Dipl.-Volksw. Frieder Schmitz

Jüngere Daten standen nicht zur Verfügung, sind aber nach Wolf auch nicht zwingend erforderlich, weist er doch schon in der Überschrift eines Ka- pitels auf „die Rolle

If the downstream fi rms’ bene fi ts from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licences, even though under

Consider now the non-trivial case in which trade is ex post efficient if and only if the buyer has a high valuation. Then it is possible to achieve ex post efficiency by writing a

Given that joint use of liability and regulation with standard s R is in fact socially advantageous, one may ask whether the expected total costs could be further decreased by

While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually domi- nated, it is shown here that joint ownership in the form of partial privatiza- tion can be optimal

However, a simple incomplete contract can implement the first best outcome only if use of seemingly inefficient random- ization is made. ∗ This is the working paper version of

This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can provide an indivisible and excludable public good to a group of n potential

Taken together, our fi ndings imply that the important difference between the property rights approach with private goods and public goods is not Besley and Ghatak’s (2001)