Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis

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Mapping

Bangladesh’s Political

Crisis

Asia Report N°264 | 9 February 2015

International Crisis Group Headquarters

Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 brussels@crisisgroup.org

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I. Introduction ... 1

II. Anatomy of a Conflict ... 3

A. A Bitter History ... 3

B. Democracy Returns ... 5

C. The Caretaker Model Ends ... 5

D. The 2014 Election ... 6

III. Political Dysfunction ... 8

A. Parliamentary Incapacity ... 8

B. An Opposition in Disarray ... 9

1. BNP Politics ... 10

2. Relations with the Jamaat ... 10

IV. Assessing the Awami League Government ... 13

A. Doubling Down against the BNP ... 13

B. Curbing Dissent ... 14

C. Politicising Justice ... 14

1. Superior courts and executive interference ... 14

2. The law enforcement apparatus ... 16

3. War crimes trials ... 17

V. Warning Signs ... 20

A. Economic Instability ... 20

B. Law and Order ... 21

1. Unchecked criminality ... 21

2. Religious extremism ... 22

3. Attacks on minorities ... 24

C. Fragile Civil-Military Relations ... 25

D. The Role of Civil Society ... 27

VI. Conclusion ... 29

APPENDICES A. Map of Bangladesh ... 30

B. Glossary of Terms ... 31

C. About the International Crisis Group ... 32

D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2012 ... 33

E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ... 35

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Executive Summary

On 5 January, the first anniversary of the deeply contested 2014 elections, the most violent in Bangladesh’s history, clashes between government and opposition groups led to several deaths and scores injured. The confrontation marks a new phase of the deadlock between the ruling Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) opposition, which have swapped time in government with metronomic con- sistency since independence. Having boycotted the 2014 poll, the BNP appears bent on ousting the government via street power. With daily violence at the pre-election level, the political crisis is fast approaching the point of no return and could gravely destabilise Bangladesh unless the sides move urgently to reduce tensions. Moreover, tribunals set up to adjudicate crimes perpetrated at the moment of Bangladesh’s bloody birth threaten division more than reconciliation. Both parties would be best served by changing course: the AL government by respecting the democratic right to dissent (recalling its time in opposition); the BNP by reviving its political fortunes through compromise with the ruling party, rather than violent street politics.

With the two largest mainstream parties unwilling to work toward a new political compact that respects the rights of both opposition and victor to govern within the rule of law, extremists and criminal networks could exploit the resulting political void.

Violent Islamist factions are already reviving, threatening the secular, democratic order. While jihadi forces see both parties as the main hurdle to the establishment of an Islamic order, the AL and the BNP perceive each other as the main adversary.

The AL and its leader, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, emphasise that the absence from parliament of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her BNP make them political non-entities. Yet, concerned about a comeback, the government is attempting to forcibly neutralise the political opposition and stifle dissent, including by bringing corruption and other criminal cases against party leaders, among whom are Zia and her son and heir apparent, Tarique Rahman; heavy-handed use of police and paramilitary forces; and legislation and policies that undermine fundamental constitutional rights.

The BNP, which has not accepted any responsibility for the election-related violence in 2014 that left hundreds dead (and saw hundreds of Hindu homes and shops vandalised), is again attempting to oust the government by force, in alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is alleged to have committed some of the worst abuses during that period. The party retains its core supporters and seems to have successfully mobilised its activists on the streets. Yet, its sole demand – for a fresh election under a neutral caretaker – is too narrow to generate the public support it needs to over- come the disadvantage of being out of parliament, and its political capital is fading fast as it again resorts to violence.

The deep animosity and mistrust between leaders and parties were not inevitable.

Despite a turbulent history, they earlier cooperated to end direct or indirect military rule and strengthen democracy, most recently during the 2007-2008 tenure of the military-backed caretaker government (CTG), when the high command tried to remove both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia from politics. Rather than building on that cooperation, the two leaders have resorted to non-democratic methods to undermine

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each other. In power, both have used centralised authority, a politicised judiciary and predatory law enforcement agencies against legitimate opposition.

Underpinning the current crisis is the failure to agree on basic standards for multiparty democratic functioning. While the BNP claims to be the guardian of Bangladeshi nationalism, the AL has attempted to depict itself as the sole author and custodian of Bangladesh’s liberation. The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established by the AL in March 2010 to prosecute individuals accused of committing atrocities during the 1971 liberation war, should be assessed in this context. While the quest to bring perpetrators to account is justifiable, the ICTs are not simply, or even primarily, a legal tool, but rather are widely perceived as a political one, primarily for use against the government’s Islamist opposition. In short, the governing AL is seen to be using the nation’s founding tragedy for self-serving political gains.

The AL needs to realise that the BNP’s marginalisation from mainstream politics could encourage anti-government activism to find more radical avenues, all the more so in light of its own increasingly authoritarian bent. Equally, the BNP would do well to abandon its alliances of convenience with violent Islamist groups and seek to revive agreement on a set of basic standards for multiparty democracy. A protracted and violent political crisis would leave Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia the ultimate losers, particularly if a major breakdown of law and order were to encourage the military to intervene; though there is as yet no sign of that, history suggests it is an eventuality not to be dismissed. The opportunities for political reconciliation are fast diminishing, as political battle lines become ever more entrenched. Both parties should restrain their violent activist base and take practical steps to reduce political tensions:

 the AL government should commit to a non-repressive response to political dissent, rein in and ensure accountability for abuses committed by law enforcement entities, reverse measures that curb civil liberties and assertively protect minority communities against attack and dispossession of properties and businesses;

 the AL should invite the BNP, at lower levels of seniority if needed, to negotiations aimed at reviving the democratic rules of the game, including electoral reform. It should also hold mayoral elections in Dhaka, a long-overdue constitutional re- quirement that would provide opportunities to begin that dialogue; and

 the BNP should commit to non-violent political opposition; refrain from an alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami that is enhancing the Islamist opposition’s street power with little political return for the BNP; and instead demonstrate willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations with the AL to end a crisis that is undermining economic growth and threatening to subvert the political order.

Islamabad/Brussels, 9 February 2015

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Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis

I.

Introduction

On 5 January 2015, a year after a violent and deeply disputed election, the conflict between Bangladesh’s two main parties, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid’s Awami League (AL) and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh National Party (BNP), took a turn for the worse.¹ The government’s provocative decision two days earlier to forcibly confine Zia to her party office in Dhaka, in anticipation of BNP protests mark- ing the anniversary of the 2014 polls, triggered deadly clashes between AL and BNP activists.² In response, Zia called for an indefinite countrywide transport blockade that has sparked ongoing violence by both sides, with more than 50 deaths and arrests of scores of BNP activists.³

Prime Minister Hasina’s rejection of the democratic rules of the game is eroding her government’s political legitimacy. By opting for street power and agitation after boycotting the 2014 elections, the BNP has failed to achieve its primary goal of ousting the AL government well before the next elections, due in 2019, but it has undermined its public image as a credible alternative.⁴ The resulting political vacuum is expanding opportunities for violent extremists and criminal groups. Jihadi organisations identify both major parties as enemies in their bid to establish Islamic rule, while the AL and BNP continue to view each other as the principle threat to domestic stability.

With the roots of confrontation going far deeper than the 2014 election or the end of the caretaker system, both parties evoke the inevitability of massive violence if the other retains or returns to power. The renewed clashes in January, after a year of rela- tive calm, bode ill for political stability. While BNP efforts to forcibly oust the government provide opportunities for spoilers, including violent extremists, Sheikh Hasina’s heavy-handed response might succeed in quelling the protests in the short term but will aggravate resentments. If the political crisis deepens, widespread violence could, in the worst case, spark a military intervention.

Mapping Bangladesh’s political crisis, highlighting the role of the key players, this report assesses the political and security implications of a continued deadlock. It is

1 For earlier Crisis Group analysis on Bangladesh, see Asia Reports N°226, Bangladesh: Back to the Future, 13 June 2012; N°187, The Threat from Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, 1 March 2010;

N°182, Bangladesh: Getting Police Reform on Track, 11 December 2009; N°151, Restoring Democ- racy in Bangladesh, 28 April 2008; and N°121, Bangladesh Today, 23 October 2006.

2 Zia’s confinement continued until 19 January 2015. “Cops withdrawn from Khaleda’s office”, The Daily Star, 19 January 2015.

3 Opposition activists, trying to forcibly impose a transport blockade, were responsible for most of the deaths. “Ten burnt alive after BD bus firebombed”, Agence France-Presse, 4 February 2015;

“BD ends confinement of opposition leader Khaleda Zia”, ibid, 20 January 2015; “No let-up in arson”, The Daily Star, 19 January 2015; “U.S., EU and UK urge restraint”, ibid, 14 January 2015.

4 The BNP boycotted the election because the AL government refused to hold it under a neutral caretaker government (CTG). Adopted in 1996, the caretaker system to oversee elections had widespread public support and credibility. However, a CTG was unelected, so unaccountable and either vulnerable to pressure or amenable to undemocratic influences, as was evident in its lack of resistance to the military’s 11 January coup (see below).

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based on field interviews in 2014, primarily in Dhaka, with key political and civil society stakeholders. Given a volatile climate, curbs on dissent and the sensitivity of the issues, most interlocutors requested their names be withheld.

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II.

Anatomy of a Conflict

A. A Bitter History

Following the bloody civil war that led to Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, in which the Jamaat-e-Islami and its armed fronts, such as Al-Badr and Al-Shams, supported the Pakistani military crackdown, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman, formed the first government.⁵ In 1972, it enacted a constitution that, like the party’s founding ideology, drew on the principles of democracy, nationalism, socialism and secularism. Mujib and most of his family were killed by army personnel in the 15 August 1975 coup, inaugurating decades of authoritarian rule amid coups and counter-coups that lasted until 1990.⁶ His daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wajid, took over the leadership and remains the head of the Awami League.

BNP leader Khaleda Zia is the wife of Bangladesh’s first military ruler, Major Gen- eral Ziaur (Zia) Rahman (1976-1981), who created the party as a civilian proxy and alternative to the AL.⁷ Absorbing constituencies with little in common except their opposition to Mujib, including disaffected AL members, pro-Pakistan remnants of the Muslim League and Islamist groups, the Zia regime “found a competing national identity” to legitimise its rule and “to delegitimise the Awami League”, by underscor- ing Bangladesh’s religious and territorial – rather than ethnic – identity.⁸ It replaced

“secularism” in the constitution’s preamble with “absolute trust and faith in the al- mighty Allah”, and lifted the ban on religion-based political parties, enabling the Jamaat and other Islamist groups to re-enter mainstream politics, and Jamaat leaders, held responsible by most Bangladeshis for atrocities during the liberation war, to return from exile.⁹

The AL-BNP relationship under Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia is shaped by this history, on which both draw to inflame a bitter rivalry. While the AL accuses Zia’s husband of assassinating the country’s founder and much of his family, the BNP blames Mujib’s assassination on the AL’s misrule and establishment of a hegemonic party system, under the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL).¹⁰ Both parties also dress their enmity in the garb of ideological differences over Bangladeshi identity, including questions of secularism, Bengali nationalism and the role of Islam.

Political expediency, however, largely dictates ideological choices. The BNP’s em- phasis on Bangladeshi nationalism did not prevent it from absorbing and allying with individuals and groups that opposed Bangladesh’s independence, including the Ja-

5 Estimates of the number killed by the Pakistan army and allied militias vary widely, from under 30,000 to over three million; a “consensus figure given in most accounts is that close to a million people died during the conflict”. David Lewis, Bangladesh: Politics, Economy and Civil Society (Cambridge, 2010). Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: India’s Secret War in East Pakistan, (New York, 2013).

6 Craig Baxter, Bangladesh: From a Nation to a State (Boulder, 1998).

7 Zia became chief martial law administrator on 29 November 1976 and president in April 1977. He was assassinated by disgruntled army personnel in 1981.

8 William B. Milam, Bangladesh and Pakistan: Flirting with Failure in South Asia (London, 2009), p. 15.

9 Proclamations (Amendment) Order, 1977. Rounaq Jahan, “Political parties in Bangladesh”, Cen- ter for Policy Dialogue (CMD) – Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) working paper, August 2014.

10 After the fourth amendment to the constitution in 1975, BAKSAL, an acronym derived from the amalgamation of the AL and the leftist Krishak Sramik party, became the only legally-recognised party. The term, BAKSAL, is now used to describe one-party rule.

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maat-e-Islami. Despite avowed secularism, the AL had an electoral alliance with Jamaat in 1996. In the run-up to the aborted 2006 elections, it allied with another Islamist party, Khilafat Majlis, to tap its votes and in return pledged to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims, enact a blasphemy law and make fatwas (religious edicts) legally binding.¹¹ While the AL’s June 2011 fifteenth constitutional amendment reas- serted secularism as a basic principle and restored the prohibition on religion-based parties, it kept Islam as the state religion, a feature inserted into the constitution by General Hussain Mohammed Ershad’s rubber-stamp parliament.¹²

Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia joined to oppose military rule during the 1980s and achieved Ershad’s ouster in 1990. With civilian rule restored, and the BNP form- ing the government after the 1991 elections, they continued to collaborate and compromise, including on the August 1991 constitutional amendment to revive parliamentary democracy. Their rivalry resumed, however, after the AL boycotted the February 1996 election and held demonstrations that paralysed Dhaka. Acceding to opposition pressure that March, the BNP supported the thirteenth constitutional amendment.

It provided that a 90-day caretaker set-up rather than the incumbent government would oversee the vote, thus lowering, though not eliminating the likelihood of rigging.¹³ Parliament was dissolved and the caretaker government oversaw the June elections that brought the AL to power for the first time since 1975. The second election under the caretaker system, in October 2001, returned the BNP to office (2001-2006) in coalition with the Jamaat and two smaller parties.

While each election was flawed, its results contested by the losing side, the swings against the incumbent conferred some legitimacy on and support for the caretaker system. Yet, electoral disputes also engendered tensions, resulting in sporadic countrywide violence, such as before the scheduled 2006 polls that resulted in military intervention on 11 January 2007 (referred to as “1/11”). The president was pressured to declare a state of emergency, and a military-backed caretaker government (CTG) was put in place that continued until December 2008.¹⁴

De facto military rule again gave Hasina and Zia common cause, particularly after the CTG’s “minus two” formula to remove both from politics. CTG excesses and poor performance also revived the parties’ fortunes, convincing a sceptical civil society that “the only option was to go back to the politicians”.¹⁵ Yet, cracks within the civil-

11 Taj Hashmi, “Islamism beyond the Islamic heartland: a case study of Bangladesh”, in Ishtiaq Ahmed (ed.), The Politics of Religion in South and Southeast Asia (Oxon, 2011), pp. 26-44. On fatwas, particularly with respect to women’s rights, see “Bangladesh: fundamental rights of women violated with impunity”, Amnesty International, October 1994. Ahmadis, a Sunni minority sect, followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, are considered non-Muslims by ultra-orthodox Sunni groups.

12 Constitution (Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 2011. Ershad imposed martial law in 1982 and created the Jatiya Party to bolster his legitimacy.

13 The caretaker proposal was introduced in parliament as an AL member’s private bill, then supported by the BNP. It envisaged that the president would appoint the chief adviser and ten advisers within fifteen days of parliament’s dissolution, to oversee elections within 90 days. The chief adviser would be either the last serving Supreme Court chief justice, a retired justice of the appellate division or “an appropriate citizen”; if none were available, the president would assume the role. He or she would also assume the defence ministry’s executive powers and functions and have authority to promulgate ordinances, rules and, if needed, declare a state of emergency.

14 Crisis Group Reports, Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh; Bangladesh Today, both op. cit.

15 Crisis Group interview, retired senior government official, Dhaka, August 2014.

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ian leadership soon reappeared; the BNP accused Sheikh Hasina of colluding with the military and said the December 2008 vote was rigged for the AL.¹⁶

B. Democracy Returns

The BNP-led government’s corruption and misrule had undermined its credibility;

even BNP leaders and members acknowledge a defeat in December 2008 would have been likely in any free and fair election. In the party’s view, however, the extent of its loss reflected a playing field tilted in the AL’s favour.¹⁷ Rather than transferring authority to a neutral set-up that could ensure a level field, a discredited military- backed government had overseen the election, refusing to revoke emergency rule until 17 December, roughly two weeks before the polls. Fundamental rights remained suspended, and cases against political leaders, including Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, continued; scores of AL and BNP members were convicted, and many were detained in military-led search and arrest operations.

Though both parties were targeted, BNP leaders believe the military was more sym- pathetic to the AL, interpreting Sheikh Hasina’s 11 June 2008 release on parole for medical reasons and permission to leave for the U.S. as the result of a deal. In July that year, more cases were filed against Zia and her son, Tarique Rahman, for embezzlement of the Zia Orphanage Trust fund, and investigations against Zia and other BNP leaders were reopened in another embezzlement case related to a coal mine project.

The two cases remain open, with life sentences possible.¹⁸

An AL-led alliance won a two-thirds majority. The BNP saw failure to win even one of 99 seats in two key divisions, Dhaka and Sylhet – almost a third of the total parliamentary constituencies – as clear evidence of rigging.¹⁹ This influenced its decision to boycott the 2014 election. Its two-thirds majority gave the AL a significant opportunity to strengthen democratic governance, but it took a confrontational approach, including by passing the fifteenth constitutional amendment, which abolished the caretaker system, thus opening a new front in the conflict with the BNP.²⁰

C. The Caretaker Model Ends

Although the caretaker model enjoyed wide popularity,²¹ a petition filed by a Supreme Court lawyer to the High Court division in 2000 and heard in 2004 challenged the thirteenth amendment. The BNP-led government’s attorney general and the AL’s advocate both backed the system. Though it upheld the amendment, the High Court

16 Nizam Ahmed, Aiding the Parliament of Bangladesh: Experiences and Prospects (Dhaka, 2012).

17 Crisis Group interviews, BNP members, Dhaka, Bogra, August 2014. Bogra is a BNP stronghold.

18 All fifteen cases against Sheikh Hasina were dropped after she returned to power. “Bangladesh drops leader Sheikh Hasina corruption case”, BBC News (online), 30 May 2010. Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Emergency and the Aftermath 2007-2008 (Dhaka, 2014), pp. 304-310.

19 Crisis Group interview, Dr Abdul Moyeen Khan, BNP standing committee member, Dhaka, 13 August 2014. A unitary parliamentary democracy, Bangladesh is administratively divided into seven administrative units called divisions, each subdivided into districts and, at the lowest tier, upazi- las (union councils). The seven divisions are Barisal, Dhaka, Chittagong, Sylhet, Khulna, Rajshahi and Rangpur.

20 The approach was symbolised by the eviction of Khaleda Zia from her home in the Dhaka can- tonment where she had lived for 38 years. “I am evicted”, The Daily Star, 14 November 2010.

21 An April 2013 AC Nielsen/Democracy International poll found 81 per cent support. David Berg- man, “Popular support for caretaker system”, The New Age, 11 September 2013.

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gave the petitioner leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which heard the case in March 2011. The system was again supported by the then-AL government’s attorney general, but the court ruled that it violated the constitutional principle of the people’s sovereignty by giving unelected officials control over the state for 90 days.²² Con- ceding that it enjoyed political and popular support, however, it allowed parliament to retain it for the next two elections.

Instead of building consensus for a new model with the opposition, the AL government abolished the system through the fifteenth amendment in June 2011, justifying this on the Supreme Court judgment and abuses of power during the military-backed CTG. The BNP believed this was done to improve the AL’s re-election prospects, given the advantages of incumbency, particularly control of the law enforcement apparatus.

These perceptions were reinforced by the failure to introduce electoral reforms to prevent executive interference and strengthen the autonomy of the Bangladesh Elec- tion Commission (BEC). Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) warned this would likely “jeopardise the level [electoral] playing field”.²³

D. The 2014 Election

The BNP’s political fortunes had been rising as the 2014 elections approached, in part due to its opposition to the fifteenth amendment. In June-July 2013, it won all five major mayoral elections, including in AL strongholds, and several opinion polls suggested victory in the general election was possible.²⁴ Yet, Zia, insisting on restoration of the caretaker government, rejected AL proposals for an all-party cabinet with new limitations on the prime minister’s power during the election cycle, opting first for violent protest to prevent the vote and then, in December, for a boycott. The EU’s Election Observation Mission (EOM) cancelled plans to monitor the election, as did U.S., Commonwealth and other international missions.

Election-related violence made the 2014 polls the most violent in the country’s history. Countrywide hartals (strikes), demonstrations and traffic blockades that stalled economic activity and travel outside the urban centres were accompanied by attacks on AL supporters and officials in the run-up to and on election day.²⁵ The High Court banned Jamaat from contesting the polls on the grounds that it violated the secular constitution; its activists reportedly committed some of the worst attacks.²⁶ An AL lawmaker said, “you can have a boycott, but it has to be peaceful. This was a very violent boycott, and [AL critics] should keep that in mind”.²⁷ Yet, the government’s response was equally extreme, as the elite paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB, discussed below), regular police and the Border Guard cracked down on the

22 A judge who had served on the panel said, “there can be no hiatus in the sovereignty of the people”. Crisis Group interview, retired Supreme Court justice, Dhaka, August 2014.

23 “Annual report: 2013”, Transparency International Bangladesh, April 2014.

24 A July 2013 AC Nielsen/Democracy International poll found 43 per cent of respondents favoured the BNP, against 32 per cent for the AL and 19 per cent undecided.

25 “Democracy in the Crossfire: Opposition violence and government abuses in the 2014 pre- and post-election period in Bangladesh”, Human Rights Watch, April 2014.

26 Ibid. “Bangladeshi court bans Islamist party from elections”, The Guardian, 1 August 2013.

27 Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, August 2014.

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opposition in BNP and Jamaat strongholds, reportedly resorting to torture, illegal detentions and extrajudicial killings of leaders and activists.²⁸

Some opposition leaders, notably Jatiya Party (JP)’s Hussain Mohammed Ershad, the former military ruler, were coerced to participate in the process to create the ap- pearance of a competitive contest. A BNP lawyer who opposed his party’s boycott asked: “If the Awami League was capable of this, can you trust them to hold a free and fair election?”²⁹ Only twelve of 42 registered parties participated; 154 of 300 seats were uncontested, of which 127 went to AL candidates by default.³⁰ The election commission announced turnout was 40 per cent; the Fair Election Monitoring Alli- ance (FEMA), a local observer group, estimated it at 10 per cent.³¹

In the final assessment, the BNP’s plan backfired, as the AL went ahead with the poll, ignoring domestic and international opinion. The U.S., UK and EU strongly criticised the election, but other influential states, including India, China, Japan and Russia appeared to endorse the result. Failing to galvanise opposition on the streets afterwards, the BNP participated in the six-phase upazila (local) elections, February- May 2014, scoring major victories in the first two rounds. It did less well in the later rounds, amid widespread allegations of rigging by AL workers and some security personnel.³² Both parties believe the local elections vindicated their stance. The AL cites the early BNP victories as evidence that the government can hold a free and fair election; the BNP points to its losses in the last three rounds as proof that the ruling party cannot be trusted to oversee one.³³

28 According to Human Rights Watch: “Before, during, and after the elections, Bangladesh’s security forces launched a brutal crackdown on the opposition, unlawfully killing dozens of leaders and activists, carrying out widespread arbitrary arrests, and in some cases unlawfully destroying prop- erty belonging to opposition leaders and activists”. “Democracy in the Crossfire”, op. cit.

29After Ershad declared his party would boycott the polls, security personnel detained him on 12 December in a military hospital, while the government allegedly successfully pressured his wife to allow a faction of the JP to contest the polls. Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, August 2014. Also,

“Bangladesh: Crackdown escalates ahead of election”, Human Rights Watch, 3 January 2014.

30 Overall, the AL won 234 seats and the JP 34, with the rest going to smaller parties.

31 FEMA, a coalition of NGOs and local civil society groups, is Bangladesh’s principal domestic election monitoring organisation. “FEMA sees low turnout”, The Independent (Dhaka), 6 January 2014. Also, Eric Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Washing- ton, DC, 2004).

32 “Six months human rights monitoring report: 1 January-30 June 2014”, Odikhar (a leading domestic human rights group); “Rigging, intimidation rampant in 6th phase of upazila polls”, New Age, 22 May 2014; “Widespread rigging marks Lakshmirpur polls”, Prothom Alo, 31 March 2014.

33 Crisis Group interviews, AL and BNP leaders, Dhaka, August 2014.

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III.

Political Dysfunction

A. Parliamentary Incapacity

Bangladesh’s political system has vacillated not only between military and democratic rule, but also between presidential and parliamentary forms of government. In 1975, the Mujib-led parliament amended the 1972 constitution to replace the parliamentary system with a presidential one. The Zia and Ershad regimes retained the presidential system, which tilted power to the head of state, with rubber-stamp parliaments

“intended more to legitimise the military rule than to provide a framework for public participation in lawmaking or for redress of grievances”.³⁴ These parliaments were also short-lived. The first to survive a full term did so in 1996, 25 years after independence.

During the democratic transition of the 1990s, legislatures passed important reforms to restore and strengthen the parliamentary system and enhance transparency.

These included new rules in 1997 that required the scrutiny of bills in committees before a vote and that parliamentary standing committees be chaired by elected members rather than ministers. Yet, even inclusive parliaments were hampered by confrontational, zero-sum politics, marked by parliamentary resolutions against the opposition party and frequent opposition boycotts.³⁵ Passage of the fifteenth amendment was emblematic of the unwillingness to cooperate; the ruling party pushed it through without meaningful consultation. Likewise, the BNP opted to boycott polls, resorting instead to violent agitation and so undermining the legislature’s ability to check executive overreach.

Inadequate resources, including personnel, logistical support and research and analysis capacity, limit parliament’s ability to shape legislation, provide oversight of the executive branch and respond to public needs. Despite the restoration of parliamentary democracy, there is also still a considerable degree of centralised executive power. Article 55 of the constitution vests all executive authority in the prime minister rather than cabinet; many legal experts consequently describe the form of government as “prime ministerial” rather than parliamentary.³⁶

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina relies more on unelected advisers, who enjoy sig- nificantly more authority than her ministers and other elected officials. Her ministers have little or no control over their line departments. “Ministers don’t want to make any calls on their own”, a senior journalist said. “They check with the prime minister on every decision. Senior bureaucrats have her phone number and will call her directly rather than going through their ministers”.³⁷ This centralisation of authority in the prime minister’s office, which also happened under BNP governments, undermines the workings of departments. A prominent human rights campaigner, said, “the policeman doesn’t know whether to take action against a particular perpe- trator; the Anti-Corruption Commission doesn’t know whether to pursue a particular case; and the information commission doesn’t know whether to divulge a particular piece of information”.³⁸

34 Nizam Ahmed, op. cit.

35 Crisis Group interview, Iftekhar Zaman, executive director, Transparency International Bangla- desh, Dhaka, 10 August 2014.

36 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, political analysts, Dhaka, August 2014.

38 Crisis Group interview, Sultana Kamal, Dhaka, August 2014. Kamal chairs Transparency Interna- tional Bangladesh and is executive director of the civil rights group, Ain O Salish Kendra.

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In September 2014, the sixteenth constitutional amendment restored parliament’s authority to impeach Supreme Court judges, by a two-thirds majority, for incapacity or misbehaviour. It also gave parliament power to impeach holders of constitutionally- mandated offices such as the chief election commissioner. This move (see Section IV.C.1 below) nominally strengthened the balance of powers but has raised concerns of potential misuse under an AL government demonstrating willingness to politicise its actions and with parliamentary opposition defunct.

It also raises questions about “who guards the guards”.³⁹ Former ministers and state ministers from the last parliament now standing committee chairpersons are unlikely to investigate their own conduct or that of their former ministries.⁴⁰ Such conflict of interest defeats the purpose of the parliamentary committee system, all the more so when, in effect, there is no parliamentary opposition.

B. An Opposition in Disarray

The BNP’s electoral boycott not only enabled the AL’s electoral sweep but also de- prived Zia’s party of a meaningful role as the main parliamentary opposition. Its ability to act as an effective extra-parliamentary opposition depends on its own resuscita- tion. Khaleda Zia may believe that the January 2015 strikes and transport blockade will strengthen her party’s bargaining position. Some in the BNP may also believe that continued violence will provoke the military to act. As in the past, however, such an intervention would debilitate the BNP as much as the AL, and possibly revive the military’s “minus-two” formula.

Instead, the BNP should work to convince the public that it will not repeat its 2001- 2006 performance in office, which was marred by rampant corruption, heavy-handed use of force, poor governance and alliances with Islamist parties that allowed extremist groups to expand their space. It was also marred by internal party divisions. A faction controlled by the prime minister’s son, Tarique Rahman, ran what many close observers within and outside the party reportedly termed a “parallel government”, antagonising many BNP parliamentarians and some sections of the party leadership.⁴¹ In 2004, the government established the RAB, which it used against its political opponents and Tarique’s internal rivals.⁴²

The BNP also needs to shake its image as primarily an anti-AL alliance, rather than a party with a self-standing, coherent ideology. Even the “prioritisation of religion”

in its portrayal of Bangladeshi identity appears to stem “from its inability to distinguish it from its arch-rival, the [secular] Awami League”.⁴³ Nevertheless, AL weaknesses have repeatedly given the BNP a significant opportunity to revive its political fortunes. By 2013, as discussed above, it had regained much of its organisational strength and popular support, evinced in its victory in five mayoral elections. Yet, it has squandered such opportunities because of two fundamental problems: an over- centralised party structure and close ties with the Jamaat-e-Islami.

39 Crisis Group interview, AL parliamentarian, Dhaka, August 2014.

40 “JS ignores issues of public interest: TIB”, New Age, 8 July 2014.

41 “Some civil servants and senior ministers would report directly to Tarique”, a senior journalist said. Crisis Group interview, Dhaka, August 2014.

42 Crisis Group interviews, BNP members, journalists, Dhaka, August 2014. The BNP government formed the RAB in 2004 to combat terrorism and other serious crime.

43 Ali Riaz, God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh (Oxfordshire, 2004), p. 12.

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1. BNP Politics

A senior BNP member claimed there was broad consensus within the party that boycotting the 2014 elections would undermine the AL’s standing. “The Awami League has a shaky mandate only because BNP didn’t take part in the election”, he said.⁴⁴ However, according to several BNP members, a majority of party office holders and the rank-and-file opposed a boycott, even as they shared Zia’s concerns about rigging. They failed, however, to influence her largely due to limited avenues for internal debate.⁴⁵ The BNP’s original charter, which gave its founder, General Zia, “absolute power to control and run the party”, has remained largely unchanged. Like the AL, it has highly centralised structures.⁴⁶ Where the parties differ is at the lower tiers, where, unlike the AL, the BNP is not strongly organised. In a majority of districts, it lacks effective party committees and rarely conducts voter registration or member- ship drives.⁴⁷ It has not had a permanent secretary general, the second most senior position after the chair (Khaleda Zia), since March 2011.⁴⁸

An internal reorganisation is urgently needed if it is to strengthen its lower ranks and reinvigorate the middle – and even higher – leadership. The decision to again resort to agitation, disregarding the human and economic costs of violent protests, undermines its image as a responsible, democratic force. By restricting its campaign to the restoration of the caretaker system and fresh polls, the BNP is losing an opportunity to project itself as a credible alternative to the AL. While it should continue to urge an electoral framework that would reduce the chances of rigging, the party should be willing to engage in meaningful negotiations with the AL to end a crisis that undermines economic growth and poses grave threats to political stability. The onus would then be on the AL to reciprocate or lose credibility. The BNP also needs to focus on the needs of the electorate, such as education and health. Though out of parliament, it should position itself for a future election by adopting the posture of a government- in-waiting, appointing a shadow cabinet that formulates and communicates policy proposals.

2. Relations with the Jamaat

A BNP member who supported participating in the election contended that Zia de- cided on a boycott after the Jamaat had persuaded her its street agitation would pressure the AL – or persuade the military – to delay the vote and restore the caretaker system.⁴⁹ Yet, the BNP’s relationship with the Jamaat has political costs because of the latter’s propensity for violence, alleged links to extremist jihadi groups, and public image of involvement in atrocities during the 1971 liberation war.

A BNP leader justified the relationship as a solely political, not ideological alliance, like that between UK Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. “Just because there are contradictory ideals doesn’t mean we cannot be in coalition”, he said,not acknowl- edging that the relationship has benefited Jamaat out of proportion to its electoral

44 Crisis Group interview, Abdul Moeen Khan, BNP, Dhaka, 13 August 2014.

45 Crisis Group interviews, BNP members, Dhaka, August 2014.

46 “BNP: a party for the supremo”, Daily Star, 1 September 2014. Also, Jahan, op. cit.

47 Crisis Group interviews, journalists, political analysts, Dhaka, August 2014.

48 Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir has been the temporary secretary general since Khandaker Delwar Hossain’s death in March 2011.

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strength and BNP’s costs have been high.⁵⁰ The 2001-2006 BNP-led government had included the Jamaat and a smaller Islamist coalition, Islamic Oikkya Jote (IOJ),⁵¹ some of whose constituent groups supported the Afghan Taliban and Gulbuddin Hek- matyar’s Hizb-e Islami.⁵² The Jamaat also reportedly had links with regional, including Afghan and Pakistani, jihadi groups. The Jamaat-run Islamic Bank Bangladesh Ltd. (IBBL) reportedly held the account of the monthly Jago Mujahid, a publication of the anti-India, jihadi Harkatul Jihad ul Islam (HUJI) group. In 2006, the central bank moved against the IBBL for militancy links (allegations it has repeatedly denied).⁵³ A July 2012 U.S. Congressional report referenced IBBL’s and other Bangla- desh-based Islamic banks’ suspected terrorism links.⁵⁴

Emboldened by the Jamaat-BNP government partnership, Islamist groups attacked the Hindu minority as well as Ahmadis. Instead “of clamping down on the perpetrators”, the government “succumbed to their pressure and on 8 January 2004 banned all Ahmadiyya publications”.⁵⁵ Facing domestic and international criticism, the government banned some radical Islamist groups, such as the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and arrested scores of JMB operatives, especially after the JMB’s countrywide terror attacks on 17 August 2005. The police reportedly found Jamaat literature exhorting jihad with arrested JMB members.⁵⁶ Many JMB cadres and top leadership were also found to have belonged to or enjoy close links with the Jamaat or its student wing.

The BNP’s alliance with the Jamaat has much to do with the Islamist party’s capacity to mobilise street power against the AL. While its vote bank is only some 5 per cent of the electorate, it has considerable resources, including IT companies, insurance firms, NGOs, charities and other social welfare entities, hospitals and real estate in- vestments.⁵⁷ The BNP has again appealed to the Jamaat to support its post 5-January street agitation, and Jamaat appears to have responded. According to law-enforcement agencies, its activists were responsible for much of the violence in Dhaka and elsewhere.⁵⁸ Earlier, a retired senior bureaucrat, now a BNP member, noted: “If Ja-

50 Crisis Group interview, Abdul Moeen Khan, Dhaka, August 2014.

51 The BNP won 193 seats, the Jamaat seventeen and the IOJ two in the October 2001 elections.

52 An IOJ parliamentarian, Mufti Shahidul Islam, had previously fought alongside the Afghan mu- jahidin. The IOJ has since split into smaller groupings. Riaz, op. cit., pp. 30, 46.

53 Shahriar Kabir, “Jamaat-e-Islami’s link with Islamic militancy”, South Asian People’s Union Against Fundamentalism and Communalism (SAPUAFC), July 2007. A prominent journalist, doc- umentary filmmaker and human rights campaigner, Kabir helped to found SAPUAFC, a coalition of South Asian civil society organisations to counter religious extremism.

54 Majority and minority staff report, “U.S. vulnerabilities to money laundering, drugs, and terrorist financing: HSBC case history”, staff report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Sen- ate, 17 July 2012. IBBL strongly rejected the allegations and has also denied links with Jamaat. “Views of Islami Bank on the news relating to HSBC implicating with Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited”

and “Clarification of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited on the issues raised in the recent report of US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ‘U.S. Vulnerabilities to Money Laundering, Drugs, and Terrorist Financing: HSBC Case History’”, IBBL website, 19 July 2012 and 16 August 2012.

55 Riaz, op. cit., p. 34.

56 JMB attacks hit 63 of 64 districts. Crisis Group Report, The Threat, op. cit.; Kabir, op. cit.

57 Crisis Group interviews, political analysts, economists and journalists, Dhaka, August 2014.

58 Trucks, buses and trains were firebombed, killing and injuring scores of passengers. “Molotov cocktail attacks zooming in on capital: Intelligence claims Jamaat-Shibir men behind most attacks”, Dhaka Tribune, 21 January 2015; “Ten burnt alive after BD bus firebombed”, Agence France- Presse, 4 February 2015.

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maat is taken out of play, organised opposition on the streets will be very difficult”.⁵⁹ Pointing to the Jamaat connection, AL parliamentarians depict the BNP as an Islam- ist sympathiser, even alleging it has links to terror groups such as al-Qaeda.⁶⁰ Refut- ing this, a senior BNP member acknowledged that the AL had “succeeded in convincing Western governments that BNP is a fundamentalist party, and this has put us on the back foot”.⁶¹

The alliance has other significant political drawbacks. The Jamaat remains linked in the public mind with liberation war atrocities, even among a new generation whose knowledge of that period is increasingly drawn from ongoing war crimes trials. A social science researcher at BRAC University, a Dhaka-based private institution, asked:

“What is the BNP’s brand? For example, why does it support Jamaat’s line on the war crimes trials? If its account of the liberation war is different from Awami League’s fine – but what is it? It has a female leader on the one hand, but the Jamaat has links with the Hefazat [Hefazat-e-Islam, a radical Islamist coalition], which wants to deny women’s right to work”.⁶² The 2013-2014 election-related violence has also hardened public contempt for the party.⁶³ Yet, though the association undercuts its credibility, the BNP apparently still calculates that the political benefits outweigh the costs.

60 The agriculture minister branded Khaleda Zia as “lady Laden” and Tarique as “junior Laden”.

“MPs link BNP-Jamaat with ‘Zawahiri’ statement”, Dhaka Tribune, 17 February 2014.

63 Crisis Group interviews, BNP senior members, workers, civil society activists, Dhaka, August 2014.

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IV.

Assessing the Awami League Government

A. Doubling Down against the BNP

The AL frequently says the BNP has “missed the train”.⁶⁴ A senior legislator said,

“our message to the BNP [is] you gave it your best shot, … did everything to stop the election, and now you’re saying let’s have another election. Why should we agree?”

An adviser to the prime minister argues: “The BNP has four years to regroup. The field will be open to them in 2019 [the next election]. If the BNP wants to take part, it should file its nomination papers, and then if voters vote [for it] we will respect that. There is nothing more to discuss”.⁶⁵ But while it downplays a BNP threat, the AL worries about losing political legitimacy. “This government, by its own reckoning, lacks a popular mandate”, said Transparency International Bangladesh’s executive director.⁶⁶ Its heavy-handed response to January protests, including excessive force, mass arrests of opposition activists and leaders and attacks on the press, reflect con- cern popular disenchantment could find a public channel.⁶⁷

Anxious about declining support, the AL has yet to hold a mayoral election in Dhaka, in violation of constitutional obligations. Control over the capital has always been a major political trophy. Senior AL members acknowledged that the prolonged delay reflects fear that a loss would give the BNP an opportunity to re-enter the political mainstream.⁶⁸

The anti-BNP rhetoric includes holding it responsible for violent attacks against the AL leadership. General Zia, Khaleda’s late husband, is blamed for Mujib’s 1975 assassination, and she and her heir apparent son, Tarique Rahman, are held responsible for the 2004 assassination attempt targeting Sheikh Hasina, then the opposition leader, that killed a senior party member and over twenty others.⁶⁹ Neither charge has been substantiated in court, and Zia denies involvement.⁷⁰ According to a senior journalist, “Sheikh Hasina, already convinced of General Ziaur Rahman’s role in the loathsome events of 1975, now looks at Khaleda Zia and her son … not as political opponents but as her potential killers”.⁷¹ An adviser to the prime minister said, “if Tarique comes to power, 70 per cent of our party will be butchered”.⁷²

The anti-BNP campaign extends to the courts; several senior BNP members face charges from corruption, to election-related violence, to war crimes. Khaleda Zia and Tarique Rahman face embezzlement charges in a special anti-corruption court. On 8 January, the son was charged with treason, while the mother has been implicated in instigating two arson cases during the BNP-led January blockade.⁷³ Convictions in

64 “PM rules out dialogue with BNP”, The New Age, 27 July 2014.

65 Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, August 2014.

66 Crisis Group interview, Iftekhar Zaman, Dhaka, 10 August 2014.

67 “Bangladesh: crackdown on opposition, media”, Human Rights Watch press release, 8 January 2015.

68 Crisis Group interviews, AL cabinet minister; Gowher Rizvi, international affairs adviser to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajid, Dhaka, August 2014.

69 “Khaleda, Tarique involved in Aug 21 grenade attack: Hasina”, BDnews24.com, 21 August 2014.

70 “Bangladesh ex-PM in murder probe”, BBC News (online), 5 June 2007.

71 “‘Internment’ of BNP chief, a dangerous precedent”, The Daily Star, 9 January 2015.

72 Crisis Group interview, Gowher Rizvi, Dhaka, August 2014.

73 “Khaleda implicated in two arson cases”, Dhaka Tribune, 26 January 2015; “Bangladesh: crackdown on opposition, media”, op. cit.; “Tarique Rahman, ETV chairman Salam charged with sedi- tion”, BDnews24.com, 8 January 2015.

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any of these cases – which could result in at least life sentences – might even threaten the party’s survival. Should that happen, Islamist hardliners like the Jamaat are well positioned to fill any vacuum. Some AL leaders contend that the Islamist opposition, while popular locally, would not be viable nationally.⁷⁴ Yet, the AL should realise that the Jamaat and its Islamist allies are far more of a threat than the BNP, given their propensity to violence and, above all, their opposition to the secular democracy and gender equality that the AL claims to represent.

B. Curbing Dissent

In December 2014, the cabinet approved a draft law, the Foreign Donations (Volun- tary Activities) Regulation Act, to regulate international NGOs and local ones that receive foreign funds. Among other provisions if passed by parliament, it would grant the NGO affairs bureau in the prime minister’s office authority to approve or deny NGO access to foreign funding; and that bureau’s director general and divisional commissioners, deputy commissioners and other local executives authority to “in- spect, monitor and assess the activities” of NGOs receiving such funds. The director general could name an administrator to file cases against NGOs, and those responsible for violations could be fined or have registrations suspended or revoked. NGOs would not be allowed to challenge decisions.⁷⁵ Many Dhaka-based NGOs fear that the bill lends itself to rampant government abuse.⁷⁶

In August 2013, the AL-dominated parliament amended the Information and Communication Technology Act 2006 to tighten controls on dissent in the electronic media, enhancing punishments for violators, including by giving police the authority to investigate and arrest offenders without warrant or court authorisation.⁷⁷ In Au- gust 2014, the AL government approved a policy to create an independent national broadcast commission to oversee the electronic media. The policy calls for prohibiting content contrary to the “public interest” that undermines the reputation of the army and law enforcement agencies or harms relations with “friendly countries”.⁷⁸ It was announced amid widespread media condemnation of the RAB’s heavy-handed- ness, including in the aftermath of a murder case in Narayanganj district (see Section V.B.1). Responding to broad criticism of the policy, the government said that it con- tained only “guidelines”, with no mechanisms for enforcement or punishment.⁷⁹ Yet, the potential for misuse remains.

C. Politicising Justice

1. Superior courts and executive interference

In the past, the Supreme Court played an important role in democratic development, including by declaring unconstitutional military interventions, such as Zia’s 1975 coup, and prohibiting any future imposition of martial law without the prime minister’s con-

74 Crisis Group interviews, AL, Dhaka, August 2014.

75 “Bangladesh: withdraw restrictive draft law on NGOs”, Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2014; “Bangla- desh: new NGO law aims at suppressing independent human rights work”, International Federation for Human Rights, 18 June 2014.

76 Crisis Group interviews, local and international NGO representatives, Dhaka, August 2014.

77 “Human rights report: 2013”, Odhikar, 15 April 2014.

78 Text of the policy, on the AL website at http://www.albd.org/~parbonc/index.php/en/updates/

news/1430-cabinet-approved-the-draft-national-broadcasting-policy-2014.

79 “Broadcast policy will not curb press freedom: minister”, The New Age, 11 August 2014.

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sent.⁸⁰ In 2010, the High Court division similarly declared unconstitutional Ershad’s martial law and the Seventh Amendment that validated it, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court’s appellate division in 2011.⁸¹ Yet, under the current government, the Supreme Court has failed to prevent executive interference in and politicisation of the courts; the higher judiciary is at best only nominally independent, as demonstrated by the High Court’s January 2015 ban, amid BNP protests, on any media coverage of Zia’s son, Tarique Rahman.⁸²

The president appoints (additional) judges for a two-year probationary period on the prime minister’s (binding) advice and in consultation with the Supreme Court chief justice. The president may confirm permanent appointments on the chief justice’s advice. Yet, the prime minister has had the decisive role on appointments, largely ignoring higher court judgments calling for meaningful consultation with the chief justice. During its 2001-2006 tenure, the BNP government tried to stack the bench with loyalists, including by naming nineteen additional judges to the High Court division before the Supreme Court’s 2004 summer recess. BNP attempts to politicise the judiciary were highlighted by the AL in its 2008 electoral campaign. Once in office, however, Sheikh Hasina also appears to have made judicial appointments on political grounds and without meaningfully consulting the chief justice that have undermined justice delivery.⁸³ Impartial senior judges now commonly share benches with additional judges with clear political leanings, or who are disinclined to challenge the government before confirmation.⁸⁴

In 1978, the Zia regime transferred the power to take disciplinary action against judges and holders of constitutional offices from parliament to a Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), comprising the chief justice and the next two senior judges. In Septem- ber 2014, the AL-dominated parliament passed the sixteenth constitutional amendment, restoring parliament’s authority to impeach judges. This amendment has been almost unanimously criticised by bar leaders. Though in itself it provides a more transparent mechanism than a defunct SJC, the criticism reflects mistrust of the AL, given its track record of partisan appointments and propensity to curb opposition and dissent. A senior journalist said, “the problem today is that one can’t distinguish between a power play and a sincere reform”.⁸⁵

The judicial appointment procedure still remains the prime minister’s preroga- tive. Taking advantage of the AL’s two-thirds parliamentary majority and constitutional limits on parliamentarians voting against party directives, the prime minister

80 “The Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act’s Case 2006”, The Bangladesh Law Times (special is- sue), 21 May 2006. This did not apply to the president’s imposition of a state of emergency, as on 1/11.

81 Siddique Ahmed (appellant) versus Government of Bangladesh and Others (respondents), civil appeal no. 48 of 2011. The Supreme Court has two divisions: a High Court that hears appeals from lower courts and tribunals and has original jurisdiction in some limited cases; and an appellate bench that hears appeals from the High Court.

82 “Bangladesh media ban for opposition leader Khaleda Zia’s son”, BBC News (online), 7 January 2015.

83 “Bangladesh” in “Countries at the Crossroads: An Analysis of Democratic Governance”, volume 11, Freedom House, 23 February 2012, pp. 57-74.

84 Crisis Group interviews, senior lawyers, Dhaka, August 2014.

85 Crisis Group interview, Mizanur Rahman Khan, Dhaka, August 2014. The bar council passed a resolution for a 22 September 2014 boycott of the courts to mark lawyers’ objections. “Lawyers to boycott courts tomorrow”, The Daily Star, 21 September 2014. Also, “Senior jurists vehemently oppose impeachment bill”, The New Age, 9 September 2014.

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has sweeping powers to shape the bench.⁸⁶ Any mechanism to enhance accountability must not compromise judicial independence; a starting point for meaningful reform would be creation of a more transparent and consultative appointment process, including consultations with the bar councils and relevant parliamentary committees, followed by parliamentary endorsement.

2. The law enforcement apparatus

When in government, the AL (like the BNP) has tended to respond to civil agitation, even when grievances are legitimate, by using and strengthening the state’s coercive arm. Responding to labour unrest in the four industrial hubs (Dhaka, Gazipur, Nara- yanganj and Chittagong), for instance, it created an industrial police in October 2010.⁸⁷ Exploitive businesses and factory owners with links to the government allegedly have significant sway over the force and have used it to confront labour groups.⁸⁸

The RAB has come to symbolise heavy-handed, politically-motivated law enforcement.The AL had opposed its 2004 creation by the BNP government and called for its disbandment. Today, the 9,000-strong force, comprising fourteen battalions from the police, border and coast guards and other agencies, but especially the military, is the most prominent and feared security agency.⁸⁹ It is headed by the police inspector general, but, circumventing the home ministry, personnel are administratively controlled by their parent institutions.⁹⁰

The force has been accused of illegal abductions, torture and extrajudicial killings, creating a “culture of fear, where anyone can disappear at any time”.⁹¹ In June 2014, nine RAB personnel were sued by the family of a businessman allegedly tortured and murdered at a RAB camp in Kishoreganj.⁹² Since its creation, 2,000 RAB officers – roughly equal numbers from the military and policy – have been punished, mostly through internal administrative action, for such crimes as theft, extortion, torture, rape and drug trafficking.⁹³ A September 2014 European Parliament resolution called on Dhaka to end RAB impunity for human rights violations.⁹⁴

The U.S., which along with the UK has viewed the RAB as Bangladesh’s most effective counter-terrorism body, has had to limit assistance to it because of a legislative prohibition on aid to any unit of a state’s security forces committing gross human rights violations.⁹⁵ In March 2011, the UK ended its training program focused on

86 Inserted by the fifteenth amendment (June 2011), Article 70 of the constitution requires parliamentarians voting against their parties to vacate their seats.

87 “Industrial police launched”, Daily Star, 4 October 2010.

88 Crisis Group interviews, human rights groups, Dhaka, August 2014.

89 For details of the RAB’s composition, see webpage www.rab.bd.org.

90 Major Michael J. O’Connor, “Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion: satisfying the requirements of the Leahy amendment with a rule of law approach”, Military Law Review, volume 215, 2013.

91 Crisis Group interview, journalist, Dhaka, August 2014.

92 RAB’s director said the case was being internally investigated; its media director denied the allegations. After the government removed a local magistrate who had ordered a police probe, the businessman’s family filed a petition in the High Court, which began hearing the case in December 2014.

“9 RAB men sued for torture, killing”, The Daily Star, 2 June 2014; “They want justice”, The Daily Star, 11 December 2014.

93 “2,000 RAB men punished in 10 years”, BDnews24.com, 11 May 2014.

94 “Human rights: Azerbaijan; the case of Mbonimpa, in Burundi; Bangladesh”, press release, ple- nary session, European Parliament, 18 September 2014.

95 The U.S. legislative restriction on such aid is known as the Leahy Amendment. Statement of As- sistant Secretary of State Robert Blake before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, U.S.

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human rights and ethnical policing.⁹⁶ The U.S. still supports RAB’s internal inquiry cell and training related to human rights.⁹⁷ However, the human rights training has had no visible impact on the force.

The police are widely believed to have committed similar abuses. According to Odhikar, a leading domestic human rights organisation, they were responsible for over 80 extrajudicial killings from January 2001 to August 2014.⁹⁸ Several human rights activists and crime reporters alleged that officers regularly took bribes from detained political workers in return for release and that those who failed to pay might be tortured or even killed.⁹⁹

The government should recognise the costs of such practices to its domestic and international standing. Abolishing the RAB and forces such as the industrial police would send the right signal to critics and supporters alike. Until then, the parliamentary standing committee on home affairs should respond to credible allegations of arbitrary force by holding regular hearings, and the 2013 Torture and Custodial Death (prevention) Act should be effectively enforced.

3. War crimes trials

Experience with the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a national court, demon- strates how politicised justice undermines the criminal justice system and, by fuelling a sense of injustice, creates opportunities for extremists.¹⁰⁰ It was created in 2010 under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act of 1973 to prosecute Bangladeshis who had committed atrocities in collusion with the Pakistani military during the 1971 liberation war. Because the process presented an important opportunity to address major unaddressed injustices, the ICT initially enjoyed wide public support.¹⁰¹ It has, however, lost much of its legitimacy due to the absence of due process and other international fair trial standards, political interference and opacity.

The tribunals have better facilities than even the Supreme Court and a much slim- mer case load, but the weaknesses of the criminal justice system hamper their work, particularly the dearth of qualified trial judges and prosecutors. A tribunal typically has a manageable docket of twenty matters pending judgement, while the Supreme Court often has over 500, with overcrowded courtrooms and chaotic proceedings. Un- like trial courts, the tribunals award bail, despite the gravity of the crimes, and some witness protection.¹⁰² Yet, the process lacks transparency. Access to observe the tribunals at work is restricted, requiring written requests and long waits for approval;

requests other than from the media are often denied.¹⁰³

House of Representatives, 19 July 2012. In a January 2009 cable made public by Wikileaks, the U.S. ambassador to Dhaka described the RAB as the “enforcement organisation best positioned to one day become a Bangladeshi version of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation”. “U.S. embassy cables: Ambassador said controversial paramilitary force could become ‘Bangladeshi FBI’”, The Guardian, 21 December 2010.

96 Crisis Group email correspondence, UK official, London, 4 February 2015.

97 Crisis Group telephone interview, February 2015.

98 “Total extra-judicial killings from January 2001-August 2014”, Odhikar, undated.

99 Crisis Group interviews, Dhaka, August 2014. Also Crisis Group Report, Getting Police Reform on Track, op. cit.

100 The ICT has two tribunals, with separate rules of procedure. See website at www.ict.bd.org.

101 An April 2013 AC Nielsen poll found 86 per cent wanted the trials to proceed, though two-thirds deemed them “unfair” or “very unfair”. “Final sentence”, Economist, 17 September 2013.

102 Crisis Group interviews, lawyers, ICT prosecutors, retired judges, Dhaka, August 2014.

103 Crisis Group observations of ICT procedures; interviews, ICT staff, Dhaka, August 2014.