The Assessment of the Impact of the Coordination between Fiscal and Monetary Policies on Economic Objectives: Using an Empirical Model

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Munich Personal RePEc Archive

The Assessment of the Impact of the Coordination between Fiscal and

Monetary Policies on Economic

Objectives: Using an Empirical Model

Kamal, Mona

November 2010

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26670/

MPRA Paper No. 26670, posted 17 Nov 2010 13:15 UTC

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ﻥﻤ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻟﺍ ﺍ ﺭﺜﺃ

ﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟ ﻴ

ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎ

ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻗ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ

داﺪﻋإ :

لﺎــــﻤﻛ ﻰﻨﻣ

ﮫـﯾدﺎﺼﺘﻗا ﮫـﺜﺣﺎﺑ ﺔــﻌﻣﺎﺟ دﺎﺼﺘﻗا ﺮـﯿﺘﺴﺟﺎﻣ

Queen Mary, University of London

E-mail:

economist.researcher@gmail.com

ﺮﺒﻤﻓﻮﻧ

2010

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ﻥﻤ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻟﺍ ﺍ ﺭﺜﺃ

ﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟ ﻴ

ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎ

ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻗ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ

1

ﺹﺨﻠﻤ

ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻨﺼ لﻭﺩ ﺔﺴﻤﺨﻟ ﺔﻌﻤﺠﻤ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻗ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺙﺤﺒﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻑﺩﻬﻴ

ﺜﺄﺘ ﻥﻤ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻠﻟ ﻲﻠﻜﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺭﻴ

ﻙﻠﺘ ﻡﺴﺘﺘﻭ .

ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺡﺎﺠﻨﻟ ﺔﻤﺯﻼﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﺒﻴﺘﺭﺘﻟﺍ ﺭﻓﺍﻭﺘﺒ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﺴﺎﻴﺴ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﻲﻓ ﹰﺎﻴﺒﺴﻨ ﺔﻠﻴﻭﻁﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﺘﺭﺒﺨﺒﻭ .

ﺔﺜﺣﺎﺒﻟا ﺎﮭﯿﻟإ ﻰﻤﺘﻨﺗ ﺔﺴﺳﺆﻣ ىأ ﻦﻋ ﺮﺒﻌﺗ ﻻ ةرﻮﻛﺬﻤﻟا ءارﻵا 1

.

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رﺪﺼﻤﻟا ﻰﻟإ ةرﺎﺷﻹا ﺪﻌﺑ ﻻإ ﺚﺤﺒﻟا ﻦﻣ ءﺰﺟ ىأ ﺦﺴﻧ مﺪﻋ ﻰﺟﺮﯾ .

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The Assessment of the Impact of the Coordination between Fiscal and Monetary Policies on Economic

Objectives: Using an Empirical Model

Abstract

The objective of this study is to estimate an empirical model using

pooled data for five industrialized countries to assess the impact of

the coordination between monetary and fiscal policies on

macroeconomic targets. Those countries are characterized with the

existence of the institutional coordinating arrangements required for

the success of the coordination between the two policies and the

long history of implementing the stabilization policies.

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ﺔﻣﺪﻘﻣ

ﺢﺒﺼﺃ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺩﻴﺩﻋ ﻰﻌﺴﺘ ﹰﺎﻴﺭﻭﺭﻀ ﹰﺎﺒﻠﻁﻤ

ﻭﺤﻨ

ﻤﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ لﻅ ﻲﻓ ﻙﻟﺫﻭ ،ﻪﻘﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﺎﻬﻟ ﻰﺘﺄﺘﻴ ﻰﺘﺤﻭ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﹴلﻜ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﺃ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺽﺭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻠﺜ

ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﺃ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﺫﻴﻔﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻴﻟﺁﻭ ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﺒﻴﺘﺭﺘﻟﺍ ﺩﺩﻌﺘ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻯﺩﺃ ﻱﺫﻟﺍ ﺭﻤﻷﺍ ﻭﻫﻭ ،

،ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺡﺎﺠﻨﻟ ﺔﻤﺯﻼﻟﺍ ﻯﺩﺃ ﺎﻤﻜ

لﻭﺤﺘ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺭﻴﺒﻜ ﺩﺩﻋ ﺭﻌﺴﻟ ﺔﻨﻭﺭﻤ ﺭﺜﻜﺃ ﻡﻅﻨ ﻭﺤﻨ

ﺎﻤﻭ ﻑﺭﺼﻟﺍ ﻪﻌﺒﺘ

ﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﻑﺭﺼﻟﺍ ﺭﻌﺴ ﻥﻋ ﻲﻠﺨﺘ ﺭﺎﻁﺈﻜ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﻲﻨﺒﺘﻭ ﺔﻴﻤﺴﺍ ﺓﺯﻴﻜﺭﻜ

ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﻴﺒﺩﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺴﺍﻭ ﹴلﻜﺸﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﻗ ﺡﺭﻁ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘﻟ .

ﻭ ﺔﻴﻤﻫﻷ ﹰﺍﺭﻅﻨ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﻗ

، ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﻲﻓ ﻡﺘﻴ ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻗ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ

ﻷﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺭﻴﺜﺄﺘ ﻥﻤ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫ

ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻨﺼ لﻭﺩ ﺱﻤﺨ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘﻴﻭ .

ﻲﻫ ﺓﺩﺤﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻜﻠﻤﻤﻟﺍ) ﺍﺩﻨﻠﻴﺯﻭﻴﻨ -

ﺍﺩﻨﻜ - ﺔﻴﻜﻴﺭﻤﻷﺍ ﺓﺩﺤﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻴﻻﻭﻟﺍ - ﺎﻴﻟﺍﺭﺘﺴﺃ -

ﺔﻴﻨﻤﺯ ﺔﻠﺴﻠﺴ ﺭﺒﻋ (

ﻥﻤ ﺓﺩﺘﻤﻤﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻠﻟ ﻰﻟﺇ 1975

2005 .

ﻙﻠﺘ ﺭﺎﻴﺘﺨﺍ ﺎﻬﻴﻟﺇ ﺩﻨﺘﺴﺍ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﻴﺎﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺓﺭﺎﺸﻹﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻫﺃ ﺯﺭﺒﺘ ،ﻕﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻲﻓﻭ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ

لﺜﻤﺘﻴ ﻲﺘﻟﺍﻭ

ﻲﻠﻴ ﺎﻤﻴﻓ ﺎﻬﻤﻫﺃ :

1 ﻟﺍ - ﺓﺭﺒﺨ ﻟ ﹰﺎﻴﺒﺴﻨ ﺔﻠﻴﻭﻁﻟﺍ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ لﺎﺠﻤ ﻲﻓ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ

ﻭ ،ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺭﻓﺍﻭﺘ

ﺭﻁﻷﺍ ﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺔ

ﻴﻌﻴﺭﺸﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻤﺯﻼﻟﺍ ﺔ

ﻪﺤﺎﺠﻨﻟ .

2 ﻑﺎﺼﺘﺍ - ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻭﺴﻷﺍ

لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺭﻭﻁﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺓﺭﻴﺒﻜ ﺔﺠﺭﺩﺒ

ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﻴ ﺎﻤﻤ ،ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻕﻤﻌﻟﺍﻭ

ﺩﻴﻜﺄﺘ ﺠﺭﺩ ﻁﺎﺒﺘﺭﺍ ﺔ

ﻕﺍﻭﺴﻷﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﺭﻭﻁﺘ ﺒ

ﺡﺎﺠﻨ ﺔﺒﺭﺠﺘ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ

.

4 ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻟ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺩﻋﺍﻭﻗ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﻥﻤ ﺎﻬﺒﺎﺴﺘﻜﺍ ﻥﻜﻤﻴ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻌﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺒﺨﻟﺍ -

ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻭﺤﻨ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻑﺩﻫﻭ ﻕﺴﺘﺘ ﺔﻤﻴﻠﺴ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴ .

5 ﺫﺨﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﺡﺎﺠﻨ - ﺒ

ﺠﻴﺘﺍﺭﺘﺴﺎ ﺔﻴ

ﻹ ﻡﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺩﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺍﺩ

،ﺓﺀﺎﻔﻜﻟﺎﺒ ﻡﺴﺘﺘ ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﺃ ﻱﺫﻟﺍ ﺭﻤﻷﺍ

ﻭ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺩﺤﻟﺍ ﺽﻔﺨ

ﻲﻤﻭﻜﺤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺩﻟﺍ .

6 ﺎﻤ ﻭﻫﻭ ،ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻠﻟ ﺩﻴﺤﻭ ﻑﺩﻬﻜ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﺓﺭﻭﺭﻀ ﺏﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﺩﻴﻜﺄﺘ -

ﻜ ﻯﺭﺨﻷﺍ ﺔﻤﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻟ ﻡﺌﻼﻤﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻁﻹﺍ ﺭﻴﻓﻭﺘ ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﻴ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺎ

لﻴﻭﻁﻟﺍ ﻯﺩﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻑﻅﻭﺘﻟﺍﻭ .

7 ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﺴﺎﻴﺴ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ لﺎﺠﻤ ﻲﻓ ﹰﺎﻴﺒﺴﻨ ﺔﻠﻴﻭﻁﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﺘﺭﺒﺨﺒ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻡﺴﺘﺘ -

Stabilization Policies .

لﻭﺎﻨﺘﻴ ﺙﻴﺤ ،ﺔﻴﺴﻴﺌﺭ ﺀﺍﺯﺠﺃ ﺔﺜﻼﺜ ﻥﻤ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﻥﻭﻜﺘﺘﻭ لﻭﻷﺍ ﺀﺯﺠﻟﺍ

ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺎـﺒ ﻑـﻴﺭﻌﺘ

ﻡﺩﺨﺘﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺒ .

ﺽﺭﻌﺘﺴﻴ ﻰﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍ ﺀﺯﺠﻟﺍ

ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺎﻬﺼﻼﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻥﻜﻤﻴ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ ﻡﻫﺃ .

،ﹰﺍﺭﻴﺨﺃﻭ ﻰﺌﺎﺼﺤﻻﺍ ﻕﺤﻠﻤﻟﺍ

.

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: ًﻻوأ ﻲﺳﺎﯿﻘﻟا جذﻮﻤﻨﻟا :

-

ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺀﺯﺠﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻲﻓ ﻡﺘﻴ ﻥﻤ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻠﻟ ﻙﻟﺫﻭ ،ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻗ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﺒﺩﺎﺸﺭﺘﺴﻻﺍ

ﺔﻴﻟﺎﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﺭﻔﻟﺍ :

"

لﻼﺨ ﻥﻤ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻱﺩﺅﻴ

ﻥـﻤ ﺭـﺒﻜﺃ ﺔـﺠﺭﺩ ﻱﺯـﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙـﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺢﻨﻤ

ﺭﻴﻭـﻁﺘ لﻼـﺨ ﻥـﻤ ﻲﻤﻭـﻜﺤﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ لﻴﻭﻤﺘﻟ ﻯﺭﺨﺃ لﺌﺍﺩﺒ ﺭﻴﻓﻭﺘﻭ ،ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻁﻠﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻋ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ

ﺓﺭﻭﺼﺒ ﺔﻟﻭﺩﻠﻟ ﺔﻤﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻭ ﺔﻴﻠﻜﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺔﻏﺎﻴﺼ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺔﻴﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻭﺴﻷﺍ ﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ لﺜﻤﻟ ﺔﻴﻟﺁ ﺩﻭﺠﻭ ﻡﺩﻌﺒ ﺔﻨﺭﺎﻘﻤ ﺓﺀﺎﻔﻜ ﺭﺜﻜﺃ ﻕﻴﺴ

."

،ﺔﻴﻀﺭﻔﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﺭﺎﺒﺘﺨﻻﻭ ﻘﻴﺭﻁ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﻡﺘ

ـ ﺔ Seemingly Unrelated Regression

Method (SUR)

، ﺍﻭ ﻲﺘﻟ ﻬﻘﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﻡﺘ ﺎ

ﺔﻌﻤﺠﻤ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﻰﻠﻋ Pooled Data

ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻲﻨﻌﻴ ﺎﻤ ﻭﻫﻭ -

ﺔﻴﻌﻁﻘﻤ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﺍ ﺽﻌﺒﻟ

لﻭﺩﻟ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ لﺎﺠﻤ ﻲﻓ ﹰﺎﻴﺒﺴﻨ ﺔﻠﻴﻭﻁﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺒﺨﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺫ ﻠﺴ ﺭﺒﻋ

ﺔﻠﺴ

ﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﺯ ـ

ﺔ Cross Country and Time Series Data ﻡﺎﻋ ﻥﻤ ﺩﺘﻤﺘ ﻲﺘﻟﺍﻭ

ﻡﺎﻋ ﻰﺘﺤﻭ 1975 2005

ﺎﻬﻤﺩﻗ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﺩﻨﺘﺴﻴﻭ - Bennett and Loayza

2000) (

ﻥﻤ ﺔﻨﻴﻋ لﻴﻠﺤﺘﻟﺎﺒ ﺕﻟﻭﺎﻨﺘ 2

ﻥﻤ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﺔﻤﺩﻘﺘﻤ ﺔﻟﻭﺩ 19 ﻰﺘﺤﻭ 1975

ﺀﺍﺭﺠﺇ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗﻭ ،1994

ﻼﻴﺩﻌﺘ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﺯﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍﻭ ،ﺔﻴﻟﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﻟﻭﺎﻨﺘﺘ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﺭﻔﻟﺍ ﻊﻤ ﻡﺀﻼﺘﻴ ﻲﻜ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺕ

ﺙﺤﺒﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ ﻊﻤ ﻰﻓﺎﻨﺘﺘ ﺎﻬﻨﻷ ﺔﺌﺸﺎﻨ ﺕﺍﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﺍ ﺕﺍﺫ ﻭﺃ ﺔﻴﻤﺎﻨ ﹰﻻﻭﺩ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ ﺔﻨﻴﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﻤﻀﺘﺘ ﻻﻭ .

ﺘﻟﺍ لﻴﻭﻤﺘﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﻫﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﻗﺍﻭﺴﺃ ﺭﻭﻁﺘ ﻡﺩﻌﺒ ﻡﺴﺘﺘ ﺙﻴﺤ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ ﺔﻴﻀﺭﻔﻟﺍ ﻲﻤﺨﻀ

ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺕﺎﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻥﻤ ﺩﻴﺩﻌﻟﺍ ﻲﻨﺒﺘ ﻥﻤ ﻡﻏﺭﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻙﻟﺫﻭ ،ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻠﻟ لﺎﺠﻤﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺜﻴﺩﺤ ﺎﻬﺘﺭﺒﺨ لﺍﺯﺘ ﻻ ﺙﻴﺤ ﺔﻴﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﻗﺍﻭﺴﺃ ﺭﻴﻭﻁﺘ ﻭﺤﻨ ﺏﺌﺍﺩﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﻠﻤﻋﻭ .

ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﺩﻤﺘﻌﻴﻭ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﺎﻌﻤ

ﺔﻴﻟﺎﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺯﺘﺨﻤﻟﺍ :

t i t i r j i r t i

t i t i d j i d t i

MFP X

B rr

MFP X

B pdratio

;

µ θ

ε θ

+ +

=

+ +

=

ﺙﻴﺤ : - pdratio ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤ :

ﻰﻟﻭﻷﺍ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺒﺎﺘ ﻥﻋ ﺭﺒﻌﻴ

ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻜ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ

ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ .

rr ﺔﻴﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺒﺎﺘ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤ : ﻥﻋ ﺭﺒﻌﻴ

ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ

، ﻟ ﺭﺜﺄﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ

ﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺴﺃﺭﻟﺍ ﺏﺎﺴﺤﻟﺍ ﺡﺎﺘﻔﻨﺍ ﺔﺠﺭﺩﺒ ﺔﻴﻠ

.

X ﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﺌﻓ : ﺔﻤﻜﺎﺤ

control variables ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻭ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻠﻟ

.

MFP ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﺠﻓ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ ﺭﺸﺅﻤ :

.

2 Herman Bennett and Norman Loayza, “Policy Biases When the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives”, Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 66, March 2000.

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i,t ﺹﺎﺨﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻥﺍﺯﻤﺭﻟﺍ ﻥﺍﺫﻫ ﺭﻴﺸﻴ : ﺒ

ﺔﻟﻭﺩﻟﺎ ﻭ ،i ﺔﻴﻨﻤﺯﻟﺍ ﺔﻁﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺩﻨﻋ ﻙﻟﺫ t

.

θ : B, ﺎﻫﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﻡﺘﻴ ﻲﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ لﺍﻭﺩ ﺕﻼﻤﺎﻌﻤ

.

µ ε, ﺄﻁﺨﻟﺍ ﻪﺠﺘﻤ : ﻲﻟﺍﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ،ﺔﻴﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍﻭ ﻰﻟﻭﻷﺍ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﻲﺘﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﻲﻓ ﻲﺌﺍﻭﺸﻌﻟﺍ

.

ﺠﺘ ﺩﻭﺠﻭ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺽﺭﺘﻔﻴﻭ ﹴلﻜ ﺔﺒﺎﺠﺘﺴﺍ ﺙﻴﺤ ﻥﻤ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺱﻨﺎ

ﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻭ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷ

ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻠﻟ

X ﻭ ﺕﻼﻤﺎﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﺃ ﻲﻨﻌﻴ ﺎﻤ ﻭﻫﻭ ، MFP

B, θ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺔﺘﺒﺎﺜ

ﺔﻴﻨﻤﺯﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍ لﻼﺨﻭ ﺕﻼﻤﺎﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻭﻨﻌﻤﻭ ﺓﺭﺎﺸﺇ ﺭﺎﺒﺘﺨﺍ ﻡﺘﻴﻭ .

r^θ, d^θ ﺔﺒﺠﻭﻤ ﺓﺭﺎﺸﻹﺍ ﺕﻨﺎﻜ ﺍﺫﺈﻓ

ﻲﻨﻌﻴ ﺍﺫﻬﻓ ﺔﻴﻭﻨﻌﻤﻭ ﻥﺃ

ﻥﻤ ﹴلﻜ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺏﺎﻴﻏ ﻱﺩﺅﻴ ﺎﻤﻨﺇ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ

– ﺕﺎﺒﺜ ﺽﺍﺭﺘﻓﺎﺒ

ﻯﺭﺨﻷﺍ لﻤﺍﻭﻌﻟﺍ Ceteris Paribus

ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻭ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻔﺘﺭﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ - ﺱﻜﻌﻟﺍﻭ ،

ﺢﻴﺤﺼ ﺀﺍﺩﺃ ﻥﺴﺤﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ ﻙﻟﺫ ﻥﺈﻓ ﺔﻴﻭﻨﻌﻤﻭ ﺔﺒﻟﺎﺴ ﺕﻼﻤﺎﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﺓﺭﺎﺸﺇ ﺕﻨﺎﻜ ﺍﺫﺇ ﻪﻨﺃ ﻰﻨﻌﻤﺒ )

ﻲﻠﻜﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺭﻓﺍﻭﺘﻟ ﺔﺠﻴﺘﻨ ﻙﻟﺫﻭ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻭ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﺽﺎﻔﺨﻨﺍ لﻼﺨ ﻥﻤ

ﺔﻴﺒﺎﺠﻴﻹﺍ ﺭﺎﺜﻵﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻟ ﻡﺌﻼﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻁﻹﺍ ﺔﻤﺩﺨﺘﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺎﺒ ﻑﻴﺭﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﻠﻴ ﺎﻤﻴﻓ ﻡﺘﻴﻭ .(

ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺭﺩﺎﺼﻤﻭ .

ﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ • ـ

ﺔﻌﺒﺎ Dependent variables

ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ

ﻲ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻜ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺒﺎﺘ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻜ ،

ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺀﺎﺼﺤﻹﺍ لﻴﻟﺩ ﻥﻤ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﻭﻓﺩﻤﻭ ﻲﻠﻜﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗﻭ ،ﻰﻟﻭﻷﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻭﻜﺤﻟﺍ Government Finance Statistics(GFS)

ﻲﻟﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﻕﻭﺩﻨﺼ ﻩﺭﺩﺼﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍ .3

ﻡﺘ ﻡﺜ

ﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻲﺴﺎﺴ

ﻲﻠﻜﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ) = ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻋﻭﻓﺩﻤ -

ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺒ ،(

ﻲﻟﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﺓﺩﻋﺎﻗ ﻥﻤ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ

4.

ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺎﻤﻜ ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ

ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ) = –

ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ ﻲﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ

ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍ

،( ﻜ ﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺒﺎﺘ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤ ﺔﻴﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍ ﺭ

ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗﻭ .

ﺔﻴﻟﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺀﺎﺼﺤﻹﺍ لﻴﻟﺩ ﻥﻤ ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍﻭ (IFS)

International Financial Statistics .5

ﺔﻨﺍﺯﺨﻟﺍ ﻥﻭﺫﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﻙﻟﺫﻜ Treasury Bill Rates

ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻥﻋ ﺭﺸﺅﻤﻜ

ﻤ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻟ ﺭﺸﺅﻤﻜ ﺔﻴﻜﻴﺭﻤﻷﺍ ﺔﻨﺍﺯﺨﻟﺍ ﻥﻭﺫﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌ

ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺵﻤﻜﻤ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗ ﻭ ،ﺔﻴﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍ GDP Deflator

ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻠﻟ

ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ .

3International Monetary Fund, “Government Finance Statistics Yearbook”, Different Issues.

4World Bank, “World Development Indicators (WDI)”, Different Issues.

5International Monetary Fund, “International Financial Statistics (IFS) ”, Different Issues.

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ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﺠﻓ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﺘ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤ •

:

Proxies for the Difference in Preferences Between Monetary and Fiscal Authorities (MF):

ﻰﻠﻋ ﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﻡﺘ - ﺎﻫﺩﻋﺃ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﺓﺩﻋﺎﻗ

Beck 2000) ﻥﻭﺭﺨﺁﻭ (

ﺔﻴﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﺴﺴﺅﻤﻟﺍ لﻭﺤ 6

Database on Political Institutions(DPI) ﻲﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻪﺠﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺜﺄﺘ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻑﺭﻌﺘﻠﻟ ﻙﻟﺫﻭ ،

ﻲﻌﻨﺎﺼﻟ ﺓﺩﻋﺎﻘﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻲﻁﻐﺘﻭ ،ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﻡﻬﺘﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﻟﺍ

177

ﻥﻤ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﺔﻟﻭﺩ 1975

2000- ﻰﻠﻋ ﻱﻭﻁﻨﻴ ﻱﺭﺎﺴﻴﻟﺍ ﻪﺠﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺽﺍﺭﺘﻓﺍ ﻡﺘﻴ ﺙﻴﺤ .

ﺭﺍﺭﻘﻟﺍ ﻊﻨﺎﺼ لﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻱﻭﻁﻨﻴ ﻲﻨﻴﻤﻴﻟﺍ ﻪﺠﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺒ ،ﺔﻟﺎﻁﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﺽﻴﻔﺨﺘﻟ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﺽﻴﻔﺨﺘﻟ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘﻭ ،ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ

(gov) ﻲﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻪﺠﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻋ ﺭﻴﺒﻌﺘﻠﻟ

ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍﻭ ،ﻲﻨﻴﻤﻴﻟﺍ ﻪﺠﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺤ ﻲﻓ ﺭﻔﺼ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺫﺨﺄﻴ ﺙﻴﺤ 5

,

،ﻲﻁﺴﻭ ﺏﺯﺤ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻪﺌﺎﻤﺘﻨﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺤ ﻲﻓ 0

ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍﻭ ﻱﺭﺎﺴﻴ ﺏﺯﺤ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻪﺌﺎﻤﺘﻨﺍ ﺔﻟﺎﺤ ﻲﻓ 1

.

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗﻭ - (CWN)

ﺭﻁﻴﺴﻟﺎﺒ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺩﻬﻌﺘ ﻥﻋ ﺭﻴﺒﻌﺘﻠﻟ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺓ

ﻰﻠﻋ ﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺙﻴﺤ ،ﺩﻬﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻴﻌﻴﺭﺸﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﻻﺎﺒ ﻪﻌﺘﻤﺘﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻱﺫﻟﺍ ﺭﺸﺅﻤﻟﺍ

ﺎﻬﻤﺩﻗ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻪﺒﺎﺴﺘﺤﺍ ﻡﺘ Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti

1992)

7( ﺔﻴﻤﻫﺃ ﺱﻜﻌﻴﻟ

ﻥـﻴﺒ ﺱﺎﻴﻘﻤﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﺡﻭﺍﺭﺘﻴﻭ ،ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻠﻟ ﻑﺩﻬﻜ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ 0 )

1- ﺙﻴﺤ (

ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻴﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻁﻠﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻋ ﺔﻠﻤﺎﻜ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﻊﺘﻤﺘ ﺢﻴﺤﺼﻟﺍ ﺩﺤﺍﻭﻟﺍ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻟﺎﺤ ﻲﻓﻭ ،ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻠﻟ ﺩﻴﺤﻭ ﻑﺩﻬﻜ

ﺔ ﺔﻤﻭﻜﺤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺽﺭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ

ﻥﻭﻜﻴ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍﻭ ﺭﻴﺨﻸﻟ

ﺫﺎﺨﺘﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻕﺤﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻟ ﻲﺌﺎﻬﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﻟﺍ

ﻲﻓ ﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷ

،

ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺫﺨﺄﻴ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺒ 8

, ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺭﻜﺫ ﻡﺘ ﺍﺫﺇ 0 ﻲﻓ

ﻑﺩﻬﻜ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻠﻟ ﻲﺴﻴﺌﺭ ﻭﺃ ﺩﻴﺤﻭ

ﻑﺍﺩﻫﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻑﺩﻬﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﺔﻴﻭﻟﻭﺃ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﺤﺍﺭﺼ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ لﻤﻌﻟ ﻡﻅﻨﻤﻟﺍ ﻊﻴﺭﺸﺘﻟﺍ ﺹﻨﻴ ﻥﺃ ﻥﻭﺩ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺫﺨﺄﻴﻭ ،ﻯﺭﺨﻷﺍ ﺔﻤﻭﻜﺤﻟﺍ 6

, ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﺭﻜﺫ ﻡﺘ ﺍﺫﺇ 0 ﻲﻓ

ﺏﻨﺎﺠ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﺃ

ﻱﺭﻌﺴﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻊﻤ ﺎﻬﻘﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﺽﺭﺎﻌﺘﻴ ﻻ ﺙﻴﺤﺒ ﻱﺭﺨﺃ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺎﻤﺃ ،

4 , ﻙﺎﻨﻫ ﻥﺃ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺭﻴﺸﺘﻓ 0

ﺏﻨﺎﺠ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻯﺭﺨﺃ ﹰﺎﻓﺍﺩﻫﺃ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ

ﻲﻓ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﺘﻟﺍﻭ

ﺽﺭﺎﻌﺘﺘ ﺩﻗ ﻪﻌﻤ

.

ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺢﻀﻭﺘ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺒ 2

, ﻥﺃ0 ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ لﻤﻌﻟ ﻡﻅﻨﻤﻟﺍ ﻊﻴﺭﺸﺘﻟﺍ ﺩﺩﺤﻴ ﻻ

ﻓﺍﺩﻫﺃ ﻪ

،ﺢﻀﺍﻭ ﹴلﻜﺸﺒ

ﺱﻜﻌﺘﻭ ﺍ

ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﻥﻭﻨﺎﻗ ﻥﺃ ﺭﻔﺼ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟ ﻻ

ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺹﻨﻴ ﻲﻓ

ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ

،ﹰﺍﺭﻅﻨﻭ .

ﻡﺎﻋ ﺩﻨﻋ ﺱﺎﻴﻘﻤﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻬﻟ ﺔﺤﺎﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﺀﺎﻬﺘﻨﻻ ﻡﺎﻋ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺩﺘﻤﻴ ﻲﻜ ﻪﻠﻴﺩﻌﺘ ﻡﺘ ،1992

ﹰﺍﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﺍ 2005

6 Thorsten Beck, and others, “ New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions”, World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 2283, February 2000.

7 Alex Cukierman, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti, “ Measuring the Independence of central Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes”, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol.6 , No.3,1992,pp. 353- 398.

(9)

ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ ﺔﻴﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻭﻨﺒﻟﺍ لﻤﻌﻟ ﺔﻤﻅﻨﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻌﻴﺭﺸﺘﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻠﻟ ﻥﻠﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻑﺩﻬﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﺔﻴﺠﻴﺘﺍﺭﺘﺴﺍ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﻭﺤﻨ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺩﻴﺩﻌﻟﺍ لﻭﺤﺘ ﺭﺎﺒﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﻲﻓ ﹰﺍﺫﺨﺃ .

ﻱﺭﻭﺼ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ -

،ﺢﻴﺭﺼ لﻜﺸﺒ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻠﻟ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﻻ ﺔﻟﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﻴﻟ (IT) ﺫﺨﺄﻴﻭ

ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﺘﻓ ﻲﻓ ﺩﺤﺍﻭ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍﻭ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻡﺩﻋ ﺕﺍﺭﺘﻓ لﻼﺨ ﺭﻔﺼ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ .

ﺭﺸﺅﻤ ﺔﻓﺎﻀﺇ ﻡﺘ - (gov)

ﺸﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻥﻴﺭ

(CNW) ﻭ

لﻅ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻤﻭﻜﺤﻟﺍ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﺘﻟ ،(IT)

ﺭﺍﺭـﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻲﻓ ﻪﺘﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﻱﺯـﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﻊﺘﻤﺘﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩـﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﺭﺎﻁﺇ ﻱﺭﻌﺴﻟﺍ ﺏﺎﻴﻏﻭ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺽﺭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺭﺸﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺫﻬﻟ ﺔﻌﻔﺘﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻤﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺱﻜﻌﺘﻭ)

ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺎﻤﻫ ﻥﻴﺩﻴﺩﺠ ﻥﻴﺭﺸﺅﻤ ﻰﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻡﺘ ﻡﹶﺜ ﻥﻤﻭ ،(

ﻭ ،MFP ﻲﻟﺍﻭﺘﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ،MIT

.

ﺔﻤﻜﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ •

(X) ariables V

ontrol C

ﺔﻤﻜﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺎﻤﻜ ﺯﺠﻌﻠﻟ ﺓﺩﺩﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺭﻴﺸﺘﻟ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﻲﺘﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﻲﻓ X

لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻟﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒ ﺓﺩﻋﺎﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗﻭ ،ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻭ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﻠﻋ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻰ -8

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺍﺩﻋ ﺎﻤﻴﻓ (groecd)

ﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﻕﻭﺩﻨﺼ ﺭﻴﺭﻘﺘ ﻥﻤ ﻪﻴﻠﻋ لﻭﺼﺤﻟﺍ ﻡﺘ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ

لﻭﺤ ﻲﻟﻭﺩﻟﺍ

"

ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻕﺎﻓﺁ WEO

"

ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻥﻤﻀﺘﺘﻭ ،9

:

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ - (Gdpr)

،ﺔﻴﺭﺎﺠﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺎﺒ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺎﺒ ﻱﻭﻨﺴﻟﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ ﻥﻋ ﺭﺒﻌﻴﻟ

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻡﺩﺨﺘﺴﻴﻭ (gdv)

ﻁﺴﻭﺘﻤ ﻥﻋ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺎﺒ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ ﻑﺍﺭﺤﻨﺍ لﺜﻤﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ

ﺓﺭﻭﺩ ﺀﺍﺩﺃ ﺱﻜﻌﺘﻟ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻗﻭ ،ﺔﻘﺒﺎﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﻨﺴ ﺱﻤﺨﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ لﺎﻤﻋﻷﺍ .

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ - (Inf) ﻊﻴﺭ ﻥﻤ ﺩﺤﻟﺎﺒ ﺔﻁﺒﺘﺭﻤﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻤﻜﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﺤﺄﻜﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻥﻋ ﺭﺒﻌﻴﻟ

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻟﺫﻜﻭ ،ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ لﻴﻭﻤﺘﻟ ﺭﺍﺩﺼﻹﺍ ( Infv)

ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻑﺍﺭﺤﻨﺍ لﺜﻤﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ

ﺔﻘﺒﺎﺴﻟﺍ ﺱﻤﺨﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﻨﺴﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻁﺴﻭﺘﻤ ﻥﻋ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﺤﻟﺍ .

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ - (Trade)

ﻭ ،ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺓﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﺒﺴﻨ لﺜﻤﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ

(groecd)

ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻁﺴﻭﺘﻤ لﺜﻤﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻤﻅﻨﻤ لﻭﺩ ﻲﻓ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ

لﻼﺨ OECD

ﻡﻜﺤﺘﻠﻟﻭ ﻲﺠﺭﺎﺨﻟﺍ ﻡﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﺡﺎﺘﻔﻨﺍ ﺔﺠﺭﺩ ﻥﻋ ﺭﻴﺒﻌﺘﻠﻟ ﻙﻟﺫﻭ ،ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻡﺘ ﺎﻤﻜ ،ﺔﻴﺠﺭﺎﺨﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻤﺩﺼﻟﺎﺒ (DS)

ﺔﻴﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﺨﺩﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﺇ ﺔﺒﺴﻨ لﺜﻤﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ

ﺘﻟ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﻘﺒ ﺔﻁﺒﺘﺭﻤﻟﺍﻭ ﻱﺩﺭﺎﻜﻴﺭﻟﺍ ﺊﻓﺎﻜﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻀﺭﻓ ﺱﻜﻌ

ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻤﺩﺨﺘﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﻟﺎﺘﻟﺍ لﻭﺩﺠﻟﺍ ﺢﻀﻭﻴﻭ .

.

8 World Bank, “World Development Indicators (WDI)”, Different Issues.

9 International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook (WEO)”, April 2004.

- The OEDC Statistics, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/

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لﻭﺩﺠ 1

)

ﻲﺴﺎﻴﻘﻟﺍ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻤﺩﺨﺘﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ

: (

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ

* ﺔﻤﺩﺨﺘﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺎﺒ ﻑﻴﺭﻌﺘﻟﺍ

PDRATIO? ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻜ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ

RR? ﻲـﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩـﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ لﺩـﻌﻤ –ﻲـﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ^{) =}ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻲﻤﻟﺎﻌﻟﺍ (

MFP? ﺔـﺠﺭﺩ لـﻅ ﻲـﻓ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺎﺒ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﻟﺍ ﻲﻌﻨﺎﺼ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ ﺭﺸﺅﻤ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻲﻓ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺎﻬﺒ ﻊﺘﻤﺘﻴ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ .

GDPR? ﺔﻴﺭﺎﺠﻟﺍ ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺎﺒ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺎﺒ ﻱﻭﻨﺴﻟﺍ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ GDV? ﺱﻤﺨﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻁﺴﻭﺘﻤ ﻥﻋ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺎﺒ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ لﺩﻌﻤ ﻑﺍﺭﺤﻨﺍ ﺔﻘﺒﺎﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﻨﺴ

INF? ﺔﻴﻭﻨﺴﻟﺍ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ

INFV? ﺱـﻤﺨﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﻨـﺴﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘ ﻁﺴﻭﺘﻤ ﻥﻋ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻑﺍﺭﺤﻨﺍ ﺔﻘﺒﺎﺴﻟﺍ TRADE? ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺓﺭﺎﺠﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﺒﺴﻨ

DS? ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺔﻴﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﺨﺩﻤﻟﺍ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﺇ ﺔﺒﺴﻨ

GROECD لـﺤﻤ ﺓﺭـﺘﻔﻟﺍ لﻼﺨ ﺔﻴﻤﻨﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﻱﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻥﻭﺎﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻤﻅﻨﻤ لﻭﺩﺒ ﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻁﺴﻭﺘﻤ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ

MIT? لـﻅ ﻲـﻓ ﺔـﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔـﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﻟﺍ ﻲﻌﻨﺎﺼ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ ﺭﺸﺅﻤ

ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ .

ﺔﺳارﺪﻟا ﻞﺤﻣ لود ﺲﻤﺨﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺮﯿﻐﺘﻤﻟا ﻚﻟذ ﻢﯿﻗ ﻰﻟإ مﺎﮭﻔﺘﺳﻻا ﺔﻣﻼﻋ ﺮﯿﺸﺗ *

، ﺔ ﻌﻤﺠﻤﻟا تﺎ ﻧﺎﯿﺒﻟا ﻦﻋ ﺮﯿﺒﻌﺘﻟا ﻢﺘﯾ ﺚﯿﺣ

ﺔﻣﺪﺨﺘ ﺴﻤﻟا ﺔﯿﺋﺎ ﺼﺣﻹا ﺔ ﻣﺰﺤﻟا ﻲ ﻓ لوﺪ ﻟا ﻚﻠﺘﻟ E-Views

ﻮ ھو ﺪ ﯿﺣو ﺮ ﯿﻐﺘﻣ اﺪ ﻋ ﺎ ﻤﯿﻓ مﺎﮭﻔﺘ ﺳﻻا ﺔ ﻣﻼﻋ ماﺪﺨﺘ ﺳﺎﺑ

GROECD ﺔﯿﻤﻨﺘﻟاو يدﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻا نوﺎﻌﺘﻟا ﺔﻤﻈﻨﻣ لوﺪﺑ ﻮﻤﻨﻟا تﻻﺪﻌﻣ ﻂﺳﻮﺘﻣ ﺲﻜﻌﯾ يﺬﻟاو

.

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ًﹰﺎﻴﻨﺎﺜ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺎﻬﺼﻼﺨﺘﺴﺍ ﻥﻜﻤﻴ ﻲﺘﻟﺍ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ ﻡﻫﺃ

:

10

ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨ ﺕﺤﻀﻭﺃ ﺩﻗﻭ ﺔﻘﻴﺭﻁ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ -

ﻑﻼﺘﺨﺍ ﺔﻠﻜﺸﻤ ﻱﺩﺎﻔﺘﻟ SUR

ﻥﻴﺎـﺒﺘﻟﺍ Heteroskedasticity

ﻲﻠﺴﻠﺴﻟﺍ ﻁﺎـﺒﺘﺭﻻﺍ ﺔﻠﻜﺸﻤﻭ ، ﺔــﻴﺌﺍﻭﺸﻌﻟﺍ ﺀﺎـﻁﺨﻸﻟ

Serial

correlation ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﻊﻀﻭﻤ ﺔﻴﻀﺭﻔﻟﺍ ﻕﻘﺤﺘ -

ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﺭﺎﻁﺇ ﻲﻓ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻕﻘﺤﺘﻴ ﺙﻴﺤ .

لﻴﻭﻤﺘﻟ ﺔﻴﻤﺨﻀﺘ ﺭﻴﻏ ﺭﺩﺎﺼﻤ ﺭﻴﻓﻭﺘ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻱﺩﺅﻴﻭ ﺔﻴﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻭﻨﺒﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺢﻨﻤ ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ .

ﻭ ﻕﺤﻠﻤﻟﺎﺒ لﻭﺍﺩﺠﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺸﺘ ﻰﺌﺎﺼﺤﻹﺍ

ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺝﺫﻭﻤﻨﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ

ﻡﻗﺭ لﻭﺩﺠ ﺢﻀﻭﻴ ﺙﻴﺤ - 2)

(

ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﻰﻟﻭﻷﺍ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨ ﺯﺭﺒﻴ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ ﻲﻠﺤﻤﻟﺍ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺔﺒﺴﻨﻜ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ

ﻲﻟﺎﻤﺠﻹﺍ ﻡﺎﻋ ﻥﻤ ﺓﺩﺘﻤﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻨﻤﺯﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺘﻔﻟﺍ ﺭﺒﻋﻭ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ لﻭﺩ ﺱﻤﺨﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻊﺒﺎﺘ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻜ

1975

ﻡﺎﻋ ﻰﺘﺤﻭ ﻜﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒﻭ ،2005

ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺕﺍﺭﺸﺅﻤﻭ ﺔﻤ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ

ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﺠﻓ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﺭﺸﺅﻤ لﻤﺎﻌﻤ ﻥﺃ -

MFP? 11

،ﺓﺭﺎﺸﻹﺍ ﺏﺠﻭﻤ

ﻯﺩﺃ ﺎﻤﻨﺇ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﺠﻓ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺏﺎﻴﻏ ﻥﺃ ﺩﻜﺅﻴ ﺎﻤ ﻭﻫﻭ ﹰﺎﻴﺌﺎﺼﺤﺍ ﻪﺘﻟﻻﺩﻟ ﹰﺍﺭﻅﻨ ،ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻔﺘﺭﺍ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺔﻴﻭﻨﻌﻤ ﻯﻭﺘﺴﻤ ﺩﻨﻋ)

5 Significant % .(

ﺍ ﻑﺩﻫ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻭﺤﻨ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻠﻟ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺢﻨﻤ ﻥﺃ ﻥﻤ ﺩﻜﺄﺘﻠﻟﻭ ﻥﺃﻭ ،ﺭﺎﻌﺴﻷﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﺍﺭﻘﺘﺴﻻ

ﻱﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﻁﺎﺒﻀﻨﻻﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻴﻤﻫﻷﺍ ﺔﻐﻟﺎﺒ ﺭﺍﻭﺩﺃ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘﻟ ﺭﺎﻁﺈﻜ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﻻ ﺭﺸﺅﻤ ﺔﻓﺎﻀﺇ ﻡﺘ ﺩﻘﻓ ،ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺓﺀﺎﻔﻜ ﻊﻓﺭﻭ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍﻭ ﻱﺫﻟﺍﻭ MIT?

ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ لﻅ ﻲﻓ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺔﻗﻼﻌﻟﺍ ﺱﻜﻌﻴ

ﻅﻴﻭ . ﻡﻗﺭ لﻭﺩﺠﻟﺍ ﺭﻬ 3)

ﺔﻴﺒﺎﺠﻴﻹﺍ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ (

ﺎﻤﺒ ﺎﻬﺘﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻥﻴﺒ ﺏﺭﺎﻘﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺩﻴﺯﻤ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻯﺩﺃ ﺙﻴﺤ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻙﻟﺫ ﻥﻤ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﻉﺎﻔﺘﺭﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺩﺤﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﺃ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ لﻤﺎﻌﻤﻟ ﺔﺒﻟﺎﺴﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺎﺸﻹﺍ ﻥﻤ ﻙﻟﺫ ﺢﻀﺘﻴﻭ .

ﺔﻴﻭﻨﻌﻤ ﻯﻭﺘﺴﻤ ﺩﻨﻋ ﺔﻴﺌﺎﺼﺤﻻﺍ ﻪﺘﻟﻻﺩ ﺕﻘﻘﺤﺘ ﺎﻤﻜ ، MFP?

5 .%

ﻡﻗﺭ لﻭﺩﺠ ﺢﻀﻭﻴﻭ 4)

ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ ﺔﻴﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍ ﺭﺍﺩﺤﻨﻻﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ (

ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍ ﺔﺴﺎﻴﺴﻠﻟ ﺔﻤﺎﻬﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﺩﻷﺍ ﺩﺤﺃ ﺱﻜﻌﺘﻟ ﻊﺒﺎﺘ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻜ ﺽﺭﺎﻌﺘ ﺩﻭﺠﻭ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘﻟﺍ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨ ﻥﻤ ﺢﻀﺘﻴﻭ .

ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻉﺎﻔﺘﺭﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﺃ ﺎﻤﻤ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﺕﺍﻭﺠﻓ ﻥﺄﺸﺒ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻡﺩﻋﻭ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ

ﺭﺸﺅﻤﻟﺍ ﺍﺫﻫ ﺔﻟﻻﺩ ﺍ

ﹰﺎﻴﺌﺎﺼﺤ .

ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﺭﺸﺅﻤ ﺔﻓﺎﻀﺇ ﺩﻨﻋﻭ ﺎﻤﻜ -

ﻰﻓ ﻡﻗﺭ لﻭﺩﺠ 5)

( ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﻙﻟﺫ ﻥﺃ ﺢﻀﺘﻴ -

ﻴ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﻥﺃ ﺩﻜﺅﻴ ﺎﻤ ﻭﻫﻭ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﻉﺎﻔﺘﺭﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺩﺤﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﺃ ﺩﻗ ﺓﺍﺩﺃ ﺔﺒﺎﺜﻤﺒ ﺩﻌ

ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﺔﻴﺎﻬﻨﻲﻓ ﻰﺌﺎﺼﺤﻹﺍﻕﺤﻠﻤﻟﺍ ﻰﻟﺇﻉﻭﺠﺭﻟﺍ ﻰﺠﺭﻴ10

.

ﺔﻌﻤﺠﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺎﻨﺎﻴﺒﻟﺍ ﻥﻋﺭﻴﺒﻌﺘﻟﺍ ﻡﺘﻴﺙﻴﺤ ،ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ لﺤﻤ لﻭﺩ ﺱﻤﺨﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻟﺫ ﻡﻴﻗ ﻰﻟﺇ ﻡﺎﻬﻔﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺔﻤﻼﻋ ﺭﻴﺸﺘ11

ﺔﻤﺩﺨﺘﺴﻤﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺌﺎﺼﺤﻹﺍ ﺔﻤﺯﺤﻟﺍ ﻲﻓ لﻭﺩﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘﻟ

E-Views

ﻡﺎﻬﻔﺘﺴﻻﺍ ﺔﻤﻼﻋ ﻡﺍﺩﺨﺘﺴﺎﺒ .

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ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻟ ﺔﻠﻋﺎﻓ ﺫ ﺢﻀﺘﻴﻭ .

ﺭﻴﻐﺘﻤﻟﺍ لﻤﺎﻌﻤﻟ ﺔﺒﻟﺎﺴﻟﺍ ﺓﺭﺎﺸﻹﺍ ﻥﻤ ﻙﻟ MIT?

ﺔﻴﻭﻨﻌﻤ ﻯﻭﺘﺴﻤ ﺩﻨﻋ ﹰﺎﻴﺌﺎﺼﺤﺇ ﻪﺘﻟﻻﺩﻭ 5

.%

ﻡﺯﻼﺘﺘ ﺙﻴﺤﺒ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﻡﺘﺘ ﻥﺃ ﺓﺭﻭﺭﻀ ﺞﺌﺎﺘﻨﻟﺍ ﻩﺫﻫ ﺩﻜﺅﺘﻭ

ﻲﺴﺴﺅﻤ ﺭﺎﻁﺇ ﺩﻭﺠﻭ ﻊﻤ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻟﻼﻘﺘﺴﻻ ﺯﻴﺯﻌﺘ ﻥﻤ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﻩﺭﻓﻭﻴ ﺎﻤ ﻭﻫﻭ ﻡﺌﻼﻤ

ﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﺩﺎﻤﺘﻋﻻﺍ ﻥﻤ ﹰﻻﺩﺒ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ لﻴﻭﻤﺘﻟ ﻯﺭﺨﺃ ﺭﺩﺎﺼﻤ ﺭﻴﻓﻭﺘ لﻼﺨ ﻥﻤ ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻁﺎﺒﻀﻨﻻﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻭ ﻱﺯﻜ

ﻲﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ لﻴﻭﻤﺘ ﺽﺍﺭﻏﻷ ﺔﻤﻭﻜﺤﻟﺍ ﺽﺍﺭﻗﺈﺒ ﻱﺯﻜﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻨﺒﻟﺍ ﻡﺎﻴﻗ ﺭﻅﺤﻭ ،ﺭﺍﺩﺼﻹﺍ ﻊﻴﺭ ﻰﻠﻋ .

ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﺔﻤﻫﺎﺴﻤ ،ﻰﻟﻭﻷﺍ ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﺭﻴﺩﻘﺘ ﺢﻀﻭﺃﻭ ﺕﻼﻴﻀﻔﺘ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘ لﻅ ﻲﻓ -

ﺒ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍﻭ ﺞﺘﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻥﺄﺸ

ﺔﻟﺩﺎﻌﻤﻟﺍ ﺕﺤﻀﻭﺃ ﺎﻤﻨﻴﺒ ،ﺔﻨﺯﺍﻭﻤﻠﻟ ﻲﺴﺎﺴﻷﺍ ﺯﺠﻌﻟﺍ ﺽﻔﺨ ﻲﻓ -

ﺔﻴﻨﺎﺜﻟﺍ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﻕﻴﺒﻁﺘ ﻥﺃ ﻪﺘﺍﺫ ﺩﺤ ﻲﻓ -

ﻲﻓ ﻡﻬﺴﺃ ﺙﻴﺤ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺒ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘﻠﻟ ﻪﻴﻟﺁ ﺩﻌﻴ -

ﺔﻴﻘﻴﻘﺤﻟﺍ ﺓﺩﺌﺎﻔﻟﺍ ﺕﻻﺩﻌﻤ ﺽﻔﺨ ﺓﺀﺎﻔﻜ ﻊﻓﺭ ﻲﻓ ﻡﺨﻀﺘﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻬﺘﺴﺍ ﺭﺎﻁﺇ ﻡﻬﺴﺃ ،ﻥﻴﺘﻟﺎﺤﻟﺍ ﺎﺘﻠﻜ ﻲﻓﻭ .

ﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﻠﻤﻋ ﺔﻴﺩﻘﻨﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﻴﻟﺎﻤﻟﺍ ﻥﻴﺘﺴﺎﻴﺴﻟﺍ ﻥﻤ ﺓﻭﺠﺭﻤﻟﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘﻭ ﻕﻴﺴﻨﺘ

.

ﺔﻴﺴﺴﺅﻤ ﺭﻁﻷ ﺔﻴﻤﺎﻨﻟﺍ لﻭﺩﻟﺍﻭ ﺔﺌﺸﺎﻨﻟﺍ ﻕﺍﻭﺴﻷﺍ لﻭﺩ ﺔﺒﻜﺍﻭﻤ ﺓﺭﻭﺭﻀ ﻰﻟﺇ ﺔﺴﺍﺭﺩﻟﺍ ﺹﻠﺨﺘ ﺎﻤﻜ ﺭﺜﻜﺃ ﺓﺭﻭﺼﺒ ﺔﻤﺎﻌﻟﺍ ﺔﻴﺩﺎﺼﺘﻗﻻﺍ ﻑﺍﺩﻫﻷﺍ ﻕﻴﻘﺤﺘ لﻴﺒﺴ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻴﻋﺎﻨﺼﻟﺍ لﻭﺩﻟﺎﺒ ﺔﻘﺒﻁﻤﻟﺍ ﻙﻠﺘﻟ ﺔﻠﺜﺎﻤﻤ

ﺓﺀﺎﻔﻜ .

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References:

Beck, Thorsten, and others, “ New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions”, World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper 2283, February 2000.

Bennett, Herman and Loayza, Norman “Policy Biases When the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives”, Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 66, March 2000.

Cukierman, Alex, Webb, B. Steven and Neyapti, Bilin, “ Measuring the Independence of central Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes”, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol.6 , No.3,1992, pp. 353-398.

International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook (WEO)”, April 2004.

International Monetary Fund, “Government Finance Statistics Yearbook”, Different Issues.

International Monetary Fund, “ International Financial Statistics(IFS) ”, Different Issues.

The OEDC Statistics, available at: http://stats.oecd.org/

World Bank, “ World Development Indicators (WDI) ”, Different Issues.

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ﻲﺌﺎﺼﺤﻻﺍ ﻕﺤﻠﻤﻟﺍ

Table(1): Descriptive statistics for each variable

Sample: 1975 2005 Balanced sample

PDRATIO? RR? MFP? GDPR? GDV? INF? INFV? TRADE? DS? GROECD MIT?

Mean -5.068036 0.727333 0.964000 2.771533 0.051667 5.536933 0.540200 44.29853 20.33540 2.430667 0.860000 Median -4.745237 1.180000 1.000000 3.085000 0.200000 3.380000 0.250000 48.15000 20.90000 2.396667 1.000000 Maximum 5.387025 7.500000 2.000000 7.800000 4.200000 27.03000 17.66000 84.50000 25.56000 2.745000 2.000000 Minimum -14.99469 -13.37000 0.200000 -3.900000 -6.000000 -0.600000 -4.400000 16.15000 12.90000 2.200000 0.000000 Std. Dev. 3.809877 3.412637 0.541472 2.178815 1.772949 4.894408 2.247956 16.42105 3.124383 0.207595 0.685712 Skewness -0.093211 -1.218848 0.130179 -0.636671 -0.842641 1.519388 3.362788 -0.100663 -0.327269 0.517438 0.184559 Kurtosis 2.728445 5.798015 1.649029 3.286339 4.537753 5.347977 24.93345 2.168525 2.086596 1.884373 2.128551

Jarque-Bera 0.678095 86.07030 11.83069 10.64619 32.53035 92.16976 3289.436 4.574261 7.892048 14.47244 5.597943 Probability 0.712449 0.000000 0.002698 0.004878 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.101557 0.019331 0.000720 0.060873

Sum -760.2055 109.1000 144.6000 415.7300 7.750000 830.5400 81.03000 6644.780 3050.310 364.6000 129.0000 Sum Sq. Dev. 2162.759 1735.268 43.68560 707.3379 468.3589 3569.329 752.9427 40177.97 1454.504 6.421267 70.06000

Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150

Cross sections 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

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Table(2): Estimation output for PDRATIO?

Dependent Variable: PDRATIO?

Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section SUR) Sample: 1975 2005

Included observations: 30 Cross-sections included: 5

Total pool (balanced) observations: 150

Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix

Cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f.

correction)

Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C -3.507914 4.225607 -0.830156 0.4079

MFP? 0.702199 0.236097 2.974198 0.0035

GDPR? -0.212449 0.138992 -1.528494 0.1287

GDV? 0.254862 0.164842 1.546097 0.1244

INF? -0.670469 0.086720 -7.731426 0.0000

INFV? 0.543881 0.117797 4.617100 0.0000

TRADE? -0.092230 0.027960 -3.298672 0.0012 GROECD -3.071119 1.671428 -1.837423 0.0683

DS? 0.655329 0.076344 8.583932 0.0000

Fixed Effects (Cross)

UK--C 2.121185

NZ--C 0.626405

AUST--C 0.276548

USA--C -1.358231

CAN--C -1.665908

Effects Specification

Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

Weighted Statistics

R-squared 0.625212 Mean dependent var -1.128588 Adjusted R-squared 0.592384 S.D. dependent var 1.700256 S.E. of regression 0.961134 Sum squared resid 126.5576 F-statistic 19.04500 Durbin-Watson stat 0.819068 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000

Unweighted Statistics

R-squared -2.151474 Mean dependent var -5.068036 Sum squared resid 1064.183 Durbin-Watson stat 0.494882

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Table(3): Estimation output for PDRATIO? with MIT?

Dependent Variable: PDRATIO?

correction)

Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C -2.852079 4.386141 -0.650248 0.5166 MFP? -1.626569 0.687263 -2.366734 0.0194 MIT? 2.216823 0.666311 3.327010 0.0011 GDPR? -0.116813 0.138400 -0.844026 0.4001 GDV? 0.125013 0.162570 0.768978 0.4432 INF? -0.588612 0.094751 -6.212175 0.0000 INFV? 0.485602 0.124694 3.894335 0.0002 TRADE? -0.082812 0.028536 -2.902014 0.0043 GROECD -3.523128 1.761048 -2.000586 0.0474 DS? 0.636737 0.076211 8.354920 0.0000 Fixed Effects (Cross)

UK--C 1.679210

NZ--C 0.215709

AUST--C 0.538885

USA--C -0.371975

CAN--C -2.061829

Effects Specification Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)

R-squared 0.657533 Mean dependent var -1.380202 Adjusted R-squared 0.624798 S.D. dependent var 1.623158 S.E. of regression 0.974374 Sum squared resid 129.1190 F-statistic 20.08608 Durbin-Watson stat 0.827664 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000

R-squared -1.556239 Mean dependent var -5.068036 Sum squared resid 963.7699 Durbin-Watson stat 0.542358

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Table(4):Estimation output for RR?

Dependent Variable: RR?

correction)

C 2.549278 4.547258 0.560619 0.5759 MFP? 0.218206 0.206725 1.055537 0.2930 GDPR? 0.106220 0.111481 0.952807 0.3423 GDV? -0.146292 0.138726 -1.054542 0.2934 INF? -0.405901 0.071168 -5.703443 0.0000 INFV? -0.192950 0.085462 -2.257716 0.0255 TRADE? -0.134902 0.021026 -6.415971 0.0000 GROECD 1.208147 1.625348 0.743316 0.4585 DS? 0.156114 0.090488 1.725249 0.0867 Fixed Effects (Cross)

UK--C 0.878009

NZ--C 1.093481

AUST--C -1.321335

USA--C -2.253746

CAN--C 1.603590

R-squared 0.702157 Mean dependent var 0.619348 Adjusted R-squared 0.676987 S.D. dependent var 1.697655 S.E. of regression 1.003747 Sum squared resid 143.0660 F-statistic 27.89673 Durbin-Watson stat 1.064932 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000

R-squared -0.536799 Mean dependent var 0.829032 Sum squared resid 738.1861 Durbin-Watson stat 0.614244

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Table(5):Estimation output for RR? with MIT?

Dependent Variable: RR?

correction)

C 3.193244 4.174428 0.764954 0.4456 MFP? 1.920219 0.691808 2.775652 0.0063 MIT? -1.741864 0.624823 -2.787771 0.0060 GDPR? 0.052155 0.112659 0.462945 0.6441 GDV? -0.089074 0.142547 -0.624874 0.5331 INF? -0.517846 0.076925 -6.731809 0.0000 INFV? -0.106589 0.091928 -1.159484 0.2482 TRADE? -0.129304 0.022600 -5.721332 0.0000 GROECD 1.008733 1.502094 0.671551 0.5030 DS? 0.166440 0.095444 1.743852 0.0834 Fixed Effects (Cross)

UK--C 1.154089

NZ--C 1.373905

AUST--C -1.400947

USA--C -2.786936

CAN--C 1.659889

R-squared 0.692524 Mean dependent var 0.576308 Adjusted R-squared 0.664175 S.D. dependent var 1.696663 S.E. of regression 1.000952 Sum squared resid 141.2686 F-statistic 24.42861 Durbin-Watson stat 1.012559 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000

R-squared -0.495535 Mean dependent var 0.829032 Sum squared resid 687.1170 Durbin-Watson stat 0.642064