter exclusively consists of injunctions (aikdntikavidhitva)

59

; and thus the kalpasutra cannot have independent authority (na svatantrapramdnatd).

60

Then, we should ask: Does Kumärila have any good reason to assert that only the Veda is the authorless scrip¬

ture that has independent authority?

56 Kumärila additionally makes a conjecture that "Katha" is the name of a subdivi¬

sion(carana)of a Vedic school rather than the name of an individual. (M. Witzel [1997, n. 217] points out that Patafijali [on A 6.3.42] mentions Katha as a tribe. See VMBh pt. 3, p. 157,14: "a woman of Katha tribe, a woman of Katha district" [kathajdtïyd kathadesiyd]) The text called "Kdthaka" is thus proved to be perpetual because of the perpetuity of the Vedic branch that preserves the text (TV p. 239,28-29: TV pt. 2, p. 167,13-14, cf. SV,Ved an ity atädh ikarana v. 12). "Masaka" and other names prefixed to kalpasutras, on the other hand, respectively designate a person who has a beginning, namely, a birth (ddimadekadravya) .It istherefore impossible to use these names in the title of revealed texts that have no beginning (anddigrantha) (TV pp. 239,29-240,5: TV pt.2,p. 167,14-16).

57 The opponent points out that Lata (i.e., Lätyäyana), Drähyäyana and Kätyäyana at¬

tach more importance to theÄrseyakalpa of Masaka thanto brahman as (TV p. 231,17-29:

TVpt. 2,pp. 157,26-158,13).Cf. LSS 9.5.22; 10.10.20; Gonda 1977, p. 535, n. 186; Caland 1908,pp.XII-XVII.

58 TV p. 231,17-19: TV pt. 2, p. 158,1-2: ta tp ra tya k s a v ih it am cdrsakalpena tatrd- numdnam na vidyataiti brdhmanavihitddapy drsakalpavihitagarïyastvam añglkrtyoktam . According to MmS 1.3.3, The authority of a smrti text is denied if the smrti text is sup¬

posed to bebasedon an assumed Vedic text whichis, however, proved to be incompatible with an existent Vedic text. Moreover, because kalpasutras haveamore detailed descrip¬

tion of a sacrifice than the Veda,it is impossibleto perform a sacrifice following the Veda alone without the helpof kalpasutras (TVp. 232,13-14: TV pt.2, p. 158,23-24).

59 TV p.241,26-27: TV pt. 2, p. 169,21-22.

60 TV p.241,21-22: TV pt. 2, p. 169,16-17.

(15)

5. The Vedic impression convincing the authorlessness

What really makes Kumärila convinced of the authorlessness of the Veda and

of

its clear distinction from kalpasutras

is

not any kind

of

reasoning, but

a

profound emotion evoked by the recitation of Vedic mantras.

61

He asserts that owing to this excitement one would cease to suspect the human origin of the Veda if one listens only to the beginning of the samhitds of the three Vedas.

62

In the world, poets compose verses connecting words and phrases in accordance with one's own experience of events (drstdrthavyavahdra). 63 What a Vedic mantra does, however, is to illustrate an event inaccessible

for human beings with a brilliantly impressive literary language.

64

Quot¬

ing Rgvedasamhitd 1.1.1 "I glorify Agni as the foremost in rank, as the god who timely performs a sacrifice, as the main priest who brings about the best treasure" (agnim île puróhitam yajñdsya devdm rtvíjam / hótdram ratnadhatamam)j Kumärila repeats to say that no one can observe the state of affairs illustrated by each part of this verse.

65

Turning then to the first three parts of the Yajurveda mantras, "For

a

draft you" (isé tvd), "for strength you" (ürjé

tvd) 66

and "You are winds" (vdydvafsj

stha) y67

Kumärila emphasizes that no one can hit upon these phrases to illustrate the respective

61 K. Harikai (1994, pp. 157-158) refers to the following comments by Kumärila on the beginnings of the samhitds of the three Vedas.

62 TV p. 237,11-15: TV* pt. 2, p. 164,17-21: "For the pseudo-reasons, for example, that the Vedas consist of an aggregate of words and sentences [just like human state¬

ments], there may, at first, arise a fallacy that [the Veda] is something created so long as one does not perceive the own form of the Veda owing to one's heretical position.

No sooner, however, one perceives the own form of a re, a saman and other [mantras]

than this fallacy disappears. If one listens only to the beginnings of the [three] Vedas, nobody who has intelligence would in the least consider that they have human origin."

(vedesu hi tdvad eva padavdkyasamghdtdtmakatvddihetvdbhdsaih krtakatvabhrdntir bhavati. ydvad (IO 2151; Änandäsrama ed.: yd tad) bahiravasthdn ad vedar upam na drsyate / rgsdmddisvarupe tu drste bhrdntir nivartate // ddimdtram api srutvd veddndm pauruseyatd / na sakyddhyavasdtu m hi manag api sacetanaih //)

63 TV p. 237,16-17: TV pt. 2, p. 164,22-23.

64 TV p. 237,18-19: TV pt. 2, p. 164,24-25: "Who could compose the Rgveda with those words that are [organized into] sixty-four lectures,"" endowed with fixed accents and mostly not found in the ordinary language?" (prapa thaka catu hsast iniya tasvaraka ih padaih/ lokesv apy asrutaprdyair rgvedam kah karisyati //).

::"Sixty-four prapdthakas result from the mechanical division of the Rgveda into eight astakas each of which is subdivided into eight adhydyas. Cf. Gon da 1975, p. 9.

65 TV pp. 237,20-238,3: TV pt. 2, p. 165,1-12.

66 According to Somesvara (NSu p. 236,33), Kumärila quotes "ürjeti" (TV p. 228,7:

TV pt. 2, p. 165,16: evam urjety ayam mantra h) instead of "ürja ity" (Somesvara: ürjay

iti) for fear of the excess of syllables in a verse (slokdksardtirekdpattibhïtyd).

67 TS 1.1.1, KS 1.1, KapS 1.1 and VS 1.1 coincide with each other in the form of these three parts whereas MS 1.1has "subhutdya" as the second part. Cf. Keith 1967, p. 1, n. 2;

(16)

scenes of the preparation of the dairy oblation (sdmndyya) in the new moon sacrifice, namely, the cutting of a twig (sdkhdccheda), the rubbing of the twig (sdkhdnumdrjana)

68

and the driving away of calves (vatsdpdkarana) by the twig.

69

Lastly, with regard to the beginning of Sdmavedasamhitd 1.1.1, "Come, Agni, to the feast" (dgna a ydhi

vît

dye), which is quoted from Rgveda 6.16.10, Kumärila rhetorically wonders how any intelligent person (buddhipürvakdrin) could devise the extraordinary method of chanting sdmans by pronouncing a rc verse with excessive transformation of vowels in a manner based neither on common usage nor on grammar (lokavydkaranddisv anavagatapurvam).

70

From these examples of the three Vedas, Kumärila concludes that for anyone who has ever appreciated the actual texts

of

the Veda

it is

totally self-evident (svasamvedyam eva) that the Veda has no human origin

71

and only the autonomous (svatantra) Veda can

create such hymns. 72

Let us return to Kumärila's explanations about the "intention" (vivaksd) signified

in a

Vedic injunction. Elucidating the difference between kalpasutras and the Veda, he displays

a

surprise at the brilliance of Vedic hymns. Judg¬

ing from his exaltation of Vedic hymns, Kumärila seems deliberately to put the three explanations in an order. He thereby gradually leads us from a provisional rejoinder based on figurative expression to the traditional dif-

MSS 1.1.1.15: subhütäyeti samnamayati; VärSS 1.2.1.3: subhütäyeti samnamati. Does the quotation of "ûrjé tvd" suggest that Kumärila does not belong to the Maitrâyanï school?

68 Unlike Kumärila, the relevant brdhmanas of the Yajurveda (cf. Keith 1967, p. 1,n. 1), i.e., Taittiriyabrdhmana 3.2.1.3 (ed. Mahadeva Sastri), KS 30.10: p. 192,14, KapS 45.8, Satapathabrdhmana 1.7.1.2 (ed . Weber), and some srautasütras (SS), i.e., BaudhdyanaSS 1.1 (ed. Calan D,pp. 1,10), ÄpastambaSS 1.1.10 (ed. Garbe) and KdtydyanaSS 4.2.1-2 (ed.

Weber), assign both "ise tvd,yand "ûrje tvd" to the cutting of a twig. U. Rus tag r (1981, p. 65, n. 5),however, enumerates some srautasutras that assign "ürje tvd33to the straighten¬

ing (samnamayati) or the rubbing (anumdrsti) of the twig, namely, BbdradvdjaSS 1.2.10 (ed.

Kashikar), ÄpastambaSS 1.1.11 (an alternative to 1.1.10), HiranyakesiSS 1.2 (Änandäsrama ed.: p. 76) and VaikhdnasaSS 3.3 (ed. Calan d), to which VddhulaSS 2.1.9 (ed. Chaubey) and BaudbdyanaSS 20.1 (Dvaidhasutra, p. 5; cf. Nishimura 2006, p. 100) are to be added.

KdtydyanaSS 4.2.3 mentions aview of uttering "ürje tvd" at the straightening.

69 TV p. 238,5-10: TV pt. 2,p. 165,14-19. With this explanation, Somesvara points out (NSu p. 236,30-31), the Yajurveda brahman a that assigns (viniyojaka) the utterance of a yajus to aparticular action is also said by Kumärila to have no human origin.

70 TV p. 238,13-19: TV pt. 2, pp. 165,22-166,1. Cf. Gonda 1975, p. 316, n. 29.

71 TV p. 238,23-24: TV pt. 2, p. 166,5-6,: "Thus, whenever students, teachers or by¬

standers appreciate the form of Vedic words, Vedic injunctions and their meanings, they

self-evidently feel convinced that [the Veda] has no human origin." (evam cayadd yadd- (IO 2151; Änandäsrama ed.: yadd-)adhyetdro 'd h y dp ay itdrdhpdrsvasthd vd vedapadavdk- yatadartha rüpd ny dlocayanti tadd tadd (IO 2151; Änandäsrama ed.: tadd) svasamvedyam

evdpaurus e yat va m adhyavasyanti.)

72 TV p. 238,4: TV pt. 2, p. 165,13:svatantro veda evaitat kevalo vaktum arhati /

(17)

ferentiation of the expounder from the composer, and finally to his own view that reflects his inner conviction.

73

The Veda constructs an autono¬

mous structure in an aggregate of injunctions by repeatedly comprising the meaning of

a

word. This structure may make one think of the organism of an extraordinary body, which the supreme self (paramdtman) intentionally sets in motion to give ritual instructions far beyond human creativity.

The final explanation reminds

us of

the very first verse

of

the Slokavdrttika:

"Reverence to him who is embodied in the purified knowledge, him whose eyes are the three Vedas, him who

is

the efficient cause for the attainment of bliss and who bears

a

part of the moon."

74

Here Kumärila confesses to his adoration for Siva who wears the crescent moon (somdrdhadhdrin

)75

and il¬

lustrates Siva's three divine eyes

as

being the three Vedas (trivedïdivyacaksus).

This illustration seems to be more than

a

metaphor that would praise Siva's omniscience. Because the attainment of bliss (sreyahprdpti)

is

the aim in per¬

forming Vedic sacrifices,

76Siva

who

is

said to

be

its "efficient cause" (nimitta) must have

a

close connection with the Vedic sacrifices. We may say that here Kumärila praises Siva as a personification of the Veda, because Kumärila characterizes him as having a body (deha) made of "purified knowledge"

(visu

ddhajñdna

) ,77

which we can etymologically construe as the essence

73 Kumärila concludes his introduction with the third explanation and then begins to take up the main theme of the seventh section, namely, the theorem of the singleness of a goblet (grahaikatvanydya) .

74 SV, Pratijñasütra v. 1:visuddhajñdnadehdya trivedïdivya caksuse / sreyahp rap tini- mit täya namah somdrdhadhdrine // Cf. Shastri, Pashupatinath 1980, pp. 151-153. This verse seems to be the genuine opening verse because Umbeka (8c), the earliest commenta¬

tor on the SV,comments on it. In SVK p. 1,21-22, Sucaritamisra points out that Rumania's making of reverence to Siva does not contradict the Mimämsä anti-anthropomorphism (MmS 9.1.6-10) for the reason that Kumärila thereby follows the exegetic rule that the making of reverence to deities by stotras isto be considered asaprimary action (pradhdna) of a soma sacrifice (MmS 2.1.13-29). It should be noted, however, that Kumärila men¬

tions pasupata, the representative group of S aiva renouncers, in a list of the heterodox sects to be reproached due to their perverse secular motivations. See TV p. 194,10-11:

TV pt. 2, p. 112,19-20: sdmkhyayoga-pan card tra -päsupa ta-sdkya -nirgrant ha(IO 2151;

Änandäsrama ed.:gra nth a)-pa rigrh ït adharmddharmanibandhandni.

75 Grammatically, "ardhagrdrna" derived from "ardham grdmasya" denotes the half of the village (samapravibhdge napumsakalingah ) whereas "grdmdrdha" derived from

"grdmasya ardhah" denotes apart of the village (avayavavdcipumlingah ) .Cf. VMBh pt. 1, p. 407,2-4 on A 2.2.2. Thus we may take "somdrdha" as apart of the moon, that is, the crescent moon on Siva's head.

76 Dbar ma, which is described by the Vedic injunction (MmS 1.1.2: codandlaksana), is said to be the cause of the attainment of bliss. Cf. SBh(F) p. 16,6: sa (-dharma) hinih sreya - sena purusam samyunakti; SV, Pratijiiäsutra v. 125 ab: jijñdsyah sa m saydd dharmah

srey askara taydpica /

77 Sucaritamisra holds "jñdnadeha" as a Dvandva compound whereas Pärthasärathi does asa Karmadhäraya. SVK p. 1,14-15: visuddhau jñdnadeha uyasya sa tathoktab; NR

(18)

of the Veda from the verbal root "vid" that means "to know" and all the more if we take into consideration Kumärila's final view that the supreme self (paramdtman) signifies his intention (vivaksd) through each limb of his body called "Veda." 78

Abbreviations and Literature Primary Literature

A Astddhydyï. In: Katre 1987.

BndPu Brahmdndapurdna. Varanasi 2000 [1 st ed.: Bombay 1906-1912].

IO 2151 India Office Library Sanskrit Manuscript 2151, the British Library.

London.

IO 2158 India Office Library Sanskrit Manuscript 2158, the British Li¬

brary. London.

KapS Kapisthalakathasamhitd, ed. Raghu Vira. Delhi 1968.

KS Kdthakam, ed. L. von Schroeder. Wiesbaden 1972[1 st ed.: Leip¬

zig 1900-1910].

LSS Lätyäyanasrautasütra yed. A. Ch. Vedantavagisa. New Delhi 1982[1 st ed.: Calcutta 1872].

MBh Mahdbhdrata, Text as Constituted in its Critical Edition, vol. III.

Poona 1974.

MmS Mïmamsasutra. See SBh.

Mn Manusmrtiy ed. Jagadïsalala Sästri. Delhi 1996 [1 st ed.: 1983].

MS MaitrdyanlSamhitd, ed. L. von Schroeder. Wiesbaden 1970[1st ed.: Leipzig 1881-1886].

p. 3,11: visuddham mïmdmsayd samsodhitam jñdnam eva deho yasya. Pärthasärathi's interpretation seems to be better because what is coupled with body is soul, rather than knowledge.

78In a part (vv.3198-3210)of the Brhattikd fragments quoted by Säntaraksita in TSg vv. 3127-3245, Kumärila accepts the omniscience of Brahma, Visnu and Siva(v. 3198:

brahmddi; v. 3208:devotta m atray a; v. 3209: brahmdditraya). He states that they are praised as omniscient in itihäsapuranas (TSgv. 3198)and they can be omniscient because they are embodied intheVeda (vedadeba) that consists of omniscience (sa rvajñ an am aya) in TSg v.3207:athdpi vedadehatvdd brahmav is numab esvara h / sarvajñ anam aya dveddt sarvajñd mdnusasya kim // See Kawasaki 1992,p. 310. Gunaratna, who wrote a com¬

mentary on Haribhadra's Saddarsanasamuccaya , quotes the same verse in another ver¬

sion: athdpi divyadehatvdd brahmavisnumah esvara h / kdmam bhavantu sarvajñdh sdrvajñyam mdnusasya kim // (TRD p. 433,11-12). Among the three gods, Kumärila es¬

pecially refers to Saiikara,i.e., Siva, whois described aspossessing ten imperishable quali¬

ties (dasdvyaya) suchas jñdna, vairdgya and aisvarya (TSg v. 3205). For apossible source of the dasdvyaya of Saiikara, see VPu 1.10.60 (correct "at ha ydni" to "avyaydni") men¬

tioned by Sh. Kawasaki (1992, p. 51) as quoted by Väcaspati together with VPu 1.12.31in TVS p. 348 on Yogasütra1.25, andseealso BndPu 3.4.2.218.