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Comparing Steering P ro file s of P o litic a l Systems: The Case o f Israel
Itzhak Galnoor*
* P o lit ic a l Science Department
Hebrew U n iv e rs ity , Jerusalem, Is ra e l
Prepared f o r the Conference on Comparative Research on National P o lit ic a l Systems
Science Center, B e rlin July 9-12, 1984
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
In diesem A rb e its p a p ie r w ird vorgeschlagen, Steuerungsprozesse a ls zentralen An
satz f ü r vergleichende Untersuchungen ganzer p o lit is c h e r Systeme zu verwenden.
Anhand e in e r F a lls tu d ie über das is ra e lis c h e p o litis c h e System z e ig t der Autor die N ü tz lic h k e it dieses Ansatzes. Die O p e ra tio n a lis ie ru n g beruht auf einem spe
z ie lle n p o lito lo g is c h e n Zugang aus der Perspektive der Kommunikationstheorie, m.a.W. auf der Annahme, daß das System ein Kommunikationsnetz d a r s t e llt , m it Ka
nälen, In fo rm a tio n s flü s s e n , usw.; das g le ich e g i l t f ü r den Steuerungsmechanismus s e lb s t.
P o litis c h e Entwicklung w ird a ls ein Prozeß der Entwicklung von "Steuerungskapazi
t ä t " gesehen, was n ic h t unbedingt m it e in e r Demokratisierung einhergeht. Demokra
tis c h e p o litis c h e Entwicklung w ird a ls eine s p e z ie lle Form der p o litis c h e n Ent
wicklung d e f in ie r t - ein Prozeß, in dem Bürger ih re M öglichkeiten ausweiten, auf die Steuerung E in flu ß zu nehmen.
H in s ic h tlic h des Steuerungsmodus im p o litis c h e n System Is ra e ls kommt der Autor zu dem Ergebnis, daß eine demokratische p o litis c h e Entwicklung n ic h t ohne eine po
lit is c h e Entwicklung s ta ttfin d e n kann und daß diese beiden Prozesse g le ic h z e itig ablaufen können. Für eine demokratische Steuerung bedarf es gewisser Komponenten wie Zugang und B e te ilig u n g , d ie in Verbindung m it der Steuerungskapazität des Systems den E in flu ß des Bürgers ve rstä rke n . E inige vergleichende Hypothesen wer
den vor dem H intergrund der is ra e lis c h e n F a lls tu d ie a u fg e s te llt und e r ö r t e r t .
ABSTRACT
This paper suggests a focus on "s te e rin g ” as a key concept f o r comparative re search o f whole p o lit ic a l systems. I t attem pts to demonstrate the usefulness o f th is approach f o r the study o f the Is r a e li p o lit ic a l system. The o p e ra tio n a liz a tio n o f th is approach is based on the study o f p o lit ic s from a communication pe r
sp e ctive , th a t is , the a n a lysis o f the system as a communication network w ith channels, in fo rm a tio n flo w , e tc . as w ell as the s te e rin g mechanism i t s e l f .
P o lit ic a l development is defined as a process o f c re a tin g "s te e rin g ca p a city" and i t is not in h e re n tly re la te d to d e m o cra tiza tio n . Democratic p o lit ic a l development is defined as a special case o f p o l it ic a l development - the process whereby c itiz e n s increase t h e ir o p p o rtu n itie s to have an impact on s te e rin g .
Regarding the s te e rin g mode o f the Is r a e li p o lit ic a l system, i t is concluded th a t democratic p o l it ic a l development cannot occur w ith o u t p o lit ic a l development but th a t these processes can take place sim ultaneously, Democratic s te e rin g re quire s c e rta in components such as access and p a r tic ip a tio n , which in a d d itio n to the system's s te e rin g c a p a c ity , w i l l su sta in the c it iz e n 's im pact. On the basis o f the Is r a e li case stud y, several comparative p ro p o s itio n s are suggested.
Introduction
L is tin g some im portant lessons fo r the c o m p a ra tivist, Dogan and Pelassy warn us th a t "th e most general a n a ly tic a l cate g o rie s, the most am bitious ones, are not n e ce ssa rily the easiest to o p e ra tio n a liz e " (1984, p.2 2). In th is paper I suggest a focus on "s te e rin g ", based on p o lit ic a l communication, as the key concept fo r comparative research o f whole p o lit ic a l systems. I t is a general a n a ly tic a l approach, and my only excuse fo r not heeding the wise words o f Dogan and P e llassy is my desire to "o p e ra tio n a liz e " i t , i . e . , to demonstrate the usefulness o f th is approach f o r the study o f the Is r a e li p o lit ic a l system.
The exte nt to which what I c a ll here "an approach" is a p p lica b le to other p o lit ic a l systems w ill be discussed at the end o f th is paper. Nonetheless, it s comparative p o te n tia l c a lls f o r , as we are a ll fond o f saying, " fu r th e r stud y".
The purpose is not to replace other approaches or a n a ly tic a l c a te g o rie s , but to add another conceptual dimension - "s te e rin g " - to comparative stu d ie s o f p o lit ic a l systems.
The idea is not new, namely, th a t in a d d itio n to the e x is tin g comparative th e o re tic a l frameworks, there is a need to study p o lit ic s from a communication perspe ctive and to compare s te e rin g modes, or p r o file s o f d iffe r e n t p o lit ic a l system. This approach has been s u c ce ssfu lly developed in o rg a n iz a tio n a l theory (Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1957; Blau and S co tt, 1962; Gross 1964; Landau, 1969;
H all 1972) and form ulated fo r the f i r s t time fo r whole systems by Deutsch (1953, 1963). There have re c e n tly been new attempts to expand on i t (see Kochen, 1975; Kochen & Deutsch, 1980; M e rrit & Russett, 1981). What is perhaps new is my attempt to apply i t to a whole s p e c ific p o lit ic a l system; to p o in t
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out c e rta in communication components o f ste e rin g th a t can be studied compara
t iv e ly ; and to form ulate a th e o re tic a l lin k between s te e rin g and p o lit ic a l development.
In terms of the lit e r a t u r e on comparative government the focus on ste e rin g belongs to those studies th a t look on patterns o f government as independent v a ria b le s (Riggs in H o lt and Turner 1970, p .7 7 ). I t is also anchored in s tu d ie s o f p o l i t i c a l developm ent as p a rt o f so cio -e co n o m ic development (Deutsch, 1961). I t fo llo w s the ideas o f those who presented the "development syndrome" (Pye, 1966, p. 45) in terms o f the evolvin g ca p a city o f the p o lit ic a l system. The approach is also fu n c tio n a l to the extent th a t i t views "s te e rin g "
as a fu n c tio n o f the p o lit ic a l system, and "government" as s o c ie ty 's p ilo t (Deutsch, Domingues and Heclo, 1981, p. 3 ) .
The concept o f s te e r in g may a ls o serve as a b rid g e to th e grow ing lit e r a t u r e on " g o v e rn a b ility " (C ro z ie r, Huntington and Watanuki, 1975). I t stops sho rt o f in c o rp o ra tin g the actual outputs o f p o lit ic a l systems, because i t focuses only on the ca p a city o f the s te e rin g mechanism to achieve re s u lts , not on the outcomes themselves. Thus "s te e rin g concepts" could also c o n trib u te to the comparative lit e r a t u r e on policy-m aking. F in a lly , ste e rin g as presented in th is paper is p a rt o f a much more elaborate th e o re tic a l model o f p o lit ic a l communication (G a ln o o r, 1982). I t is somewhat a r b it r a r y to cut o f f the d is c u s s io n o f s te e rin g from i t s broader communication c o n te x t. But fo r b r e v ity , only the most rudim entary references to the communication model w ill be made. S im ila rly , the Is r a e li case study in my book is much more d e ta ile d , and o n ly a ve ry general d e s c r ip tio n o f the s te e rin g components, can be presented here.
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I . STEERING; THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Steering Capacity
A p o lit ic a l system is as a network o f communication, because i t represents r e la t iv e ly stab le p a tterns o f human co n tacts. I t enables in te ra c tio n to be repeated a s u ff ic ie n t number o f times to enable some c r y s ta lliz a tio n o f message co n te n t, meaning and channels. I t becomes a p o lit ic a l communication network once i t s ta rts to s p e c ia liz e , to be organized around p o lit ic a l in s titu tio n s and to e s ta b lis h contacts between the p o lit ic a l "ce n te rs " and "non-centers" o f s o c ie ty . C onstructing a p o lit ic a l communication network means: 1) a higher le v e l o f d if f e r e n t ia t io n and a s p e c ia liz e d network fo r the c ir c u la tio n o f p o lit ic a l in fo rm a tio n , ( f o r example, the development o f a n a tio n a l bureauc
ra c y ); 2) formal channels fo r the flow o f support to the p o lit ic a l center ( f o r example, vo te s) and f o r the d iffu s io n o f p o l i t i c a l d e c is io n s , law s, and propaganda to the p e rip h e ry; 3) a h ie ra rc h ic a l q u a lity o f in s t it u t io n s which gives some immediate order to the complex o f channels; and 4) e ff o r ts by the center toward co o rd in a tio n and c o n tro l, which supplies the cement fo r the whole system.
The existence o f a p o l it ic a l network o f communication is an absolute p re re q u is ite f o r the development o f s te e rin g c a p a c ity . This is not ju s t another way o f saying th a t p o lit ic a l systems must r e ly on in s t it u t io n - b u ild in g . The analysis o f communication networks is concerned also w ith components such as inform ation flo w (c o n te n ts , p a tte rn s , and d ir e c tio n s ) , the various channels and t h e ir many fu n c tio n s , and the locus o f co o rd in a tio n and co n tro l - the
"sw itchb oard," or the p o lit ic a l center o f the network.
Steering is a h ig h ly a b stra ct concept. Yet i t s h ifts our a tte n tio n to a
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d if f e r e n t - and e a s ie r to compare - governing a c t i v i t y . Governments, o f course, form ulate p o lic y , a llo c a te resources and go to war, but a ll these re q u ire s te e rin g , th a t is , the a b i l i t y to a d ju st to environmental changes, to make binding d e cisio n s, to in ve st in the system's own v i a b i l i t y and to avoid breakdowns. The most conspicuous aspect o f ste e rin g is purposeful movement.
Steering is the goal-seeking f a c i l i t y o f the p o lit ic a l system. Without i t , no goal can be achieved. Obviously the s te e rin g f a c i l i t y must be lin ke d to the p o lit ic a l communication network. Otherwise we may have a disconnected helm:
the system can d r i f t , but i t cannot develop purposeful movement, or even m aintain s t a b i l it y in the the face o f external pressures.
In order to o p e ra tio n a liz e th is general concept o f s te e rin g fo r comparative a n a ly s is , I s h a ll confine i t to "b u ild in g s te e rin g c a p a c ity ". A ccordingly, s te e rin g does not guarantee goal achievement, but improved ste e rin g means a higher ca p a city f o r achieving a g o al, or fo r coping w ith c ris e s . Steering capacity means also the a b i l i t y to b rin g a system under c o n tro l; and c o n tro l in th is context means keeping the system w ith in a s te e rin g range (compare V icke rs, 1957, p. 41; Kuhn, 1974, p. 25). Assuming th a t the re e x is ts a communication network th a t feeds the s te e rin g mechanism o f the p o lit ic a l system, we can examine the mechanism i t s e l f to evaluate it s c a p a city.
The proposed c r i t e r i a fo r e va luatin g th is capacity are: autonomy, monopoly on o f f ic i a l symbols, exclusiveness, transm ission and in ta k e , and d iffu s io n and l e g i b i l i t y o f in fo rm a tio n . They w i l l be discussed in d e ta il in Part Two o f th is paper.
The questions associated w ith these c r it e r ia re fe r to issues such as: to what exte nt is the p o lit ic a l s te e rin g mechanism independent? Is there only one
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s te e rin g mechanism operating in th a t sta te or society? Has i t kept the system on a s ta b le course, preven ting d r i f t and overcoming th re a ts ? What is the p r in c ip le means fo r m aintaining s te e rin g capacity - coercion or persuasion?
P o litic a l Development
The old debate about the d e fin itio n o f p o lit ic a l development is fa r from s e ttle d . (See Huntington and Domingues in Greenstein and Polsby, 1975„ v o l. 3, pp. 1-11.) Two general problems continue to haunt us. F ir s t , the tendency to a ttr ib u te p o s itiv e connotations to “ p o lit ic a l development" (and to "develop
ment" in general) as a movement toward a d e sirab le s ta te o f a f f a ir s . Second, and c lo s e ly r e la te d , the tendency to confuse p o l i t i c a l development w ith progress toward s o c ie ta l or p o lit ic a l democracy ( c f . Linz and Stepan, 1978, p.
97). The con ce p tu a liza tio n o f p o lit ic a l development in terms o f s te e rin g can provide some answers to these problems, even though i t may be expected to ra is e some new ones.
I suggest th a t a reconstructed d e fin itio n o f p o lit ic a l development should assert th a t the higher the s te e rin g ca p a city o f a p o lit ic a l system, the more th is system is p o l it ic a l l y developed. P o lit ic a l development is thus a movement toward c re a tin g and improving s te e rin g ca p a city. A developed p o lit ic a l system has high marks on a ll the f iv e c r i t e r i a o f ste e rin g ca p a city lis te d above. ( I s h a ll la te r add another one: avoidance o f breakdowns). A ccord ingly, various
" p r o file s " o f underdeveloped, developing and developed p o lit ic a l systems can be drawn in terms o f the various combination o f t h e ir s te e rin g c h a ra c te ris tic s .
D e m o c ra tic p o l i t i c a l d e v e lo p m e n t is a s p e c ia l case o f p o l i t i c a l development. I t is characte rized by some other components which, in a d d itio n to s te e rin g c a p a c ity , w i l l sustain the c itiz e n s ' impact on s te e rin g . The
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essence o f democratic development is th e re fo re not ju s t s te e rin g , but members' in c o rp o ra tio n and p a rtic ip a tio n in the communication network. Two im portant conclusions fo llo w : F ir s t , p o lit ic a l development is not in h e re n tly re la te d to dem ocratization. P o lit ic a l development thus becomes a more n e u tra l concept: the refinem ent o f ste e rin g ca p a city th a t can be used fo r d iffe r e n t purposes and can r e s u lt in the emergence o f d if f e r e n t p o l it ic a l regim es. Simply s ta te d , s te e rin g capacity can be achieved through coercion and b ru ta l fo rc e . Secondly, i t fo llo w s th a t the re are no democratic undeveloped p o lit ic a l systems. This may e x is t, o f course, in small communities, but not in r e la t iv e ly large and complex systems. D em ocratization re q u ire s th e re fo re a c e r ta in degree o f developed s te e rin g c a p a c ity . This degree is d i f f i c u l t to a s c e rta in , but i t is achieved when a tu rn in the ce n tra l helm steers the whole system to a new course. Once th is co n d itio n has been met, we can ask the f i r s t questions about the system's dem ocratization:
* Can c itiz e n s gain access to the p o lit ic a l communication network ( i . e . , to p o lit ic a l resources); do they have the o p p o rtu n ity to jo in the p o lit ic a l system v ia a v o lu n ta ry lin k u p w ith the network?
* Do independent in d iv id u a ls and groups a c tu a lly p a rtic ip a te in p o lit ic s , i . e . , i n i t i a t e info rm a tion flo w (and pressure) from below?
I f one happens to be in te re s te d in the question o f whether a c e rta in p o l it ic a l system is (o r is becoming) democratic (and th is is a norm ative concern), one should ask i f there are in d ic a tio n s th a t c e n tra l ste e rin g is influ ence d by autonomous c itiz e n s who s u b je c tiv e ly b e lie ve in t h e ir ro le in p o lit ic s , and who have access to the communication network and can a c tu a lly use i t .
The e v a lu a tio n o f c it iz e n s ' impact on s te e rin g is complex because the
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number o f p o ssib le "in flu e n c e s " is p o t e n t ia lly as great as the number o f c itiz e n s and groups in the s o c ie ty . However, im po rta nt steps toward the understanding o f c it iz e n s ' ro le s in the democratic process have been made re c e n tly in the growing lit e r a t u r e on p a rtic ip a tio n (Thompson, 1970; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Nie and Verba, 1975; Converse, 1975; McPherson e t al 1977;
M ilb ra th and Goel, 1977; Verba, 1978; Almond and Pow ell, 1978; Verba and Pye, 1978; Powell, 1982). They a ll enrich our understanding o f the many d iffe r e n t v a ria b le s th a t in flu e n c e the degree o f c it iz e n s ' impact on s te e rin g . The proposal c r it e r ia fo r studying the process whereby c itiz e n s gain impact on ste e rin g are: p o lit ic a l e q u a lity , responsiveness to feedback and openness. As in our discussion o f s te e rin g ca p a city, these c r it e r ia do not enable us to examine the actu a l r e s u lts o f c it iz e n s ' in flu e n c e on s te e rin g , o n ly the p o te n tia l o f so doing. In many respects they can be regarded as the "system ic c o n d itio n s " which in d ic a te the p r o b a b ilit ie s th a t c itiz e n s would become involved in the communication network and have a say in the governing process.
On the basis of the in fo rm a tio n gathered about the system 's s te e rin g ca p a city and about c itiz e n s ' impact on s te e rin g , one can draw crude 'p r o f ile s ' o f system 's p o l it ic a l and democratic development. Table 1 provides some illu s t r a t io n s o f the d iffe r e n t possible com binations.
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Table 1: Examples o f s te e rin g combinations Steering
ca p a city
C itiz e n s ' impact
on ste e rin g P r o file o f development
(1) low low p o l i t i c a l l y undeveloped
system
(2) medium low developing, nondemocratic
system
(3) high low p o l i t i c a l l y developed, non
democratic system
(4) medium medium simultaneous p o lit ic a l and
democratic development
(5) medium high d e m o cra tica lly developed,
lo s in g s te e rin g capacity
(6) high medium-high p o l i t i c a l l y and democrat
i c a l l y developed system
Note th a t the examples do not include the case o f low s te e rin g ca p acity and gh impact. This is not p o ssible when a system s ta r ts to develop. I t could found as a sequence in case (5) - a system th a t is on the verge o f a breakdown in i t s s te e rin g mechanism. More d e ta ile d d is c u s s io n w i l l be presented la te r in connection w ith the Is r a e li case.
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I I . ISRAEL AS A CASE STUDY
Is ra e l is apparently considered a d i f f i c u l t case fo r comparative studies of n a tio n a l p o lit ic a l systems. A lb e it a new s ta te , i t is not u s u a lly included in stu d ie s o f new or developing n a tio n s; although a democratic regime, i t is n e v e r th e le s s f r e q u e n t ly dropped fro m c o m p a ra tiv e s tu d ie s o f w e s te rn dem ocracies. Powell (1982) in clu d e s Is ra e l in h is l i s t o f contemporary democracies, but " fo r p ra c tic a l reasons o f c o m p a ra b ility ", Is ra e l is excluded from much o f the s t a t is t ic a l a n alysis in subsequent chapters (p . 6. 239).
L ijp h a r t , on the o th e r hand, was not deterred by I s r a e l’ s uniqueness and c la s s ifie d i t as a sem iconsociational democracy (1977, 129-134). Benjamin's (1972) comparison o f p o lit ic a l development in Is ra e l and In d ia ; and Inkeles and Smith (1974) in t h e ir general analysis o f modernization are good examples o f what can be done w ith comparative cro ss-cou ntry categories o f s im ila r it y or c o n tra s t.
My argument is th a t Is r a e l's seemingly unique path o f p o lit ic a l development makes i t a good general case-study fo r comparative research. My aim here, however, is more r e s tr ic te d : p o lit ic a l development, when s trip p e d to it s basic raw m a te ria ls , can be analyzed in a way th a t overcomes most o f the tr a d itio n a l problems associated w ith the "proper" choice o f co u n trie s (see Przeworski and Teune, 1970; E ckstein, 1975: and Dogan and Pelassy, 1984 pp. 99-138). Thus, i f we probe the communication roots o f p o lit ic s in general, and o f the exercise o f power in p a r t ic u la r , we can w orry less about u n c o n tro lla b le comparisons.
Comparing ju s t the s te e rin g p r o f ile o f d iffe r e n t p o lit ic a l systems is a more modest e xe rcise , because we must s ta r t w ith c e rta in assumptions or pro p o sitio n s regarding the p o lit ic a l network, the channels and the flo w o f in fo rm a tio n .
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Nevertheless, I b e lie ve th a t i t is also possible to is o la te s te e rin g as a co m p a ra tive item f o r re s e a rc h , much l i k e the s tu d ie s o f s o c ia liz a t io n , p a r tic ip a tio n , or policy-m aking.
What fo llo w s is a case-study o f ste e rin g in a s in g le country. The focus is on Is r a e l, but the research items and the hypotheses are general (see on th is issue Binder, 1962). C ertain r e s tr ic tio n s should be s p e c ifie d . F ir s t , ste e rin g in Is ra e l w ill be discussed o n ly in re la tio n to in te rn a l p o lit ic s . This is a severe r e s t r ic t io n , given the c e n t r a lit y o f external problems in Is r a e l, but i t does not im pair the comparative value o f the e xe rcise. Second, some o f the most in te re s tin g aspects o f p o lit ic a l development in Is ra e l are pushed in to the background to perm it a focus on s te e rin g . Thus the fo llo w in g discussion o f I s r a e l's s te e rin g capacity ( i . e . p o lit ic a l development) and c itiz e n s ' impact on s te e rin g ( i . e . dem ocratic p o l it ic a l development) is based on the fin d in g s presented in my book (see summary in Galnoor, 1982, pp„ 368-378). T h ird ly , the presen tatio n is n e ce ssa rily sketchy because o f the com plexity o f the case and i t becomes even more so as a r e s u lt o f any attem pt to squeeze in to the presentation a comparison o f two periods in I s r a e l's p o lit ic a l development: the p re -s ta te period (1930-1948) and the e a rly -s ta te period (1949-1967). There w ill also be references to the la te - s ta te period (1968-1984).
Steering Capacity
In terms o f the general process o f p o lit ic a l development, the p re -s ta te and e a rly state periods represent a continuum. I t was during the 1960's th a t s ig n if ic a n t changes s ta rte d to take place (Galnoor, 1980). In th is section I s h a ll present the various s te e rin g components u n til the 1960's, to illu s t r a t e the p o te n tia l o f such an approach fo r intersystem and in tra-syste m comparisons.
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A minimum amount o f common contents is a necessary - but not s u f f ic ie n t - p re re q u is ite fo r the beginning o f p o lit ic a l development. In the case o f Is ra e l t h is p r e r e q u is ite was met from the ve ry b e g in n in g , because o u t o f many sentiments and dive rge nt h is to r ic a l events, a locus o f id e n tific a tio n c a lle d Zionism emerged.
By the 1930's the ste e rin g components o f the Jewish community in P a le stin e could be c le a r ly discerned. There emerged a p o lit ic a l center dominated by the lab or movement, and i t operated through a network in which strong and ra th e r s ta b le i n s t i t u t i o n s played the c r i t i c a l r o le s . The e xte n sio n o f p a rty c h a n n e ls , supplem ented by th e a f f i l i a t e d p re s s , and r e in fo r c e d by th e bureaucracy o f the secondary centers (such as the H is ta d ru t - The General Federation o f Workers), provided the center w ith p e n e tra tiv e and maintenance c a p a b ilitie s .
In the s ta te p e rio d , these channels continued to enable the p o l it ic a l system to perform the in te g ra tiv e (p e n e tra tio n ) and s ta b iliz in g (maintenance) fu n c tio n s . By the mid-1960's there was s t i l l a great deal o f in te rlo c k in g in t h e i r o p e r a tio n s . The p a r t i e s ' s tro n g e s t c o n t r ib u t io n to s te e r in g was c o o r d in a t io n ; th e b u re a u cra cy - c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ; and th e mass media - reinforcem ent. The f i r s t two are channels based p r im a rily on o rg a n iz a tio n s ; hence t h e ir advantage in both personal contacts and c e n tra liz e d c o n tro l. The l a t t e r are channels based on mass technology; hence t h e ir advantage in the d iffu s io n o f in fo rm a tio n , f l e x i b i l i t y , and a d a p ta b ility to other channels. The three channels, i f they are adequately d iffe r e n tia te d , and yet operating w ith some syn ch ro n iza tio n , can be described as a "winning combination" f o r p o lit ic a l development.
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The a u th o rity o f ta x p o lit ic a l system in the p re -s ta te period was based on v o lu n ta ry compliance up to the f i r s t national e le c tio n s in the sta te period (1949). N evertheless, the p o lit ic a l cen ter proved capable o f coping w ith successive c r i t i c a l challenges which required supreme ste e rin g performance. In a m atter o f f iv e years (1945-1950) there was a serie s o f almost simultaneous c ris e s : the afterm ath o f the Holocaust in Europe, the s tru g g le w ith the B r itis h government in P a le s tin e , the in te rn a l stru g g le w ith s p lin te r groups, the war w ith the Arab c o u n trie s , the establishm ent o f the s ta te , the massive in flu x o f new immigrants and economic a u s te rity . In re tro s p e c t we know th a t the p o lit ic a l center and it s ste e rin g mechanism system coped w ith a ll these te s ts and was supported by a great m a jo rity o f the Jewish community. We also know th a t i t was able to ste e r c le a r o f im m o b iliza tio n and breakdowns. And f i n a l l y , i f s te e rin g performance is judged by the outcomes, (not discussed in th is paper), we can say th a t i t met the most im portant goal: s e c u rity and the s u rv iv a l o f the s ta te . F a ilin g to achieve th is goal would have rendered a ll other c o lle c tiv e goals ir r e le v a n t.
In the sta te p e rio d , the p o lit ic a l center secured compliance w ith l i t t l e investment in coe rcion , kept a sta b le course w h ile managing c o n f lic t s , and made b in d in g de cisio n s. Indeed, during the e a rly s ta te p e rio d , the network was f u r t h e r developed d e s p ite the d r a s tic changes in the com position o f the population and the ta x in g challenges in the external environment. We tu rn now to the evaluation o f the s te e rin g capacity i t s e l f .
Autonomy
Autonomy is the r e la tiv e independence o f the p o lit ic a l system to conduct p o lit ic s as a separate so cia l fu n c tio n . The autonomy o f the Is r a e li p o lit ic a l
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system was based, already in the p re -s ta te p e rio d , on the a b i li t y o f the p o lit y to "invade" s o c ie ty , and not the other way around. The Is r a e li system was carved out o f Zionism which was b a s ic a lly a p o lit ic a l movement w ith r e la t iv e ly few " n o n p o litic a l r u le s " . The p o lit ic a l helm was connected to , yet separate from , the s o c ia l, c u lt u r a l, or economic subsystems. R eligion was d iffe r e n t.
There was no o v e ra l1 t r a d itio n a l a u th o rity , but the main challenge to Zionism came from Jewish orthodoxy which did not recognize secular a u th o rity and i t s p o lit ic a l ru le s . This has been a continuous serious th r e a t, but in the period under review, the orthodox groups e ith e r remained outside the movement, or jo in e d w ithout cha lle ng in g d ir e c t ly the secular leadership o f the movement and, la t e r , o f the s ta te . The existence o f a r e lig io u s and Z io n is t camp w ith in Zionism helped to m itig a te th is th re a t. The other im portant development in the p re -s ta te period was th a t the Jewish community in P alestin e g ra d u a lly achieved lo c a l autonomy w ith in the Z io n is t movement, and e v e n tu a lly took over the leadership o f the movement as a whole.
The s itu a tio n in Is ra e l was perhaps unique because the re was not only autonomy o f p o lit ic a l s te e rin g , but also domination o f the p o lit y over many s o c ia l and economic spheres th a t are outside the realm o f p o lit ic s in other c o u n trie s , The d iffe r e n tia tio n process in the sta te period was almost the reverse - not a s tru g g le o f the p o lit y to fre e i t s e l f from tr a d itio n a l social fo r c e s , but a gradual re la x a tio n in the high degree o f p o lit ic iz a t io n of s o c ie ty . A ccordingly, during the sta te p e rio d , the s te e rin g mechanism re ta in e d i t s autonomy, but lo s t some o f i t s dominance over other spheres.
Monopoly on O f f ic ia l Symbols
This includes a monopoly on o f f ic i a l info rm a tion and on the cre a tio n or
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re p re senta tion o f p o lit ic a l symbols associated w ith common contents, such as the nation or the s ta te . Monopoly on o f f ic i a l symbols during the p re -s ta te period was low. Form ally, the Jewish p o lit ic a l system was recognized ju s t as a re lig io u s community by the B r itis h Government in P a le s tin e . E x te rn a lly , the Z io n is t o rg a n iza tio n s spoke fo r the Jews outside P a le s tin e . But more im portant was th e c o m p e titio n w ith in th e Jewish community in P a le s tin e over th e id e o lo g ic a l and p o lit ic a l monopoly on the cre a tio n and repre senta tion o f the symbols associated w ith common con ten ts, such as the n a tio n , Zionism and the fu tu re s ta te . The main contender was the R e v is io n is t movement and it s m ilit a r y o r g a n iz a tio n ( E t z e l) , which re garded i t s e l f as an a lt e r n a t iv e to la b o r dom ination, and presented a d iffe r e n t version of Zionism. There were also the u ltra -o rth o d o x groups which were a n ti- Z io n is t and refused to take p a rt in the s e c u la r in s t it u t io n s o f the Jewish community. W ith in the m a jo rity which supported the Jewish p o lit ic a l ce n te r, there were powerful secondary ce n ters, economic org a n iza tio n s and a quasi-independent m ilit a r y body (th e Palmach).
These did not undermine the le g itim a c y o f the c e n te r's p o lit ic a l a u th o rity , but they in s is te d on m aintaining independence in t h e ir spheres o f a c tio n . The more id e o lo g ic a l groups (such as the kibb utz movements) were p a r tic u la r ly m ilit a n t w ith respect to t h e ir c u ltu ra l and symbolic c o n trib u tio n to the s o c ie ty and the fu tu re s ta te .
Some o f these r iv a lr ie s came to a clash in the years when the sta te was e s ta b lis h e d . The le g itim a cy o f the P ro visio n a l Government set up in May 1948 was g e n e ra lly accepted, but there were several cases o f d ir e c t c o n fro n ta tio n s during th a t year. Almost a ll o f them were solved through compromises, the only notable exception being the use o f m ilit a r y power in June 1948 against E tz e l's
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arm s-carrying ship , the A lta le n a . By the e a rly 1950's the p o lit ic a l center had e s ta b lis h e d i t s a u t h o r it y , in c lu d in g th e monopoly on th e c r e a tio n and embodiment o f the s ta te 's p o lit ic a l symbols. A ccordingly, Is ra e l gets a high score on monopoly in th e s ta te p e rio d because a c le a r d is t i n c t i o n was e s ta b lis h e d between the o f f i c i a l voice o f the s ta te government and o th e r voices. Moreover, the c e n te r's version o f Zionism became the o f f i c i a l one.
However, on ly compromises about s ta te monopoly were achieved, and these problems emerge time and again u n til th is very day. F ir s t , the re la tio n s h ip between the s ta te o f Is ra e l and the Jewish diaspora are s t i l l a source o f confusion (and o f r iv a lr y over fu n c tio n s between the Government M in is trie s and the Jewish o rg a n iz a tio n s ). The p o lit ic a l center has gained monopoly on I s r a e li symbols, but i t aspires to represent the Jewish ones as w e ll. Second, the compromise w ith the Z io n is t r e lig io u s groups re s u lte d in the c re a tio n o f separate ra b b in ic a l courts which de rive t h e ir ru le s o f ju s tic e from re lig io u s law and not from the sta te laws. There are many other anomalies in what is re fe rre d to in Is ra e l as the "s ta tu s quo" in re lig io u s a f f a ir s . I t r e fle c ts the p o te n tia l cleavage between sta te and r e lig io n in Is ra e l and the fa c t th a t
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thus f a r t h is d i f f i c u l t s te e rin g problems has been circum vented. T h ird , I s r a e li Arab c itiz e n s present another s te e rin g problem, expressed also in t h e ir am bivalent id e n t if ic a t io n w ith s ta te symbols. Is r a e li o f f i c i a l symbols are predom inantly Jewish. Consequently, s te e rin g w ith regard to Is r a e li Arabs r e lie d not on id e n t if ic a t io n and autonomous com pliance, but was e ffe c te d through d ir e c t c o n tro l by a m ilit a r y government u n til 1966, and o th e r means la te r on.
These arrangements did not s ig n if ic a n t ly dim inish ste e rin g ca p a c ity , ye t
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th e y l e f t c r i t i c a l q u e stio n s un re so lve d , and t h e ir th r e a t was f e l t more considerably in the la te s ta te period.
Exclusiveness
Exclusiveness means one ste e rin g locus per system, c e n tr a lly located in the communication network, and w ith a monopoly on coercion. In the p re -s ta te period the v o lu n ta ry p o lit ic a l center faced great d i f f i c u l t i e s in e s ta b lis h in g i t s e xclu sive a u th o rity . There were, as we noted, oth er powerful contenders, and the question is whether the center was nevertheless more "c e n tra l" than any o th e r. The answer is p o s itiv e , but the re was also a d is tin c tio n between the d is t r ib u t io n o f i n s t it u t io n a l a u th o r ity and th e d is t r ib u t io n o f charisma ( S h ils , 1975). In the p re -s ta te period the former was more c e n tra liz e d and e x c lu s iv e than the l a t t e r . Consequently, the center did gain an e x c lu s iv e p o s itio n in the network, but the secondary centers preserved t h e ir autonomy in c e rta in spheres and fun ction ed as agencies o f the center in o th ers. A powerful secondary ce n te r, such as the H is ta d ru t, was not subjected to a p o s itio n o f dependent vassal. There evolved a d iv is io n o f labor in which the center gained in s t it u t io n a l exclusiveness in na tiona l matters w hile the cooperation o f the secondary-centers and the periphery as a whole was not achieved through the use o f coercion. The monopoly o f the center on the areas o f s e c u rity and fo re ig n a f f a ir s enhanced i t s s te e rin g capacity and served as a basis fo r e s ta b lis h in g o v e ra ll exclusiveness in the s ta te period.
Since 1948 the p o s s ib ilit y o f e s ta b lis h in g co m p e titive p o lit ic a l centers became th e o r e tic a l. R ival contenders such as the Herut p a rty accommodated themselves to the e xclu sive a u th o rity o f the government. Other contenders fou gh t m ainly to re ta in t h e ir p o s itio n s as secondary-centers. The periphery
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increased in numbers and became more "p e rip h e ra l" , more d is ta n t, which, by d e f in it io n , made the center more " c e n tr a l" . In the c ru c ia l areas, the center acquired o f f ic i a l monopoly over the m ilit a r y , the p o lic e and other coercive means. Steering ca p a city had reached a high sta tu s o f exclusiveness by the e a rly 1950's and th is was manifested also in a high le ve l o f popular support and le g itim a c y . By the 1960's, however, a new s itu a tio n sta rte d to emerge, w ith the old center lo s in g some o f it s exclusive powers and the reemergence o f old contenders as w ell as new ones. The appearance o f new pressure groups, p a r t ic u la r ly those advocating settlem ents in the occupied t e r r i t o r ie s , has posed a th re a t to the p o s itio n o f the o f f ic i a l ce n te r. Such s h ifts in d ic a te t h a t e x c lu s iv e n e s s co u ld serve as a c r i t i c a l c r i t e r i o n f o r e v a lu a tin g flu c tu a tio n s in the system's o v e ra ll ste e rin g c a p a c ity .
Transmission and Intake
Transmission and in ta ke re fe r to the a b i l i t y o f the center to engage in s e le c tiv e exchanges o f in fo rm a tio n w ith external and in te rn a l environments.
Transm ission aims a t: a) p e n e tra tio n - c ro s s in g s o c ia l and ge ographical boundaries in ord e r to in c o rp o ra te the p e rip h e ry , p a r t ic u la r ly the more problem atic groups, in to the p o lit ic a l system; and b) maintenance - preserving the f r u i t s o f p e netratio n and re ta in in g the lo y a lty o f the periphery and the
le g itim a cy o f the ste e rin g ce n te r.
In the p re -s ta te p e rio d , the network was ra th e r developed as f a r as in fo rm a tio n flo w was concerned. I t provided o p p o rtu n itie s f o r transm ission and in ta ke o f info rm a tion across socia l s tra ta and system le v e ls ( v e r tic a l flo w );
w ith in such le v e ls (h o riz o n ta l flo w ); between the center and the secondary c e n te rs (dia go nal f lo w ) ; and w ith the e x te rn a l environm ent. The c e n te r
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succeeded in reaching the more problem atic groups in the pe riphery and in m a in ta in in g t h e i r ge n e ra l s u p p o rt. This was accom plished th ro u g h the r e in f o r c in g e f f o r t s o f the d i f f e r e n t ch a n n e ls, the s p e c ia liz e d messages tra n s m itte d to d iffe r e n t groups and the fo s te rin g o f national s o lid a r it y .
As fo r in ta k e , the questions are to what extent is the center capable o f re c e iv in g 'adequate' in fo rm a tio n fo r steering? Has i t developed a memory - storage and re c a ll f a c i l i t i e s ? Can i t tra n s la te inform ation in to in te llig e n c e ? There is no easy way to answer these questions and even i f we can show th a t Is ra e l developed adequate te ch n ica l f a c i l i t i e s fo r inform ation in ta ke , we would fin d i t d i f f i c u l t to demonstrate how Is r a e l's s te e rin g cap acity was improved by the q u a lit y o f it s in ta ke performance. Instead, we must be content w ith in d ir e c t in d ic a to rs o n ly .
The main channels in the p re -s ta te p e rio d were th e p o l i t i c a l p a r tie s . T h e ir most im p o rta n t c o n tr ib u tio n to s te e rin g was not policy-m aking or d ire c t coercion, but t h e ir a b i l i t y to hold to g eth er the maze o f organ ization s operating in the system and to coordinate the v e r t ic a l, diagonal and h o riz o n ta l flows o f in fo rm a tio n . Thus the p a rtie s served as a clearinghouse in the network and provided some in te rn a l order to the h ig h ly complex p o lit ic a l system. Mapai's a c t iv it ie s in p a r tic u la r , were e ffe c tiv e not only fo r m o b iliz in g support f o r the p a rty , but also fo r the p o lit ic a l development o f the e n tir e n a tio n a l system. The Is r a e li p a rtie s served as channels fo r both the center (p e n e tra tio n , maintenance and c o n tro l) and the pe riphery (demands, pressures and p a r tic ip a tio n ) (see S a r to r i, 1970, p.
1048; M arvick, 1973, p. 747).
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Compared to the p a rtie s , the Is r a e li s ta te bureaucracy was a la te s ta r te r , but i t marked the beginning o f the s tru c tu ra l d iffe r e n tia tio n require d fo r fu r th e r p o lit ic a l development (see Eisenstadt in LaPalombara, 1966, p. 99). The bureaucracy provided more "p ro fe s s io n a l" channels and also a higher degree o f o v e ra ll le g itim a c y and o ffic ia ld o m . I t could also use coercive means more d ir e c t ly .
Is r a e li mass communications were c lo s e ly associated w ith the s tru c tu re and modes o f performance o f the p o lit ic a l system. There were d ir e c t lin k s between most newspapers and the p a rtie s , and th e re was in d ir e c t but strong in flu e n ce o f the p o lit ic a l center on the d is tr ib u tio n o f info rm a tion in the s ta te c o n tro lle d ra d io . The mass channels strengthened the s te e rin g ca p acity o f the system in a number o f ways: re in fo rc in g the pe n e tra tio n and maintenance e ff o r ts through d if f u s io n o f n a tio n a l s o l i d a r i t y and id e o lo g ic a l messages, p r o v id in g a c e n tra liz e d and p a r tly monopolized communication channel, le g it im iz in g the p o lit ic a l system, and sending special messages to pe riph era l groups.
To conclude, s te e rin g ca p a city in terms o f domestic transm ission and intake remained r e la t iv e ly high, in the s ta te p e rio d , despite the enormous socio
economic changes. The community grew in size and com plexity and the channels used became more com plicate d. The need f o r te c h n o lo g ic a l m ediation grew co rre sp o n d in g ly. The p a rtie s remained the prime channels f o r leaders and secondary-level cadres, w hile communication w ith the p u b lic at la rg e , in c lu d in g p a rty members, was in c re a s in g ly c a rrie d through the mass media. In th is sense s te e rin g in Is ra e l became more modernized - less in tim a te and more mediated, as in o th er developed p o lit ic a l systems. This trend continued more ra p id ly a fte r the 1960's w ith fu r th e r de clin e in the ro le o f the p a rtie s and the emergence o f
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p o p u lis tic mass p o lit ic s . D iffu s io n and L e g ib ilit y
D iffu s io n and l e g i b i l i t y means overcoming communication b a rrie rs through c o n t r o lle d c h a n n e ls which t r a n s m it in fo r m a tio n w ith m inim al lo s s and d is t o r t io n . This could be expected to fo llo w a normal S curve, under optimal c o n d itio n s , th a t is , few c o n s tra in ts a t the source (transm ission b a r r ie r s ) , and at the re c e iv in g end (re ce p tio n b a r r ie r s ) . The c o n d itio n s in the p re -s ta te Jewish community - sm a lln e ss, high l i t e r a c y , shared common co n te n ts and e xte rna l th re a t - were congenial to normal d iffu s io n and l e g i b i l i t y . The most d i f f i c u l t c o n s tra in t was the s o c ia l d iv is io n s along r e lig io u s , e th n ic and id e o lo g ic a l lin e s . We noted already how d iffu s io n b a rrie rs were overcome because the communication network was ra th e r e f f ic ie n t , e s p e c ia lly in the use o f o rg a n iz a tio n a l channels as tra n s m itte rs and re la y p o in ts .
L e g ib ilit y is f i r s t o f a ll a m atter o f language and co n te n t. The Is r a e li p o lit ic a l center had to speak in d iffe r e n t p o lit ic a l languages to the various groups in order to be understood. This was done ra th e r s u c c e s s fu lly through th e pe n e tra tio n /m a in te n a n ce e f f o r t s and the u t i l i z a t i o n o f d if f e r e n t ia t e d p o l it ic a l c o n te n ts . I t was f u r th e r enhanced by the c e n te r's monopoly on p o lit ic a l symbols as objects o f id e n t if ic a t io n .
One o f the most im portant changes in the sta te period was the decline in the p re v io u s ly high a b i l i t y o f the center to cope w ith d iffu s io n and l e g i b i l i t y b a rrie r s . The reasons are obvious: the d ra s tic increase in population and the change in demographic co m positio n. The same ce n te r which p re v io u s ly had penetrated tr a d itio n a l groups o f new immigrants, extended fa m ilie s in ru ra l Arab v illa g e s and the new generation o f young people, s ta rte d to lose the
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a b i l i t y to speak to such groups, once the process o f modernization began to e sca la te . This reversal is lin ke d to the other features o f ste e rin g ca p a city in the state pe riod . I t would s u ffic e to say here th a t the d iffu s io n and l e g i b i l i t y b a rrie rs could also appear as a r e s u lt o f s u b je ctive fe e lin g s of d e p riv a tio n , such as those f e l t by many o rie n ta l new immigrants, e s p e c ia lly among the second generation who were already born in Is r a e l.
★ ★ ★
On the basis o f the f iv e items presented above, I s r a e l's p o lit ic a l system scored high on s te e rin g ca p a c ity . The system was already q u ite developed p o l i t i c a l l y in the p re -s ta te period and i t continued to develop i t s s te e rin g ca p a city a fte r 1948. This process has been described from the p o in t o f view o f the ce n te r. We s h a ll s h if t the focus now and discuss p o lit ic a l development from the p o in t o f view o f the p e rip h e ry , th a t i s , in terms, o f c it iz e n s ' o p p o rtu n itie s to have impact on s te e rin g .
Impact on Steering
Zionism embraced democracy not only as a symbolic ornamentation, but also as an o p era tive instrum ent. There were, to be sure, nondemocratic a ttitu d e s w ith in the Z io n is t movement. Yet p o lit ic a l actio n was based from the very beginning on elected c o a litio n s . Is ra e l was th e re fo re c o r re c tly lis t e d among the c o u n trie s whose "independence movement blended n a tio n a lis m w ith th e ideology o f re p re s e n ta tiv e government and p o lit ic a l lib e ra lis m " (D ahl, 1971).
The Z io n is t movement to le r a te d a h ig h le v e l o f in t e r n a l s o c ia l and p o lit ic a l d iv is io n s . The e g a lita ria n s o c ia lis t ideology th a t dominated the movement a fte r the 1930's and the lack o f t r a d itio n a l sources o f socioeconomic in e q u a lity in h ib ite d the emergence o f non-democratic leadership. The s o c ie ty
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was very heterogenous and th e re were d i s t i n c t group d iv is io n s based on r e li g i o s i t y , id e o lo g ie s , and e th n ic cleavages. Nevertheless, in re tro sp e ct we know th a t these d iv is io n s did not develop in to separate p o lit ic a l systems, or in to serious attempts to form r iv a l s te e rin g ce n te rs. In f a c t , the binding common contents plus the penetration and maintenance a c t iv it ie s o f the center created a high c o lle c tiv e c a p a b ility to a degree th a t Is ra e l was o ften regarded as a t o t a l l y "m obilized s o c ie ty ". Yet the le v e l o f coercion was very low and the basis fo r democratic development already existe d when the system sta rte d to develop p o l it ic a l l y .
P o lit ic a l E q u a lity
P o lit ic a l e q u a lity is defined as c itiz e n s ' r ig h t to tra n s m it inform ation about t h e ir preferences w ith a high p r o b a b ility th a t info rm a tion tra n sm itte d by d iffe r e n t c itiz e n s has the same o p p o rtu n ity to e xe rt pressure and to in flu ence s te e rin g . P o lit ic a l e q u a lity in Is ra e l is u s u a lly understood in terms o f fre e e le c tio n s and the open com petition among p a rtie s . In the p re -s ta te period, a d d itio n a l democratic requirements such as the freedom o f expression, freedom to form and jo in o rg a n iz a tio n s , e l i g i b i l i t y fo r p u b lic o f f ic e and general c o n s titu tio n a l guarantees o f c i v i l r ig h ts , were viewed as secondary. As long as the re was no s ta te , the absence o f a f u l l c o n s titu tio n a l democracy could be j u s t i f i e d . Access to the p o lit ic a l network and actual p a r tic ip a tio n were r e la t iv e ly h ig h, but they were also h ig h ly s tru c tu re d because o f the imposing presence o f the p o l it ic a l camps and the p a r tie s . A c c o rd in g ly , p o l it ic a l e q u a lity in I s r a e l's p re -s ta te p e rio d was "medium" - lower than th a t o f d e m o cra tica lly developed cou ntrie s and higher than th a t found in other new co u n trie s .
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T h is general p ic tu r e did not change much in the e a rly s ta te p e rio d . F orm ally, the Is r a e li legal framework provided fo r a c o n s titu tio n a l democracy.
The p re v io u s ly high leve l o f in d iv id u a l access to p o lit ic a l resources was maintained and there were also more o p p o rtu n itie s fo r access o f groups. Most o f the basic freedoms were maintained: freedom o f the press, o f expression, movement, f a i t h , employment and a s s o c ia tio n . Moreover, d e s p ite the more c o e rc iv e methods used toward I s r a e li Arabs and the p a te r n a lis tic approach toward O rie n ta l Jewish immigrants which r e s tr ic te d t h e ir autonomous p a rtic ip a tio n in p o lit ic s , they were not denied legal and c i v i l r ig h ts . However, the e a rly s ta te period deserves ju s t "average" on p o lit ic a l e q u a lity , because the boundaries between s ta te and government p riv ile g e s and c i v i l freedoms were s t i l l ill- d e f in e d , and the general o p p o rtu n itie s fo r p o lit ic a l e q u a lity were c o n s tra in e d by s ta te in te r v e n tio n , due m ainly to s e c u rity pressures. In a d d itio n , the prospects fo r developing an accepted code o f c i v i l r ig h ts were
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hindered by the controversy regarding the ro le o f r e lig io n in the s ta te . ‘ In terms o f o v e ra ll o p p o rtu n itie s , th e re was s t i l l p o l it ic a l in e q u a lity : the p o lit ic a l p a rtic ip a tio n o f many c itiz e n s was organized from above, and there were groups which could take greate r advantage o f p a rtic ip a to ry o p p o rtu n itie s (compare Verba et a l . , 1978, p. 308).
In terms o f o p p o rtu n itie s o f tra n s m ittin g in fo rm a tio n th a t could e x e rt pressure upon and in flu e n ce ce n tra l s te e rin g , the conclusion is q u a lifie d . Impact was mediated by the prescribed channels. This was manifested p r im a rily in the more constrained ro le o f the peripheral groups in Is r a e li p o lit ic s . A f t e r th e 1960's th e general tre n d has been toward incre ase d p o l i t i c a l e q u a lity . The second generation o f new immigrants, no tab ly those from o rie n ta l o r ig in , has become more independent in it s p o lit ic a l behavior. The same could be said w ith regard to new economic, s o c ia l and p o l i t i c a l groups. The cu lm in ation o f the process was the end o f labor domination in 1977. As we s h a ll p o in t o u t, Is r a e l's p o lit ic a l system scores higher marks on a ll three items o f impact on ste e rin g in the la te sta te pe riod .
Responsiveness to Feedback
Responsiveness to feedback means the p r o b a b ility th a t an upward flo w of in fo rm a tio n from c itiz e n s th a t is e ith e r c o rre c tiv e or aimed at changing the course o f s te e rin g would be absorbed and acted upon. C itiz e n s become "fa c to rs "
in p o lit ic s when they have the o p p o rtu n ity to gain access on a v o lu n ta ry ba sis.
They become even more im p o rta n t when th e y can a c t u a lly p a r t ic ip a t e and in flu e n c e the a llo c a tio n process. I s r a e li c itiz e n s were fa c to rs in t h e ir p o lit ic a l system because, as in d iv id u a ls , they were p o l i t i c a l l y mobile and had the o p p o rtu n ity to lin k up w ith the network. Group-based access, however, was
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h ig h ly constrained because new or independent groups had had to face imposing b a rrie rs (and l i t t l e to le ran ce) when they t r ie d to tra n sm it inform ation outside th e e s ta b lis h e d cha nne ls. Even th e p r e - s ta te groups were not o r d in a ry v o lu n ta ry or pressure groups, because t h e ir autonomy was constrained by t h e ir parent in s t it u t io n s and they had lim ite d options to play an adversary ro le in the p o lit ic a l system. In the sta te p e rio d , to o , access was achieved through belonging, and belonging required some form o f a f f i l i a t i o n to the established network.
The p revale nt mode o f gaining access was through the p o lit ic a l p a rtie s and t h e ir extensions. C itiz e n s jo in e d , became members, and voted, because th is was the most expedient way to gain access to ta n g ib le b e n e fits . They could choose among a host o f p a rtie s and gain access through them, but access to p a rty channels did not e n ta il automatic in flu e n c e on the p a rty 's nominations or in te rn a l decision-m aking. The p ic tu re w ith regard to access to the bureau
c r a tic channels was also mixed. C itize n s had some choice between bureaucratic and nonbureaucratic channels: They could complain to o f f ic i a l s d ir e c t ly and cou ld p r a c tic e a ll kinds o f c irc u m v e n tio n s . At the same tim e , however, v o lu n ta ry lin k u p w ith th is channel was r e s tr ic te d because i t was synchronized w ith the o th er channels in the p o lit ic a l network, e s p e c ia lly the p a rtie s . The mass media channels were e a s ily accessible as fa r as inform ation supply was concerned. Yet they were r e la t iv e ly in s ig n ific a n t as s o c ie ty 's suggestion box.
The prevale nt mode o f p a rtic ip a tio n in Is r a e li democracy was responsive - a high tu rn o u t on e le c tio n day (over 80% on the average), and personal contacts w ith p u b lic o f f i c i a l s . Responsive p a rtic ip a n ts operate p o l it ic a l l y w ith in the narrow confines perm itted fo r such a c t iv it ie s . They can modify ste e rin g but
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not the course. Committed p a r tic ip a tio n , on the other hand, is more c lo s e ly associated w ith a high sense o f e ffic a c y . Is r a e lis were re lu c ta n t to commit themselves to p o lit ic a l a c t iv it y re q u irin g d ire c t personal involvement, such as independent group a c t iv it y or personal campaigning in e le c tio n s . Hence th e ir p a rtic ip a tio n did not re q u ire e ff o r ts to create new channels in order to a ffe c t s te e rin g more d ir e c t ly .
The modes o f p a rtic ip a tio n o f the pe ripheral groups in Is r a e li democracy were by and large s im ila r to th a t o f the general po p u la tio n . For instance, the vo tin g tu rn o u t ra te o f Is r a e li Arabs or the new o rie n ta l immigrants was high, whereas group form ation and independent cooperative a c t iv it y were very low.
Such groups were not l e f t outside the Is r a e li p o lit ic a l system despite t h e ir p e rip h e ra l s ta tu s . Moreover, even i f the i n i t i a l purpose o f the s te e rin g cen ter was merely to guarantee acquiescence o f these groups, they e ve n tu a lly acquired the a b i l i t y to have an impact on s te e rin g . The fa c t th a t c itiz e n s ' p a r t ic ip a t io n in Is r a e l was u s u a lly re sp o n sive in d ic a te s th a t c it iz e n s ' feedback was m ainly aimed at marginal c o rre c tio n s and not d ra s tic changes. In the vo lu n ta ry p re -s ta te community, there was no need to use coercion: there was l i t t l e a lie n a tio n , s te e rin g was h ig h ly responsive to feedback, and the small distance between center and periphery could e a s ily be bridged.
In the e a rly s ta te p e rio d , th is distance grew and thus the e ffe c t o f the m ediating channels became more s ig n if ic a n t. The p a rtie s , the bureaucracy and the mass media brought about what Easton (1965, p. 363) c a lls "system ic feedback" - responsive in fo rm a tion about the general nature and consequences o f government d e c is io n s . By the time th is in fo rm a tio n reached the p o lit ic a l ce n te r, i t c a rrie d l i t t l e pressure and could not modify behavior. Moreover,
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th e re were more o p p o rtu n itie s fo r screening and even f o r fa b r ic a tin g the content o f such feedback. However, in th is period too , the government and the p o lit ic a l system as a whole did not remain a lo o f. The established channels provided an o u tle t fo r feedback inform ation to reach i f not the s te e rin g center d ir e c t ly , the im portant ju n c tio n s in the network. Such feedback could cause a s te e rin g response, a lb e it one th a t was c a r e fu lly tuned to the preferences o f the c e n te r. The p a rtie s co n tin u e d to serve as th e main "m achinery f o r o b s e rv a b ility " (Merton, 1968, 409), w hile more d ire c t means fo r the expression o f p u b lic opinion - such as a referendum or p o lls - were not used in Is ra e l during th a t period. The p o lit ic a l process was c a r e fu lly mediated and the responsiveness o f the s te e rin g center to info rm a tion generated from below was never allowed to run out o f c o n tro l. However, by th a t tim e, Is ra e l was already a "high info rm a tion system" in which the le g itim a cy o f p o lit ic a l norms acquired responsiveness to c itiz e n s ' in fo rm a tio n (A p te r, 1971, p. 14) and th in g s s ta rte d ■
to change a fte r the war o f 1967. Feedback has become more change-oriented;
p u b lic opinion - a more vocal and independent fa c to r ; and the s te e rin g center - much more responsive.
Openness
Openness means the degree o f d e lib e ra te in te rfe re n c e w ith the fre e flow o f in fo rm a tio n by the p o lit ic a l center and the p o s itio n o f the p o lit ic a l system on the continuum o f closed-open communication networks.
The question here is where should Is ra e l be placed on the continuum o f closed-open systems in the d iffe r e n t periods? Much o f what I have said above about the p re -s ta te period applies to openness as w e ll. Secrecy was the ru le , but the need to share in fo rm a tio n was the p ra c tic e . The com plexity o f the
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communication network required exchanges o f in fo rm a tio n , ’at le a s t between those who were regarded as " in s id e r s " . Thus in the p re -s ta te period openness was r e la t iv e ly high, because a v o lu n ta ry network, even i f i t is h ig h ly c o n tro lle d by the ce n te r, cannot a ffo rd too much clo su re . However, there were d iffe r e n t c ir c le s o f those who were in -the-know . The o p p o rtu n ity to be an in s id e r in c re a s e d as one moved from the p e rip h e ry to the e s ta b lis h e d p o l i t i c a l movements; from the movement to a p a rty; from the le ss-e sta b lish e d p a rtie s to those which took p a rt in the leadership o f the Jewish in s t it u t io n s ; and from the p a rtie s in general to Mapai - the dominating p a rty . Before 1948, the im portant b a rrie rs to the fre e flow o f info rm a tion were erected against the re a l o u tsid e rs - the Arab community, the B r itis h government, the n o n -Z io n is ts , and the R e v is io n is t movement - in th a t order. For in s id e rs , the system was q u ite open and ste e rin g was d ir e c t ly influenced by intim acy and easy access to the ce n te r.
The establishm ent o f the s ta te had an immediate e ffe c t on openness, even though the basic modes o f p o lit ic a l behavior changed very s lo w ly . The formal laws established the p r in c ip le th a t secrecy is the ru le and d is c lo s u re , the exception. S im ila rly , the people's r ig h t to know was recognized more as a slogan and less as a norm. The previous party-based communication network continued to fu n c tio n , but the in te rn a l exchanges became more r ig id and th e ir c o n trib u tio n to general openness, more r e s tr ic te d . What did th is mean in terms o f the c itiz e n s ' impact on steering? The simple answer is th a t impact did not correspond to the leve l o f p a r tic ip a tio n . This was manifested in the low sense o f e ffic a c y . During th a t p e rio d , Is r a e lis did not fe e l they had a say in government a f f a ir s . (Fein 1962, p. 72; A ria n , 1971, p .7 ; E tzio n i-H a le vy and
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Shapira 1977, pp. 70-77). On the other hand, they did not fe e l alien ate d and the re was also a high level o f support, as long as stee ring proved capable o f achieving the major goals: winning wars and ra is in g the standard o f liv in g . The Is r a e li periphery at th a t time was p o l it ic a l l y d o c ile because o f the imposing e xte rna l th re a ts , but also because the p o lit ic a l system was responsive, at le a s t to the pressing needs o f most in d iv id u a ls and groups. In th a t period the Is r a e li p o lit ic a l communication network resembled a fix e d sound system. The responsive c itiz e n s did not compose the music and had l i t t l e c o n tro l o f the channels and t h e i r c o n te n ts . They c o u ld , however, a c tiv a te the network (access), choose among a lim ite d number o f programs (v o tin g ) , and a d ju st the volume and noise knobs (co m p la in ts). They could make i t respond to c e rta in lim ite d preferences, engendering m o d ific a tio n s but not tra n sfo rm a tio n s: they had impact, but i t was r e s tr ic te d .
The tre n d , however was toward g re a te r openness. C itize n s were becoming less passive lis te n e rs and more a c tiv e p a rtic ip a n ts . Moreover, symptoms o f mass behavior in the s o cie ty and in p o lit ic s were already manifested during the 1960's, p a r tic u la r ly in the weakening o f p a rty dominance. E ve n tu a lly, new modes o f p o lit ic a l behavior - some o f them outside the e le c to ra l process - s ta rte d to emerge. There appeared new a c tio n groups, c itiz e n movements, independent in te re s t groups and even new p a rtie s , a ll o f whom co n trib u te d to the opening - up o f the p o lit ic a l system. This also imposed a new s tra in on th e p re vio u s balance between s te e rin g c a p a c ity and c i t i z e n s ' im pact on s te e rin g . And i t a ffe c te d also the system's a b i l i t y to cope w ith breakdowns.
30 “
Is r a e l's Steering P ro file
Figure 1 is an attempt to summarize what has been said thus fa r about the changes in the various s te e rin g components during the d iffe r e n t periods. The t h ir d period (1968-1984), although not under discussion here, is presented fo r comparative purposes.
Figure 1: Is r a e l's S teering P r o file
P re -sta te period E a rly s ta te period Late sta te period
(1930-1948) (1949-1967) (1968-1984)
L M H L M H L M H
1 is th a t in a period o f over f i f t y The general conclusion from Figure
years, Is ra e l has developed and re taine d i t s s te e rin g ca p a c ity , i . e . , i t has become and remained p o l i t i c a l l y developed. S teering c a p a city was strengthened in the e a r ly s ta te p e rio d , but d e c lin e d in the la t e p e rio d . This was m anifested m ainly in the i n a b i l i t y o f the c e n tra l goverment to r e ta in the
