The Changing Face of United Nations Peacekeeping
Colonel Colm DOYLE, Ireland,
UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO)
United Nations peacekeeping has come a long way since I first went overseas to Cyprus in 1964. Then, it was a matter of interposing a force between two belligerents while awaiting a political or diplomatic solution. While the notion of interim or temporary may have been a falsehood, at least the status quo, in general terms, existed. A cease-fire, consent of the parties and strict impartiality always prevailed. Second Generation Peacekeeping is a world apart. It is multifaceted, multidimensional, with greater demands on professionalism and integration. To add to this over the past 18 months the Organization has had to cope with what we term the ’surge’ in peacekeeping. In 1999 the UN had approximately 12,500 troops deployed. Today there are upwards of 75,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 Missions worldwide. What brought more pressure on the UN was that most of these surge operations occurred around at the same time - UNMIL (Liberia), ONUB (Burundi), ONUC (Cote ’d’Ivoire) and MINUSTAH (Haiti). In addition, attention was focussed on MONUC (Congo).
Right now, UNMIS (Sudan) is the priority and is engaging much of the UN’s energy and effort. This extra surge has created enormous pressure which has led to the need for a more professional and effective approach to
The Chan ging F
ace of Unite
d N ati ons
Peacekeeping
Colonel Colm DOYL E, Ireland,
UN Department of Pea ce K
eeping Ope rations (DP KO)
United Na tions pea
cek eeping h
as c om e a lon g w
ay
since it was a yprus in 1964. Then, as to C I first went overse
matte r of interposing
a f orc e be twee n two be lliger
ents
while awaiting a political or
diplomatic solution. While
the notion of interim or
tempor ary may h ave be
en a ral terms, gene falsehood, at least the status quo, in
exis ted. A ce ase-fi
re, consen t of the pa
rtie s a nd str ict
impartiality alwa ys
prev
ailed. Second Generation ld apart. g is a wor Peacekeepin It is multifaceted,
multidimensiona l, with g
rea ter dema
nds on
professionalism and integ ration. To add to this
over the ation has had to co past 18 months the Organiz
pe with
what we term the ’surge
’ in peacek eeping.
In 1999 the
UN had approximatel y 12,500 tr
oops deployed.
Today
there are upwards of 75,
000 peaceke epers
deployed to 18 e pr ght mor Missions worldwide. What brou essure on the
UN was that most of these sur
ge ope rations o
ccurred
around at the s ame ti
me - UN MIL (L iberia),
ONUB IN e) and M NUC (Cote ’d’Ivoir (Burundi), O
USTAH
(Haiti). In addition, attention was fo
cussed on MONUC
(Congo).
Right now, UNM IS (
Sudan) is the priorit y and is
engagi ng m uch o f t he U N’s energ
y and effort . Thi s ex tra
surge has created enorm ous pressur
e whic h has le
d to the e approach t and effectiv essional need for a more prof
o
how we do peacekeeping. In other words we have had to move from traditional to complex peacekeeping. This process is well under way as can be evidenced, for example, in MONUC where, for the first time ever the UN has established a Divisional HQ. At HQ the notion of an Integrated Mission Planning Process has been progressed, the concept of which is an interactive approach to integration of planning, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The process is described in a linear form of successive steps but, continuous reassessments and updating plans on the basis of new information or changing circumstances actually make it cyclical.
Generating Military Capability:
The sequence of steps which require action from A.
DPKO towards the Mission, followed by B. those of the Mission towards DPKO is essential. Both follow on the authority received by the Security Council Mandate and Subsequently, the Rules of Engagement.
A. Actions from DPKO towards Mission
Planning: Planning process, Peculiarities of the UN
planning process, Clear levels of operation and delegation, HQ/ Mission responsibilities, Integration.
Preparation & Training: National training, Pre-
deployment training, and Induction training.
Resources: Troop ceiling, Force structure coherent
units where possible, Troop capability &
how we do peacek eeping.
In othe r words we hav
e had to
move from tradi
tional to com
ple x peaceke epi
ng. Thi s
process is well under way
as can be evidenced, for example, in MONUC where,
for the first time e ver the
UN has established a Divisional HQ. At HQ the notion of
an Inte grated Mission Planning
Process has been t of whic cep con d, the esse progr
h is an inter active
approach to inte gration
of planning, at the strategi
c,
opera tional a nd tac tical leve ls. The process is d
escribed
in a linear form of successive st
eps but, continuous plans on the basis of new ing reassessments and updat
inform ation or chan
ging ci rcumst
ances act ual ly make i t
cyclic al.
Gener ati ng Milit
ary Ca pability:
The sequence of steps which require action from A.
DPKO towards the Mission, followed b y B
. those of the
Mission toward s DPKO is e
ssentia l. Both
follow
on the e Security Council Mandate and ceived by th authority re
Subsequently, the Rules of Engage
ment.
A. Actions from D PK O tow ards Mission
Planning:
Planning proc
ess, Pe culia ritie s of the
UN ess, Clear levels of operation and planning proc
delega tion, HQ/ Mission responsibilities, Inte
gration.
Preparation & Traini ng: Nationa
l trai ning, Pre-
deployment training
, and I nduction
training. ce structure For ng, Troop ceili : Resources
coherent
units where possible , Tr
oop c apa bilit y &
sustainability, Logistic supportability, Troop readiness.
Mission Establishment / Transition: Deployment
time, Transition arrangements
B. Actions from Mission towards DPKO
Capacity building: HQ cohesion, Doctrine / SOPs,
Timely generation & deployment, Inter-mission cooperation
Information Management: Analysis & advice at
the correct level, Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), integrated mission database.
Effectiveness: Proactive operations, Operational
management, Joint Operations Center (JOC) (JLOC), Operational depth.
The Actions in Detail Planning
The planning process requires an initial estimate with a technical assessment, followed by a concept development and the production of a concept of operations. These must be linked to the Integrated Mission Planning Process, which I referred to earlier. Military planning in the UN context produces its own challenges due to the structure and processes within the Secretariat, and the absence of the normal hierarchical relationship between HQ, at least in the early stages of a mission. It is important for the establishment of a clear distinction between the different levels of the operation and of
sustainability, L ogi stic supportability,
Troop
readiness.
Mission Establishm
ent / Transition:
Deployment
time, Tr ansition a rra
ngeme nts
B. Actions from Mission
towards DP KO
Capac ity buil ding:
HQ cohesion, Doctrine / S
OPs, ssion er-mi Int ent, ym generation & deplo Timely
cooperation
Inform ation Management:
Ana lys is
& a dvi ce at
the c orr ect leve l, Joint Mission Ana lys
is Ce
ll d mission database. ate , integr (JMAC)
Eff ectiven ess: Proacti
ve oper ations, Oper
ational
manage ment, Joint Operations Center (J
OC) (JL
OC), Operational depth.
The Ac tions in De tail
Planning The pla nning pr
ocess r equir es a n initia l estima
te with a
techni cal assessm
ent, fol lowed b y a
concept devel
opment
and the production of a concept of operations. These
must be linked to the Inte grated Mission Planning
Proc ess, whic h I r
efe rred to ear lier.
Military planning in
the UN context produce s its own challenges du
e to the , and t ariat Secret he in t with ure and processes struct
he
absence of t he norm al hi
erarchi cal rel ati onship bet ween
HQ, at least in the ea
rly st ages o f a mission. It
is
importa nt for the esta blishme nt of
a c lea r dis
tinction ent levels of the operation and of between the differ
ensuring that decisions are taken at the appropriate level as soon as practicable. The Concept of Operations developed by DPKO is intended to provide the broad outline of the plan, to justify the number of troops and the resource requirements after which it should be handed over to the Mission to be refined by the Force Commander. However, in practice, this can be problematic when a Force Commander has yet to be appointed, or the Headquarters properly established. The Concept is intended to cover the military contribution to the implementation of the mandate and will have been coordinated with the other functional areas as part of the planning process but the Mission will need to develop its own integrated campaign plan.
Preparation and Training
The training of UN peacekeepers is primarily a national responsibility and for the deployment of many national contingents, particularly a new Troop Contributing Country, there will be a Pre-deployment assessment visit by Military Division. The UN has developed, over the last few years, standardized training modules to ensure that Member States are delivering to their troop’s standardized guidance. The UN gives limited assistance to emerging TCCs either by developing training programs at their national training centers, delivered by trainers from Mil Div or, where feasible, sponsoring military students at established international training centers. In the last 12 months the Military Division’s Training and Evaluation Service (TES) has initiated Mission specific pre-deployment training for key ensuring that decisions a
re ta ken at the
appropria te level
as soon as pra cticable . The Concept of
Operations
developed by DPKO is inte
nded to provide th
e broad e number of troops and ustify th outline of the plan, to j
the resource requirem ents
after which it should be
handed over to the Mis sion to be refined
by the F orc
e an be e, this c actic , in pr ver r. Howe Commande
problem atic when a Force C
om mand er has
yet to be
appointed, or the He adquarte
rs properl y established. The
Concep t is intende
d to cover the military
cont
ribution to nd will ha te a manda tion of the menta the imple
ve be en
coordinated with the oth er fun
ctional a reas
as part of the
planning proc
ess but the Mission will need
to deve
lop its gn plan. own integrated campai
Pre par ation and Tr aining
The training of UN pea
cekeep ers is primaril
y a national
responsibility and fo r the depl
oym ent of man
y national w Troop Contributing a ne rly articula contingents, p
Country, there will be a Pre-deplo
yment assessment visit
by Militar y Division. The UN has developed,
over the modules to ensur rdized training ars, standa last few ye
e
that Member States are delivering to their troop’s
standa rdize d g uida nce . The UN g
ive s limite d assista
nce g training evelopin y d g TCCs either b to emergin
programs at their n ational trainin
g c enters, delivered by
trainers from Mil Div or, wher e feasible, sponsoring
military students a
t e sta blished inte
rna tional tr
aining vision’s ry Di months the Milita last 12 In the ters. cen
Trai ning a nd Eval
uation Se rvic
e ( TES) ha
s initiate d
Mission specific pre- deployment t
rainin g f or key
personnel aimed at providing essential mission specific information, acting as a step in achieving headquarters integration and establishing key principles of UN operations (including policy on sexual exploitation and abuse). Also included is specific training for military observers and UNMO leader training. The latest initiative undertaken by TES is induction training, which is training undertaken in the mission area where members of the deploying force are trained in theatre prior to becoming operational. There are currently Mission Training Cells (MTCs) in 16 of the 18 Missions in operation, the only exceptions being UNDOF and UNMIS.
Resources:
The troop strength must be adequate for mandated tasks, therefore it is essential to establish the total requirement at the outset and, so, avoid an incremental approach that inhibits both planning and operations. The structure must be balanced. The force should consist of coherent units, have effective command measures in place, possess adequate reserves, and contain key enablers, which is one of the most demanding tasks for Mil Div at any time. In the recent past it has become a critical issue to generate units that are properly equipped and with the appropriate levels of self-sustainment. Many troop contributing countries find the question of self sustainment a particular challenge. This has led to the notion of a sponsorship arrangement. In relation to MONUC DPKO has been pursuing the agreement by Belgium to provide for the equipping, transporting and sustaining of a
personnel aimed at providin
g ess ential mission specific
information, acting as a step in achieving
head
quarters principles of UN key ablishing integration and est
operations (including po licy on
sexual ex ploitation and
abuse ). Also inc lude
d is speci fic trai ning f or milita
ry st initiative late g. The ainin r tr ade nd UNMO le rs a observe
undertaken by TES is induction training , which is
training unde rtaken in the mission area wher
e members re d in theat aine re tr orce a g f yin deplo of the
prior to
becomin g op erational
. There are cu
rrently Mi ssion
Training Cells (MTCs) in 16 of the 18 Missions in
operation, the only e xceptions being UNDOF
and . UNMIS
Resources :
The tr oop str eng th must be
ad equate for
mandated tasks, blish the tota sta o e ntial t it is esse fore there
l r equir eme nt
at the outset and, so, avoid an incremental approach that
inhibits both planning and ope
rations. The st ructur
e must
be balanced. The force
should consist of cohere
nt units, ace, n pl measures i and e comm ctiv have effe
possess
adequate res erves, and contain ke
y en ablers, which is one
of the most dema
nding t asks f or Mil Div at a
ny t ime.
In era to gen al issue critic me a s beco nt past it ha ece the r
te
units that are prop erly eq
uipped and with the appr
opriate
levels of self-sustainme nt. Man
y t roop contr
ibuting estion of self sustainment a countries find the qu
partic ular c halle nge . T his has led to the notion of a
sponsorship arrangem ent. In
relation to MONUC DPKO
has been pursuing the a greement b
y B elg
ium to provide nsporting and sustainin for the equipping, tra
g of a
battalion from Benin in advance of its deployment to the mission area. It is to be realized and the timeline is slipping further behind.
There is the need for each mission to have an integrated and joint logistics plan in place and for the Organization one of its greatest challenge, is that of readiness for rapid deployment. The whole question of the UNSAS arrangement requires to be examined with a view to seeking better ways to more rapidly deploy, which I believe is very unlikely to improve under existing conditions.
Mission Establishment / Transition
The conventional force generation and deployment may not be fast enough to achieve the desired result. This is one of the reasons why we have seen an increased number of occasions in which a UN mission has assumed responsibility from another force. This leads to an examination of the inherent challenges faced by such an arrangement. The underlying principle is to sustain a level of capability while transferring responsibility from one force to another, and thus ensure continuity of operations. Examples in the recent past are of the operations in UNMIL, ONUB, ONUCI, and more recently, MINUSTAH.
The transition is often difficult to achieve and can make a force vulnerable for a number of reasons:
a) Command and control is not fully established.
battalion from Benin in advanc e of
its deplo yment to the
mission are a.
It is to be r
ealize d a nd the tim
eline is
slipping further b ehind.
There is t he ne ed for e
ach m issi on to have an int
egr ated
and joi nt l ogi stic s plan i n pl ace and for t
he O rga niza tio
n or rapi ness f of readi hat s t nge, i alle est ch great one of its
d
deployment. Th e whole
question of the UNSAS
arrangem ent requi
res t o be ex amin
ed with a vi ew to
seeking better w ays to more rapidly deplo
y,
which I ex to improve under unlikely believe is very
isting
conditions.
Mission Establishm ent / Transition
The conventional force gen eration and d eplo
ym ent ma y
not be fast enou gh to
achieve the desired r
esult.
This is
one of the reasons wh y
we have seen an increas
ed
number of occ asions in which a
UN mission has assumed another for responsibility from ce. This le
ads to an
exam inat ion of t he i
nherent chal len ges f ace d by such an
arrangement.
The unde rlyi
ng p rinciple is to
sustain a responsibilit transferring y while level of capabilit
y from
one force to another, and thus ensure continuit y o
f
operations. Ex ampl
es in the recent past are
of the and more ONUCI, , ONUB, operations in UNMIL
recently , M IN UST AH.
The tr ansition is of ten diff
icult to a chie
ve a nd can ma
ke a asons: for a number of re force vulnerable
a) Command and control is not fully established.
b) There might be differences in mandates and ROEs between the forces.
c) The 'rehatted' force might not be equipped to UN
scales
d) Problems with self sustainment.
e) Incoming troops require time for induction
f) The capability might not match the requirement and
takes times to achieve.
Minimizing the problems
There will be a need for the in-place and incoming forces to conduct a joint approach to planning to as great a degree as possible so that the transition plan is mutually agreed. There may also be a difficulty in conducting joint planning in the absence of common doctrinal guidelines and the need to develop them. It will be essential to achieve the necessary level of capability for the force to be credible. Self sustainment will have to be looked at as will the all-important issue of command and control as the forces transition. Different levels and standards of training must be considered
Capacity building
To achieve the cohesion necessary for any UN force it must, first of all, exist at the Force HQ level. There is the requirement for fluid integration, a unity of command and effective joint operations. Much of this can be achieved through a common and standardized approach on doctrine and SOPs. There is an increased awareness
b) There migh
t be differen ces in mandates and RO
Es
between t he
forces.
The 'reh c)
atted' fo rce mig ht not be equipped to
UN
scales d) Problems with self sustainment.
Incoming e)
troops require t ime for induction
f) The c apa bilit y mi ght not ma tch the
requir eme nt an d
take s times to a
chie ve.
Min im izi ng th e prob
lem s
There will be a n
eed for the in-pla ce a nd incomin
g f orc es
to conduct a joint appr oach to planning to as
great a
degree as possi ble so t
hat the t ransi tion pl an is
mut ual
ly cting joint y in condu e a difficult y also b agreed. There ma
planning in the absence of common doctrinal guidelines
and the need to de
velo p them
. It will be e
ssentia
l to force to y for the level of capabilit ary achieve the necess
be c red ible. Se lf susta inm ent will ha ve to be
looke d a t a s
will the a ll-impor tant is
sue of comma nd and c
ontr ol a s
the forces transition. Different
levels and standards of red training must be conside
Capac ity buildi ng
To achieve t he cohesi on necessar
y fo r any
UN force it l. Ther e HQ leve orc t the F exist a all, st of must, fir
e is the
requirement for fluid integration, a unit y o
f co mmand
and effective joint operations. Much of this can be
achieved through a com mon and standardiz
ed approach ased a ncre There is an i OPs. ne and S on doctri
wareness
on the issue of flexibility in the utilization of resources, and in inter-mission cooperation, particularly in areas where UN missions are closely linked or in close proximity i.e. MONUC - ONUB or UNMIL – UNAMSIL - ONUCI, and again UNIFIL - UNDOF.
Information Management
With the increased complexity of missions there has become a greater need for a better informed decision making process which demands good information and intelligence, as well as a more proactive approach to information management. This demands a unified reporting of information and a better dissemination of intelligence to all elements of a mission. Recent events have led the organization to re-assess its need for being better informed and thus, being better prepared. The fluid and unpredictable environment into which UN operations are often deployed demand new integration capacities than was the case some time ago. These include the ability to process available information, the product of which is intelligence and to plan and act on this product in an integrated fashion. The structural and conceptual mechanism to meet this capability requirement is the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC). It is a multidisciplinary unit that undertakes analysis of information from all sources, analyses it and provides medium and long term intelligence to the senior mission management to assist the decision making process. It covers the main functional areas of a mission and contains military, civilian police and civilian experts. It seeks information from all sources both in, and outside on the issue
of f lex ibility
in the utiliza tion of r
esour ces,
and in inter-mission cooperation, particul arly in area
s
where UN missions a re closel
y link ed or i
n close - ONUB or UNM UC ty i.e. MON proximi
IL –
UNAMSIL - ONUC
I, an d again UNIF
IL - UND OF
.
Inform ation Managem
ent
With the inc rea sed comple xit
y of missions there
has ed decisi r inform for a bette r need ate gre become a
on
making proc ess which dema
nds good info rmation and
intellig enc e, a s we ll as a
more pr oac tive a pproach
to a unified ment. This demands information manage
repor ting of
info rm ation and a better dissemination of
intelligence to all eleme
nts of a mission. Recen
t events ed for bein re-assess its ne ganization to have led the or
g
better informed and thus, being better prep
ared. T he fluid
and unpredictable environment into which UN operations
are ofte n deplo yed de mand ne
w integr ation c apa
citie
s the include These ago. some time s the case than wa
ability to proc ess available
information, the product of
which is intelligen ce and to plan and act on this
product nceptual ural and co The struct on. ed fashi grat nte in an i
mech anism to me et this c
apa bilit y re quireme
nt is the
Join t Mission Analy
sis Cell ( JMA C).
It is a lys multidisciplinary unit that undertakes ana
is of
information from all sources, anal yses it and p
rovides
medium a nd long t
erm inte lligen ce to th e se nior mission
manag eme nt to assist the
decision makin g proc
ess. It s of a mission a l area ctiona in fun rs the ma cove
nd
conta ins milita ry, c
ivilia n police a
nd civilia n exp
ert s. It
seeks information from all sources both in, and outside
the mission. As such, it is the only information management mechanism with responsibility across the full spectrum of activity. It is not a military intelligence cell. It provides intelligence input to current operations but has no responsibility for coordinating those operations, which is the job of the Joint Operations Cell (JOC). It is a mission asset that will work under the direction of the Head of Mission and the priorities and guidance given to the organization will be adjusted and refined as the implementation of the mandate proceeds.
The current lack of an accepted UN policy on the JMAC allows the Missions to develop what they think is the best solution. While there is some latitude for designing a JMAC to meet a Mission’s needs, i.e. some components like police, formed police units, or even formed military units will not always be present in all PKOs, there must be an overall structure which is common. A policy document is currently being prepared for DPKO senior management.
Effectiveness
Operations must be more focussed and the requirement for good intelligence is so important. There should be clear and unequivocal tasking with clear priorities and a means for measuring success. It is essential to move away from the ‘static based’ approach of the past, we need to be more imaginative in our use of troops.
Operations must be designed to achieve maximum synergy between all elements of the military force, i.e.
between contingents and military observers. Joint Operations Centers should be established. There must be
the mission. As such, it is the onl y in
formation
manage ment mechanism with responsibilit
y a
cross the intellig military It is not a y. activit um of ctr full spe
ence
cell. It provides intelli gence input to cur
rent op erations
but has no responsibilit y for coordinating
those rations Ce oint Ope the J job of tions, which is the opera
ll
(JOC) . I t is a mission asse
t that will wor k un
der the
direction of the Head of Mission and
the priorities and tion will be a aniza org ven to the gi nce guida
djust ed a nd
refined as the i
mpl em ent ation of t he m
andat e pr oceeds.
The current lack of an accept
ed UN pol icy
on the JM AC
allows the Missions to develop what th ey think is t
he best me latitude for designin solution. While there is so
g a
JM AC to meet a Mission’s needs, i.e. some com
ponents
like polic e, f orm ed police units, or e
ven for med milita
ry must ll PKOs, there nt in a ese s be pr units will not alway
be an overall structure which is common. A polic
y
document is curr ently
bei ng p repa red for DPK
O seni
or ment. manage
Eff ectiven ess
Operations m ust
be m ore focussed and
the requir
ement
for good intellig ence is
so important. There should be sking with c l ta nd unequivoca ar a cle lea
r pr iorities a nd a
mean s for measur ing su cce ss. It
is esse ntial to move
away from the ‘static b
ased’
approach of
the past, we need to be more imaginative in our use of troops.
Operations must be designed to a chieve m
aximum
synerg y be tween a
ll eleme nts of the milita
ry f orc e, i.e .
betwe en continge nts and military
observe rs.
Joint There d be established. Operations Centers shoul
must be
operational depth as to enable each level of operation to function effectively while also providing the capacity for the next level to provide support when required.
Operational Depth and Strategic Reserves
This leads to the final portion of this presentation which is the issue of a Strategic Reserve. Operational depth means the ability to provide for a properly structured force with reserves at each level of an operation. At the tactical level a commander will provide for his reserve within a Battalion or Brigade. Within a force there will be constituted a Force Reserve under operational control of the Force Commander.
However, no such reserve exists at the Strategic level.
It is essential to make good the existing gap in capability without which UN peacekeeping missions risk loss of credibility and increased risk of failure.
The Strategic Reserve should be:
A balanced, combined arms formation, whose
development is credible and
capable of influencing the situation. It must be
capable of independent action, but
integrated within the command and control structure
of the Mission into whose
area it is deployed. It should be deployable within a
timeframe that meets the
operational requirement on the ground and be
matched with the appropriate operational depth as to enable
each level of ope ration to
function effectivel y whil
e also providing the capac ity fo r
the next level to provi de support when required.
Op eration al Dep th and St rategic R
eserv es
This lead s to the f
ina l por tion of this pr
ese nta tion whic h
is t he i ssue of a St
rategi c Reserve. Oper ational
depth
mean s the a
bilit y to provide for
a pr oper ly struc tur
ed ation. At the h level of an oper rves at eac force with rese
tactic al le vel a comma nde
r will pr ovide f
or his rese rve
within a B atta lion or B
rig ade . Within a for
ce the
re will control r operational rve unde e Rese orc be constituted a F
of the For ce Commander.
How ever, n o su
ch res erve exi sts
at th e Stra tegic l
evel
. bility apa p in c ga existing good the ke ntial to ma esse It is
without which UN peac ekeeping missions risk
loss of
cre dibilit y a nd incr ease d ri sk of f ailur e.
Th e Strategi c Reserv
e sh ould be :
A balanced, combine
d arms formation, whose development is credible and
capable of influencin
g the situation. It
must be ent action, but capable of independ
integr ate d within the comma
nd and c ontrol str
uct ure
of the Mission into whose
area it is deplo yed.
It s hould be deploya
ble within a ets the that me ame timefr
operational requirem
ent on the ground
and be
matched with the appropriate
strategic movement capability.
Its tasks would include:
Stabilization operations acting as reinforcement to an
existing Mission whose resources can no longer meet the operational requirement and whose inability to respond will undermine the chances of long term success.
Act as an interim force pending longer term
redeployment and / or reinforcement of a Mission.
A surge capability to cover specific peak activities for
which a Mission does not possess the necessary resources (i.e. elections)
A show of force capability to reinforce a UN
presence.
The concept of the Strategic Reserve is being further developed by DPKO. It is expected that in the negotiations on the UN September Summit, it will be supported by the General Assembly, at the level of Heads of State and Government.
strateg ic move ment ca
pability.
Its tasks woul d include:
Stabiliza tion opera
tions acting a s r
einf orc em ent to a
n meet can no longer Mission whose resources existing
the ope rationa l requireme
nt and whose inabilit
y to respond will undermine the chances of long t
erm success.
Act a s a n inte rim for ce pe
nding lon ger
te rm
redeployment and / or rein
forcement of a Mission.
A surge
capa bility to c ove r spe cif ic pea k a ctivitie
s for which a Mission does not possess the necessary
resources (i.e. el ections)
A show of f
orc e cap abilit y to re inforc
e
a UN presence.
The concept of t he S trat egi c Reserve i s bei
ng further hat pected t s ex It i KO. y DP developed b
in t he
nego tiations on the UN
Septe mbe r Summit, it will be
supported by the G ener
al Assembl y, at the level o
f Head s
of State and Government .
