Reinventing the Public Employment Service:
the changing role of employment assistance in Britain and Germany
Professor Dan Finn, University of Portsmouth
Associate Research Director, Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion
Wissenschaftszentrum Nordrhein-Westfalen Kulturwissenschaftliches
Institut
Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie Institut Arbeit und Technik
PD Dr. Matthias Knuth, Research Director, Institut Arbeit und Technik, Gelsenkirchen
Lecturer, University of Duisburg- Essen
Overview
z
Introduction (DF)
z
German unemployment and the ‘Hartz’
reforms (MK)
z
The British ‘employment first’ welfare state (DF)
z
British lessons learned and not learned in German Reforms (MK)
z
Lessons from AGF case studies (DF)
Employment and Unemployment Rates of Selected EU Countries (1995–2002)
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Employment Rates
Unemployment Rates
DK NL
IR
UK
DE
SW FR
Source: Employment in Europe 2003
FI
Employment Rates 15-<65, West and East Germany, by Gender
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Males West
Males East Females West Females East
Unemployment Rates1991–2004 and 01/04 – 02/05
(National Count vs. ILO Definition)1/04 2/04 3/04
4/04 5/04
6/04 7/04 8/04
9/04 10/04
11/04
12/0401/05 02/05
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1991 1992
1993 1994
1995 1996
1997 1998
1999 2000
2001 2002
2003 2004
per cent
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
per cent
annual average end of month
Source: Federal Employment Agency Website
Long-Term Flows between Employment and Unemployment (West Germany)
0 500.000 1.000.000 1.500.000 2.000.000 2.500.000 3.000.000 3.500.000
1982 1983
1984 1985
1986 1987
1988 1989
1990 1991
1992 1993
1994 1995
1996 1997
1998 1999
2000 2001
2002 2003
2004 outflows UE > employment
inflows empl. + apprenticeships > UE
Individuals' unemployment spells completed in June 2000 by duration and contribution to macro volume
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
per cent of cases
per cent of volume
> 4 years 2 - 4 years
1 - 2 years 39 - 52 weeks
26 - 39 weeks
13 - 26 weeks
0 - 13 weeks
Source: Karr 2002
Percentages of Working-Age
Population Depending on Benefits
1,21 0
1,84 2,72 2,15 2,09
0,59
1,98
3,2
6,59 4
0,76 1,76
4,63 4,32 7,03
3,29
1,93
2,72
2,39
4,27
3,37
2,11
2,66
1,77
4,61
3,39 2,13
2,51 5,74 1,82
6,9 5,5
5,15
5,04
6,35
7,64
5,58
4,38
4,6
6,7
7,21 6,3
4,08
4,79 5,22
2,92 4,67 1,95 3,13
7,6
5,01
3,96 3,92
4,29
4,35
4,1 2,88
6,64 2,5 4,7
1,16
0,99
0,9 0,19
1,83
1,55
2,88 2,12
1,48
1,62
1,22 2,8
2,24
3,04
0 5 10 15 20 25
DK NL UK DE FR DK NL UK DE FR DK NL UK DE FR
1980 1990 1999
Per cent of working-age population
Assistance Unemployment Leave
Disability Sickness Old Age
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2003: 224ff.
Problems of the German Labour Market
z low rates of net job creation
z job destruction in East Germany following unification (40%) never compensated
z automatic in-built redistribution within social insurance systems works as primary financial pipeline West ¼ East
1/3 of total East German public and private spending based on transfers from the West
z German unification has driven up social insurance contributions and thus labour costs
z containment of labour costs through wage restraint creates depression on domestic market
Problems of the German Labour Market (cont.)
z
rising levels of UE primarily due to increasing average UE durations
z
decoupling of LTUE from labour market
– UE as a pathway to retirement
– 1/3 of UE persons with impaired health
z
restrictive criteria for incapacity pension keep ‘unemployable’ people in UE
z
national preference for ‘inclusive’ UE
statistics far above ILO definition
The ‘Hartz Commission’
z individual honorary membership
D social partner participation in person, not by delegation
D deviation from established tripartite policy patterns like
“Alliance for Jobs”
• industrial and political leaders
• only two members from Academia: Labour Market Policy and Public Management
• from the sidelines strong influence of
• consultancy firms
• the Bertelsmann Foundation (think-tank and source of funding for applied research)
Key Messages and Concepts
z
„Fördern und Fordern“
“promoting and obliging” / “advancement and challenge”
D pedagogical framing of “activation”
•
reducing UE level by shortening individual UE duration
• earlier intervention
• more effective job placement
• activation to job search, more intensive monitoring
• stricter criteria of ‘acceptable job’
D ‘Modern Services on the Labour Market’
labour demand side hardly considered at all
The „Hartz“ Proposals and their Legislative
Implementation
z numerous new instruments of almp (legislation “Hartz I”)
D for an organisation already overburdened with instruments
z more favourable conditions for “small jobs” (on the employees’ side, not the employers’!) (Hartz II)
z renaming from ‘institution’ to ‘agency’, renaming of executive functions, modernisation of the Federal Employment Agency’s governance, HR policies and organisation of services (Hartz II and III)
B earlier intervention, more effective job broking, monitoring of job search, reducing UE by shortening individual UE spells
z merging of services hitherto divided between Employment Agencies and municipalities (‘one-stop Job-Centre’) (Hartz IV)
z merging of the benefits of the two customer groups concerned:
(Hartz IV)
D UE Assistance ∪ Social Assistance for working-age and able-to-work people ⇒ Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende (‘basic income for jobseekers’ ≈ jobseekers allowance)
1927–2004: Three Benefits for
Workless People of Working Age
paid in arrears (end of month) wage replacement
paid in advance subsistence
no contributions to other social yes
security branches
means-tested
limited duration
unlimited duration not means-tested
any able-bodied household member of working age (in
theory!) former breadwinner=claimant only
obligation to work
flat-rates for each category of household members
household entitlement
with child supplement individual entitlement
minimum income flat-rate
relative status maintenance earnings related
funded through taxes funded through contributions
social assistance unemployment
assistance unemployment
benefit
The Benefit System from 2005
zhealth and pension contributions introduction of:
no yes
contributions to other social security yes branches?
zstatus maintenance
zbreadwinner model abolition of:
What has changed?
any able-bodied household member of working age (able to work for three hours per
day) means-tested
limited duration
unlimited duration not means-tested
by definition not able to
work former breadwinner only
obligation to work / counted as unemployed jobseeker
household entitlement
with child component individual entitlement
flat-rate
relative status maintenance earnings related
tax based contribution based
social assistance basic income for jobseekers
unemployment benefit
Basic income for jobseekers and their
households (at least 1 member able to work)
80%
additional
household member able to work
children / household members not
able to work
<14: 60%
15+: 80%
two persons in household 18+
single / lone parent able to
work
2 X 90%
full cost of “adequate”
housing and heating working age
345 ¼ (West) 331 ¼ (East)
Changes in Contribution-Based UE Benefit Duration
months of
contribution age
months of entitlement
months of
contribution age
months of entitlement
12 6 12 6
16 8 16 8
20 10 20 10
24 12 24 12
28 45 14 30 55 15
32 45 16
36 45 18 36 55 18
40 47 20
44 47 22
48 52 24
52 52 26
56 57 28
60 57 30
64 57 32
since 1998 from 2006
„Arbeitsgelegenheiten“
‘Opportunities for Work’
z old concept inherent in the Social Assistance tradition
z intentionally inherited by the new ‘basic income for JS’
z now to be universalised: 600,000 work opportunities announced
z working for the benefit + 1-2 ¼ per hour
can be more than equivalent low-wage job
z no labour contract, but health and pension insurance contributions now part of the benefit anyway
z ‘additional’ and ‘in the public interest’
z individual participation for about 6 months at a time
z participants not counted as unemployed
Extension of Obligation to Work Boosts UE Statistics
z Former members of households receiving Social Assistance and able to work:
– in theory no change (were supposed to register)
– in practice, many were not registered
– municipalities interested in defining as ‘able to work’
z Former recipients of UE Assistance:
– only the recipient himself had to be registered
– now, all household members able to work are registered
D group strongly affected: Turkish housewives who don‘t speak German
Increase in UE through
Implementation of Reform
The British Employment Service:
‘Activation’ & lessons from the 1980/90s
z Labour Force Survey, the ‘inactive’ unemployed and remaking the link between benefit administration and employment assistance
z ‘Work First’:
z ‘activation’ (individual job search and the responsibilities of the unemployed – Jobseekers Allowance)
z labour market attachment: ‘signing on’ & Restart
z work incentives (‘carrot and sticks’)
z the role of programmes (duration dependent & job search) z Market Testing and Quasi Markets (performance related
contracts: evidence of instability and ‘creaming’)
z Assessment of impacts (tracking & evaluation)
New Labours Strategy: An
‘Employment First Welfare State’
z Jobcentre Plus and Work Focused Interviews
z Financial Assessors & Personal Advisers
z Focus on unsubsidised jobs
z New Deal Programmes and ‘Pathways’ for the Unemployed and
‘inactive’ (‘Rights and Responsibilities’)
z ‘Hardest to Help’ (Basic Skills; Progress2Work; Ex-offenders)
z Make Work Pay
z Tax Credits, Labour market re-regulation & Childcare
z ‘Risk’ and Making Transitions Pay
z Role of ‘contestability’ (evidence based reform, bench marking, ‘spur’ to modernisation):
z New Deal Private Sector Leads
z Employment Zones and Action Teams
Jobcentre Plus
Policy Design & Implementation
z Integration by 2006, and network of 1000 Jobcentres and 25 ‘contact call centres’ by 2008 (efficiency gains from centralisation)
z Extensive use of new technologies
z Staff numbers predicted to fall to 70,000 by 2006 (re- training and redeployment)
z New management and target systems, organisational change and pressure from the private sector
z New Deal for Skills & ‘Building on New Deal’:
‘localising’ Jobcentre Plus provision from 2005
Set-up of the German State
larger cities independent
of a county
counties
municipalities
Land A Land B Land C
Federation
New Benefit Regime
Administered by Consortia between
Employment Agencies and Municipalities
Local Branch of Federal Employment Agency
Municipality under Land legislation
no straightforward legal solution in terms of
liability, contractual relations with workforce, employee representation…….
Consortium of public or private law
zhousing and heating allowance
zcase management
zconcomitant services
zjob broking, counselling
zbenefit processing
zalmp instruments
?
Alternatively, 69 Municipalities Could Opt for Full Responsibility for 6 Years
households with at least one member
able to work and without UE insurance
eligibility
households with no member considered able to work
social assistance
(unlimited duration)
insured labour market participants
Local Branch of Federal Employment Agency
unemployment benefit (6-18 months)
Municipality under Land legislation
„able to work“ classification
basic income for jobseekers (unlimited duration)
German assets for activation policy
z OECD holy trinity of benefit processing, job broking and employment assistance (traditional)
z ‘availability for job offers’ expanded to ‘active job search’ (legally since 1998 but poorly monitored)
z ‘active measures’ subcontracted to third party
providers (traditional; targeting and incentives wanting)
z job placement monopoly lifted (since mid-nineties)
z responsibilities for program mix and third party
procurement devolved to Employment Agency Districts (since 1998)
z strong financial incentive for local authorities to reduce assistance dependency
Lessons Germany has learned
z language important for recalibration of entitlements and obligations:
– ‘Unemployment Assistance’ D ‘Basic Income for Jobseekers’
(Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende)
z pre-scheduling of customer contacts, management of customer flows
z frontline case-loads must be kept in reasonable limits
z integration of IT systems crucial
z readily available ‘work test’ (‘Arbeitsgelegenheiten’)
Lessons Germany has not learned
z framing of reform should engage jobseekers
– ‘promoting and obliging‘ engages only the professionals
– too many ‘Hartz gimmicks’ shroud fundamental strategy
z equity problems:
– simultaneous reduction of benefits and demand for more individual initiative
z physical space shapes behaviour:
– centralistic architecture of Federal Employment Agency might prevent decentralisation into wards
z roll-out strategy transition with defined schedule needed
z changing benefit system and organisational set-up simultaneously tends to crowd out activation of customer and employer contacts
z targeting: 3 million jobseekers agreements at once
= nothing for all
z ‘making work pay’ strategy suffers from absence of legal minimum wage
Aspects neglected in
implementation of German reforms
z legacy of social assistance system for unemployment count
z extensive UE definition and jobsearch requirement creates deadweight for activation:
– physically able to work three hours ≠ employability
– housewives without training and language skills become ‘jobseekers’
z changing the mindset and professional profile of staff
– prevailing attitudes: “there is no work, and our customers have no chance”
– ‘administrators’ and ‘social workers’, but no job-search coaches
z comprehensive professional approach of “Assistance to Work”
(case management, pathways) might be buried in the merger
z differences in professional and organisational culture between Federal Employment Agency and municipalities not addressed
Difficult institutional legacies of Germany
z
federalism and local self-government bar join- up between federal and local services
z
federalist policy interlock prevents
straightforward and sustainable approach
– open race between two competing models
z
financing social security primarily through contributions
z
collective bargaining by strong unions used to be functional equivalent of minimum wage
– unions divided over minimum wage
Lessons from AGF case studies
z ‘Learning by doing’ & ‘Hearts and minds’, but conflicting priority between rollout implementation and operational delivery.
z ‘Take over’ of Benefits Agency (investment in the front office)
z IT limitations:
z ‘Paper work’ and ‘work arounds’, e.g., ‘ghost interviews’ with assessors, loss of LMS expertise
z Delays in Customer Management System
z Select Committee: “adverse effect on staff morale and turnover” (p.5).
z Interaction with PAs
z ‘Crowding out’ employment assistance: routinised ‘scripts’ – potential for profiling
z Better Off in Work Calculations
z Skills, capacities and motivation of PAs (training and cultures)
z Employment barriers of the workless (soft skills) – issues around sanctions and passive compliance
Lessons from AGF case studies
z Systemic or problems specific to the transition?
z Policy Dynamism & Pace of Change: capacity of staff
implementing inititiatives – front line training & awareness crucial to deal with rapid changes in programme rules, eligibility and
involvement of other partners.
z Front and back office (the ‘Achille’s Heel’ of the British system? - ) Benefit Administration & simplification, e.g., two benefits to
replace IB)
z Employment Assistance as a new entitlement (legal benefits &
discretionary assistance)
z The limits of ‘Work First’: Unemployment Benefit & the German
‘high skills equilibrium’