Steadfast Jazz 2013: NATO on Course to Strike a Better Balance . . . . .

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No. 63 (516), 11 June 2013 © PISM

Editors: Marcin Zaborowski (Editor-in-Chief)

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Roderick Parkes

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Steadfast Jazz 2013:

NATO on Course to Strike a Better Balance

Wojciech Lorenz

NATO’s Steadfast Jazz 2013 manoeuvres are expected to confirm the Alliance’s ability to defend the territories of the new member states. Although the exercises will enhance the credibility of Article 5 guarantees, the limited presence of western allies does not allow for taking advantage of the full potential of the training. Poland should thus take leadership in promoting the joint exercises as the main vehicle for the transformation of the Alliance, which could enhance Polish influence within NATO.

NATO’s Steadfast Jazz 2013 exercises, which will take place at the beginning of November, send a clear signal that the Alliance is trying to strike the right balance between the expeditionary capabilities it has developed for more than a decade and the somewhat neglected credibility of collective defence. For the first time, the Alliance will embark on live exercises to train the NATO Response Force (NRF) on the territories of Poland and the Baltic States. The new, challenging formula of the manoeuvres will also serve as a practical example of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), which is supposed to become the main vehicle for the Alliances’ transformation and interoperability after the end of the mission in Afghanistan in 2014.

NATO Response Force—Quick Response to Threats and Interoperability. The main purpose of the exercises is to certify the command-and-control elements of the NATO Response Force before it begins a 12-month rotation in 2014. In case of a crisis, the North Atlantic Council will be able to deploy on short notice a 13,000-strong force and support it with an additional 15,000 troops. Although the main goal of NRF is to conduct both Article 5 (collective defence) missions and perform out-of-area operations, the training of forces has been based on crisis management scenarios (humanitarian, anti-insurgency and anti-piracy missions) set in the fictitious Cerasia region, geographically placed in east Africa. The NATO Response Force has not tested the full potential of its other major role, which is to maintain the ability of different militaries to operate together. Since countries usually train their troops separately, their ability to cooperate was tested during computer-assisted exercises with simulated tactical units.

The Steadfast Jazz 2013 manoeuvres, though, will provide a totally different look. According to the new scenario, the NRF exercises will take place in the fictitious region of Skolkan, which has been located geographically in Sweden and Finland. For the first time since 2006, NATO will exercise all command-and-control levels (strategic, operational, tactical) together with all four components of NFR: land, maritime, air and special forces. The manoeuvres were also combined with the Baltic Host exercises, which will test the ability of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to accommodate the forces of the Alliance in the event of a threat to their territory.

The level of participation is expected to reach around 5,000 troops on the ground, 15 naval vessels and 40 aircraft from 17 nations. Poland, which will host the main part of the land exercises, will provide the biggest force of up to 3,000 soldiers, 10 vessels, and 30 aircraft. France, which will command the land component of NRF in 2014 will contribute around 1,000 troops. The UK will send two naval vessels and the U.S. probably will dispatch a company of up to 200 soldiers. Significant support for the exercises will be provided by the Baltic States and Polish partners from the Visegrad Group—Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. The Czechs are sending six planes to the manoeuvres.

NATO has already agreed that another “high visibility” exercise will be staged in 2015. It will also adopt a new plan for exercises for 2015–2020. The Alliance is attempting to encourage countries to participate in the expensive exercises

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by expanding their financing from the common budget as well as by embracing logistics through the Smart Defence initiative.

From Expeditionary Missions to Territorial Defence. Due to the NATO missions in the Balkans and later in Afghanistan, the Alliance has for more than a decade been clearly focused on developing its expeditionary capabilities.

Only after the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and the Russian-Belarusian Zapad 2009 and Ladoga 2009 exercises, which simulated attacks on the Baltic States and Poland, were the new member states able to persuade NATO to enhance the credibility of the collective defence guarantees. Consequently, the Alliance updated its contingency plans for defence of those countries. Nevertheless, they still argued that the plans and political declarations should be supported by visible assurances, i.e., exercises and a bigger presence of NATO on the territory of the new members. One of the arguments claimed that it would help convince member states to invest in out-of- area operations once they felt safe at home.

The first step towards a better balance between collective defence guarantees and the commitment to out-of-area crisis management operations was the adoption of the new Strategic Concept in 2010, which defined three major tasks for NATO: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. At the same time, in response to cuts in defence budgets, NATO launched the Smart Defence initiative, which promotes common investments in capabilities critical to the Alliance. NATO also had to find ways to balance the U.S. strategic shift from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, the necessity for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security, and the end of the mission in Afghanistan, which led to an unprecedented level of interoperability among the allies. To meet those challenges, NATO launched CFI. The NRF has become the flagship of the initiative and should be used for increasing the interoperability of allied forces and balancing the decreasing presence of U.S. troops in Europe. The American administration has already declared that a U.S.-based brigade would be permanently designated for NRF operations and elements of the brigade would be sent for training to Europe on a regular basis. However, the U.S. and NATO still maintain more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, which may limit the determination for using the full potential of CFI and NRF.

Conclusions and Recommendations. Steadfast Jazz 2013 will confirm the ability of NATO to send reinforcement to the new member states. The new location of the manoeuvres and its complexity will enable NATO to train its forces using a wider set of scenarios, including territorial defence. Although the NRF entry force of 13,000 troops would not suffice to defend any given country against a large-scale attack, their deployment could prepare the ground for a bigger deployment, and as such send a clear signal that NATO is prepared for further escalation.

Nevertheless, the enhanced credibility from the collective defence exercise is minimised by the limited commitment of western allies’ troops to the manoeuvres. The biggest share of the participating forces (around 70%) will be provided by Poland, its partners from the Visegrad Group, and the Baltic States. It is likely that a number of western allies are not prepared to send more significant forces because of significant deployments in Afghanistan and the cuts in defence expenditures that have hit the budgets for training, though some have not for fear of antagonising Russia.

To maintain the proper balance between collective defence credibility and the commitment to expeditionary operations, the allies with the U.S. at the forefront will have to contribute more robust forces for joint NRF training in the future. This will also be crucial for the credibility of NRF and CFI, which are set to become the major mechanisms of NATO’s transformation after the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan.

While planning for exercises for 2015–2020, NATO should guarantee adequate proportions of live NRF exercises, computer-assisted exercises, and national manoeuvres. The proper mix could be a cost effective way of maintaining the readiness of NATO in line with CFI. However the NRF live exercises will have an additional element of enhancing NATO credibility, and as such should be organised every year.

NATO should also make a bigger effort at promoting common exercises with Russia, which increases the ability to conduct common crisis-response operations and are important as a means of confidence-building. Both NATO and Russia should also attempt to lower the tensions over the Steadfast Jazz 2013 and Zapad 2013 exercises by following the rules on transparency and exchanging observers. Even if both exercises do not exceed the limits set in the Vienna Document, the presence of observers could help dispel uncertainties regarding the scenarios.

Poland, as host of the main part of Steadfast Jazz 2013, should use the full potential of the exercises to test elements of the national administration responsible for crisis management. The exercises should also be an opportunity for strengthening cooperation with the Baltic States and Poland’s partners in the Visegrad Group, especially in logistics.

The lessons learned from the exercises should also help Poland take a leading role as a promoter of CFI. Poland, with its vast training fields, Joint Forces Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, and military modernisation programmes, which can help set up a network of simulators integrated with NATO, has the capacity to steer the NATO transformation process.Thus, Poland couldmore effectively shape its security through joint exercises and better secure its interests within the Alliance.