Canada’s RetuRn to east asia: Re-engagement
thRough maRitime diplomaCy 1
James manicom
intRoduCtion
After a decade of neglect, the Canadian government is prepared to re-engage East Asia, particularly China. Adding a maritime component to Canada’s re- engagement efforts would help mitigate threats to the strategic stability that makes economic growth possible and build Canada’s prestige in the region.
Recognizing that re-engagement must go beyond bilateral economic issues, Canadian policy makers are seeking to deepen Canada’s regional diplomacy.
Canada has signalled its support for regional institutions by acceding to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (Job, 2010). In an effort to reverse early missteps in Canada’s relationship with China, Canadian Minister of Foreign
1 This policy brief draws on research conducted by the author for “Canadian Debates about China’s Rise:
Key points
• To rebuild its reputation in the region, Canada should support its East Asian re- engagement efforts through maritime defence and cooperation endeavours, which would improve the region’s strategic stability and foster economic growth.
• Canada should strengthen maritime exchanges in East Asia, including joint exercises with Chinese and other regional navies, and partner with East Asian states to build coast guard capacity through tabletop exercises, personnel exchanges and training exercises.
• Drawing on its own diplomatic experiences, Canada should foster dialogue in the East Asian region on cooperative living and non-living resource management in disputed waters.
James maniCom
James Manicom is a research fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the development of the Global Security Program.
Previously, he held fellowships at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His current research explores Arctic governance, East Asian security and China’s role
Copyright © 2013 by The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
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Affairs John Baird declared in 2011 that “my government gets it” before departing for a visit to China and to attend the ASEAN ministerial conference in Bali (Perkins and Hoffman, 2011). At the 9th ASEAN-Canada Dialogue in June 2012, Baird pledged CDN$10 million to fund various ASEAN initiatives.
Nevertheless, the region still perceives Canada as a fair-weather Asia-Pacific country that only seeks to establish the basic elements of trade and investment relations to diversify its trading partners. According to then ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, Canada’s admission to the region’s leading economic and defence forums — the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM)
— remain out of reach until Southeast Asian states are convinced of the durability of Canada’s re-engagement (Clark, 2012). As it is widely accepted that “process matters in an Asia Pacific context...contributing as well as receiving is important,” Canada should round out its economic re-engagement strategy with contributions to regional peace and security (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2012: 12).
Maritime diplomacy contributes to regional peace and stability by addressing urgent problems, such as those affecting trade and fishing in East Asian waters. The region relies heavily on these sectors for growth, but is afflicted with numerous maritime and territorial disputes that are negatively impacting them. By adding maritime diplomacy to its economically oriented regional re-engagement strategy, Canada signals its determined return to the region, building the reputation that it requires for membership to East Asia’s premier institutions. This could, in turn, pave the way for closer economic ties with East Asia. As Canada has no military forces permanently deployed to the region, no formal treaty allies and limited bilateral trade relationships,
maritime diplomacy is the optimal means to convey its long-term commitment to the region. Above all, Canada’s strategy must transcend the electoral cycle;
relationships are built in East Asia over the long term.
maRitime pRoblems in a maRitime Region
Canada’s return to East Asia is occurring during a strategic transition in the region. After 60 years of stability that underwrote unprecedented economic prosperity, East Asia is undergoing a strategic shift, as the United States re-evaluates its global strategic commitments at a time when China seems prepared to assert itself.
American primacy in East Asia is being questioned as a function of its domestic financial woes and the legacy of fighting two wars in the Middle East. Despite China’s positive contributions to East Asian regionalism and free trade, concerns abound over its ambitions for disputed maritime areas, coupled with the lack of transparency in its military spending. Although US President Barack Obama announced an unambiguous foreign policy shift from the Middle East to Asia in November 2011, there is no doubt that the American presence in the region will be different than it has been (Obama, 2011; US Department of Defense, 2012). All signs point to a United States that leans more heavily on its allies to share the burden of military responsibility.
At the 11th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta pledged to keep 60 percent of the US Navy forward deployed in the region, the most clear outline of US forces structure “rebalancing” in East Asia (2012). This amounts to an effort to reassure regional states of the credibility of the US presence in the region.
Amid this strategic uncertainty, China has asserted its maritime claims in the East, and the South China Sea in particular, with unprecedented vigour. Chinese coast guard vessels patrol disputed waters more frequently and have enforced China’s claimed jurisdictional rights against civilian and military vessels from Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. This has resulted in a number of dangerous armed confrontations at sea. Lurking in the background is the increasingly capable and active People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy. Recent Chinese behaviour is widely viewed with apprehension, and threatens to divide East Asia. Indonesia, which is not a party to a maritime boundary dispute with China, lodged reservations with the United Nations in response to ambiguous Chinese claims to the South China Sea. Japan, which has typically avoided comment on Southeast Asian maritime security concerns for fear of alarming both local and Chinese sensibilities, has reversed course and moved to support Southeast Asian states that are party to disputes with China, such as the Philippines. Furthermore, regional meetings have become staging grounds for diplomatic confrontations over Chinese activities at sea. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reminded the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features” (2010). Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reacted angrily, calling the remarks an “attack on China” (“Foreign Minister Yang,” 2010). Most recently, Cambodia, which occupied the rotating chair of ASEAN in 2012, was pressured by China not to include any mention of maritime tensions in the final communiqués of ASEAN-centred meetings.
As a state that seeks to capitalize on East Asia’s economic dynamism, Canada should concern itself with these challenges to regional peace and security because they threaten to undermine the economic dynamism
upon which its regional interests are predicated. This strategy, however, needs to be carefully calibrated to avoid alienating China, with whom Canada has only recently resuscitated relations. Furthermore, maritime diplomacy will fail if China perceives Canada to be an extension of the United States.
the Case FoR maRitime diplomaCy
Maritime diplomacy is the best way forward for Canada because it is instrumental to Canada’s broader regional strategy. It builds on Canada’s long-standing track record in the region and it adopts a role familiar to regional states. Building confidence is Canada’s legacy in East Asia. Canada has a long and quite successful track record of Track-Two diplomacy on non-traditional security issues in East Asia (Evans, 2009), through efforts such as the Canadian International Development Agency’s support of the Indonesian-hosted South China Sea dialogues in the early 1990s. These were important confidence-building measures, representing the only set of meetings where all claimants were present, particularly at a time of escalating tension (Djalal and Townsend-Gault, 1999). Canada’s role as an honest broker in the proceedings is evidenced by the fact that the Chinese were on record as preferring Canadian funding to US- or Japanese-funded workshops (Snyder, Glosserman and Cossa, 2001: 2; 13). Conversations in the region reveal an expectation that Canada’s re- engagement will carry some of these elements with it.
Contributing to regional peace and security will build Canada’s regional prestige, which supports the deeper institutional engagement that Ottawa is pursuing.
Although the East Asian diplomatic calendar can be burdensome, these meetings drive regional decision- making processes. As then US Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell has suggested, “These institutions, these regular meetings, tend to drive the process inside government”
(Campbell, 2012). Similarly, Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay attended the 2012 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue to support Canada’s bid for an invitation to the ADMM Plus; a more active regional engagement strategy could open doors to the region’s primary institutions. By leveraging its credentials as a maritime state as a member of the ARF’s Maritime Security Working Group, Canada increases its standing in East Asia. This could, in turn, create momentum for Canadian participation at the next ADMM Plus meeting, which has its own maritime security working group.
Maritime diplomacy and deeper institutional engagement bring closer political ties and, over time, improved relations to support Canada’s regional economic objectives. Canada has been long-time supporter of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and is pursuing membership in the related Trans-Pacific Partnership. ASEAN-centred trade liberalization has long existed alongside APEC initiatives, but has historically excluded non-Asian states (Stubbs, 2002). By paving the way for membership in institutions like the EAS, Canada gains a window into the ASEAN-centred process of regional trade liberalization including trade, finance and regulatory discussions. This also supports its efforts to pursue bilateral trade agreements with East Asian economies.
poliCy ReCommendations
Maritime diplomacy deliberately goes beyond Canada’s Track-Two legacy; East Asian states have mastered the
“habits of dialogue” (Dewitt, 1994). In an era of growing naval spending and numerous maritime flashpoints,
the region is in need of inclusive security cooperation that builds transparency between navies and coast guards. Canada is already deepening military ties with the region, through, for example, its discussions with Japan towards an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, and is negotiating access to military facilities in Singapore. These will support Canada’s proven record of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) within the region, evidenced in Sri Lanka in 2004, and offered to Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. The proposals outlined below are deliberately ambitious and are designed to spark debate about their suitability and feasibility in the context of strained budgets.
Given Canada’s previous track record as a trusted bridge builder between China and other states, naval engagement could be one component of maritime diplomacy (Adams, 2012). China’s efforts at defence diplomacy have increased in the past decade, creating opportunities for more frequent and in-depth Sino- Canadian defence exchanges. Both countries participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Given that direct military exercises between the United States and China are banned by US law, there may be an opportunity for Canada to conduct its own bilateral exercises with China; Australia has already done so. In September 2010, the Royal Australian Navy conducted an exercise with the PLA Navy in the Yellow Sea, which included live fire drills, search and rescue (SAR) operations and joint helicopter missions. The Australian Defence Force has also conducted a HADR exercise with the PLA. More ambitiously, Canada and Australia could work together to foster regular naval interaction with China, and bring in new partners over time. This effort would build on the steady stream of Canadian naval port visits to the region since 1995, and build ties in
advance of China’s participation in the 2014 Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. The ideal geographic focus of this engagement would be the western Pacific Ocean, but a more economical alternative is the Indian Ocean where many of these potential partners are engaged in anti-piracy missions.
Frigate HMCS Ottawa (FFH 341) at RIMPAC 2012. Source: Royal Canadian Navy.
If deeper naval links are too politically sensitive, coast guard cooperation is an alternative avenue that is valued in East Asia. For instance, despite their often acrimonious relationship, Chinese and Japanese coast guards have conducted three SAR exercises together in an effort to build confidence (Shen and Chen, 2011).
Canada, China, Japan and South Korea are members of the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF), which coordinates efforts among members to address maritime security challenges. Canada could reach out to other nations, such as South Korea and Japan, who are interested in conducting joint exercises, exchanges or tabletop exercises with Chinese coast guards.
Canada already has close working relations with both the South Korean and Japanese coast guards through its membership in the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, which promotes conservation of anadromous fish stocks in the North Pacific. Like Canada, East Asian states confront the challenge of
policing a large exclusive economic zone with limited resources, thus Canadian expertise and lessons learned are likely to be appreciated.
Canada could also contribute to coast guard capacity building in Southeast Asia. Japan trains a number of Philippine and Indonesian officers at its Coast Guard Academy. Canada could partner with ASEAN states to assist these capacity-building efforts, which could involve Canadian vessels in theatre or simply educational exchanges. Canada could also explore regional interest in the establishment of a Southeast Asian equivalent of the NPCGF. The United States, China and Japan have all used maritime security capacity building as part of their efforts to contribute to regional security in Southeast Asia.
Finally, Canada could foster dialogue on cooperative resource exploitation in disputed areas. Although the marginal utility of Track-Two dialogues in East Asia is on the decline due to their proliferation and a reduction in earnest participation by Chinese participants, they are not entirely without value. Canada could lead discussions toward a regional fisheries management organization for Southeast Asian waters. Similarly, Canada could share its experience in maritime boundary delimitation and resource development in disputed waters. All East Asian claimant states have rhetorically committed to this idea, but have been unwilling to share jurisdiction in contested areas. In one attempt, the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking agreement, Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine oil companies collaborated in exploration activities in a disputed area of the South China Sea. Although the agreement collapsed due to domestic opposition in the Philippines, this initiative was the deepest cooperation witnessed among the South China Sea claimants, and merits resuscitation with Canadian support.
ConClusion
While maritime diplomacy is an ambitious re- engagement strategy for Canada, two potent counterpoints are worth considering. Because Canada is familiar with European security issues and pan-Atlantic security institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it could be argued that it is ill-equipped to involve itself in matters of East Asian security. East Asia is home to a different set of multilateral structures that operate under different rules. In this view, the proposals herein risk alienating important economic partners, such as China. Canada should, therefore, limit its East Asian engagement to economic issues while leaving strategic questions to those countries directly affected. For instance, taking a stand on Chinese threats to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea risks alienating China for little strategic gain (Manicom, 2012).
An alternative perspective advocates adopting a
“whole-of-country approach” to re-engagement that seems out of touch with Canada’s history, ongoing priorities and capacity (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2012: 13). Australia, often cited as a model for Canada’s Asia policy, has doubled-down on the Asian Century by pledging to strengthen its Asian literacy (Government of Australia, 2012). However, Canada is not Australia and will always have important links with the Americas and with Europe.
By contrast, maritime diplomacy offers a more modest, if ambitious, route by building on Canada’s past contributions to regional security and leveraging its capacity to contribute to stability in East Asia, which supports its regional economic aspirations.
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Adams, Thomas (2012). “Shift to the Pacific: Canada’s Security Interests and Maritime Strategy in East Asia.” In Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats, edited by David S. McDonough. Pages 160–173. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
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poliCy bRieFs
Policy Brief Canada-US arCtiC Marine CorridorS and reSoUrCe developMent1 John higginbotham, andrea Charron and James maniCom
introdUCtion The shrinking Arctic ice cap is creating unprecedented geophysical change in the circumpolar region, a trend that is very likely to continue. Together, this “great melt” and the delineation of extended national economic zones afford increased access to economic resources in the Arctic Ocean. Intense activities in commercial, investment, diplomatic, legal, scientific and academic sectors abound in the new Arctic, but the region’s long-term significance is only gradually penetrating North American public consciousness. Media reports such as the recent, virtually ice- free trans-polar transit of a Chinese icebreaker through the Russian Northern Sea Route, or the transit of the Northwest Passage by a large cruise ship, are only the tip of the proverbial economic iceberg. In preparing for the commercialization 1 This policy brief is drawn in large part from discussions at the Arctic Marine Corridors and Resource Development Round Table. The event was held in a House of Commons facility in Ottawa, June 2012.
Key pointS
• The Arctic region stands at the cusp of tremendous economic development. Efficient, secure, environmentally sensitive marine transportation systems and smart public infrastructure could facilitate offshore and onshore energy, mineral, ecotourism and local community development.
• Current Canadian and American government policies, regulations and investment in support of Arctic maritime infrastructure and resource development are inadequate.
There is an urgent need for strengthened, comprehensive and innovative national Arctic economic development policies, and Canada-US federal, regional and corporate cooperation in the Arctic.
• Public leadership and private investment, through the development of smart and strategic transportation infrastructure, is urgently needed in the North American Arctic to drive development and facilitate economic activity.
no. 24 noveMber 2012
John higginbothaM John Higginbotham is a senior distinguished fellow at Carleton University. In his previous roles with the federal government, he coordinated Canada’s Asia-Pacific Gateway Initiative at Transport Canada, was an assistant deputy minister in three departments and served abroad in senior positions in Washington, Hong Kong and Beijing.
andrea Charron Andrea Charron is assistant professor in political studies at the University of Manitoba. She is also a research associate at Carleton University’s Centre for Security and Defence Studies at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), where she was a post- doctoral fellow.
JaMeS ManiCoM James Manicom is a research fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), contributing to the development of the global security program. Previously, he held fellowships at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo and the Balsillie School of International Affairs. His current research explores Arctic governance, East Asian security and China’s role in ocean governance.
Canada-US Arctic Marine Corridors and Resource Development
John Higginbotham, Andrea Charron and James Manicom
In preparing for the commercialization of the Arctic Ocean, Canada and the United States face enormous opportunities in protecting economic and environmental interests; however, a number of challenges impede the fulfillment of this vision.
Policy Brief Zero: The SurPriSing and unamBiguouS Policy relevance of The cuBan miSSile criSiS James G. BliGht and janet m. lanG
None of the nuclear-weapon states “has an employee, let alone an inter-agency group, tasked full time with figuring out what would be required to verifiably decommission all its nuclear weapons.”
— Jessica T. Matthews, Preface to Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Where black is the color, where none is the number.
— Bob Dylan, “A Hard Rain’s a-Gonna Fall”
Key PoinTS
• The threat of nuclear war is more multi-dimensional than ever, requiring sustained attention by the world’s leaders and citizens. Nuclear weapons must be abolished. Zero is the right number of weapons in the world.
• A robust, deep and sustained appreciation of the Cuban missile crisis
— a nuclear war that came within an eyelash of happening — is the prerequisite for energizing movement toward nuclear abolition. Focusing on the nearness to doomsday can provide an engine for paralyzed mechanisms of global governance that are already, at least on paper, committed to zero nuclear weapons.
• The existing global governance mechanisms for reducing nuclear threats are more than adequate to reach zero nuclear weapons if empowered to do so by the international community. These include the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
no. 2 ocToBer 2012
JameS g. BlighT and janeT m. lang
James G. Blight is the CIGI chair in foreign policy development and professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA), and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo.
janet M. Lang is research professor at the BSIA and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo.
Blight and Lang are the authors or co-authors of six previous books on the Cuban missile crisis. Their newest book, The Armageddon Letters:
Kennedy/Khrushchev/Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis, was published in September 2012 by Rowman &
Littlefield.
For information about the project, see:
• armageddonletters.com
• facebook.com/armageddonletters
• twitter.com/armageddontweet
Zero: The Surprising and
Unambiguous Policy Relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis
James G. Blight and janet M. Lang Drawing on a quarter century of research on the Cuban missile crisis, this policy brief offers takeaways and recommendations for moving towards zero nuclear weapons.
Policy Brief reSPoNDiNG To DiSASTer:
NeGlecTeD DiMeNSioNS of PrePAreDNeSS AND THeir coNSeQUeNceS
iNTroDUcTioN The international community has become adept at responding to disasters.
When a disaster hits — whether natural or as the consequence of human activity — humanitarian relief can be on the ground almost anywhere in the world in less than 24 hours. The international community has developed an elaborate network to respond to catastrophes involving the collaboration of international agencies, humanitarian relief organizations, national governments and concerned individuals. The collective ability to help save lives quickly is unprecedented in human history; the problem remains, however, that one never knows in advance where disaster will strike, what the immediate needs of those affected will be or what conditions the first responders will confront. Given these uncertainties, how can disaster-response planners best position themselves to take action?
It is natural, inevitable and desirable to look to past disasters in order to improve responses to future ones, but lesson-drawing, in such cases, is rarely systematic, as responses to disasters are, by their very nature, typically ad hoc.
Key PoiNTS
• Disaster responders must develop communications strategies that clearly identify both what is and is not known in a timely way, and provide, if at all possible, a basis for risk assessment by individuals, communities, national authorities and international contributors.
• Responders must search for ways to provide urgently needed public goods without undermining public authority.
• Responders must address the psychological as well as the physical needs of victims.
• Greater steps must be taken to improve global and regional disaster preparedness.
No. 1 JUly 2012
ANDrew S. THoMPSoN AND DAviD A. welcH Andrew S. Thompson is adjunct assistant professor of political science at the University of Waterloo, and the program officer for the global governance programs at the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA). He is a specialist in the fields of international human rights, civil society movements and fragile states, and has written extensively on these issues.
David A. Welch is CIGI chair of global security at the BSIA and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo. An award- winning author and scholar, David is an expert in foreign policy decision making and international security.
He also hosts CIGI’s podcast series Inside the Issues.
Responding to Disaster: Neglected Dimensions of Preparedness and Their Consequences
Andrew S. Thompson and David A. Welch Through a comparison of responses to the recent disasters in Haiti and Japan, this policy brief identifies neglected dimensions of disaster response preparedness and offers suggestions for improvement.
Policy Brief Unleashing the nUclear Watchdog:
strengthening and reform of the iaea Key Points
• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the nucleus of the global nuclear governance system.
• Since its establishment in 1957, the IAEA has evolved deftly, shedding unrealizable goals and adding new roles when requested, while coping with and learning from catastrophes and alarming non-compliance cases — Chernobyl, Iraq, North Korea, Iran — and adapting to tectonic international changes such as the end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks.
• Today, it fulfills irreplaceable functions in the areas of nuclear safeguards, nuclear safety and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and is steadily developing a role in nuclear security.
• The Agency has maintained a reputation for technical proficiency and effectiveness, despite (or perhaps because of) zero real growth imposed on it for much of the past 27 years.
• The IAEA can thus be regarded as a “bargain” for international peace and security; if it did not exist it would have to be invented.
• Nonetheless, the Agency is in need of both strengthening overall and reform in some areas.
• In recent years, the Agency has suffered increasing politicization of its governing bodies, become embroiled in a protracted compliance dispute with Iran and faltered in its response to the Fukushima disaster.
• In addition, like any 55-year-old entity, the Agency faces “legacy” issues — notably in its management and administration, use of technology, financing and “public diplomacy.”
• The IAEA also faces significant external challenges: avoiding non-compliance surprises by exploiting new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities; preparing for the uncertain trajectory of nuclear energy post-Fukushima; gearing up for equally uncertain roles in verifying nuclear disarmament; meeting stakeholders’ expectations of improved transparency and accountability; and making ends meet in a period of international financial stringency.
• Above all, the Agency needs the renewed support of all its stakeholders, but especially its member states, in depoliticizing the Agency’s governing bodies; complying fully with their obligations; providing the organization with the necessary legal and other authorities; and contributing, in cash and kind, to all of the Agency’s activities.
no. 23 JUne 2012
trevor findlay A CIGI Senior Fellow since 2006, Trevor Findlay holds the William and Jeanie Barton Chair in International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, where he is a professor and director of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance. He is a graduate of the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University, and a former Australian diplomat. For seven years he was Executive Director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in London, United Kingdom.
His previous project for CIGI, from 2006 to 2010, culminated in his four-volume report on The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030: Implications for Safety, Security and Nonproliferation.
Professor Findlay is currently a joint fellow with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, where he is writing a book on the IAEA.
Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog:
Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA Trevor Findlay
The conclusions of the June 2012 report on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by Trevor Findlay are outlined in this policy brief, which contains recommendations for strengthening and reform of the IAEA.
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A Policy Mismatch: Canada and the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region
James Manicom
The United States and Canada, two of the world’s closest allies, have reinvigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the Asia-Pacific region. On balance, however, Canada may not be an ideal Pacific partner for the United States.
about Cigi
The Centre for International Governance Innovation is an independent, non-partisan think tank on international governance. Led by experienced practitioners and distinguished academics, CIGI supports research, forms networks, advances policy debate and generates ideas for multilateral governance improvements. Conducting an active agenda of research, events and publications, CIGI’s interdisciplinary work includes collaboration with policy, business and academic communities around the world.
CIGI’s current research programs focus on four themes: the global economy; global security; the environment and energy; and global development.
CIGI was founded in 2001 by Jim Balsillie, then co-CEO of Research In Motion (BlackBerry), and collaborates with and gratefully acknowledges support from a number of strategic partners, in particular the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario.
Le CIGI a été fondé en 2001 par Jim Balsillie, qui était alors co-chef de la direction de Research In Motion (BlackBerry).
Il collabore avec de nombreux partenaires stratégiques et exprime sa reconnaissance du soutien reçu de ceux-ci, notamment de l’appui reçu du gouvernement du Canada et de celui du gouvernement de l’Ontario.
For more information, please visit www.cigionline.org.
Cigi masthead
Managing Editor, Publications Carol Bonnett
Publications Editor Jennifer Goyder
Publications Editor Sonya Zikic
Assistant Publications Editor Vivian Moser
Media Designer Steve Cross
eXeCutive
President Rohinton Medhora
Vice President of Programs David Dewitt Vice President of Public Affairs Fred Kuntz
CommuniCations
Communications Specialist Kevin Dias kdias@cigionline.org (1 519 885 2444 x 7238) Public Affairs Coordinator Kelly Lorimer klorimer@cigionline.org (1 519 885 2444 x 7265)
