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The Possibilities of the Journalism as Peacebuilding in the Periphery:

The Colombian Case

Dissertation

Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der Naturwissenschaften (Dr. rer.nat)

An der

Universität Konstanz

Mathematisch – Naturwissenschaftliche Sektion Fachbereich Psychologie

Vorgelegt von

Jairo Enrique Ordóñez Garzón

Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 23. Juli 2009

1. Referent: Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Kempf, Universität Konstanz 2. Referent: Prof. Dr. Sean McCrea, Universität Konstanz 3. Referent: Prof. Dr. Georg Lind, Universität Konstanz

Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-83447

URL: http://kops.ub.uni-konstanz.de/volltexte/2009/8344/

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Gedruckt mit Unterstützung des Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienstes.

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Tv~ÇÉãÄxwzxÅxÇàá

I would like to acknowledge the people who contributed to my dissertation.

First of all, I would like to thank Dr. Prof. Wilhelm Kempf for supervising my dissertation and prov iding an outstanding model of how to perform excellent research. Thank you for the great opportunity to work in your research team and for your invaluable advice and help during all stages of my dissertation. It was a stunning experience.

The realization of this research would have been impossible with out the scholarship and help of Colfuturo and the DAAD (Deut scher Akedemischer Austausch Dienst), thanks for believing on my ideas and giving me the resources to fulfil my dream.

I am also very grateful to profe ssors Sean McCrea and Georg Lind for his involvement as part of my dissertation com mittee. In the same way, I appreciate the continous advice, feedback and constructive cr itic of the Peace Research Group at Universität Konstanz.

Finally I want to thank to my family and friends for their support and understanding.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT...9

ZUSSAMMENFASSUNG...12

INTRODUCTION ...15

CHAPTER 1 THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT...21

1.1 Generalities about the Colombian Conflict... 31

1.2 The Intervention of U.S.A. ... 35

1.3 The Conflict Today ... 43

1.4 Conclusions ... 61

CHAPTER 2 THE JOURNALISM AND ITS POTENTIAL FOR PEACEBUILDING ...63

2.1 Genres of Journalism... 65

2.1.1 News ... 65

2.1.2 The Feature ... 66

2.1.3 The Reportage ... 67

2.1.4 The Comments... 68

2.1.4.1 Comment ... 68

2.1.4.2 The editorial ... 68

2.1.4.3 Opinion Articles... 69

2.1.4.4 Gloss... 70

2.1.4.5 Cartoons ... 70

2.2 Theories of Journalism... 71

2.2.1 Normative Individualism... 72

2.2.2 Materialistic Media Theory ... 77

2.2.2.1 Marxist theories of Media Studies ... 79

2.2.3 Analytic Empiricism ... 80

2.2.3.1 Analytic Philosophy... 81

2.2.3.2 Language Games and the Popular Scientific Journalism... 84

2.2.3.3 Richard Rorty: Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature... 85

2.2.4 Legitimate Empiricism ... 87

2.2.4.1 Further Explorations ... 89

2.2.5 Critical Action Theory ... 90

2.2.5.1 Social Inquiry as Practical Knowledge... 94

2.2.6 Systemic Functional Theory ... 96

2.2.7 Integrated Social Theories ... 99

2.2.8 Cultural Studies... 100

2.2.9 Journalism as Occupation ... 104

2.3 Journalism of Attachment and Peace Journalism... 107

2.3.1 Journalism of Attachment ... 107

2.3.2 Peace Journalism... 111

2.3.3 Interactions between the two approaches... 114

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2.4 Conclusions ... 115

CHAPTER 3 THE COLOMBIAN MEDIA ... 118

3.1 Introduction... 118

3.2 The State’s Rural Counterinsurgency Propaganda ... 120

3.2.1 Hearts and Minds... 120

3.3 Self-censorship... 124

3.4 International Press in Colombia ... 127

3.5 Colombian Journalists in international Press... 130

3.6 Evolution of the Colombian Newspapers ... 135

3.7 Colombian Outlets... 135

3.7.1 Invernac... 136

3.7.1.1 Valórem S.A... 137

3.7.1.1.1 Canal Caracol ... 138

3.7.1.1.2. Internationalization of Caracol Channel... 140

3.7.1.2 Comunican S.A... 141

3.7.1.2.1 Cromos... 142

3.7.1.2.2 El Espectador... 147

3.7.1.2.2.1 Fighting for the Press Freedom ... 151

3.7.1.2.2.2 Drug Trafficking... 152

3.7.1.2.2.3 The pressure of the Paramilitaries and the Government... 154

3.8 Planeta Group... 156

3.8.1 Casa Editorial El Tiempo ... 157

3.8.1.1 El Tiempo... 159

3.9 Conclusions ... 161

CHAPTER 4 THE COLOMBIAN ATTACHMENT ...163

4.1 Cromos ... 163

4.2 El Tiempo ... 173

4.3 El Espectador... 184

4.4 The Authors...195

4.4.1 María Jimena Duzán... 195

4.4.2 Iván Cepeda Castro... 196

4.4.3 Alfredo Molano... 197

4.4.4 Alberto Aguirre... 199

4.4.5 William Ospina... 199

4.5 Conclusions ... 200

CHAPTER V THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA...202

5.1 Media from U.S.A... 203

5.1.1 The New York Times Company... 203

5.1.1.1 History... 206

5.1.2 The International Herald Tribune... 211

5.1.2.1 History... 213

5.1.3 The Boston Globe... 215

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5.1.3.1 History... 216

5.1.4 The Washington Post Company ... 217

5.1.4.1 The Washington Post ... 219

5.1.4.2 History... 221

5.2 The Economist Group... 224

5.2.1 The Economist... 227

5.2.2 History ... 233

5.2.3 Censorship... 236

5.3 BBC Broadcasting... 237

5.3.1 History ... 244

5.3.2 Competition... 246

5.3.3 Controversies ... 247

5.3.4 BBC NEWS... 250

5.4 Conclusions ... 253

CHAPTER VI IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL AND INTE RNATIONAL INDE PENDENT OPINION ARTICLES ON THE READERS...254

6.1 Experiment ... 255

6.1.1 Methodology ... 256

6.2 Results... 258

6.2.1 Variables... 261

6.2.1.1 Politics... 263

6.2.1.2 Civilian Victims... 265

6.2.1.3 Armed Actors ... 267

6.2.1.4 Peace... 268

6.2.1.5 Conclusions about variables... 269

6.3 Analysis by level of understanding in the answers... 270

6.3.1 Higher level of understanding with Colombian articles... 271

6.3.2 Higher level of understanding with international articles... 277

6.3.3 Same level of understanding between the groups ... 282

6.3.3.1 Group number one has the same level of understanding as group three ... 282

6.3.3.2 Group number two has the same level of understanding as group three ... 286

6.3.3.3 Groups number one and two have the same level of understanding... 288

6.3.3.4 The level of understanding is the same in all the groups ... 289

6.4 Coherence ... 290

6.5 Dispersion ... 292

6.6 Undecided ... 293

6.7 Conclusions about the impact of the articles on the readers ... 296

CHAPTER VII QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLES ...299

7.1 Methodology ... 300

7.1.1 Selection of articles... 300

7.1.2 Definition of the variables ... 301

7.1.3 Measurement ... 301

7.2 Analysis of the Variables and the Categories ... 305

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7.2.1 Politics... 306

7.2.2 Killing... 309

7.2.3 Civilian Victims... 311

7.2.4 Armed Actors... 314

7.2.5 Peace ... 317

7.2.6 Conclusions about Catgories and Variables... 318

7.2.6.1 Conclusions about Politics... 318

7.2.6.2 Conclusions about Killing... 319

7.2.6.3 Conclusions about Civilian Victims... 320

7.2.6.4 Conclusions about Armed Actors ... 321

7.2.6.5 Conclusions about Peace... 322

7.3 Correlations ... 322

7.3.1 Correlations in the Colombian Articles... 323

7.3.2 Correlations in the International Articles... 328

7.4 Conclusions about the Quantitative Analysis of all the Articles... 330

7.5 Quantitative Analysis of the Articles used in the Experiment... 333

7.5.1 Methodology ... 333

7.5.2 Analysis of the Comparisons... 335

7.5.3 Co-ocurrence ... 342

7.5.3.1 Co-ocurrence Colombian Articles... 342

7.5.3.2 Co-Ocurrence International Articles ... 344

7.5.4 Conclusions about the quantitative analysis of the articles used in the experiment... 345

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS...347

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...353

ANNEXES ...378

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TuáàÜtvà

This dissertation analyzes the way the Colombian conflict is repres ented in Colombian and international qualitative indepen dent opinion articles and their influence on readers’ understanding of the conflict.

The Colombian gover nment has carried on an extens ive propaganda campaign to promote disinformation in order to disgui se the aims of weakening the political opposition and politically and economically ‘legalizing’ a wide range of Mafia activities in Colomb ia. This sh ows the influence t hat the pa ramilitary mafia e xercises in important areas of Colombian political and economic life. It is inherent in the high level of corruption caused by the ‘Narcot raffic’. However, the US War on Drugs demands at least some results, which until now have been minimal with respect to the Narcotraffic, although very successful against the guerrillas, who are to some extent competitors of the par amilitaries in the drug traffi c. Due to the War on Drugs, some drug lords hav e received jail sentences, although under very mild and lax conditions. This seems to be more a lega lization than a punis hment, at leas t in the case of the paramilitaries. After a short pr ison term, the drug dealer is “clean” again and is free to resume his illegal business. All th is explains the disinf ormation promoted by the official propaganda and the lack of k nowledge about the war on the part of the average Colombian.

Given this situation, it is essential for t he public to be able to rely on independent media that can expose the lies of official propaganda and inform the public about the risks of accepting the illegal as the law, the so-called Pax Mafiosa.1 The media must also show the importance of opting for dem ocratic ways to solve the conflict (in the current climate of polarization, the opposition and independent candidates are designated as “enemies” and “guerrille ros” by the official propaganda).

Understanding what is happening in Colombia can help people take a stand against violence and criminality as solutions. The cu rrent military strategy and the infiltration of the paramilitary mafia into the government represent both violence and criminality.

1 When an illegal party won the war and imposed its order.

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In Colombia there are independe nt journalists, but according to this research, they are victims of polarization and for this reas on are promoting the war, although this is not their intention. Nevertheless, with the help of the intern ational qualitative media it would be possible to reorient Colombian j ournalism towards a journalism pro peace.

For the present research, I chose thr ee Colombian media for which independent journalists write: El Tie mpo, El Espectador and Cromos, and from the internationa l media I chose: BBC News (online version), The New York Tim es Group , The Washington Post and The E conomist. In all cases, I selected what I regard as opinion articles, because unlike news arti cles, opinion articles offer analyses and are very free to be critical.

In all, 66 subjects participated in an ex perimental study designed to measure the impact of the articles on readers. Of th em, 94% were German citizens, and on average they were 24 years old. All th e subjects had little knowledge of the Colombian conflict. Three groups were set up. The first had to read 22 Colombian opinion articles, the second 22 internati onal articles , and the third both sets of articles. After reading the articles, al l the subjects completed the same questionnaires.

According to the results of the experim ent, obtained with quantit ative and qualitative analysis, the Colombian articles belong to the ‘journalism of attachment’, and the international articles to ‘journalism pro peace’. We found that when subj ects read both kinds of article, the international articles with their analytical style have a greater influence than the Colombian articles, wh ich emphas ize emotional attachment with victims. Similarly, the inter national articles allow a hig her level of understanding and coherence.

However, the international articles alone do not fully explain the conflict, because they lack the rich details that the Colombian articles offer. For this reason, a first step toward countering the official propaganda would be to combine the two types of journalism to provide Colomb ians readers with pro-peace, detailed and enlightening information. With more qualitativ e informati on, Colombian reade rs will be able t o understand, in a pro-peace style, the conflict and its causes, and to avoid polarization and one-sided attributions of guilt. Additionally, they will be better prepared to look for

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democratic solutions, such as electing ma yors, legislators and a president who are more interested in a peacefu l r esolution o f the conflict than in the current military approach.

The effort to counter propaganda is only one step on the long and very complex pat h to peace, but because no one wants Colombia to completely fail as a state, informing and enlightening Colombian c itizens about the conflict must be a priority. The research suggests that the Colombian jour nalism of attachment should be r eoriented in a more productiv e way. The results of this exp eriment are encouraging, and perhaps if they were transformed into praxis , they would provide an opportunity for a country that desperately needs peace.

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mâáátÅÅxÇytááâÇz

Das Ziel der vorliegenden Diss ertation wa r eine Analyse der Darstellungen des Kolumbienkonfliktes in unabhängigen kolumbianischen und internationalen Leitartikeln angesehener Medien, sowie des Einflusses der Darstellungen auf das Konfliktverständnis der Leser.

Die kolum bianische Regierung bedient sich umfangreicher Propaganda um die Desinformation der Bevölkerung zu fördern und das folgende Projekt zu verschleiern:

die Schwächung der politischen Oppositi on und die politische und wirtschaftliche Legalisierung mafiöser Aktivitäten. Diese r Zweck ihrer Propaganda verdeutlicht die Macht der Mafia (insb esondere durch Drog enhandel) in Ko lumbien. Sie ko ntrolliert wichtige Teile des politischen und wirtschaftlichen Lebens.

Allerdings ist die USA in Kolumbien präsent und in ihrem Kampf gegen Drogen darauf angewiesen mit der Regierung zusa mmenzuarbeiten. Zwei wichtige Gruppen des Droge nhandels in Kolumbien sind Guerill a und Paramilitä rs. Die Pa ramilitärs führen ihre Geschäfte versteckt und unter dem Deckmantel der Regierung aus. Die Konsequenz daraus ist, dass d er Drogen handel b islang n ur de r Guerilla erschwert wurde und bis heute keine wirkliche Reduzierung des Drogenhandels erreicht wurde.

Als Folge des Kampfes gegen Drogen wu rden einige Drogenbar one inhaftiert, aber die Haftbedingungen hängen da von ab, ob di ese Beziehungen zur Guerilla oder zu den Paramilitärs besitzen. Die Haftbedingungen der Drogenbarone, scheinen im Fall der Paramilitärs mehr eine Lega lisierung als eine Strafe zu sein. Nach einer kurzen Verurteilung sind die Drogenbar one wieder anständige und freie Staatsbürger und können mit ihren illegalen Geschäften weitermachen.

All dies wird durch die gezielte Desinf ormation der offiziellen Tegierungspropaganda bewirkt, die vom kolumbianischen Durchschnittsbürger nicht durchschaut wird.

Es ist darum unerläss lich, sich auf unabhängi ge Medien zu stützen, um erstens die Lügen der offiziellen Propaganda aufzudecken, um zweitens die öffentliche Meinung darauf aufmerksam zu machen, wie illegale Ansichten als geltendes Recht verkauft

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werden (die sog. Pax Mafios a2); und um drittens demokratische Wege der Konfliktlösung einzus chlagen (in dem aktuellen polarisierten Klima werden Opposition und unabhängige Politiker als „Feinde“ und „Guerrilleros“ bezeichnet).

Wenn ver standen wird, was in Kolumbien passiert, kann Gewalt als derzeitige militärische Strategie abgelehnt und die Infiltration der par amilitärischen Mafia in d ie Regierung aufgedeckt werden.

In Kolumbien gibt es unabhängige Journalis ten, aber nach den Prämissen dieser Forschungsarbeit müssen sie als Opfer der Polarisierung bezeichnet werden, weil sie ohne bewusste Absicht den Kr ieg unterstütz en. Dennoch ist es eine Hy pothese dieser Arbeit, dass es mit der H ilfe internationaler renommierter Medien möglich ist, diesen unabhängigen Journalismus in Kolumbien zu eine m Journalismus Pro- Frieden zu verändern.

Für die v orliegende Untersuchung habe ich drei kolumbianische Medien mit unabhängigen Journalisten aus gewählt: El Tiempo, El Espectador und Cromos. Aus der internationalen Pr esse ha be ich v ier Medien ausgewählt: BBC Ne ws (Online version), The New York Tim es Group, The Washington Post und The Economist. In allen Fällen wurden Artikel ausgewählt, die als Leitartikel bezeichnet werden können, weil sie Analysen machen und in freier Form geschrieben sind.

Der Versuchspersonenpool set zte sich aus 66 Personen zus ammen. 94% hatten deutsche Nationalität und waren durch schnittlich 24 Jahre alt. Alle

Versuchspersonen hatten nur geringe Kenntnisse des Konflikts in Kolumbien. Je 22 Personen mussten entweder 22 kolumbianische oder 22 internationale oder beide (also insgesamt 44) Leitartikel lesen und nach der Lektüre der Artikel denselben Fragebogen beantworten.

Die Ergebnisse der qualitativ en und q uantitativen Analysen des vorliegenden Experiments zeigen, dass kolumbianische Artikel eher einem „Journalis mus of Attachment“ und int ernationale Artikel eher einem „Journalis mus Pro-Frieden“

zugeordnet werden können.

2Wenn Kriminelle das Land regieren und ihre Vorstellungen von Frieden der Bevölkerung auferlegen.

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Während des Experiments wurden Daten zu r Messung des Konfliktverständniss es der Leser erhoben. Diese zeig en, dass der analytische Stil der internationalen Texte einen größ eren Einfluss auf das Verständnis des Konflikts hat, als der häufiger verwendete emotionale Stil der kolumbiani schen Autoren, die vor allem das Leiden der Opfer betonen.

Weil s ie weniger Det ails als die kolumbianischen Ar tikel verwenden, sind jedoch auch die internationalen Text e allein nicht ausreichend, um den Konflikt verständlich zu machen,. Ein wichtiges Ergebnis dies er Arbeit ist es deshalb, eine Kombination der beiden Arten des Journalis mus zu verwenden, um der offiziellen Propagand a entgegenzutreten. Dem kolum bianischen Leser k ann auf diese Weise ein Journalismus pro Frieden, detaillierte Information und Aufklärung angeboten werden.

Mit mehr qualitativen Info rmationen in einem „Pro Frieden“ Journalismus könnten Kolumbianische Leser Polarisierung und Vorverurteilung vermeiden, den Konflikt und seine Ursachen verstehen und s ich damit für demokratische Lösungen entscheiden.

Ein Beispiel wäre die Wahl von Bü rgermeistern, Kongress abgeordneten und Präsidenten, die die friedliche Lösung des Konflikts dem derzeitigen militärischen Vorgehen vorziehen würden.

Der Aufwand gegen den Einfluss der Propaganda ist nur ein Schritt für den Frieden, aber notwendig für Kolumbien als vertrauenswürdiger Staat. Diese Untersuchung hat gezeigt, wie der kolumbianisc he Journalis mus of Attachment verändert werden muss, um seiner Funktion als Informati on und Aufklärung der Bürger über den Konflikt gerecht zu werden.

Die Ergebnisse des Experiment s waren er mutigend, für die Praxis wird hier eine Chance für ein Land aufgezeigt, dass dringend Frieden braucht.

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\ÇàÜÉwâvà|ÉÇ

The main goal of my dissertat ion is to analy ze the representations of the Colombian conflict in Colombian and international opin ion articles and to study their impact on readers’ understanding of the c onflict. In the Twentieth C entury, three civil wars wrought havoc in Colombia, and yet wa r seems a distant phenomenon for the majority of Colombians. The lar gest and most important cities have bee n growing and have experienced construction booms in t he last few years, especially private developments including luxu ry apartments, houses and shopping malls offering prestige brands. Many of their residents shop at Calvin Klein, Versace or Hugo Bos s boutiques and enjoy coffee or cocktails in elegant and exclusive bars and

restaurants. At the same time, however, t housands of people have die d in t he wars, millions are displaced (Colombia has one of the worst indices of displac ement in the world, surpassed only by Sudan) , and hundr eds of people languish in the hands of kidnappers. In fact, Colombia is one of the 10 least peaceful countries in the world, 3 close in the rankings to Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, among others. How can two such different countries coexist?

Bogotá City – The Capital of Colombia

Even more surprising is that av erage Co lombians do not kn ow much a bout the Colombian conflict. For them, Colombia has problems just like any other country, and the situation is nothing special or remarkab le. In the same way, they cannot explain why the g uerrillas ar e fighting or what t he relations are betwe en the par amilitaries and the government. Furthermore – although Colombia is one of the three most important recipients of Amer ican economic aid – they also cannot explain what exactly this US aid consists in.

3The Economist Intelligent Unit (2008): Global Peace Index. London: The Economist.

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However, this lack of awarenes s and the apparent economic boom are part of the same conflict that has displa ced millions of people in the last 20 years. On the one side, the government is conduc ting a massive propa ganda campaign to promote disinformation and to keep people from learni ng about its paramilitary aims. It wants a country free of guerrillas with a weakened opposition so t hat the paramilitary mafia can more freely exer cise s ignificant polit ical and ec onomic in fluence to partially legalize its criminal ac tivity in a c ountry already highly corrupted by the Nar cotraffic.

Corruption has distorted the actions of th e guerrillas and of a s ignificant s hare of Colombia’s politicians and businesspeople. However, the US War on Drugs demands some results, which until now have been mini mal with respect to the Narcotraffic, but very successful against the guerrillas, wh o are to some extent th e competitors of the paramilitaries in the drug tra ffic. Another conseque nce of the war on dru gs is the imprisonment of a few drug dealers, alt hough under very favorable and lenient conditions. For this reason, we can regard these jail terms as a form of legalization:

After a short jail sentence, the dr ug dealer becomes “clean” ag ain and resumes his illegal bus iness activities. All this explains the dis information promoted by official propaganda and the average Colombian’s lack of knowledge about it.

On the other hand, the appa rent economic boom in Co lombia repres ents the infiltration of the illegal economy into the legal. Many enterprises and investments are simply fronts for money-laundering activities ; others are set up using illegal money, although their activities are actually legal and may even be profitable. Many investors belong to the drug cartels, an effective strategy for small cartels, in contrast to the big and highly visible car tels of the 80s (Pabl o Escobar’s cartel, for example) . These small cartels represent a new emergent social class in Colombia, whose investments create apparent prosperity in some sectors, while for the majority of Colombians the economic situation is very harsh. Many of the three million pe ople displaced by the conflict are refugees, and millions have bec ome economic migrants living in Europe and North America. Others suffer from unemploym ent, and many others cannot compete with the enterprises founded by t he drug traffickers. The government spends most of its budget on t he military. Key sectors like logistics and s cientific research receive little attention, which makes Co lombia’s ind ustries and economy uncompetitive und unattractive for foreign investments. However, the partial defeat of the guerrillas and the impos ition of the paramilitar y regime are producin g a Pax

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Mafiosa (when an illegal party won the war and imposed its order), which offers better general indic ators (fewer violent deaths, for example) and attracts some legal national and foreign investment.

It is essential to hav e independent media t hat can expose the lies of t he official propaganda, alert citizens to the risks of accepting the illegal system (the Pax Mafiosa) and enlighten them about the importance of dem ocratic means for solving the conflict. (In the current climate of polarization, the official propaganda denounces the opposit ion and in dependent candidate s as “enemies” and “guerrillero s”). With better information, the media audienc e w ould be in a better position to choose politicians who are interested in peace and in peaceful conflict resolution.

Understanding what is happenin g in Colombia would enable citiz ens to reject illega l practices a nd the use of force as a solu tion (the current military strategy and the infiltration of the paramilitary mafia into the government).

In Colombia, there are independ ent journalists, but according to my hypothesis, they are victims of the polar ization and, therefore, they promote war, al though this is not their intention. However, with the help of international qualitative media that fortunately cover the s ituation in Colombia, it is poss ible to redirect this independen t journalism toward journalism pro peace. Fo r the present research, I chose three Colombian media for which in dependent journalists write: El Tiempo, El Espectador and Cromos, and from the internat ional media I chos e: BBC News (online version), The New York Times group, The Washington Post and The Economist. From these media, I selected what I could regard as opinion articles (unlike news articles, opinion articles offer analyses and are critical). Us ing these sources, I tested the following hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:

H1. The w riters of opinion articles in the international media use their independence, resources and privileged positions to do journalism pro peace.

Sub-H. 1.1. The internati onal articles focus on the c auses of the conflict more than do the Colombian articles.

Sub-H. 1.2. The international articles do not identify actors as “bad” or “good.”

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Sub-H. 1.3. The international articl es focus more than do the Colombian articles on the largest and most complex civilian actors in the conflict.

Sub-H. 1.4. The international articles devot e less space to elit e victims (and make an implicit distinction between worthy and unworthy victims).

H2. In Colombia, the independent and critical media publish qualitative opinion articles, but they h ave chosen the jo urnalism of attachment as a w ay to contribute to peace.

Sub-H 2.1. The Colombian artic les do not focus on key and v ery complex actors like the USA.

Sub-H 2.2. The Colombian articles identify actors as “bad” or “good.”

Sub-H. 2.3. The Colombian articles focus more than do the international articles on small groups, easy to identify as civilian actors in the conflict.

Sub-H. 2. 4. The Colombian articles do not focus on com plex and key situations t o help readers under stand the conflict, even wh en t hey inv olve extreme violations of human rights.

H3. Read ers of journalism pro peace can better understand the conflict tha n can the readers of the journalism of attachment.

Sub-H 3.1. With journalism pro peace, readers can more clearly identify the causes of the conflict.

Sub-H. 3.2. With journalism pro peac e, readers can gain a more coherent understanding of the conflict.

Sub-H. 3.3. With jour nalism pro peace, readers ca n better understand the actors and their roles in the conflict.

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Sub-H. 3.4. With journalism pro peac e, readers can understand more about complex phenomena like “parapolitics.”

H4. Journalism pro peace represents an opportunity t o re-contextualize independent Colombian journalism and to produce better understanding.

Sub-H. 4.1. When readers read both versions, they can more clearly identif y the causes of the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.2. When readers read both versions, they can gain a more coherent understanding of the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.3. When readers read both versions, they can under stand more about the actors and their roles in the conflict.

Sub-H. 4.4. When readers read both versions, they can better understand complex phenomena like “parapolitics”.

In order to contextualize these hypotheses, and to present the results of the study, this dissertation is divided into seven chapters: The purpose of the first, The Colombian Conflict, is to explain th e war in Colombia. The second chapter, Journalism and Its Potential for Peace Buildi ng, defines a theoret ical framework for the research as a whole. The third chapt er, The Colomb ian Media, explains how official propaganda and media outlets function in Colombia. The fourth chapter, The Colombian Attachment, presents a qualitative analysis of t he Colombian articles and their emotional attachment to the vict ims of the war. The fifth chapter, The

International Media, explai ns what makes these med ia independent and pro-peace.

The sixth chapter, The Impact on Readers of National and International Independent Opinion Articles, is a quantitativ e analys is of the experiment done to measure the impact of the articles on r eaders’ understanding of the conflict when they read only the Colombian, only t he international, or bo th kinds of article. The seventh chapter, International and Colombian Journalism a nd its Relationship with Journalism Pro Peace, finally, presents a content analysis of the 311 articles selected for the period from 01 January 2005 until 31 De cember 2007, a time peri od during which important

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changes occurred in the conflict. At the end of the study, in the conclusions, I discuss whether and to what extent the hypothe ses received theoretical and empirical support.

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Map 1 – Geographical Position of Colombia

According to the Global Peace Index 2008 (GPI) 4, Colombia has a score of 2757 (less points indicates a more peaceful society), what means that between 140 countries analyzed ar ound the world, Colombia is at place number 130 surpassing only Russ ia, Lebanon, North Korea, Cent ral Af rican Re public, Cha d, Israel, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia and Iraq. At the same time, this means that Colombia is in company of other well known case s: Iran (Sco re: 2341); Haiti (Sc ore: 2362);

Congo (Sc ore: 2417); Ethiopia (score: 2439) ; Zimbabwe (score: 2513); Pakistan (Score: 2694); D.R. Congo (2 707) and Nigeria (Scor e: 2724), and others. In other words, Colombia is one of the least peaceful countries of the world (see Map number 2).

4The GPI i s collated and calculated by the Economist Intelligence Unit, a division of the E conomist Magazine.

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The GPI is compos ed of 24 qualitative and qu antitative indicators from highly respected sources, which combine internal and external factors, which were selected by an inter national panel of academics, bu siness people, phila nthropist and peac e institutions, to mention some: Professor Ke vin P. Clements, Dire ctor of Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Univ ersity of Queensland, Australia; Paul Van Tongeren, Executive Director, Global Par tnership fo r the Prev ention of Armed Conflict ( GPPAC), The Neth erlands; Dr. Manuel Mesa, Director, Center for Educational and Peace Research (CEIPAZ ) and President for Peace Research (AIPAZ), Spain; Professor Andrew Mack, Director, Human Security Centre, University of British Columbian, C anada; Alyson JK Bailes, former Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (S IPRI), Sweden; Dr Bates Gill, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden.

For the elaboration of the Index were used statistics collected by institutes as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Inter national Peace Research Institute of the Oslo University, The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) a nd the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). The 24 indicators used to elaborate t he index were: Number of external and internal c onflicts (2001- 2006); Estimated number of deaths from organized conflict (external); Number of deaths from organized conflict (internal); Level of or ganized conflict (internal); Relations with neighboring countries;

Level of distrust in other citizens; Number of displaced people as a percentage of the population; Political I nstability; Level of disrespect for human rights; Potential for terrorist acts; Number of homicides per 100,000 people; level of violent crime;

Likelihood of violent demonstrations; Nu mber of jailed popu lation per 100,000 people; Number of internal secur ity officers and police per 100,000 people; Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP; Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people; Volume of tr ansfers (imports) of majo r conventional weapons per 100,000 people; Volume of tr ansfers (exports) of major conventional weap ons per 100,000 people; UN Deployment s 2007-08 (percentage of total armed forces); Non UN Deployments 2007-08 (percentage of tota l armed forces); A ggregate number of heavy weapons per 100,000 people; ease of access to small arms and light

weapons; Military ca pability /So phistication. The ov erall composite score a nd index

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was formulated by appl ying a wei ght of 60% to the measure of i nternal peace and 40% for external peace.5

The most important reason to situate Colombia at the end of the ranking is its high score in the measures of internal conf lict. For decades the g overnment combats leftist guerrillas, many of which were formed in the mid 1960 as poor peasant armies.

But since 1980 the guerrilla movement is concentrated aroun d two gro ups the Fuerzas Arm adas Revoluc ionarias de Colombia (FARC) a nd El Ejér cito de Liberación Nacional (ELN). Both financ e their act ivities through drug-t rafficking, which also finances the param ilitaries and feeds the corruption. The current policy of the Colombian Government is t o weaken t he FARC to obligate the group to start peace negotiations, while with the ELN sustains preliminary peace talks since 2006.

Additionally to this situation the Colombia n homicide rate is very high (according to Peace Global Index the score is 4, on a sc ale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest and 5 the highest). Conversely the respect fo r human rights is ver y low according to Gibney and Dalton Index 6. Level 5, where Colombia is located, means that t here is imprisonment for polit ical activity in an ex tensive way, politic al motivated executions or other politic al mur ders and brutality are co mmon across the country.

Disappearance and torture are a common part of life and t he leaders of the country place no limits on the means with which th ey pursue their personal and ideological goals.

In the same way military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the highest (With Cuba) in Latin America, even though the aggregate number of heavy weapons is relatively low, small arms and light weap ons are v ery easy to access; all these conditions place Colombia at the end not only of the world ranking (Table 1), but also at the end of the Latin Amer ica Region (Table 2). In the following sections will be detailed the different aspects of the conflict.

5Global Peace Index 2008. Pg 6. Available at:

www.visionofhumanity.org/images/content/Documents/2008 GPi EIU Report.pdf

6Mark Gibney and Matthew Dalton, both from the University of North Ca rolina, have coded countries on a 1 to 5 scale, according to th e level human rights respect based on the i nformation provided by Amnesty International Yearbook – in this case 2007 yearbook, referring to 2006 data.

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Map 2 - Global Peace Index 2008

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GLOBAL PEACE INDEX – 2008

Rank Country Score Rank Country Score

1 Iceland 1.176 36 France 1.707

2 Denmark 1.333 37 Vietnam 1.720

3 Norw ay 1.343 38 Malaysia 1.721

4 New Zealand 1.350 39 Latvia 1.723

5 Japan 1.358 40 Ghana 1.723

6 Ireland 1.410 41 Lithuania 1.723

7 Portugal 1.412 42 United Arab Emirates 1.745

8 Finland 1.432 43 Madagascar 1.770

9 Luxembourg 1.446 44 Taiwan 1.779

10 Austria 1.449 45 Kuwait 1.786

11 Canada 1.451 46 Botswana 1.792

12 Sw itzerland 1.465 47 Tunisia 1.797

13 Sweden 1.468 48 Panama 1.797

14 Germany 1.475 49 United Kingdom 1.801

15 Belgium 1.485 50 Mozambique 1.803

16 Slovenia 1.491 51 Laos 1.810

17 Czech Republic 1.501 52 Cyprus 1.847

18 Hungary 1.576 53 Zambia 1.856

19 Chile 1.576 54 Greece 1.867

20 Slovakia 1.576 55 Gabon 1.878

21 Urugua y 1.606 56 Argentina 1.895

22 Netherland s 1.607 57 Bulgaria 1.903

23 Hong Kong 1.608 58 Tanzania 1.919

24 Romania 1.611 59 Nicaragua 1.919

25 Oman 1.612 60 Croatia 1.926

26 Bhutan 1.616 61 Libya 1.927

27 Australia 1.652 62 Cuba 1.954

28 Italy 1.653 63 Morocco 1.954

29 Singapore 1.673 64 Equatorial Guinea 1.964

30 Spain 1.683 65 Jordan 1.969

31 Poland 1.687 66 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.974

32 South Korea 1.691 67 China 1.981

33 Qatar 1.694 68 Indonesia 1.983

34 Costa Rica 1.701 69 Egypt 1.987

35 Estonia 1.702 70 Paraguay 1.997

Table 1 - Global Peace Index (Continued over page)

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GLOBAL PEACE INDEX – 2008

Rank Country Score Rank Country Score

71 Senegal 2.011 106 Yemen 2.352

72 Kazakhstan 2.018 107 India 2.355

73 Malawi 2.024 108 Saudi Arabia 2.357

74 Bahrain 2.025 109 Haiti 2.362

75 Sy ria 2.027 110 Angola 2.364

76 Rw anda 2.030 111 Uzbekistan 2.377

77 Namibia 2.042 112 Algeria 2.378

78 Bolivia 2.043 113 Philippines 2.385

79 Albania 2.044 114 Uganda 2.391

80 Peru 2.046 115 Turkey 2.403

81 Burkina Faso 2.062 116 South Africa 2.412

82 Dominican Republic 2.069 117 Congo (Brazzaville) 2.417

83 Moldova 2.091 118 Thailand 2.424

84 Ukraine 2.096 119 Kenya 2.429

85 Serbia 2.110 120 Mauritania 2.435

86 Bangladesh 2.118 121 Ethiopia 2.439

87 Macedonia 2.119 122 Cote d’ Ivoire 2.451

88 Mongolia 2.155 123 Venezuela 2.505

89 El Salvador 2.163 124 Zimbabwe 2.513

90 Brazil 2.168 125 Sri Lanka 2.584

91 Cambodia 2.179 126 Myanmar 2.590

92 Cameroon 2.182 127 Pakistan 2.694

93 Mexico 2.191 128 DRC 2.707

94 Belarus 2.194 129 Nigeria 2.724

95 Papua New Guinea 2.224 130 Colombia 2.757

96 Jamaica 2.226 131 Russia 2.777

97 U.S.A 2.227 132 Lebanon 2.840

98 Trinidad and Tobago 2.230 133 North Korea 2.850 99 Mali 2.238 134 Central African Republic 2.857

100 Ecuador 2.274 135 Chad 3.007

101 Azerbaijan 2.287 136 Israel 3.052

102 Turkmenistan 2.302 137 Afghanistan 3.126

103 Guatemala 2.328 138 Sudan 3.189

104 Honduras 2.335 139 Somalia 3.293

105 Iran 2.341 140 Iraq 3.514

Table 1 - Global Peace Index (Continued over page)

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Latin America Overall Rank Overall Score Regional Rank

Chile 19 1.576 1

Uruguay 21 1.606 2

Costa Rica 34 1.701 3

Panama 48 1.797 4

Argentina 56 1.895 5

Nicaragua 59 1.919 6

Cuba 62 1.954 7

Paraguay 70 1.997 8

Bolivia 78 2.043 9

Perú 80 2.046 10

Dominican Republic 82 2.069 11

El Salvador 89 2.163 12

Brazil 90 2.168 13

Mexico 93 2.191 14

Jamaica 96 2.226 15

Trinidad and Tobago 98 2.230 16

Ecuador 100 2.274 17

Guatemala 103 2.328 18

Honduras 104 2.335 19

Haiti 109 2.362 20

Venezuela 123 2.505 21

Colombia 130 2.757 22

Table 2 - Latin America Peace Index 2008

In general the small, democratic and stable countries are the most peaceful: “16 of the 20 most peaceful are west ern or central European democracies. Most of them are members of the European Union. Three Scandinavian countries are in the top ten”.7

The GPI found som e correlations related with the peace degree of a country; to illustrate the Colombian Case, I choose three of these correlations: Democracy index;

Corruption perceptions and GD P per c apita. The gra phics 1, 2 and 3 illust rate the situation of Colombia. In each case, it is clear that less democracy, more corruption and less income are factors are strongly correlated with the war.

7Global Peace Index. Op Cit.

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Graphic 1 – Correlation between Democracy and GPI Score

COLOMBIA

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Graphic 2 - Correlation between Corruption perceptions and GPI Score

COLOMBIA

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Graphic 3 - Correlation between GDP Per Capita and GPI Score

COLOMBIA

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1.1 Generalities about the Colombian Conflict

Throughout second half nineteenth century and first half twentieth, Colombian politics were dominated by conflicts between Parti do Liberal (PL) and Partido Conservador (PC) causing frequently civil wars; t he most notable c ases included the One Thousand Days War (1899-19 03) and a period k nown as “La Violenc ia” (The Violence) from 1948 to 1957, after the assassi nation of a leader of the Liberal Party and presidential c andidate Jo rge Eliécer Gaitán in Apr il 9, 1948, whic h caused a bloody confrontation between th e members of the two partie s. The violence of this time is explained because the identities of the C olombians existed in terms of

“Liberal” or “Conservador”, like there are national identities in other parts of the world:

National loyalty is almost nonexiste nt. Until the mid-twentieth century, political parties substituted as generators of deep loyalties for the country. In de ed, the grea t

“irrational” violence exp erienced du ring mid-ce ntury can b e explained only if on e accepts tha t peasants had party loyalties co mparable to national lo yalties in ot her countries. 8

This weak notion about State has its grounds in many reasons: a big inequality in the distribution of the wealth, the geography of the country, the political structure and the few possibilities for social mobility.

The inequality in Colombia has its ground in t he rural country, where few persons have the majority of the land and exercise a significant influence on the poor farmers, which is described by Kalmanovitz as the “ethos of inequality” 9. The control of the elite in the country side is v ery strong bec ause the State has little controls there, although the urban zones are more dem ocratic and permit a more democratic distribution of the wealth as well as a more rents for the State, the schema of a smal l elite who controls the majority of the capital stay s until today in the form of monopolies (one group controls the soft dr inks, another one the beers, only two media outlets control the majority of t he national cinemas, r adio and televis ion channels, etc), these monopolie s became very influential on the Government and to some degree make it dependent of their owners. Ho wever with more economical

8Rensselaer W. Lee III and T houmi, Francisco E. (2003). “Drugs and Dem ocracy in Colombia”. In:

Godson, Roy (Ed.) Mena ce to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the wo rld. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick: (U.S.A) and London. Pg 73.

9Kalmanovitz, Salomón (19 99). La encrucijada de la Sinrazón y Otros Ensayos (The Cr ossroads o f Nonsense and Other Essays). Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.

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development these monopolies have admitted external par tners and competence in the recent years.

The location of Colombia between tradit ional coca gr owing areas and the most important market made the country an optimal transshipment site, moreover the presence of jungles, forest, mountains a nd the climatic conditions required to cultivate dr ugs made of Colo mbia a place f or drug proc essing and smuggling. Not surprising, between 155 countr ies analyz ed for the Inter-American Development Bank’s Index of geographic f ragmentation, Colom bia is the 3 rd count ry most fragmented in the world. As a consequence, in many regions it is very dif ficult to identify the illegal grows and processes and where the State has presence, it s representatives are very vulnerable to briberies. Additionally while small countries like all in Central Americ a and the Cari bbean, Uruguay, Ecuador and Paraguay are relative easy of monitoring, Colombia and it s relative big and difficult extens ion was another exceptional condition to locate the center of the production and process in its land. Moreover during the 70´s some count ries like Brazil, Argentina and Chile had dictators with a strong presence and control of their countries, making of Colombia and its weak Government an ideal plac e to locate the drug business. Parallel the guerrillas taking advantage of the geographical conditions started their activities since the 60´s and in this way the country was str ongly divided between four actors by the 70s: guerrillas, drug traffickers, elites a nd the Government, each one e xercising control in its zone of influence.

The Colombian Political Stru cture by the end of the 50´ s was very closed, as solution to the civil war between Liberal es and Conservadores was conceived the National Front, which was a divis ion of po wers between the Partido Liberal and the Partido Conservador, the traditional parties, w here the elites wer e very influential, it left any other party or proposal without possibilities, in e ach presidential election was only a candidate, once a Conservador, the next a Liberal and so on; in the c ongress, ministries and all the official institutions the participat ion was of 50% for the liberals and of 50% for the “conservadores”. The National Fr ont lasted from 1958 to 1974, time enough for the depoliticiz ation of th e parties and their t ransformation into

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clientelistic electoral machines10, because sharing the power the political fundaments took a second place and the interest of the regional elites became the central point of the parties. In fact, i n the regions the e lites had the control t hat the State should have, and without political fundaments to defend, the parties succumbed to this powerful elites. This clientelis tic structure made it poss ible to “buy ” votes and in this way, who has more money, can buy more vo tes and win the elections. For the drug traffickers it was another favorable condit ion to continue with their busines s without confrontation with the State; contrarily, it was an opportunity to influenc e it through the funding of political campaigns.

The fe w possibilit ies for social mobility caus ed by the elites who control the majority of the country and the National Fr ont that only allowed the two traditional political powers made of the illegal activities a manner to gain social status and better economical conditions, in a weak State it was accepted as a triumph, as a way to get a plac e in the society and the well being s o scarce for the most of the Colombia n Population, as illeg al and very profitable and accep ted activities we can cite the emerald exploitation at the beginning of t he century XX, after came the contraband and since the 70´s the drug traffic:

Among the main illegal industrie s were emerald mining and exp orting, diverse contraband imports, and contraban d exports of cattle and coffee, thr ough which Colombians developed foreign exchange, m oney laundering skills an d internatio nal smuggling distribution systems. Contraband imports are estimated variously to account for 20 to 40 pe rcent of leg al imports. A large info rmal and illegal econo my blurred any moral difference between drug generated income and capital and ot her income and capital, resulted in a widespread acceptance of contraband and promoted the development of money laundery skills. All these factors cont ributed to t he development of the illegal drug industry.11

This development of the illegal business in Colombia ended in the drug business as a very profitable activity very useful to win economic and political power, in fact the drug business is probably the most profitable activity in Colombia, although there are not systemic data about the dr ug traffic, authors like Clawson and Lee estimated the income at the beginning of the 90´s betw een US$3 and US$4 billions for the then or

10Leal, Francisco (1989). Estado y Política en Colombia (State and Politics in Colombia). Bogotá: Siglo XXI Editores y CEREC.

11Rensselaer W. Lee III and Thoumi, Francisco E. Op. Cit Pg 75-76.

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fifteen biggest drug cartels, after paying suppliers, transport and laundering; it makes this industry the most important in Colombia.12

Such sums of money needs polit ical support to be incorporated into a relative small economy, with political support it is more easy the transportation, the making of very favorable laws, lax condemns and information about the acti ons of the army and the police again drug business (planned raids, for example), as Thoumi says:

For the most part the drug cartels require only local support networks to allow them to grow coca and poppies and to manufacture and export drugs. However, when it comes to laundering money these cartels often need to win favor with ranking officials of the central government. Such favor affords protection from the law. The reason that drug cartels have turne d to corrupting high level government officials involves the Colombian economy’s modest capacity for absorbing and hiding illegal funds.13 This alliance between dr ug traffickers and politic ians was very beneficial for the drug dealers. T hey could legalize their illegal earnings and inve sted in companies, real estate and diverse industries across the count ry. In many cases they were convicted to short prison sentences with easy possibilities to be reduced by up to two thirds and the opportunity to return to the society after these short sentences. A remarkable example of this very s oft punishment was t he case of Pablo Esc obar Gaviria, one of the most powerful drug dealers of his time, and the managers of the Cali Cartel:

The short sentences meted out to top Medellín and Cali kingpins, the farce of Pablo Escobar’s `designer` prison in his home town of Envigado, which he could leave at will to attend soccer matches and carouse in l ocal discoth eques, and the apparent ability of Cali´s Rodríguez Orejuela brothers to run their trafficking em pires from jail are testimonies to this unfortunate situation.14

For the leaders of the Colombian Governm ent the alliance with the drug dealers is also beneficial, the politici ans have access to a huge s ums of money to finance their campaigns, there is a reducti on of anti-state violence by the drug cartels and in the eyes of the American public many drug dealers are apparently punished; but of course this criminal allianc e between po litician and drug dealer s is only o ne mor e step into the corruption of t he Colombian State and its def initive capitulation to the mafias.

12Clawson, Patrick, and Rensselaer Lee III (1996). The And ean Co cain In dustry. New York: St.

Martin´s Press.

13Thoumi, F rancisco E. (1 995). Political Econom y a nd Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

14Rensselaer W. Lee III and Thoumi, Francisco E. Op. Cit. Pg. 89.

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1.2 The Intervention of U.S.A.

After the Cold War the U. S.A. made em phasis on the Wa r o n Drugs; under this perspective Colombia gained significance because the country had the conditions to concentrate the drug business and could be a destabilizing fa ctor in a key region for the U.S.A. due to t he geographical proximity of Colomb ia to the U.S.A itself and a very important resources and infrastructure for the American Interests: Oil in Venezuela, The Panama Canal and Oil and Am erican Capital in Brazil, moreover Colombia is a Caribbean and Pacific nat ion, Amazonian and Andean. The larg e borders of Colombia are another condition to consider, the 6.004 kms of borders are divided in the following wa y: Brazil, 1643 kms; Ec uador, 590 Kms; Panama, 625 Kms, Peru, 1496 kms; Venezuela, 2050 kms; not only the extension is a challenge, in the most of the cases the borders are inhospitable zones very difficult to control:

If the United States, in spite of its enormous deployment of human, economic, and technological resources, has been unable to gain complete control over its border with Mexico, we need only to imagine the implications for a border that is much longer, has little state presence on either side, and is mostly jungle.15

But to wage war in Colombia implic ies to wage war against the traffickers, i t means drug cartels, Guerrillas and Paramilitaries, especially when these two last organizations are considered terrorist, a relev ant topic for the U.S.A. after September 11. This involvement of the U. S.A in the Colombia n Civil Wa r is clearly visible in the Putumayo department:

The purpose of these battalions w as, chiefly, to support the Colombian National Police in eradicating coca cultivation in the Putumayo depa rtment bordering Ecuador and Peru. This department wa s of fundamental geo strategic importance to paramilitary groups as well as the FARC. These two armed groups h ad divided the impoverished department between them, and constituted the only real authority in the area from which they derived the vast bulk of their e conomic resources, thanks t o extensive coca cultivation and processing l aboratories. Further, no state had any real control over this part of the Colombian border with Ecuador and Peru, so the regio n was conducive to drugs as well as arm trafficking.16

15Pizarro, Eduardo and Gaitán, Pilar (2006). “Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative: Lights and Sh adows”. In: Love man, Bryan (Ed.). Addicted to Fail ure. Plymouth: Ro wman an d Littlefiel d Publishers INC. Pg 56

16Ibidem.

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In the Colombian cas e drug trafficking becam e linked with terrorism in a co untry with no real state control, wher e there are many internal conflicts between no state armies, which control parts of the territo ry and strategic resources. This linka ge between drugs, terrorism and failed State bec ame a string argument to continue wit h the war in Colomb ia and support the Governm ent military. However, this intervention of the U.S.A. contributes to the escalati on of the conflict and overlook the social causes that originated the conflict: the inequity of the wealth and the weakness of the State. As we can see in Table number 3, the U.S.A help focus on the military and offer little to economic and social issues: ”In other w ords, 75 – 80 percent of the resources went to military assistance and the remainder to other areas of need”17.

ITEM /YEAR 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Military and Police Assistance

Programs 88.56 112.44 308.81 785.97 224.68 374.61 499.02

Economic and Social Assistance

Programs 0 0.52 8,75 212 5,65 127.5 154.8

TOTAL 88.56 112.96 317.56 997.97 230,33 502.11 653.82

Table 3 – All U.S.A Aid to Colombia in millions of U.S dollars.

Source: Vaicius and Isacson18

Not focusing on the causes of the problem, t he solution to the Colombian Civil War is impossible. The strengthening of the Colo mbian State is crucial to establis h a democratic State that controls the country , protects the human and politic al rights, and ensures a more equilibrated distribution of the wealth that was almost exclusively in private hands until 1975, when for the firs t time the Colombian State s tarted to receive important amounts of capital and rents different to taxes:

Tireless fighters, working day-in, day-out under the most adverse conditions, t hey have managed to survive, without, as of yet, win ning the lottery; without, like Mexico, having a Border with t he United S tates; witho ut the tour ism of Cuba, in its day; or Argentina’s or Uruguay’s grains and cattle; or the size of Brazil. Everything con spired against the survival of the Colombian State. Only in 1975 did it begin to derive income from its pat rimony –unrelated to ta x rev enue- from State owned coal, surpluse s of national petroleum for export, and cerromatoso nickel.19

17Ibidem.

18Vaicius, Ingri d and I sacson, Adam (20 03). “The `War on Drug s` meets th e `Wa r on T error`”. In:

International Policy Report. Washington, D.C. Available at: www.ciponline.org

19Deas, Malcom (1993). Del Poder y la Gramática, y otros ensayos sobre historia, política y l iteratura colombiana (of Power and the Gra mmar, and other e ssays a bout Col ombian histo ry, politic an d literature). Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores. Pg. 14.

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