Ludwig Maximilian University Munich
Department of Economics and Faculty of Law
Law and Economics of Financial Contracting
January 25 – 26, 2014 (winter term 2013/14)
Dr. Lars Hornuf
lars.hornuf@jura.uni-muenchen.de
Seminar Description:
Is there a common economic and / or contractual structure across different financial transactions? To analyze this question, seminar participants will explore how economists model the agency problems which are underlying various financial transactions. Law students will investigate the contractual or legal solutions that have evolved in legal practice. The seminar begins with the classical owner vs. manager conflict in joint stock companies. Thereafter, we will examine the incentive structure of (majority) shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders, bondholders, employees as well as corporate outsiders. In the second part of the seminar, we will focus on specific transactions such as credit risk transfers, M&A deals and the funding of risky ventures.
For each topic an economist will be matched with a law student to present a state-of- the art agency model and the according contractual or legal response. Finally, we will jointly evaluate how successful these legal solutions perform in practice.
Prerequisite:
Enrolment as a B.Sc. student at the Department of Economics or LL.M. student at the
Faculty of Law / LMU Munich.
Evaluation:
B.Sc. students (Department of Economics) Presentation (100%)
3 ECTS (2 SWS)
LL.M. students (Faculty of Law) Seminar Paper (67%)
Presentation (33%) 9 ECTS (3 SWS)
Please apply by November 1, 2013 via email (lars.hornuf@jura.uni-muenchen.de) indicating the two seminar topics you are most interested in. Seminar topics will be assigned on a first-come, first-serve basis. Participants are going to meet on November 15, 2013 from 10 am to 12 am to discuss seminar logistics.
Literature:
(1) Bolton, Patrick, Sloan School of Management and David Scharfstein (2012) Agency Problems, Financial Contracting and Predation, Ulan Press.
(2) Cumming, Douglas and Sofia Johan (2013) Venture Capital Financial Contracting: An International Perspective, 2nd ed., Elsevier Science &
Technology.
(3) Hart, Oliver (2001) Financial Contracting, Journal of Economics Literature, Vol.
39, pp. 1079-100.
(4) Kaplan, Steven, Frederic Martel and Per Stromberg (2007) How do Legal Differences and Experience Affect Financial Contracts?, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 16, pp. 273-311.
(5) Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.) (2009) The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A
Comparative and Functional Approach, 2
nded., Oxford University Press.
Seminar outline:
Saturday, January 25 9.00 Introduction
9.15 – 10.45 Managers vs. Owners
Armour, John, Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman (2009) Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in: Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
Berle, Adolph and Gardiner Means (1991) The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Transaction Publishers.
Blair, Magaret and Lynn Stout (1999) A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, pp. 248-328.
Easterbrook, Frank and Daniel Fischel (1996) The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, Harvard University Press.
Fama, Eugene (1980) Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, pp. 288–307.
Fama, Eugene and Michael Jensen (1983) Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, pp. 301-25.
Fleischer, Holger (2002) Die „Business Judgment Rule“ im Spiegel von Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsökonomie, in: Rolf Wank, Heribert Hirte, Kaspar Frey, Holger Fleischer und Gregor Thüsing (eds.), Festschrift für Herbert Wiedemann zum 70. Geburtstag, C.H. Beck.
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling (1976) Theory of the Firm. Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 305-60.
Kaplow, Louis (1992) Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke Law Review, pp.
557-629.
Roe, Mark (1994), Strong Managers, Weak Owners, Princeton University Press.
11.00 – 12.30 Majority vs. Minority Shareholders
Barclay, Michael and Clifford Holderness (1989) Private Benefits of Control of Public Corporations, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 371-95.
Dyck, Alexander and Luigi Zingales (2004) Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, pp. 537-600.
Enriques, Luca, Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman (2009) The Basic Governance
Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constancies, in: Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines and Andrei Shleifer (2000) Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 3-27.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (2002) Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, Journal of Finance, Vol. 55, pp. 1-33.
Nenova, Tatiana (2003) The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, pp. 325-51.
Reese, William and Michael Weisbach (2001) Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 65-104.
14.00 – 15.30 Shareholders vs. Bondholders
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton (1992) An Incomplete Contract Approach to Financial Contracting, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, pp. 473-94.
Armour, John, Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda (2009) Transactions with Creditors, in:
Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
Hornuf, Lars, Markus Reps and Stefan Schäferling (2013) Covenants in europäischen Investment-grade-Unternehmensanleihen, Journal of Banking Law and Banking, 3/2013, pp. 202-10.
Kanda, Hideki (1992) Debtholders and Equityholders, 21 Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 431-48.
Klöhn, Lars (2008) Interessenkonflikte zwischen Aktionären und Gläubigern der
Aktiengesellschaft im Spiegel der Vorstandspflichten, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht, pp. 110-58.
Qi, Yaxuan, Lukas Roth and John Wald (2011) How Legal Environments Affect the Use of Bond Covenants, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 42, pp. 235-62.
Smith, Clifford and Jerold Warner (1979) On Financial Contracting: On Analysis of Bond Covenants, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 117–62.
15.45 – 17.15 Shareholders vs. Employees
Eidenmüller, Horst, Andreas Engert und Lars Hornuf (2009) Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 European Business Organization Law Review, S. 1-33.
Enriques, Luca, Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman (2009) The Basic Governance
Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constancies, in: Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
Fauver, Larry and Michael Fuerst (2006) Does Good Corporate Governance Include Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 82, pp. 673-710.
Gorton, Gary and Frank Schmid (2004) Capital, Labor and The Firm: A Study of German Codetermination, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 2, pp. 863-905.
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling (1979) Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, Journal of Business, Vol. 52, pp. 469-506.
17.30 – 19.00 Trading on Capital Markets
Easterbrook, Frank and Daniel Fischel (1984) Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Virginia Law Review, pp. 669-715.
Black, Fischer (1986) Noise, Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, pp. 529-43.
Hertig, Gerard, Reiner Kraakman and Edward Rock (2009) Issuers and Investor Protection, in:
Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
Jackson, Howel und Mark Roe (2009) Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws:
Resource-Based Evidence, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 93, pp. 207-38.
Milgrom, Paul and Nancy Stokey (1982) Information, Trade and Common Knowledge, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 26, pp. 17-27.
Mülbert, Peter (2013) Anlegerschutz und Finanzmarktregulierung – Grundlagen, 177 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 160-211.
Stigler, George (1964) Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, Journal of Business, Vol. 37, S. 117-42.
Tirole, Jean (1982) On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations, Econometrica, Vol. 50, pp. 1163-82.
Sunday, January 26
9.15 – 10.45 Credit Risk Transfer by Banks and Individuals
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2005) Systemic Risk and Regulation, Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper No. 95-24.
Baker, Tom (1996) On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Texas Law Review, pp. 237-92.
Hakenes, Hendrik and Isabel Schnabel (2010) Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 19, pp. 308-32.
Hellwig, Martin (2009) Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime- Mortgage Financial Crisis, De Economist, Vol. 157, pp. 129-207.
Henderson, Todd (2009) Credit Derivatives Are Not 'Insurance', Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 1-59.
Nicolo, Antonio and Loriana Pelizzon (2008) Credit Derivatives, Capital Requirements and Opaque OTC Markets, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 17, pp. 444-63.
Patrick McConnell and Keith Blacker (2012) Systemic Operational Risk the UK Payment Protection Insurance Scandal, Journal of Operational Risk, Vol. 7, pp. 79-139.
Winter, R.A. (2000) Optimal Insurance Under Moral Hazard, in: Dionne, Georges (ed.) Handbook of Insurance. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Blakey, James (2013) Tax Naked Credit Default Swaps for What They Are: Legalized Gambling, 8 University of Massachusetts Law Review, pp. 136-162.
11.00 – 12.30 Mergers and Acquisitions
Hessler, Martin (2006) Material Adverse Change-Klauseln in deutschen
Unternehmenskaufverträgen – (r)eine Modeerscheinung?, in: Theodor Baum (ed.) Festschrift für Ulrich Huber zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, pp. 739-56.
Hornuf, Lars and Ulrich Zanconato (2011) Material Adverse Change Klauseln in deutschen Übernahmeangeboten: Eine rechtstatsächliche Untersuchung, Journal of Banking Law and Banking, 5/2011, pp. 412-6.
Kanda, Hicield and Saul Levmore (1985) Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA Law Review, pp. 429-73.
Kuntz, Thilo (2009) Die Auslegung von Material Adverse Change (MAC)-Klauseln in Unternehmenskaufverträgen, Deutsches Steuerrecht, pp. 377-83.
Mahoney, Paul and Mark Weinstein (1999) The Appraisal Remedy and Merger Premium, 1 American Law and Economics Review, pp. 239-75.
Picot, Gerhard and Raoul Duggal (2003) Unternehmenskauf: Schutz vor wesentlichen
nachteiligen Veränderungen der Grundlage der Transaktion durch sog. MAC-Klauseln, Der Betrieb, Vol. 49, pp. 2635-42.
Rock, Edward, Paul Davis, Hideki Kanda and Reiner Kraakman (2009) Fundamental Changes, in: Kraakman, Reiner et al. (eds.), The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press.
Schwartz, Alan and Ronald Gilson (2005) Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21, pp. 330-58.
14.00 – 15.30 Mutual Funds, Pension Funds and Hedge Funds
Almazan, Andres, Keith Brown, Murray Carlson, David Chapman (2004) Why Constrain your Mutual Fund Manager?, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 73, pp. 289–321.
Chevalier, Judith and Glenn Ellison (1997) Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, pp. 1167–200.
Cohen, Susan and Laura Starks (1988) Estimation Risk and Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers, Management Science, Vol. 34, pp. 1067-79.
Del Guercio, Diane, Larry Dann and Megan Partch (2003) Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End Investment Companies, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69, pp. 111–52.
Deli, Daniel and Raj Varma (2002) Contracting in the Investment Management Industry:
Evidence From Mutual Funds, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 63, pp. 79–98.
Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock (2007) Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 1021-93.
Brav, Alon, Wei Jiang , Randall Thomas and Frank Partnoy (2008) Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, Journal of Finance, Vol. 63, pp. 1729-75.
15.45 – 17.15 Venture Capital Contracting
Bratton, William (2002) Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 Michigan Law Review, pp. 891-945.
Cumming, Douglas and Sofia Johan (2013) Venture Capital Financial Contracting: An International Perspective, 2nd ed., Elsevier Science & Technology.
Cumming, Douglas (2008) Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 1947-82.
De Meza, David und David Webb (1987) Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, pp. 281-92.
Gompers, Paul und Josh Lerner (2000) Money Chasing Deals?: The Impact of Fund Inflows on Private Equity Valuations, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 55, pp. 281-325.
Hochberg, Yael (2012) Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm.
Review of Finance, Vol. 16, pp. 429-80.
Kaplan, Steven and Per Strömberg (2004) Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, pp. 2177-210.
Kaplan, Steven and Per Strömberg (2003) Venture Capitalists as Economic Principals, NBER Reporter, pp. 22-5.
Kaplan, Steven and Per Strömberg (2003) Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World:
An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70, pp. 281-315.
Stiglitz, Joseph und Andrew Weiss (1981) Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, Vol. 71, pp. 393-410.
Tian, Xuan (2012) The Role of Venture Capital Syndication in Value Creation for Entrepreneurial Firms, Review of Finance, Vol. 16, S. 245-83.
17.30 – 19.00 Crowdfunding and Crowdinvesting
Beck, Ralf (2012) Crowdinvesting. Die Investition der Vielen, Amazon Distribution GmbH.
Belleflamme, Paul, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher (2013) Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, Journal of Business Venturing, forthcoming.
Belleflamme, Paul, Thomas Lambert and Armin Schwienbacher (2013) Individual
Crowdfunding Practices, Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, forthcoming.
Bradford, Steven (2012) Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 Columbia Business Law Review, pp. 1-150.
Cohn, Stuart (2012) The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64 Florida Law Review, pp. 1433-46.
Hazan, Thomas Lee (2012) Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securities Laws – Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 North Carolina Law Review, pp. 1735-807.
Fink, Andrew (2012) Protecting the Crowd and Raising Capital Through the JOBS Act, SSRN Working Paper, abrufbar unter: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046051.
Kelley, Eric und Paul Tetlock (2013) How Wise Are Crowds? Insights from Retail Orders and Stock Returns, Journal of Finance, im Erscheinen.
Klöhn, Lars and Lars Hornuf (2012) Crowdinvesting in Deutschland – Markt, Rechtslage und Regulierungsperspektiven, Journal of Banking Law and Banking, 4/2012, pp. 237-66.
Neiss, Sherwood, Jason Best and Zak Cassady-Dorion (2013) Crowdfund Investing for Dummies, John Wiley & Sons.
Martin, Thomas (2012) The JOBS Act of 2012: Balancing Fundamental Securities Law, Principals With the Demands of the Crowd, SSRN Working Paper, abrufbar unter:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2040953.
