Mediation
and Dialogue Facilitation
in the OSCE
Reference Guide
Mediation
and Dialogue Facilitation
in the OSCE
Reference Guide
Table of Contents
Introduction 7
Chapter I: Conceptual Framework of Mediation and Dialogue
Facilitation in the OSCE Context 9
1. OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation 9
—
—
— Gender 13
—
—
—
—
—
—
— Outcome 21
—
Facilitation in the OSCE Area 27
—
—
—
— Mediation.
—
— Timing of mediation 39
—
—
—
—
—
— Managing information 55
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
Annex I: Examples of OSCE Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation
Engagements 79
Annex II: List of Acronyms 107
Table of Contents Table of Contents
Introduction
As the world’s largest regional security organization, the OSCE possess- es longstanding experience in facilitating political dialogue and engaging in mediation activities with the aim of preventing, managing or resolving conflicts. Already in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act participating States com- mitted themselves to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and to the use of such means as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. The 1992 Helsinki Document further strengthened OSCE struc- tures and enhanced the OSCE’s role with wide-ranging provisions on early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution.
Today, mediation is widely recognized as one of the most effective means for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts both in terms of costs and results. Faced with the emergence of new conflicts and the persistence of protracted conflicts, international and regional organi- zations resolved to strengthen their capabilities for effective mediation and dialogue facilitation. In this context, it has been recognized that both me- diation and dialogue facilitation need to be approached as a professional activity requiring specialized knowledge, expertise, and operational guid- ance, as well as sustained political, financial and administrative support.
Within the OSCE, informal discussions among participating States took place between 2009 and 2011 in the framework of the ‘Corfu Pro- cess’ and the ‘V to V Dialogues’. These led to the adoption of OSCE Min- isterial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (MC.
DEC/3/11), which, inter alia, tasked the OSCE Secretary General to pre- pare a proposal on how to maximize the continuity, consistency and effec- tiveness of OSCE engagement in conflict mediation and to strengthen the role of OSCE mediators. The Decision also called for the development of
Chapter I: Conceptual
Framework of Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation in the
OSCE Context
1. OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation
The OSCE originated in the détente phase of the early 1970s, when the Con- ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created as a multilateral mechanism to facilitate dialogue between the East and West.
After the end of the Cold War and with the increasing shift of attention from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, participating States gave the CSCE a broad mandate for early warning, conflict prevention, conflict manage- ment and post-conflict rehabilitation.
In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act participating States agreed to use nego- tiation, mediation and conciliation for the peaceful settlement of conflicts.
Further key documents were agreed on, which define the mandate, instru- ments and mechanisms of the OSCE and its structures throughout all phas- es of conflict. These include: the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe; the January 1992 Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institu- tions and Structures; the July 1992 Helsinki Document – The Challenges of Change; the December 1992 Stockholm Ministerial Council Document; the 1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security; the 2002 Ministerial Council Decision No. 8 on the Role of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office; the 2003
Introduction
a systematic mediation-support capacity within the Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), incorporating four elements: 1) training and ca- pacity-building, 2) knowledge management and operational guidance, 3) outreach, networking, co-operation and co-ordination, as well as 4) opera- tional support. This reference guide contributes to enhancing knowledge management and operational guidance related to OSCE mediation and dia- logue facilitation activities.
Furthermore, in July 2011 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly requested in its resolution 65/283 on ‘Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution’ the development of guidance for more effective mediation, taking into account, inter alia, lessons learned from past and ongoing mediation processes. Dur- ing 2011 and 2012 the UN led a broad consultation process on the develop- ment of the guidance.
The UN Guidance is a reference document which provides advice to mediators on the design and effective management of mediation processes.
It gives an outline of the logic of mediation and identifies eight fundamen- tal principles that mediators and their support staff need to consider. The Guidance makes it clear that each conflict situation needs to be addressed within its specific context. Regional organizations can contribute to this by
‘translating’ the general UN Guidance into their regional contexts. There- fore, the purpose of this reference guide is to provide recommendations surrounding the eight fundamental principles of the UN Guidance as they pertain to the OSCE context.
Chapter I Conceptual Framework
number of accompanying measures that aim to strengthen a mediation ef- fort.” Operational elements of mediation support may include training and capacity building; knowledge management and operational guidance; out- reach, networking, co-operation and co-ordination; and operational sup- port, including process design.
Mediation support also acknowledges that mediation processes are team efforts and that they require knowledge, expertise, operational guid- ance, technical capacity and other forms of resources. Therefore, mediation support provides a range of services to assist the efforts of high level OSCE mediators and their teams.
Actors and specific instruments, mechanisms and procedures
The Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) takes the lead in OSCE activities to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the OSCE area. The CiO can, for example, establish direct contact with conflict parties and facilitate dialogue and ne- gotiations. In response to a crisis or to support mediation efforts, the CiO can appoint Personal or Special Representatives or Envoys. The CiO can also task the OSCE Secretary General or the Director of the CPC to facilitate dia- logue in a crisis situation, as was done in 2004 during the political crisis in Ukraine and in 2010 during the crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Some heads of OSCE field operations are involved in dialogue facilita- tion and mediation in protracted conflicts or in regional and local disputes.
These efforts may also be conducted by field operation staff on behalf of the head of mission. Heads of missions and field operation staff also support Personal/Special Representatives/Envoys of the CiO in their mediation ef- forts.
The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) engages in quiet and preventive diplomacy by confidentially facilitating dialogue in cases of tensions involving national minorities. The Office for Democratic Strategy to Address Threats to Security in the Twenty-First Century; the
2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration – Towards a Security Commu- nity; and the 2011 Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. These are in line with the UN General As- sembly’s resolutions A/RES/65/283 (2011), A/RES/66/291 (2012) and A/
RES/68/303 (2014) on strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution.
Key definitions
Based on the OSCE Mediation-Support Framework (SEC.GAL/110/13), this reference guide uses the following broad working definitions of media- tion and dialogue facilitation.
Mediation: Mediation can be defined as a “structured communication pro- cess, in which an impartial third party works with conflict parties to find commonly agreeable solutions to their dispute, in a way that satisfies their interests at stake.” Mediation processes include four main phases: the pre- paratory phase for agreeing on negotiations (‘talks-about-talks’), mediated negotiations, agreement, and implementation.
Dialogue facilitation: The key features of dialogue facilitation are the same as for mediation. However, dialogue facilitation represents a distinct ap- proach insofar as it is “a more open-ended communication process between conflict parties in order to foster mutual understanding, recognition, em- pathy and trust. These can be one-off conversations, or go on over a longer period of time. Although dialogues can lead to very concrete decisions and actions, the primary aim is not to reach a specific settlement, but to gain a better understanding of the different perspectives involved in a conflict.”
Mediation support: Mediation support is defined as the operational capac- ity to assist dialogue facilitation and mediation activities. This includes “a
Chapter I Conceptual Framework
Gender
Both1 women and men can act as agents for change in conflict and peace- making, but the roles, experiences, needs and interests of women and men (as well as boys and girls) tend to be different.2 Therefore, if mediators and conflict parties do not adopt a gender perspective, the process and its out- come will not be sustainable. It is therefore important that mediators em- brace a gender perspective from the beginning and throughout all phases of the process.
Including women leaders, gender experts and women organizations at all levels and in all phases of the mediation process helps to identify the gender dimension of substantive issues on the agenda and to incorporate other critical issues that could possibly be ignored. It will also help to take into account women’s needs, vulnerabilities, capacities, priorities and in- terests, therefore rendering the process more inclusive and comprehensive.3 As men and women tend to have different negotiation styles, the inclusion
of women also ensures that a broader set of mediation skills is used in the process. This can significantly increase the efficiency of the process. At the same time, the thorough collection of data from both men and women about the conflict’s impact provides for a more differentiated understand- ing of substantive issues, which can improve the effectiveness of the process.
Addressing conflict-related patterns of gender-based violence in the process can also foster a more sustainable peace settlement.
However, owing to persisting stereotypes, women remain the larg- est group of stakeholders regularly excluded from official negotiation Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), through its Director and staff, can
also facilitate dialogue on issues related to the OSCE’s human dimension.
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) is involved in dialogue fa- cilitation, especially on the parliamentary level, through the PA President, her/his Special Representatives and working groups on specific conflicts, regions or critical issues.
OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation actors work in close co- ordination with each other based on the principle of respect for their spe- cific mandates.
Some OSCE mechanisms on the peaceful settlement of disputes avail- able to the CiO for her/his good offices, mediation and conciliation efforts include the Valletta Mechanism and the Provisions for an OSCE Concilia- tion Commission and for Directed Conciliation. Thirty three participating States acceded to the 1992 Convention of Conciliation and Arbitration of the CSCE, which established a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, consisting of a Conciliation Commission and an Arbitral Tribunal to assist in settling disputes brought before them by signatory states. Other OSCE mechanisms and procedures that entail some form of third-party dialogue include the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military Activities of the Vienna Document and the Stabilizing Measures for Local-
ized Crisis Situations.
There are also other OSCE mechanisms which can be utilized for the peaceful settlement of crisis/conflict situations even though they do not specifically mention the role of a third party. For example, the 2001 Minis- terial Council Decision No. 3 on Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum for Political Dialogue (MC(9).DEC/3) allows the Permanent Council (PC) and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) to provide a platform for dialogue, with the FSC providing ‘third party’ expert advice on issues of a politico-military nature.1
Chapter I Conceptual Framework
types of OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation engagement can be dis- tinguished, each requiring a different set of skills, processes and resources:
1.
The OSCE’s engagement in conducting official mediation dates back to 1992.
Since then, OSCE mediation efforts have been carried out within institu- tionalized negotiation frameworks in three different conflicts, which have evolved over time:
— The five-sided negotiations and, since 2005, the so-called “5+2”
process on the Transdniestrian settlement;
— The Joint Control Commission for the settlement of the Georgian- Ossetian conflict and since 2008 the Geneva International Discussions;
— The Minsk Group process in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
2.
This type of OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation effort relates to the prevention, management and resolution of various types of crises and con- flict situations within participating States, including pre- or post-electoral crises, civil unrest, inter-ethnic and communal violence, or the breakdown of law and order. Examples include the crises in Albania in 1997, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, in Ukraine in 2014 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010. The CiO, his/her Personal and Special Representatives, the Secretary General, the Director of the CPC, heads of missions and their field operation staff, the HCNM, the ODIHR and the OSCE PA have all been involved, either directly by facilitating dialogue or mediating between the conflict parties, or indirectly by supporting national and local efforts.
3.
The OSCE is also involved in dialogue facilitation between participating processes.4 UN Security Council resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and
Security’ from October 2000 therefore called for: an increase in the par- ticipation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes, a gender-sensitive approach to peacebuilding, the pro- tection of women and girls from gender-based violence and the protection of their rights and needs during and after armed conflict.5 The OSCE has also acknowledged the need to enhance women’s participation in peace negotiations and to promote a gender perspective in mediation and dia- logue facilitation. Ministerial Council Decision No. 14/05 on Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, among others, urge the Organization and participating States to ensure the increased participation of women in all phases and at all lev- els in conflict prevention and resolution. In 2013, the OSCE Secretariat issued a Guidance Note on Enhancing Gender-Responsive Mediation in support of this effort.
2. Types of OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation engagements
The comparative strengths of the OSCE in the area of dialogue facilitation and mediation stem from its broad mandate for early warning, conflict pre- vention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as its wide-ranging membership of 57 participating States. The OSCE has a flex- ible institutional structure and its consensus-based decision-making pro- cess gives legitimacy to all OSCE actions.
On this basis, the OSCE has been engaged in mediation and dialogue facilitation activities since the early 1990s, predominantly in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Overall, six
Chapter I Conceptual Framework 6.
Heads of missions and field operation staff also facilitate, sometimes with the support of specialized international NGOs, informal engagements to build trust between representatives of the conflict parties. The OSCE’s me- diation efforts in the protracted conflicts have, in the case of Moldova and Georgia, been complemented by confidence-building measures (CBMs)6. These measures have been proposed, planned, supported and facilitated by OSCE field operations together with the co-mediators, observers and do- nors, and jointly carried out with the conflict parties.
Some OSCE field missions have supported dialogue activities that seek to include civil society and vulnerable groups in the broader settlement processes. These processes have aimed at solving problems at the technical level, for example by developing ideas for the official negotiation process.
3. Mediation and dialogue facilitation in different phases of the conflict cycle
Mediation and dialogue facilitation are instruments that can be used in all phases of the OSCE conflict cycle. The role of the mediators and their ap- proaches and strategies will depend on the specific phase.
Conflict prevention
Conflicts can be most effectively dealt with at an early stage, i.e. before they escalate into violence and become complex or entrenched. In the early phase of an emerging conflict, mediation and dialogue facilitation can be ef- fective, as they are flexible and relatively cost-effective tools that can bridge the gap between early warning and early action. Preventive diplomacy can include efforts by high-ranking diplomats or politicians from international States. For example, in 2009 the HCNM assisted Hungary and Slovakia in
their dialogue in connection with the promulgation of amendments to Slo- vakia’s State Language Act. Also in 2009, the HCNM assisted Russia and Ukraine in their dialogue on the educational situation of their kin-minor- ities.
4. Facilitating dialogue to foster the inclusion of national minorities in state institutions
- -
5.
and mediation
The OSCE’s involvement in dialogue facilitation at the local level is main- ly carried out by OSCE field operations, for example, in Bosnia and Her- zegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Past activities have included the facilitation of inter-communal dialogue, the facilitation of dialogue between local authorities and minority communities and capacity building for local mediation and dialogue mech- anisms. These all have the long-term goal of transforming relationships be- tween stakeholders, facilitating reconciliation and preventing new conflict.
Chapter I Conceptual Framework
Conflict resolution
Mediation typically begins with extensive pre-negotiations during which the framework of the negotiations, including the principal agenda, process and main participants are agreed on. Depending on the context, formal processes profit from the support of informal efforts. The latter can, for in- stance, help to restart official negotiations after breakdowns or deadlocks by building confidence, strengthening relationships and generating ideas for formal political negotiations. The longer a conflict persists, the more com- plex the set of issues and actors, and the more numerous the third parties engaged in mediation and dialogue facilitation tend to become.
The settlement process of the Transdniestrian conflict in Moldova consists of formal political negotiations in the so-called “5+2” format. The ‘five’ con- sist of the co-mediators (the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine) and the sides to the conflict (Moldova and Transdniestria). The ‘two’ consist of the observ- ers (the European Union (EU) and the United States (US)). The format also includes joint working groups that bring together the sides in order to build confidence. This format is accompanied and supported by informal efforts facilitated by international and national non-governmental organizations with the political, financial and sometimes operational support of the OSCE and/or individual participating States.
Post-conflict rehabilitation
During the implementation of agreements, formal mediation efforts may need to continue to help resolve possible disputes that may arise from the implementation itself. This is critical so as to avoid a breakdown of the agreement or a relapse into violent conflict. Informal engagements can also be used as complementary mechanisms in this phase with a view to ensur- ing a transition to long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation. Communi- ties can also be engaged in third-party-supported dialogue processes in or- der to facilitate the implementation process and to peacefully address any additional issues that may emerge.
organizations or states – often taking the form of quiet diplomacy and shut- tle diplomacy – as well as the efforts of non-governmental organizations and eminent individuals. The earlier preventive efforts are undertaken, the better the chances for successful prevention.
In 1994, the HCNM engaged in intensive preventive diplomacy efforts in Ukraine by facilitating dialogue between the Ukrainian central Government and Crimean authorities, as the latter of which were demanding unification with Russia. The efforts of the HCNM, supported by the then OSCE Mis- sion to Ukraine (currently an OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine) led in 1995-1996 to a compromise solution on the autonomy of Crimea.
Conflict management
Once a conflict has escalated into violence, shuttle diplomacy to reduce tension and ultimately end violence takes place, and ceasefire negotiations become a priority. Opportunities for talks among conflict parties, where conflict causes can be addressed, need to be identified during the conflict management phase. OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation can use in- formal efforts to encourage the parties to (re-)start political negotiations;
to build trust between the conflict parties; and to build national and local ownership, including that of civil society, over the subsequent phase of me- diated negotiations.
Formal mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts of the then Swedish Chair of the OSCE’s Minsk Group and the Russian Federation led to the signing on 12 May 1994 of the ceasefire agreement between the Defence Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of the armed formations of Nagorno-Karabakh. The ceasefire agreement was a result of intensive shuttle diplomacy and the use of a partially power-based, directive media- tion approach.
Chapter I Conceptual Framework
foster trust between the parties, such as CBMs, while in parallel continu- ing to offer their services as mediators and trying to convince the parties of the need to negotiate.
External actors
The lack of unity of purpose to support a mediation process at the region- al and international levels may limit its success. Competition among the main international stakeholders as well as unilateral actions by neighbour- ing states and regional powers might reduce the commitment of conflict parties to negotiate in good faith and encourage them to play third parties against each other. For the OSCE, a lack of consensus among participating States in the Permanent Council limits the potential of mediation engage- ments. It also significantly limits the amount of financial, human and other resources required by the OSCE to support the process.
Outcome
Any peace agreement negotiated by the conflict parties with the help of mediators has to respect relevant international legal obligations, especial- ly international humanitarian law, international human rights and refugee law, and international criminal law. Most importantly, mediators cannot endorse peace agreements that include sweeping amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights, including sexual and gender-based violence.7 Therefore, the accepted out- come of the mediation or dialogue facilitation process may be limited by these restrictions.
Do no harm
Like any external intervention, international mediation and dialogue fa- cilitation have consequences. To minimize negative side effects, OSCE Following the large-scale ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June
2010, a third-party-supported dialogue process was established by the OSCE to facilitate and assist inter-ethnic dialogue and post-conflict recon- ciliation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities. It was designed around four complementary and interdependent platforms for dialogue: religion, youth, women, and economic factors. Each platform aimed at bringing to- gether and building trust between members of the two communities to try to bridge some of the ethnic divides. The dialogue process was meant as a short-term intervention to reduce the level of individual and collective ag- gression between the communities as well as to address needs stemming from the post-conflict setting.
4. Limits of Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation
Despite their potential to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, mediation and dialogue facilitation have a number of limitations.
Readiness of the parties to negotiate
Given their voluntary character, the success or failure of mediation and dialogue facilitation depends foremost on the conflict parties themselves.
They need to be open to a negotiated settlement of the conflict, agree to third-party mediation, commit to the process, negotiate in good faith and have the political will to reach and implement agreements. In the absence of such political will, the possibilities for meaningful mediation and dialogue facilitation are very limited.
Third parties will need to approach the conflict parties in a consistent and co-ordinated manner. International and regional organizations may not be unified in applying the necessary measures to provide conflict parties with positive and negative incentives to accept mediation. There are also cases where ‘insider’ mediators or non-governmental groups have fostered the readiness of the parties to enter into negotiations. If conflict parties are not ready to engage in mediation, third parties can only try other means to
Chapter I Conceptual Framework
protection of human rights and for international criminal justice through- out the process8.
To help meet these challenges, international and regional organiza- tions, such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE, have recognized the need to improve the effectiveness of their mediation efforts. The analysis of past and ongoing mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts brought these or- ganizations to very similar conclusions. They all recognized the need to provide their mediators with expert support, with an emphasis on helping mediators make peace processes more inclusive, especially with regard to the participation of women and civil society, and on strengthening national and local mediation capacities. They all acknowledged the importance of developing co-operation, co-ordination and partnerships among interna- tional, regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as with NGOs and other actors involved in mediation.
To increase the effectiveness of mediation, several organizations cre- ated specific mediation-support structures. In 2006, the UN Secretary Gen- eral (UNSG) established a Mediation Support Unit in the Department of Political Affairs and, in 2008, created a Standby Team of Mediation Experts deployable within three days in support of UN mediation efforts. In 2009, the Council of the EU adopted a Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities. In 2011, a Mediation Support Team was created within the European External Action Service.
Within the OSCE, discussions on strengthening the effectiveness of OSCE mediation efforts were part of the informal consultations held among participating States between 2009 and 2011 in the framework of the ‘Corfu Process’ and the ‘V to V Dialogues’. These consultations aimed at strength- ening OSCE capabilities in conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation. They led to the adoption, in December 2011, of Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict mediators and dialogue facilitators should be guided by the ‘Do No Harm’
principle in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of their activities.
‘Do No Harm’ requires the mediator to avoid conducting the process in a way that causes harm to the conflict parties, including women and other stakeholders, or in a way that exacerbates the conflict.
External mediators can do harm in many ways, usually unintentionally through lack of proper assessment. Experience has shown that a perceived lack of impartiality, for example through a badly timed engagement with a weaker conflict party, can exacerbate existing tensions between parties. The promotion of CBMs that make the status quo more bearable for the parties can also contribute to the unwillingness of the parties to negotiate a final settlement. If CBMs are not carried out jointly they risk deepening the di- vide between the conflict parties.
Unintended negative effects of mediation and dialogue facilitation ef- forts can be minimized by implementing a conflict sensitive approach ac- cording to the ‘Do No Harm’ principle. This includes maintaining a thor- ough and continuous analysis of the conflict and the impact of the OSCE mediator’s activities, as well as continuously adapting the mediation strat- egy in accordance with the impact assessment.
5. Professional support to mediation and dialogue facilitation
International mediators are faced with a multitude of new challenges. They have to deal with a variety of highly complex substantive issues for which they require extensive specialized expertise. This requires systematic sup- port for mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts throughout all phases of a conflict. Mediators also need to aim for comprehensive settlements and mobilize international support for their implementation. They need to respond to the growing demands of civil society and ensure the participa- tion of underrepresented groups in peace processes. Mediators also have to ensure respect for international legal norms and principles related to the
Chapter I
Cycle (MC.DEC/3/11), the most comprehensive OSCE decision taken on the conflict cycle since the 1992 Helsinki Document. MC Decision No. 3/11 thus created the basis for maximizing OSCE engagement in mediation and dialogue facilitation through (1) the designation of a mediation-support fo- cal point within the CPC; (2) the development of a systematic mediation- support capacity within the CPC; and (3) the strengthening of the role of OSCE mediators at all levels.
The OSCE Secretary General subsequently appointed as mediation- support focal point the CPC’s Operations Service, which assumed the re- sponsibility to implement activities related to mediation support in close consultation and co-operation with the CPC’s Policy Support Service and other executive structures. This includes training and capacity building;
knowledge management and operational guidance; outreach, networking, co-operation with other mediation actors; and operational support.
Chapter II: Reference Guide on Effective Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation in the
OSCE Area
The references included in this chapter do not provide an exhaustive over- view of all possible scenarios and challenges or options available to OSCE mediators and dialogue facilitators. They should, therefore, be applied with common sense and judgment, according to the specific circumstances in which a concrete dispute develops and OSCE mediation and dialogue fa- cilitation efforts are undertaken.
This chapter provides recommendations for OSCE mediators and their teams on how to tackle each phase of the mediation cycle (pre-negotia- tion, negotiation and implementation). Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation are used as a reference followed by OSCE specific ideas on how to put the UN guidance into practice through existing OSCE mechanism, tools and processes.
Reference Guide
Conflict analysis
The first step in preparing for mediation or dialogue facilitation is a sys- tematic analysis of the conflict. This analysis should be comprehensive and geared towards helping the mediation team develop a well-informed me- diation strategy. The aim of an initial analysis is to gain an understanding of the conflict, in particular, its history and current phase as well as key causes and actors. In order to gain a comprehensive picture of the conflict, the sources of information used need to be comprehensive and balanced. It is particularly important to reach out to women in the analysis phase in order to ensure that the views of women on all sides of the conflict are included.
The conflict analysis will enable the mediator to decide with whom and on what level to engage, on which issues to concentrate, how to gain the nec- essary leverage and how to design the subsequent process.
Conflict analysis, however, has to be a continuous effort throughout all phases of a mediation process so as to understand the changing dynam- ics. This allows the mediator to adapt or correct the strategy as necessary, to identify ‘windows of opportunity’, to foresee possible developments, to design contingency plans and to quickly react to new developments. The analysis should be kept strictly confidential to avoid it being leaked and used against the mediator by intransigent actors.
Actors
Actors comprise the individuals, groups (including sub-groups) and institu- tions which contribute to conflict and/or are affected by it in a positive or negative manner. This part of the analysis should focus first on the actors directly involved in the conflict, i.e. the conflict parties and their stated po- sitions as well as their interests and underlying needs with regard to the is- sues at stake (see below). Attention should be paid to the kind of resources actors can leverage, the actual/potential impact of their actions on the con- flict setting, the scale of their support and power, their internal structures, as well as their leadership structures, including groups more willing to ne- gotiate and intransigent groups. The balance of power within and between
1. Preparedness
Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on preparedness:
— Commit resources to respond rapidly and to sustain support for the mediation process, including deployment of personnel on a continuous ba- sis for medium- and long-term engagements.
— Select a competent mediator with the experience, skills, knowledge and cultural sensitivity for the specific conflict situation. The mediator should be considered objective, impartial and authoritative and be a per- son of integrity. The mediator needs a level of seniority and gravitas com- mensurate to the conflict context and must be acceptable to the parties.
— Reinforce the mediator with a team of specialists, particularly experts in the design of mediation processes, country/regional specialists and legal advisers, as well as with logistics, administrative and security support. The- matic experts should be deployed as required.
— Undertake conflict analysis and regular internal assessments of the process in order to make adjustments to the mediation strategies as needed.
— Provide proper preparation, induction and training to mediators and their teams. All team members should understand the gender dimension of their respective areas of expertise.
— Include a balance of men and women on mediation teams. This also sends a positive signal to the parties with regard to the composition of their delegations.
Chapter II Reference Guide
views. To gain a good understanding of the conflict, the analysis should be based on information from the broadest possible set of interlocutors and a wide range of reliable sources.
Forming a mediation team
The next step for the mediator is to form a team. The role of the team is to support the OSCE mediator and ensure that the process is professionally and effectively implemented. The mediator can also consider appointing a chief of staff to manage operational issues on the mediator’s behalf. The OSCE mediation team should minimally include the following expertise:
political analysis and strategy; mediation processes and tactical questions;
inclusivity and gender strategy; administration and logistics; security; and media relations. Expertise in relevant thematic areas, such as constitutions, security sector reform, national minorities, power sharing, cultural herit- age, and natural resources, can be included on a long- or short-term basis over the course of the process.
It is advisable for the mediator to draw on expertise from the OSCE structures, including the country-specific expertise provided by experts from field operations and the regional desks within the CPC’s Policy Sup- port Service. Participating States may also be approached to second experts to the team. The Mediation Support Team within the CPC’s Operations Service is available to support process design and provide specialized the- matic expertise, upon request. Thematic expertise can also be drawn from within the HCNM’s office and ODIHR. Due consideration must be given to gender balance in the mediation team, as well as cultural and linguistic skills.
The mediator can also request that her/his team be trained and/or coached upon appointment to ensure that the team becomes fully function- al as swiftly as possible. Such training and coaching also provides a team- building function, helping the new team to learn to work together quickly.
the conflict parties, their relationships, i.e. the level of mistrust, interaction and communication on different levels, as well as potential overlaps of in- terests should be analysed.
It is equally important to make sure that the analysis covers the key actors on all relevant levels. The analysis should not only focus on formal actors but also take account of civil society actors, business communities, women’s and youth organizations or faith-based groups which have a stake in the conflict and could be potential partners or spoilers in the framework of the mediation process. The analysis should also cover actors that may not be directly involved in the conflict but have the means to influence the situation, for instance through specific relations with the conflict parties.
It is therefore highly advisable to take a close look at neighbouring states, regional and global powers as well as international governmental and non- governmental organizations. Such examination should include the level and nature of their interests in the conflict and/or its resolution, the leverage they may hold on the conflict parties (or some of their factions), and their own mediation efforts.
Causes and issues
If possible, the analysis should focus on framing the conflict and identifying the key issues disputed between the conflict parties. In addition, it should identify the most important structural (root) causes of the conflict, and any proximate causes that have served or could serve as conflict drivers or ac- celerators. This is important to ensure a thorough understanding of what exactly is contested, to trace the history of different issues and to grasp the significance of specific conflict dynamics. The gender dimension of key is- sues as well as structural and proximate causes needs to be assessed. The analysis of conflict causes and issues should also be used to make a closer examination of possible mitigating factors and issues that could be lever- aged to bridge divisions between the conflict parties.
An inclusive conflict analysis will always be a mixture of desk research and fact-finding through personal consultations, discussions, and inter-
Chapter II Reference Guide
Negotiations within the Joint Constitutional Commission of Moldovan and Transdniestrian representatives were delayed by several months in 2003 because the conflict parties could not agree on a venue for the talks. The Moldovan side demanded that meetings take place in the Moldovan Par- liament in Chisinau as they considered it to be the only legitimate national legislative organ in Moldova. The Transdniestrian side demanded that the tradition of rotating meetings between Chisinau and Tiraspol be continued.
A compromise was found when the OSCE Mission to Moldova opened an OSCE office in Bender for the purpose of holding Joint Constitutional Com- mission meetings. According to the July 1992 Moscow Agreement, Bender is a city that is under the joint control of the conflict parties and also serves as the seat of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which oversees the Se- curity Zone between the sides.
After the August 2008 war in Georgia, the security and political-symbol- ic concerns of the Georgian Government and the South Ossetian de fac- to authorities made it impossible to hold rotating meetings between the territories controlled by the conflict parties, as was done in earlier phases of the settlement process. The meetings of the Incident Prevention and Re- sponse Mechanism (IPRM) – co-facilitated by the EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia (EUMM) and the OSCE – were moved to a no-man’s-land at the village of Ergneti, located between checkpoints of the conflict parties’
territories. At the same time, it was necessary for the meetings of the Ge- neva International Discussions – co-facilitated by the EU, the UN and the OSCE – to take place outside of the territory of Georgia, at the UN prem- ises in Geneva.
Holding negotiations abroad, however, carries the risk that represent- atives of the conflict parties may lose contact with realities on the ground.
This could result in representatives negotiating exclusively on the basis of the leadership’s interests. Therefore, negotiations should be taken back to the conflict country as often as possible to enable parties to report back to and consult with their constituencies, and thus to undergo a ‘reality check’.
Choosing a venue
The choice of meeting venue is important to the process. The venue of nego- tiations should be selected carefully and done in a way that it contributes to building confidence between the parties. The venue should also facilitate a setting that is conducive to open discussions and full concentration on sub- stantive negotiations. Breakout rooms should be available at all times. The venue must also be a safe place where the security of all participants can be guaranteed. In the case of intra-state conflicts, if no safe venue can be found inside the country, negotiations need to be held abroad. The venue of nego- tiations often also has a significant symbolic meaning for the conflict parties.
The neutrality of the venue can take different forms. Negotiations can be held in the conflict country, for example, in the offices of an OSCE field presence or at the embassy of the country holding the Chairmanship. If the conflict takes place in the territory of two or more countries, negotiations could rotate between neutral venues in the territories controlled by the conflict parties.
Low security concerns and the availability of neutral venues in the territo- ries controlled by the conflict parties have made it possible to rotate meet- ings in the Transdniestrian settlement process. Meetings at the level of the political leadership, political representatives and technical experts have taken place both in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, and the administrative centre of Transdniestria, Tiraspol. The meetings in Tiraspol are held in an office of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and, in Chisinau, the meetings are held either in the office of the OSCE Mission, the embassies of the Russian Federation, Ukraine or the US, or in the office of the EU Delegation.
If security or political-symbolic concerns cannot be overcome, other solutions for a neutral venue need to be identified. These could be neutral venues in a location considered by all conflict parties as jointly controlled, in a no-man’s-land between the territories controlled by the conflict par- ties, or in a venue abroad.
Chapter II Reference Guide
In all three of its mediation efforts related to protracted conflicts – the Transdniestrian settlement process, the Geneva International Discussion and the Minsk Group process –- the OSCE shares the costs with several co-mediators, co-facilitators, and observers as well as other participants and sponsors. In the Transdniestrian settlement process, the host of any negotiation meeting or of any special event usually covers all related costs with the exception of travel and accommodation for the co-mediators and co-observers. Other OSCE participating States have funded specific events in the framework of the settlement process. For example, Germany hosted and funded several large CBM conferences, which were held to review pro- gress and problems in the CBM working groups as part of the “5+2” pro- cess. In another instance, Finland hosted and funded a workshop for par- ticipants of the Transdniestrian settlement process on European autonomy regulations.
The mediator will also need to ensure substantial financial, material and other resources for the parties to implement the agreement. The me- diator and her/his team may also need to stay engaged and participate in monitoring. They will need to make a detailed calculation of the costs of implementation and the resources required. Based on these calculations, the participating States and organizations can be approached to request funding.
Within the OSCE, there are several possible ways to fund mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts, as well as activities undertaken during the implementation of the agreement. Field operations, OSCE institutions and units of the Secretariat prepare budgets for anticipated mediation and di- alogue facilitation efforts during the yearly Unified Budget Process. The Chairmanship does the same with regard to the Chairmanship Fund, which is also part of the OSCE’s Unified Budget. However, the government of the rotating OSCE Chairmanship reserves additional funds in its national state budget for activities related to its OSCE Chairmanship, which could also potentially be allocated to mediation activities.
Whether abroad or in the conflict country, the negotiation venue needs to be accessible to all participants and provide space for meetings, including confidential side meetings, as well as separate spaces for the con- flict parties and the mediators. It must also have all necessary security and office infrastructure and possess functional communication equipment to enable the conflict parties to quickly report back to their political leader- ships and receive guidance. Special cultural and religious needs should also be considered.
Meetings are normally organized by an appointed host. As the ba- sic functions of mediators include hosting, arranging and support- ing meetings, they are responsible for identifying and preparing a ven- ue for the meeting and any related activities. This includes ensuring the availability of sufficient funding, preparing all logistical elements, and providing administrative staff, transportation and security. The host thus plays an important role and provides leverage in the process.
Financial planning
Mediation and dialogue facilitation are relatively cost effective means to resolve conflicts. However, when considering a mediation role, the OSCE needs to ensure the availability of sufficient funds before engaging. The me- diator will have to make a thorough estimation of costs, including the cost of staff in the mediation team, travel, meeting venues and special events in the framework of negotiations.
In joint mediation efforts, where several mediators co-operate and all third parties have the right to convene meetings and organize special events, the costs of the process can be shared. An international mediator working alone will need to ensure considerably more funding. Mediators can also request financial and other support from international third parties, such as interested participating States.
Chapter II
2. Consent
Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on consent:
— Understand whose consent is necessary for a viable mediation process to start. If only some of the conflict parties have agreed to the mediation, the mediator may need to engage with the consenting parties and gradually expand the consent base.
— Cultivate consent, in order to create the space for, and a good under- standing of, mediation. Informal contacts allow parties to test the waters without committing to a fully-fledged mediation process; this can help ad- dress possible fears or insecurities.
— Use confidence- building measures at different stages to build trust between the conflict parties and between the mediator and the parties, as well as confidence in the mediation process.
— Be consistent, transparent and even-handed in managing the media- tion process, and respect confidentiality.
— Periodically assess whether the process has sufficient consent and be prepared for fluxes in consent throughout the mediation, working to bring the conflict parties back into the process and drawing on the influence of their backers or other third parties as appropriate.
There are three options for field operations, institutions and Secretari- at units to request and receive additional funding from participating States.
Upon the request of the Secretary General and a decision of the Permanent Council, additional funding can be provided on an interim basis from the OSCE Contingency Fund. This funding is for the initial implementation of a new OSCE activity that has been agreed by the Permanent Council but cannot exceed 25 per cent of its estimated costs. A subsequent decision on a Supplementary Budget needs to be taken by the Permanent Council to cover the remaining costs of the new activity and to replenish the Contin- gency Fund. Alternatively, a field operation, institution or Secretariat unit can request a Supplementary Budget immediately, without use of the Con- tingency Fund. Finally, extra-budgetary funding can be requested directly from those participating States interested in donating to an extra-budgetary project that has been developed by an OSCE structure.
In response to the political crisis in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek was granted approval by the Permanent Coun- cil for the use of the OSCE Contingency Fund to immediately implement a number of emergency support measures. After the crisis in Southern Kyrgyzstan erupted in June 2010, the Permanent Council approved a Sup- plementary Budget for further response activities of the Centre in Bishkek, including funds to strengthen local capacities in early warning, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, as well as to replenish the Contingen- cy Fund. When, in November 2010, the Permanent Council approved the concept of the OSCE Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan (CSI) as another response to the crisis, the necessary additional funds were se- cured through extra-budgetary contributions from a number of participat- ing States which donated financial resources to an extra-budgetary project developed by the Centre in Bishkek.
Chapter II Reference Guide
OSCE dialogue facilitation efforts. OSCE mediators, therefore, need to act with the utmost care and sensitivity with regard to the form, frequency and content of their interaction with non-state conflict parties.
In situations when a newly emerging dispute does not explicitly lie within the mandate of an existing field operation, relations with the host country government are a decisive factor in enabling OSCE dialogue fa- cilitation activities. In some cases, a relationship of trust between the host country government and a field operation or a specific head of mission has led participating States to formally accept or informally acquiesce to a dia- logue facilitation role for a field operation regarding a dispute that was not explicitly covered by its mandate.
When disputes erupted between the central Government of the Republic of Moldova and the authorities of the autonomous region of Gagauzia in 1999 and 2000, Moldova accepted the temporary dialogue facilitation role of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. In December 2000, after intensive shuttle diplo- macy, the Mission organized a workshop with high-ranking representatives of the Moldovan Government and Parliament, and the Executive Commit- tee and People’s Assembly of Gagauzia during which existing disputes were discussed and possible compromise solutions developed.
Timing of mediation
The ultimate decision as to whether the OSCE can engage in mediation or dialogue facilitation depends first and foremost on the willingness of the conflict parties to negotiate and to accept the OSCE as mediator or facili- tator. The OSCE will have to assess, as part of the conflict analysis, whether the conflict is ready to be mediated. The mediator can help the conflict parties recognize that there is a negotiated way out of hostilities and a mu- tually acceptable solution to their dispute. For mediation to have a chance to succeed, the leadership of the parties must have enough cohesion and support for compromise solutions within their own political structures and populations.
Mandate to mediate
A clear mandate is mandatory for OSCE mediation efforts. All OSCE struc- tures, institutions and field operations are strictly guided by the respect for their mandates, which have been formally agreed by participating States through decisions of OSCE Summits, Ministerial Councils or the Perma- nent Council. The formal character of these mandates gives clout to media- tion and dialogue facilitation engagement.
However, OSCE mandates are not formulated so specifically that they necessarily indicate mediation and/or dialogue facilitation as specific tools to be used in their implementation. Instead, mandates are phrased in broad terms and define overall objectives with the aim of providing strategic and practical guidance. Thus, they are written in a way that avoids reducing the flexibility to use a broad range of tools for mandate implementation, in- cluding mediation and/or dialogue facilitation. For example, the mandates of field operations established to deal with specific conflicts include such phrasing as: to “facilitate a lasting comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects”9; or to assist “the parties to the conflict in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement of the conflict”10. The formal mandates from participating States are then usually reconfirmed in joint statements, protocols or decisions of the conflict parties, thus ensuring ac- ceptance of the OSCE as a mediator.
For OSCE mediators to be able to fulfil their mandates, a functional re- lationship with the host country is of utmost importance. In intra-state con- flicts, there is an asymmetry between the conflict parties as the government side is an OSCE participating State able to withdraw consensus on further OSCE engagement. However, access to and regular contact with non-state actors involved in intra-state conflicts are basic conditions for successful
Chapter II Reference Guide
can offer, such as co-operation, advice and expertise. The OSCE can also make use of the support of its participating States to provide incentives, if required.
The Economic Rehabilitation Programme in the zone of the Georgian-Os- setian conflict was initiated by the OSCE to build trust through economic co-operation and create conditions for the restart of negotiations. It ran for two years, from 2006 to 2008. The European Commission as well as several OSCE participating States funded the programme.
In support of the OSCE’s mediation efforts in the Transdniestrian conflict in Moldova in 2005, the EU deployed the Border Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM). Its goal was to help provide transparency on the flow of goods and to fight smuggling over the Transdniestrian sec- tor of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, which is not under the control of the Moldovan Government. The possibility to profit from EU asymmetric trade preferences motivated many Transdniestrian enterprises to legalize their foreign trade under Moldovan law and thus to reintegrate into the Moldovan legal and economic space.
Should none these efforts be successful in convincing the conflict par- ties to agree to negotiations, it is necessary to revert to a ‘policy of position- ing’. This means the mediator uses every opportunity to remind the conflict parties of the increasing costs and losses caused by continued conflict, the advantages of a peaceful settlement, the need to start negotiations and the existence of feasible, mutually acceptable compromise solutions, as well as the mediator’s continued readiness and availability.13
The mediator must always analyse the reasons why the parties agree to negotiate so as to determine their commitment to the process. Parties may agree to mediation in an attempt to gain time or to receive third party confirmation of their positions and instrumentalize the mediation efforts To understand whether the parties are ready to negotiate, objective in-
dicators need to be identified. These include increasing political, economic, financial or human losses or indicative changes in leadership or allies. Fur- thermore, an assessment needs to be made as to whether the conflict par- ties perceive a possibility for compromise solutions to their disputes and feel confident that they have the necessary support within their structures and constituencies to engage in negotiations.11 If not, an assessment of what the OSCE could do to increase the readiness of the parties to negotiate is required.
The mediator can also encourage or initiate CBMs between the conflict parties. If negotiations on substantive issues are not yet accepted, consulta- tions on CBMs might be a possible way to explore non-politicized areas of common interest. In such consultations, the aim is to encourage the parties to co-operate in a mutually benefitting way. This will result in the improve- ment of relations and trust between the conflict parties, which is necessary to advance to negotiations on substance at a later stage.12
The OSCE Mission in Moldova initiated and supported CBMs between the Moldovan Government and Transdniestrian de facto authorities to over- come the resistance of the conflict parties to negotiate and to strengthening mutual trust so as to allow the talks to (re) start. Such measures were used both before the initial start of settlement negotiations in 1994 and after a major breakdown of the process in 2006.
If none of these options work, the mediator can identify incentives with which to encourage the parties to negotiate. Such incentives could in- clude diplomatic pressure, and legal, economic and financial measures. In some extreme cases, military measures may be used but only if mandated by the UN Security Council. There are a few positive incentives the OSCE
Chapter II Reference Guide
Due to sensitivities regarding a direct OSCE role following the June 2010 crisis in Southern Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek expanded its technical assistance and financial support to local mediation teams in the Osh and Jalal-Abad Provinces and in Osh City. The OSCE support was de- livered through two experienced local NGOs and in co-operation with lo- cal authorities, and was designed to help prevent and address inter-ethnic disputes and resolve tensions with law-enforcement organs.
When an institutional decision has been made to engage in mediation, a lead mediator will be selected and appointed. The mediator must be ac- ceptable to the main parties of the conflict. In addition, the mediator should possess certain qualities and skills in order to be able to mediate successfully.
The mediator should be clear and honest with the conflict parties. The me- diator should establish a clear framework for the talks including rules and principles for negotiation. The mediator should also prepare the conflict parties for a difficult process which may progress slowly and experience possible setbacks. The mediator should act consistently and predictably, and communicate accurately. The mediator should also show serious commit- ment to the process and a fair outcome, and consult parties and stakeholder groups actively and inclusively.
The OSCE mediator and her/his team should also prepare diligently for the process and for each meeting with the parties as well as demonstrate good knowledge of the conflict and the context within which the conflict is taking place. The mediator should also have sufficient knowledge of the country and the region. Mediation requires careful, emphatic listening and taking the interests and needs of all stakeholders equally seriously. Media- tors should give honest feedback and not only tell the parties what they want to hear. The mediator should never make false promises. He/she has to respect confidentiality while being transparent about his/her own ac- tivity, show respect for cultural differences and demonstrate inter-cultural competency.
for other aims. If the parties lack real commitment to the process, the suc- cess of the mediation will be unlikely.
Selecting a mediator
Next, a decision needs to be taken as to whether and, if so, how to en- gage in mediation or dialogue facilitation. Depending on the nature of the conflict several roles might be appropriate for the OSCE. These would be determined based on: an assessment of the OSCE’s comparative advantage;
the credibility and the acceptance of the OSCE as a mediator to the conflict parties; the political support of participating States; the mandate of an OSCE institution or field operation; the agreement of a host coun- try government and key regional powers; and the available financial resources.
If the above conditions indicate the possibility for a more direct ap- proach, the OSCE has different options for involvement, and an assess- ment of the most appropriate option is needed. Options can include: 1) the involvement of the CiO, 2) the nomination of a CiO Personal/Special Representative or Envoy to facilitate dialogue or mediate on behalf of the Chairmanship, 3) the nomination of the Secretary General or the Director of the CPC to facilitate dialogue or mediate on behalf of the Chairmanship, 4) the involvement of the HCNM or the Director of ODIHR, 5) mediation/
dialogue facilitation by the head of a field operation and mission staff, 6) the establishment by the Permanent Council of a new field operation whose head of mission is tasked to mediate 7) dialogue facilitation efforts of the OSCE PA, or 8) joint mediation efforts with other organizations and/or participating States.
If direct involvement is not politically feasible, the OSCE and its insti- tutions or field operations can consider taking on an indirect role in support of the process. Such roles include: 1) political support to the mediation ef- forts; 2) technical assistance to the efforts, and 3) financial support.
Reference Guide
Building credibility and managing impartiality
Mediation and dialogue facilitation are voluntary processes and depend on the consent of the conflict parties. This is why the mediator must build good relations with all conflict parties and earn their trust. Such efforts will have to continue throughout all phases of the mediation process. In this regard, the mediator’s seniority, experience, skills and conduct are decisive.
The credibility of the mediator also depends on the credibility and reputation of the organization she/he represents and the international and domestic support he/she can muster for the mediation efforts. For an or- ganization like the OSCE which has few incentives to offer, impartiality is the central resource in terms of building and maintaining credibility.
Being impartial, however, does not mean being neutral. The OSCE and its representatives undertake their efforts on the basis of OSCE principles and commitments and the norms of international law. Impartiality means even-handed conduct by the mediator towards the conflict parties.
Impartiality is often difficult to manage. Even when mediators follow all good standards of conduct, they will inevitably face accusations of bias and partiality. Such accusations can be part of the conflict parties’ tactics aiming at scoring points with the public, or at putting pressure on or trying to discredit the mediator. Mediation requires a high degree of perseverance as well as self-reflection to differentiate between tactical accusations of bias and serious concerns about impartiality.
Throughout their mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts in the Transd- niestrian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts, the OSCE Missions to Moldova and Georgia have been criticized by both sides for allegedly being biased. The sides have tried to discredit the Missions and to mobilize other international third parties to intervene as potentially new or additional me- diators. Such campaigns often materialized when the Missions were pro- posing specific compromise solutions or draft agreements to the sides. As
3. Impartiality
Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on impartiality:
— Ensure and seek to demonstrate that the process and the treatment of the parties are fair and balanced, including through an effective communi- cations strategy.
— Be transparent with the conflict parties regarding the laws and norms that guide their involvement.
— Do not accept conditions for support from external parties that would affect the impartiality of the process.
— Avoid association with punitive measures against conflict parties by other actors and minimize public criticism of the parties as much as pos- sible, while maintaining frank exchanges in private.
— Handover to another mediator, or mediating entity, if you feel unable to maintain a balanced and impartial approach.
Chapter II
4. Inclusivity
Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on inclusivity:
— Identify the level of inclusivity needed for the mediation to start and required for a durable peace that addresses the needs of all affected by the conflict.
— Communicate with any party or actor necessary to address the conflict, with the knowledge of the other negotiating parties.
— Promote understanding among conflict parties of the value of broader participation and minimize preconditions for participation in the process.
— Ensure systematic and structured consultation with women’s groups early in the process to allow for meaningful participation, with specific ef- forts to include them in the mediation process.
— Encourage conflict parties to include women in their delegations.
— Develop mechanisms to broaden participation in the process, and to engage and include the different perspectives within civil society and other stakeholders, throughout the various phases of the peace process.
the criticism usually came from both involved sides simultaneously, its pur- pose to discredit the impartial compromise line of the Missions was obvious and usually understood as such by the international community.
