Expert Analysis
June 2014
The ISIS conquests in Iraq:
the new Levant reality
Executive summary
By Yossi Alpher
The conquest by ISIS of large sections of the Sunni region of Iraq in June 2014 constitutes another dramatic step toward the collapse of the post-Ottoman state system in the Levant.
Following Syria, Iraq is fragmenting. The potential ramifications of this touch on the interests of all the countries surrounding Syria and Iraq, and include energy issues, refugee flows, and Salafi infiltration. Iran’s response is of critical importance. The U.S. profile in the region has been dealt another setback. Europe can expect more refugees and more returning jihadis.
The dust has not yet settled from the sudden Sunni-ex- tremist conquest of Mosul and additional Iraqi towns in the Sunni region north of Baghdad. The outcome of the ISIS offensive is still uncertain. Yet it is imperative to address, however tentatively, the ramifications of its conquests, if only because they are liable to prove far-reaching. This expert analysis looks at the changing map beginning from the local level – where changes are most obvious – then moving to the regional and even global levels.
ISIS – the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (Sham designates the Levant, hence the alternative acronym ISIL; the Arabic acronym is Daish) – has over the course of six months carved out a large “state” embodying much of eastern Syria and western Iraq. This at least temporarily consummates a strategic process begun in early 2011 when civil war broke out in Syria, i.e. the collapse of the post-Ottoman state system that had been created by the Sykes-Picot agree- ment nearly 100 years ago. The failure of the region and the world to stem the bloodshed in Syria is a direct catalyst of ISIS’s emergence and conquests, which now include a large land mass, millions of Sunni Arabs, and petro-carbon wealth that renders the movement virtually self-support- ing.
The map of the greater Levant has definitively been altered.
The Kurdish occupation of Kirkuk with its historic signifi- cance and its large oil reserves – a long-sought objective of the Kurdish national movement – moves Iraq a step closer to genuine disintegration and partition into Sunni, Shia and Kurdish entities that overflow across the old national borders. The Kurds in what was once northern Iraq and
northern Syria are consolidating their territorial and economic control, plagued only by their own lack of unity.
The Assad regime in Damascus has seemingly become resigned to a best-case scenario of a division between
“Useful Syria” – in the western sector – where it is consoli- dating its grip, and the rest of Syria, where ISIS is emerging as the dominant force among disparate Islamist and other movements.
The surrounding countries are on high alert. The effects on Turkey’s borders and particularly its Kurdish population are uncertain. Lebanon fears a new round of Sunni extremism.
Jordan fears yet another wave of refugees, this time from Iraq. Jordan and Israel confront multiple threats from Salafis in south-west Syria who threaten to encircle the Druze of Jebel Druze and initiate cross-border attacks.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates, whose billionaires helped launch ISIS, now must contemplate the dangers posed by this extremist movement if and as it approaches the Iraqi-Saudi border. Tiny self-declared offshoots of ISIS in Gaza and the West Bank, including one that recently appeared in the context of the hostage drama being played out in the Hebron region, will now merit much closer attention by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces.
Here we must factor in Iran, whose wealth, expressed in the military prowess of its proxy Hizbullah and of the Quds force, has helped sustain both the Alawites in power in Damascus and the Shias in Baghdad. Tehran is not about to allow either regime to fall, as they represent its most successful investment in regional Shia-related revolution since the advent of the Islamic Republic some 35 years ago.
2
Noref expert Analysis – June 2014 And they link Tehran, itself a state supporter of terrorism,
to the western tip of the “Shia arc” in Hizbullah country on the Mediterranean shores of southern Lebanon, from where Iran seeks to threaten and deter Israel. This, then, is the new Levant: a Kurdish belt, a northern belt of extreme- radical Sunnis confronting Iran and its allies, and the prospect of all-out Sunni-Shia warfare across the region.
If the fragmentation of Syria has spread chaos, ethnic violence and masses of refugees across that country’s borders into Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan, the disinte- gration of Iraq poses potential dilemmas equally as devastating: a second nexus of conflict between Shia Iran and Sunni Arabs (one far more dangerous for Iran than its involvement in Syria), and new mass refugee flows. Again, the spillover could reach Jordan and possibly Turkey, but this time Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf as well.
Destabilisation or Salafi radicalisation in Jordan would affect Israelis and Palestinians. If the new, fragmented and conflicted Levant is not contained, the potential for a domino effect throughout the Middle East cannot be ignored.
Moving to the global scene, one key dynamic of this drama is the control of energy resources, a factor that could yet affect the global economy if ISIS expands its reach to the south and north and takes possession of major oilfields.
Another major factor is the U.S.: the seeming collapse of Iraq’s army in the north of the country, an army trained and armed by the U.S. that dissolved once confronted by a few thousand Salafis, represents a major U.S. strategic failure.
Leaving aside the issue of which administration is to blame – that of George W. Bush for invading Iraq in 2003 or that of Barack Obama for leaving in 2011 – the new Levant reality places President Obama’s team in the uncomfortable position of contemplating cooperation with Iran to stabilise Iraq and conceivably – or ultimately – Syria as well. The fall of Mosul, following upon the Ukraine/Crimea crisis of
recent months and the chemical weapons drama in Syria in 2013, portrays Washington in the eyes of Middle East actors as lacking in both military and diplomatic credibility, even if many Americans consider Obama’s caution to be justified and his decision-making sound.
Will Israel and Saudi Arabia now have confidence in disarmament measures agreed between the P5+1 and Iran? Will the Netanyahu government in Jerusalem, always on the lookout for excuses not to trust a two-state deal, have faith in U.S. commitments to train Palestinian gen- darmes and police demilitarisation arrangements in the Jordan Valley? Can Jordan, Israel and Turkey credit emerging U.S. schemes to train and arm “moderate”
Syrian rebels?
Ultimately, even if ISIS has overextended its meagre human resources and soon executes a tactical withdrawal, Mosul is yet another setback for the U.S. as Washington reduces its regional profile. Correspondingly, the rise of ISIS is certain to augment Russia’s concerns over Salafi terrorism at home while (in stark contrast to the U.S.) boosting Russian efforts to re-establish a serious presence in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, Europe can contemplate not only another wave of refugees from the region, but also an upsurge in local Muslim volunteers for the new jihad, some of whom will eventually return as terrorists to threaten Europeans.
Turkey has already reminded NATO that this major intra- Muslim conflagration, like the fighting in Ukraine, is taking place just across the alliance’s borders.
The end of this dynamic in the Levant is nowhere in sight.
The only established powers that appear to have coherent strategies for exploiting it are Iran and Russia, and even their vital interests could be at risk.
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Noref expert Analysis – June 2014
Yossi Alpher is a former Mossad official and former director of the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. Until re- cently he co-edited bitterlemons.net. He is currently writing a book on Israel’s periphery doctrine.
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The content of this publication is presented as is. The stated points of view are those of the author and do not reflect those of the organisations for which he worked or NOREF. NOREF does not give any warranties, either expressed or implied, concerning the content.
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