Co-governing common goods : interaction patterns of private and public actors

Co-governing common goods: Interaction patterns of private and public actors

Jale Tosun

* , Sebastian Koos

, Jennifer Shore

aInstituteofPoliticalScience,HeidelbergUniversity,Germany

bMannheimCenterforEuropeanSocialResearch,UniversityofMannheim,Germany

cDepartmentofPoliticsandPublicAdministration,UniversityofKonstanz,Germany

dCenterforEuropeanStudies,HarvardUniversity,USA

Abstract

Thisarticleaddressesco-governancewhichcanbedefinedasadynamicinteractionbetweenpublicandprivateactorstosecure theprovision of commongoods. Whichtypes of relationship betweenpublic and privateactors exist? Do the forms ofco- governancechangeovertime?Whenistherelationshipbetweenpublicandprivateactorscooperative,whenisitcompetitive,and whendowewitnessconflictualrelationships?Theseresearchquestionslieattheheartofthisintroductoryarticle,whichseeksto shedfurtherlightontheoriginsandimpactsofthevariousco-governancepatterns.Byreviewingthebodyofresearchonthistopic, weshowthatdifferentrelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateactorsexist,andthattheformsofco-governancecanalsochange overtime.Whilethedominantformofco-governanceiscooperation,onecanalsoobserveinstancesofcompetitionorevenconflict betweenpublicandprivateactors.Mostimportantly,wefindthatbothpublicandprivateactorsarereadytoreclaimcompetencesin areaswheretheyperceivetheotheractortohavegainedtoomuchinfluence.Aswediscussinthisarticle,thedegreeofcooperation andcompetitionmostlydependsontheexistingregulatoryarrangements,thecongruenceofgoalsofthedifferentactorgroups,and theinstitutionalization ofindustrial relations.Theseinsights helpustobetterunderstand theroleco-governancecan playin addressingcomplexpublicproblems.

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1. Introduction

Ever sinceMancur Olson’s(1965) path-breaking bookon the logicof collective action, social scientists have elaboratedonhowindividualsinagivengroupcanbeinducedtoprovidecommongoodsinsteadoftakingthebaitof free-ridingontheeffortsoftheothersinthesamegroup.Themoststraightforwardapproachtoimpedingfree-ridingis to have public authorities define, monitor, and enforce legallybinding rules – atype of state activity known as regulatorygovernance(seeLevi-Faur,2011:16).Theglobalclimateiswidelyregardedas acommongoodthatis typicallyunder-suppliedbymarkets sinceit ishardtoexcludethosewhodonot payfor emitting carbondioxide (Sterner,2003: 2). Preservingcommongoodsreflects the central aimof sustainabledevelopment,defined bythe

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*Correspondingauthorat:InstituteofPoliticalScience,HeidelbergUniversity,BergheimerStraße58,69115Heidelberg,Germany.

Tel.:+4906221543726;fax:+4906221542896.

E-mailaddress:jale.tosun@ipw.uni-heidelberg.de(J.Tosun).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2016.01.002

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BrundtlandReportas‘‘minimizingtheuseofnaturalresources,toxicmaterials,andemissionsofwasteandpollutants overthelifecycle,soasnottojeopardizetheneedsoffuturegenerations’’(OECD,2002:16).Therefore,toprovidea favourableglobalclimateortoachievesustainabledevelopmentingeneral,stateregulationisneeded,whichequally entailsmonitoringandenforcementtoensurethattheregulateescomplywhichtheregulation(Goeschl&Ju¨rgens, 2012;Tosun,2012).Theeffectivenessofregulationfortheprovisionofcommongoods,however,dependsoneffective government(see,e.g.,Andonova&Tuta,2014;Bo¨rzel,Ho¨nke,&Thauer,2012;Krasner&Risse,2014;Mayntz, 2002;Mills&Koliba,2015;Tosun,2013).Yet,governmentsoftenfailinsecuringcommongoods–forexample,due to capture by interest groups, territoriality of jurisdiction, or a situation characterized by ‘‘a combination of inefficiency,hightransactioncosts,poorinformationandhighdeliverycosts’’(Be´nabou&Tirole,2010:2).

Howcancommongoodsbeprovidedandmanagedwhenstateslacktheadequategovernmentcapacitytodoso?

Thisisthekeyquestionposedbydifferentstrandsofresearch,whichneverthelesssharethecommoninterestinthe questionastowhynon-stateactors,suchasconsumers,workers,andcorporations,takemattersintotheirownhands andactassubstitutesforgovernment.Theinvolvementofnon-stateactorsisanessentialcomponentofthegovernance literature,which, despite amyriadofdefinitions (Kohler-Koch&Rittberger, 2006;Weiss, 2000),canactuallybe definedinaratherstraightforwardmanner:thecooperationofstateandnon-stateactorsinsolvingsocietalproblems, which,accordingtoBiermannandPattberg(2008:278),also‘‘generallyimpliessomedegreeofself-regulationby societalactors’’(seealso,e.g.,Colebatch,2014;Howlett&Ramesh,2014;Levi-Faur,2011;Papadopoulos,2013a:86;

Peters,2014;Pierre, 2000;Steen-Johnsen,Eynaud, &Wijkstro¨m,2011).Thefocus hereisonaspecificstrandof research on governance,one which places particular emphasis on the diffusion of global production chains and thereforebringstheimportanceofcorporationstothefore.Toovercomewhatsomehavecalledthe‘globalgovernance gap’betweenglobalmarketsandtheterritorialityofjurisdiction(Ruggie,2007:35),thepastdecadeshavewitnessed anincreaseinthegovernanceofcommongoodsinvolvingpublicandprivate–orstateandnon-state–actors(Bartley, 2007;Lim&Tsutsui,2012;Waddock,2008).Thisphenomenonhasbeenanalysedbymanydifferenttermsincluding privategovernance(see,e.g., Green,2014;Pattberg,2005;Vogel,2008,2010),civilregulation(see,e.g.,William, Heery,&Abbott,2011Williamsetal.,2011),voluntarygovernance(see,e.g.,Potoski&Prakash,2005;Prakash&

Gugerty,2010;Prakash&Potoski,2007;To¨ller&Bo¨cher,2013),co-governance(see,e.g.,Ackerman,2004;Bode, 2006;Johnson&Osborne,2003;Kooiman&Bavinck,2005;Somerville&Haines,2008),transnationalor global governance (see, e.g., Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Bartley & Smith, 2010; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004;

Bulkeleyetal.,2014;Graz&No¨lke,2007;Hale&Held,2010;Held&Young,2013;Hickmann,2015;Kay,2005),or evencorporatesocialresponsibility(CSR; see,e.g., Auld,Bernstein,&Cashore, 2008;Be´nabou &Tirole,2010;

Bernhagen&Mitchell,2010;Kinderman,2012;Koos,2012a;Martin&Swank,2012;Menz,2010;Steurer,2010, 2013;Swank&Martin,2001).However,CSRmightbeunderstoodasadistinctapproachtotheprovisionorregulation ofcommongoods,asittendstobeapurelyprivatebusinessundertakingandneednotdirectlyinvolvepublicactors.

Ofthevarioustermsavailableforthesubjectinwhichweareinterested,weopttouseco-governanceasaprocess of interaction in which either the state ‘‘invites’’ social and business actors to participate in its core activities (Ackerman,2004: 448)or when the latteractorsmobilizethe stateto engageinjointsolutions ofcommongood problems.Differentfromotherconceptsdiscussedabove,co-governanceindicatesthatthereisadynamicpatternof interactionbetweenprivateandpublicactorslinkedtoamutualorientationvis-a`-visoneother.Itmusthoweverbe notedthatneitherco-governancenorthemanyotherlabelsforthephenomenonofinterestcanbedescribedasanew occurrence.Awealthofliteratureinadditiontothestudiesmentionedabovehasdocumentedthatgovernancetendsto behybridinnature(Falkner,2003).Fromourviewpoint,theconceptofco-governanceishoweverparticularlywell- suitedtolinkingthisthemedissuewiththegrowingbodyofliteratureacknowledgingthatactionstakenbyprivate actorsmustbeseeninthecontextofactionstakenbythestateatboththenationalandinternationallevels(Vogel, 2010:68;seealsoCompagnon,Chan,&Mert,2012).Themainresearchinterestofthisarticleandthethemedissuein general istolearn about how exactly co-governanceworks andwhat its effectsare:Which typesof relationship betweenpublicandprivateactorsexist?Dotheformsofco-governancechangeovertime?Whenistherelationship between public and private actors cooperative, when is it competitive, and when do we witness conflictual relationships?Thesearetheresearchquestionsaddressedinthisarticlewhichreviewstheexistingliteratureaswellas discussesthe contributionstothe themedissue.

Ourdiscussion of the literature andthe studiesincludedinthisthemed issue showthatdifferent relationships betweenpublicandprivateactorsexist,andthattheformsofco-governancecanalsochangeovertime.Whilethe dominant form of co-governance is cooperation, state and non-state actors also compete withone another over

regulatorycompetences,andevendisplayaconflictualrelationship.Particularlyinterestingisthefindingthatboth publicandprivateactorsreclaimcompetencesinareaswheretheyperceivetheotheractortohavegainedtoomuch influence. As we show, the degree of competition mostly depends on the specific regulatory arrangements, the congruence of goals of the different actor groups, and institutionalization of industrial relations. From this, we conclude that it is not government failure per se that determines the co-governance of common goods, but the constellationsofinterestsofthedifferentactorsgroupsandtheopportunitystructuresinwhichtheycanpursuetheir interests.

Thetermcommongoods,asusedthroughoutthisintroductionandasaguidingthemeofthearticlesinthisthemed issue,islikewisenotwithoutits terminologicalrivals. From aneconomicperspective,commongoodsencompass publicgoods,commonpoolresources,andcluband/ortollgoods.Whetheragivencommongoodisnon-excludableor non-rival is oftenamatter of perspective,whatthey allshare, however,are the challenges intheirprovision and governance(He´ritier,2002:1–2).

Theremainderofthisarticleconsistsoffourmainparts.First,wesummarizethemaininsightsprovidedbythe existingresearchonco-governance.Second,wepresentthecontributionstothisthemedissueanddiscusshowthey furthertheunderstandingofthepatternsandnuancesofco-governance.Next,bydrawingonthecontributionswe formulate a set of expectations for explaining the three different outcomes of co-governance: cooperation, competition,andconflict.Finally,weformulateanagendaforfutureresearch,whichbuildsontheinsightspresented inthisthemedissue.

2. Insightsonco-governance fromexistingresearch

The objectiveof thissection istosummarizewhat we knowabout co-governanceon thebasis ofthe existing literature. This is notan easy endeavour since – as already hinted above– we must consult different strands of literature.Theliteraturesvarywithregardtotheirfocus:themostencompassingfocuswecanobservecanbefoundin studiesoftransnationalorglobalgovernance,whichfocusontheparticipationofalargenumberofactors,including non-governmentalorganizations(NGOs),epistemiccommunities,experts,corporations,internationalgovernmental organizations,andevenregionsandcities(Biermann&Pattberg,2008:289;seealso,e.g.,Andonovaetal., 2009;

Bartley&Smith,2010;Bartley,2007;Betsill&Bulkeley,2004;Bulkeleyetal.,2014;Graz&No¨lke,2007;Green, 2014;Hale&Held,2010;Held&Young,2013;Hickmann,2015;Kay,2005).Asaresult,thisbodyofliteraturetends toconcentrateonthe differentgovernancelayersandhowfragmented orsegmented theyare, aswellas howthis affectstheattainmentofgovernancegoals(see,e.g.,Biermann,Pattberg, vanAsselt,&Zelli,2009).

TheotherextremeisrepresentedbytheliteratureonCSR,whichacknowledgesthemanydifferentformsinwhich CSRcanbepracticed(see,e.g.,Auldetal.,2008),but,atthesametime,exclusivelyconcentratesonbusinessactors.A largepartofCSRresearchfocusesonthe‘businesscase’forfirmofficialsaddressingenvironmentalorsocialconcerns arisingfromafirm’scorebusinessactivity,thatis,thefinancialbenefitsrelatedtothisbehaviour(see,e.g.,Orlitzky, Schmidt,&Rynes,2003).OnlyasmallbutsteadilygrowingbodyofresearchfocusesontheinteractionofCSRwith regulation (Berliner & Prakash, 2014; Bernhagen, Mitchell, & Thissen-Smits, 2013; Brown & Knudsen, 2015;

Gjølberg, 2009; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Kinderman, 2012; Knudsen, Moon, & Slager,2015; Kollman &

Prakash,2001;Koos,2012a;Potoski&Prakash,2004;Steurer,2010).Thesestudiesexaminetheembeddednessof CSRininstitutionsofthepoliticaleconomythatconstitutevariousnationalbusinesssystems,varietiesofcapitalism andworldsofwelfare,orenvironmentalregulation(Esping-Andersen,1990;Hall&Soskice,2001;Martin&Swank, 2012;Swank&Martin,2001;Whitley,1999).Theconceptsofprivategovernanceandvoluntarygovernanceshare withCSRtheirpredominantfocusoncorporations.

Co-governance–asdiscussedintheliterature–isnotrestrictedtocorporations,butreferstothedifferentwaysin whichpublic actors worktogether withprivateactors, whichcouldalso be termedas co-working (Somerville&

Haines,2008:61)orco-management(Kooiman&Bavinck,2005:20).Fromthis,itfollowsthatco-governancecan alsobeusedtoaddressprivategovernance,voluntarygovernance,andspecificformsofCSR.Asstatedabove,Auld etal.(2008)distinguishbetweendifferentformsofCSR:individualfirmCSRpolicies(Koos,2012a),specificindustry standards(see,e.g.,Reinecke,Manning,&VonHagen,2012),partnershipsbetweenfirmsandNGOs(e.g.,World Wide Fund for Nature), public-private partnerships (see, e.g., Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011), information approaches (e.g., GlobalReportingInitiative; see,e.g., Fernandez-Feijoo,Romero,&Ruiz,2014),environmental managementsystems(e.g.,InternationalStandardizationOrganization;see,e.g.,Prakash&Potoski,2006),industry

associationcodesofconduct(e.g.,ResponsibleCare),andprivatesectorhardlaw(e.g.,ForestStewardshipCouncil;

seeBartley,2007;Cashore,vanKooten,Vertinsky,Auld,&Affolderbach,2005).Wecanspeakofco-governancein caseswherestate actorsare involved inCSR activities: public-private partnerships, informationapproaches, and environmentalmanagementsystems.Inthiscontext,co-governanceisoftendiscussed asan‘outsourcing’ofstate activitiessuchas regulation,monitoring, orenforcement(see,e.g., O’Rourke,2003).

Theliteraturehasfurthermoreprovidedinsightsintoco-governanceatthegloballevel(see,e.g.,Bu¨the&Mattli, 2011;Held&Young,2013;Ronit&Schneider,1999;Ruggie,2007;Weiss,2000;Zu¨rn,2004),thenationallevel(see, e.g.,Brown&Knudsen,2015;Cashoreetal.,2005;Ho¨nke&Thauer,2014;Kay,2005;Kinderman,2012;To¨ller&

Bo¨cher,2013),andthelocallevel(see,e.g.,Johnson&Osborne,2003;Somerville&Haines,2008).Itcanhoweverbe observedthatscientificattentionhasgraduallyshiftedfromlocalandnationalperspectivestotransnationalandglobal perspectives(Fransen,2013).Areasasdiverseasenvironmentalprotection(see,e.g.,Andonova&Tuta,2014;Bartley

& Smith,2010; Bartley, 2007; Berliner &Prakash, 2013; Green, 2014; Mills & Koliba, 2015), climate change (Andonova etal., 2009; Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Hickmann, 2015; Termeer, Dewulf, &

Breeman,2013),labour(see,e.g.,Kay,2005;Bartley,2007;Fransen,2011),accounting(see,e.g.,Mattli&Bu¨the, 2005),healthcare (see,e.g., Jarman, 2014;Ho¨nke &Thauer,2014), humanrights (see,e.g., Kobrin,2009),and education(see,e.g.,Bhanji,2012)are likelytobesubjecttoco-governance.

Twomainquestionsarepresentintheliterature.Thefirstaddresseswhynon-stateactorsseektogetinvolvedin governanceprocesses.InexaminingtheparticipationofNGOsandcivil-societyactorsinparticular,thepredominant explanationreferstogovernmentfailure.Thesecondexplanationisthattheseactorsmaypromotevaluesthatarenot sharedbypolicy-makers– sincepreferences areheterogeneousandpolicy-makers havelimitedresources,not all valueswillbefullyreflectedinthepublicpoliciesproposed(Be´nabou&Tirole,2010:2).Withregardtocorporations, theliteraturegenerallyarguesthattheyarewillingtoparticipateinco-governanceifthereisa‘businesscase’forit (see,e.g.,Carroll&Shabana,2010;Vogel,2005).ThisargumentiscloselyassociatedwiththeCSRliterature,andthe voluntarystandardsadoptedhavethepotentialtoattractincreasedprofits.Inthiscontext,thebusinesscaseisoften discussedwith‘politicalconsumerism’(i.e.,boycottsandbuycottsofproducts)asaninstrumenttoinducefirmsto behaveinsociallyresponsibleways(see,e.g.,Stolle,Hooghe,&Micheletti,2005;Koos,2012b;deZu´n˜iga,Copeland,

&Bimber,2014;Bartley,Koos,Samel,Setrini,&Summers,2015).BeyondCSR,thisperspectiveisinlinewiththe literatureontheexportationofproductionstandards(see,e.g.,Prakash,2000).Forexample,Garcia-Johnson(2000) showsthat multinational corporations haveincentives toraise the environmental, health, and safetystandards of domestic companies in theirhost countries to maintain their competitiveadvantage – regardless of wheretheir productionis based.Thisreasoning reflectsthe viewthatprivate or voluntary standardssubstituteforregulation, suggestingthatfirmcommitmentsandregulationaremutuallyexclusive.

Anotherreasonwhyprivateactorsengageinco-governancepointstotheirengagementinphilanthropyonbehalfof theirinvestors,customers,oremployees;voluntarystandardsmayalsoreflectthemanagement’sowndesiretoengage inprosocialactivities(Be´nabou&Tirole,2010:9–12).Thisviewcorrespondstothenotionofco-governance,inthat stateandnon-stateactorsseektojointlyprovideacommongood.Yet,inthisunderstanding,alackofregulationand enforcement are detrimental to private governance commitments. Regulation here refers to the institutional embeddingofthepoliticaleconomybythestateorcorporatistarrangements.Followingthefirstlogic,Mattenand Moon(2008)claimthatinliberalmarketeconomiesandresidualwelfarestates‘explicit’formsofvoluntarystandards substituteforlackinginstitutionalarrangements.Fromthisperspective,excessiveregulationincoordinatedmarket economiesconstitute animplicit,yet involuntaryform of voluntary standards. On the contrary,Campbell (2007) developsamorecooperativeperspective,arguingthatcoordinatedmarketeconomiesandextensivewelfarestates providetheregulativeandideationalbasisforbusinesscommitmenttosocialresponsibility.Stateregulationsarethus thoughttoincrease thelikelihoodofCSRadoption(seealsoMartin&Swank,2012;Steurer,2010).

Empirical research,however, presents an inconsistentpicture.Several studiesprovideevidence that voluntary standards are asubstitute for existing political economy institutions. Kinderman (2009),for instance, showsthat liberalmarketeconomiesstartedvoluntarystandardsprogrammesearlierandhavehadhighermembershipratesthan incoordinatedor state-ledmarketeconomies(seealso,e.g.,Jackson&Apostolakou,2010;Lim&Tsutsui,2012).

Midttun,Gautesen,andGjølberg(2006)findapositiverelationshipbetween‘old’formsofsocialembeddedness,like thedegreeofwelfarestatedevelopment,modesofcoordination,orthelevelofcorporatism,and‘new’formsofsocial embeddedness, such as average national membership in CSR measures (e.g., participation rates in the Global Reporting Initiative).In a similarvein, Gjølberg (2009)shows a positive impactof extensivewelfare states and

corporatistarrangementsonnationalCSRscores.Whilethisdoesnotreflectregulationassuch,itcanbearguedthatin morecoordinatedmarketeconomieswefindahigherlevelofregulationthaninliberalmarketeconomies.Finally, BerlinerandPrakash(2013)findthatgreatercontrolofcorruption,andthereforemorestringenteconomicregulation, hasapositiveimpactontheuptakeofenvironmentalmanagementsystems.Contrastingthesefindings,Koos(2012a) showsthatdependingontheinstitutionalcomplementarityofwelfareandcorporatistinstitutions,civicengagement canbothsubstituteandcomplementpublicauthority.Yet,onlyfewstudiestakeintoaccountthetemporaldimensionof interaction patternsinco-governance.

Whatshouldbenotedisthatco-governancegenerallyentailscostsfornon-statesactors.Corporations,forinstance, are likely tohave higherproduction costs,while NGOsmust bearcosts relatedtoinformation gatheringandthe developmentandmaintenanceof organizationalcapacity.Inadditiontotheexplanationsoutlinedabove,non-state actorsmightbewillingtoengage inco-governanceduetothe accesstheymaygaintopolicy-makers,notonlyto substituteforabsentregulationbutalsoinanattempttoinfluenceregulationthatcorrespondstoprivateinterests.From this, it follows that non-state actors might participate inco-governance tobenefit from astrategic advantage in prospectiveregulatoryactivities.Thiscan,forinstance,leadtoasituationinwhichtheco-governancepartnersfrom businessencourageregulationthatburdensrivals(Lyon&Maxwell,2008).Likewise,voluntarystandardscanalsobe adoptedtopre-emptgovernmentregulation(Campbell,2007;Kinderman,2012;Knox-Hayes&Levy,2011;Lyon&

Maxwell,2008),whichcouldimposehighercostsoncorporations.Overall,thereareseveralplausiblereasonsasto whynon-statesactorsingeneral andcorporationsinparticularshouldengageinco-governance.

Thesecondmainquestioninthecontextofco-governanceaddresseswhythestateshouldbewillingtodelegatethe provisionandmanagementofcommongoodstoprivateactors.Theemergenceof‘privatized’regulation(O’Rourke, 2003:4)canbeexplainedbysimilarargumentsmadeintheliteratureonprivatization.Inthiscontext,theliteraturehas identified fiscal stress, economic efficiency, and ideological attitudes (e.g., Liberal-Conservative vs. Social Democratic)aspossiblereasonswhygovernmentsdecidetopursueprivatization(see,e.g.,Bel&Fageda,2009).The literatureonweakorfailedstatehoodadditionallyarguesthatsomegovernmentssimplylackthefundamentalcapacity toprovidecommongoods(see,e.g.,Bo¨rzel&Risse,2010;Bo¨rzeletal.,2012;Krasner&Risse,2014;Risse,2013).

Turning tostates withastate capacitythat isprincipally well developed,there maynevertheless be areaswhere capacityisinadequateandthusnecessitatesdelegationtoprivateactors,suchasintheareaofelderlycare(seeBode, 2006). Co-governance can thus also result from public demand– particularly in affluentdemocracies (see, e.g., Pattberg,2005).Insuchasituation,publicdemandcanleadtotheexistenceofparallelprivateandpublicregulation,as isthe case,for example,infoodsafetygovernance(see,e.g.,Martinez,Fearne, Caswell,&Henson,2007).

Summingup,regulationisprivatized whenpublic regulationisnotpossibleordesirablegivenhightransaction costsorlackinglegitimacy(Papadopoulos,2013b:3).Itthusfollowsthatwhilethestate–undersuchcircumstances– may be willing to outsource regulation to non-state actors, it may, at the same time, also seek to reclaim its competenceswhenithasdevelopedsufficientcapacity.Similarly,followingthestudybyBelandFageda(2009),the state might alsoreclaim its authority when there are changes inthe ideological composition of the government.

Consequently,wecanexpectthatthepatternsofco-governancearenotonlylikelytovaryovercountriesandsectors, butalsoovertime.Assomeofthecontributionsinthisthemedissueillustrate,wedoinfactwitnesschangingand evolvingrelationshipsbetweenactors:Attimesthestateisintheforeground,whileinotherinstancesprivateactors takethereins.Moreover,howtherelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateactorsmaychangeovertimeisrelatedto statecapacity,deliverycosts,andgoalcongruency,whichmaylikewiseshiftovertime.Wereturntothispointin Section4.Thenatureoftheco-governancerelationshipsalongwiththeircovariatesanddynamicshas,tothebestof ourknowledge,receivedrelativelylittleattentionintheotherwiserichandmultifacetedbodyofresearch.Assuch,itis thisgapinthe literaturethatthisthemed issueseekstoaddress.

3. Overviewofthethemed issue

Thisspecialissuebrings togetheradiversegroupof contributions thatanalyse therelationshipsanddynamics betweenpublicandprivateactorsinpursuitofprovidingormanagingcommongoods.Aswehaveoutlinedaboveand describeinthefollowing,privategovernanceisbynomeansaone-size-fits-allapproachtoregulationortheprovision ofcommongoods.Therearemanyfactorsthatinterveneintherelationshipbetweenthepublicandtheprivate,suchas the nature of the issue, congruency of goals, contextual idiosyncrasies, or even major events or crises. The contributionsbrieflyoutlined belowrevealnuancedandevolvingrelationshipsbetweenstateandprivateinterests.

Thestudiesprovidein-depthinsightsintothedynamicinterplays,thefactorsinfluencingthem,andtheoutcomeswith regardtotheco-governanceof thecommons.

Christian Ewert and Martino Maggetti’s analysis of the complexities of the transnational governance of environmental sustainability highlights examplesof cooperative co-governance. They examine 12 hybrid bodies comprisingpublic,commercial,andcivilsocietyactorsthatoccupyacommonissue,findingthatstateactorsoften muststruggletofindtheirrolewithinthesehybridregimes.Oftenborderingonpurelyprivateself-governance,the statecanneverthelessplayasupportingrolebyenforcingsanctionsorincreasingthelegitimacyoftheorganization.

Moreover,theyfindthatstatesupportcanpositivelyaffecttheextenttowhichhybridregulatorybodiesareableto managetheirregulatorytasks.

EvaThomann,EvaLieberherr,andKarinIngoldtackletheissueofgoalcongruencybycomparativelyexamining theconflictinggoalsofstatesvs.marketsintheirsevencasestudiesinSwitzerland,theUnitedKingdom,andthe United States. The authors argue that (1) an institutional logics approach aids our understanding of policy implementationand(2)thatpolicydesignelements–goalambiguity,accountabilitymechanisms,andthedegreeof hybridityintheimplementationsetting–canultimatelyinterferewithachievingpolicygoals.Theircasestudiesof foodsafety,welfareprovision,telecommunications,andwaterrunthegamutofthetypesof relationshipsbetween publicandprivateactors,illustratingtheconditionsunderwhichcooperationorconflictcanarisedependingonthe actors’abilitytoreconciletheunderlyingdifferences betweenstateandprivatelogics.

In his study on the development of airline safety programmes, Russell Mills also examines the role of goal congruencyintheco-governancerelationship,demonstratinghowahighdegreeofgoalcongruencybetweenpublic andprivate actors hasled to ahighly successfulcase of self-regulation. Despite the airlineindustry’s successes, competing public programmes threaten to displace private initiatives due to political pressures and high public demand.Inotherwords,wemaybewitnessingashiftinthetypeofpublic-privaterelationshiptooneinwhichthestate playsamorecentralandauthoritativerole.

OlhaCherednychenko’sstudyexaminestheinterplaybetweenprivateregulatorsandpublicsupervisorsinthepost- crisisinthefieldofEuropeanretailfinancialservices.Herfindingsshowthattheco-governanceofhowcompliance with such regulatory frameworks is monitored and enforced can, in principle, take two forms: cooperative or competitive.Yetthestudystressesthatinthepost-crisisera,apredominantlycompetitiverelationshipbetweenprivate regulators and public watchdogs has materialized, which may potentially undermine the effectiveness of co- governancearrangements.Whatseemsmorepromising for attainingthe desiredpolicy goalsis tostrengthenthe cooperationbetweenprivateregulatorsandpublicsupervisors.Thiscontributionopensupanewperspectiveonthe studyofco-governancebyarguingthatpublicsupervisionandenforcementmustberesponsivetothepeculiaritiesof co-governancearrangements.

LukasGiessen, SarahBurns, AlifSahide,and AgungWibowo also document atransformation inthe dynamic interplaybetween privateandpublic interests.Theirqualitativecasestudiesof therecentdevelopmentsinforest, timber,andpalmoilcertificationsystemsinArgentinaandIndonesiarevealaconflictualrelationshipbetweenprivate andstateactors.Drawingonbureaucraticpoliticstheoryandinternationalrelationsconceptsrelatingtostate-driven andprivatetransnationalregimes,they,similartoMills,findthatinstancesofsuccessfulprivategovernancehavebeen reclaimedbystatebureaucraciestocreatecompetingcertificationregimes.Inotherwords,withthesetwostudieswe seeevidenceofpublicactorsattemptingtocrowdoutprivateeffortsofself-regulationandthusamoreconflictual relationshipbetweenthedifferent setsofactors.

Two of the contributions inthisthemed issue explicitlyaddress corporatesocial responsibility(CSR): Daniel Kinderman’sstudyoftheEU’snon-financialdisclosureDirectiveandotherglobalattemptstoregulateCSRandAlvise Favotto,KellyKollman,andPatrickBernhagen’sstudyofCSRinUSandEuropeanfirms.Bothstudiesrevealatrend towardsprivateself-governancewithlessstatecooperation.Kinderman,forexample,findsthatpublic authorities’

attemptstoregulateCSRaremetwithfierceoppositionfromthesideofbusinesses,whichtendtobelesskeenon acceptingso-calledsmart-mixapproaches,insteadfavouringvolunteerismandsoftlaw.Moreover,thepublic-private governanceconflictscomeparticularlytoforewhenproposedregulationismorestringent.Favottoetal.lookatthe CSRcasefromavarietiesofcapitalismapproach,findingthatthenationalpatternsofstate-societyrelationshipsshape the degreetowhich firmsengage withCSR norms. LikeKinderman, theyfind evidence thatfirms haveresisted engagingwith norms andpractices aimedat improving theirlabour andhuman rights impactsandperformance, especiallyintheUS.TheauthorsthenturntheiranalysestotheenvironmentalpracticesoffirmsinEuropeandtheUS, findingnationalcontexttoplayamuchsmallerrole.Thestudieshighlightthatthedegreeofconflictbetweenpublic

andprivate actors iscontingent onintervening factors,such as the stringency of regulation(Kinderman)andthe nationallandscapeofindustrialrelations(Favottoetal.).

Thediversegroupofcontributionsinthisspecialissuebroadensourunderstandingofhowpublicandprivateactors strivetoprovideandmanagecommongoods–insomecasesintandemwithoneanotherandinothersinspiteofthe other.Veryfewstudiesrevealpurelystate-ledorprivatelyconductedincidencesofgovernance,butratherdemonstrate thatthelinesbetweenpublicandprivateareoftenblurred.Moreover,theserelationshipsarebynomeansstatic;many ofthearticlesdemonstratetheevolutionandchangingnatureoftherelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateactors.

Takenasawhole,thestudies,withtheirdifferentcases,levelsofgovernment,andissuefoci,servetoadvanceour knowledgeoftheconditionsunderwhichcooperativeorconflictualrelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateinterests emergeas wellashow thenature oftheserelationshipsmayhinder orsupportthe provisionofcommon goods.

Moreover,thecontributionsshowthewidearrayoftheoreticalperspectivesfromwhichthetopicofco-governance canbeapproached.Somestudiesemphasizetheimportanceofinstitutionalarrangements(Favottoetal.;Kinderman), whileothersstresstheimportanceofgoaldefinitionandcongruence(Mills;Thomannetal.),andagainothersadopta managerialperspectiveonefficiencygains(EwertandMaggetti)orconcentrateonlegalissues(Cherednychenko).

Most importantly, the variety of theoretical perspectives the authors employ enriches our understanding of the complexnatureofco-governanceaswellasshowcaseswhyitisoneofthefewareaswheretransdisciplinaryresearch isthriving.

4. Derivingexpectations

Basedonthe review ofthe contributions tothisthemedissueas wellas the existing literature,we are ableto formulatesomeinitialexpectationsregardingthepatternsofco-governance.Ourreasoningrestsontheassumption thatthestateactors’capacityanddeliverycostsforcommongoodsgreatlyinfluencewhetherthereisamovefrom government toco-governance (see,e.g.,Fransen,2013; Potoski&Prakash,2004; Steurer,2013).Wefurthermore assumethatthereisanegativerelationshipbetweenstatecapacityanddeliverycosts:Highstatecapacitywillentail lowdeliverycostsandviceversa.Wemodelthedifferentco-governancepatternsfromtheperspectiveofthestate sinceweassumethatco-governanceisonlypossiblewhenthestateeitherdeliberatelytakesthedecisiontodelegate certaincompetencestonon-stateactorsorincaseswhere,attheveryleast,thestatedoesnotobjectorintervenewhen

‘‘citizensandcorporationsempowerthemselvesandsubstituteforelectedgovernment’’(Be´nabou&Tirole,2010:2).

Thefocusonstatecapacityacknowledgesthatitcanrangefromfragileorfailedstatehood(Krasner&Risse,2014)to havingabundantcapacitytopractice‘goodgovernance’(Weiss, 2000).

Ifstatecapacityislowand/ordeliverycostshigh,thestateactorsarelikelytoengageincooperativeco-governance.

Insuchasituation,thestateactorsmayinvitenon-stateactorstoparticipateinco-governancerelationships,andthe non-stateactorswillbelikelytoacceptthisinvitationsinceitprovidesthemwithanopportunitytorealizetheirown interests.Whenstatecapacityishighand/ordeliverycostslow,co-governanceisstilllikelytooccur,butwilltendtobe characterizedbyacompetitiverelationshipbetweenstateandnon-stateactors.Thiscompetitiverelationshipmaystill berathercooperativeorconflictive–thedirectionittendstowardswillultimatelydependonthedegreetowhichstate andnon-stateactorspursuecongruentgoals.Whenthereisgoalcongruence,althoughtherelationshipisexpectedto remain cooperative, competition between the actors is nevertheless likely. Such a situation is characterized by instancesinwhichonesideseekstoclaimorreclaimdominanceovertheco-governanceprocess.Bythesametoken,if thegoalsbetweenstateandnon-stateactorsareincongruent,therelationshipwillnotonlybecompetitive,butwillalso tendtowardsconflict.Thisscenariocanalsooccurwhenthereareseveralprivateactorswithdivergingintereststhat fail to formulate acommon co-governancegoal. The intuitiveexpectation would predict acomplete lack of co- governancewhenthegoalsofpublicandprivateactorsareincongruentwithoneanother;asillustratedinthepaperby Thomannetal.,however,wedoseecasesinwhichco-governancetakesplacedespitedivergentgoals.Table1provides anoverview ofthe relationshipswithregardtostatecapacity,deliverycosts,andgoalcongruency.

Which of the three scenarios (cooperation; cooperativecompetition; conflictual competition) can be observed furthermore depends on the observation period – as several contributions to thisthemed issues have shown, the relationshipbetweenstateandnon-stateactorstendstobedynamic,whichcanbetheresultofanincreaseordecrease inoverall statecapacity,thewillingness ofthe non-statesactorstoparticipateinco-governance,butalsocasesin whichstateswithgenerallyhighstatecapacity lackadequate capacityinspecificareas.Acaseinpointisclimate changegovernance,which,duetoitscomplexity,haslargelyinducedstateactorstoseekcooperationwithnon-states

actors–atlocal,national,andtransnationallevels–todevelopinnovativesolutions,facilitatetheirdiffusion,and assesstheireffectiveness(see,e.g., Jordanetal.,2015).

5. Conclusion andthewayforward

The relationshipsbetween state andnon-state actorsin the provision and management of commongoods are complex.Thisthemedissueshowsthatnon-stateactorsoftencomplementtheactionsofstateactors.Moreover,there areveryfewinstancesinwhichbusinessandsocietycanactwithoutbeingaffectedbypublicauthorities.Likewise,the contributionsdemonstratethatthestateisindeeddependentonthesupportofbothbusinessandsocietyinorderto provide commongoods and services. In this regard, the concept of co-governance is well-suited to capture the relationshipsbetween stateandnon-stateactors.Furthermore,bydrawingonawidearrayof casesthatdealwith differentdegreesofstatecapacityandpolicysectors,thisthemedissuehighlightstheplethoraofrelationshipsbetween stateandprivateactorsandhowthesenuancesaffectthe co-governanceofthe commons.

In addition tothe knowledge generated bythe contributions inthisissue, there areindeed additional areasto examineforanevenbetterunderstandingoftheco-governingofcommongoods.InlinewithPapadopoulos(2003, 2013a,b),wecontendthattheexistingresearchhasyettoexhaustivelyaddressquestionsrelatedtothelegitimacyof differentformsofco-governance.Interestingly,themostinsightfulliteratureonthistopicdealswithhowstandardsare definedandimplemented(see,e.g.,Graz&No¨lke,2007;Mattli&Bu¨the,2005;Potoski&Prakash,2004;Prakash&

Potoski,2006).Thesetendtobetechnicalstandardsandarenotbeingquestionedintermsoftheirlegitimacy.Inother areas,however,wherethestatedoes notdependoninputfromthetargetgroups,onecouldreasonablyexpectthat formsofco-governance characterizedbydominantprivateactorsmaybe confrontedwithlegitimacyconcerns.A comparativestudyofMicrosoft’s‘PartnersinLearning’programmebyBhanji(2012)underscorestheimportanceof the nature of relationship between state and non-state actors for the perceived legitimacy of co-governance undertakings.InJordan,itwasastand-aloneprogrammeimplementedparalleltopublic sectoractivities,whilein SouthAfricait wastightly wovenintogovernment programmesandactivities.Microsoft’scollaboration withthe publicsectorinSouthAfricaultimatelyhelpedtoincreasetheprogramme’slegitimacy.Whilethisexampleclearly showsthatthelegitimacyofco-governancevariesdependingonhowstateandnon-stateactorsrelatetooneanother,it doesnothoweverprovideuswithabasisforderivingexpectationsastowhenexactlythedegreeofstateinvolvementis sufficientforenhancinglegitimacy.

Againbuildingontheobservationthatasubstantialportionoftheliteraturedealswithtechnicalstandards,only recentlyhasattentionshiftedtothe questionof howmorecomplexproblemscanbeco-governed. Atopicthatis attractinggrowingattentioninthiscontextisthe transnationalgovernanceofclimate change(see,e.g.,Andonova etal.,2009;Ba¨ckstrand,2008;Termeeretal.,2013).Thissteadilyexpandingbodyofliteraturestressestheimportance oftransnationaland/orlocalformsofclimateaction,buthasthusfarlargelyneglectedtheroleofstates(Jordan&

Huitema,2014).Atthesametime,Pollitt(2015)callsforaperspectivethattrulyintegratesthetasksthatneedtobe carriedoutbypublicauthoritiesandthosethatcanorshouldbecarriedoutbybusinessandcivilsociety.Similarly, Hickmann(2015)contendsthattransnationalclimateinitiativesdonotworkindependentlyofstate-basedformsof governance,butrelyontheexistenceofapublicregulatoryframeworkinordertoeffectivelycontributetotheglobal responsetoclimatechange.Therefore,wearguethattheconceptofco-governanceisusefulforbringingbackthestate inthe analysisof complextopicssuchas internationalclimategovernance.

Table1

Patternsofco-governance:statecapacity,deliverycosts,andgoalcongruency.

Cooperativeco-governance Competitiveco-governance

Statecapacity=low Statecapacity=high

Deliverycosts=high Deliverycosts=low

Congruentgoals?

Yes: No:

Cooperativecompetition Conflictualcompetition

Athirdperspectiveforfutureresearchinvolvesconnectingtheliteratureonco-governancewiththatoflearning (see,e.g.,Howlett&Rayner,2007).Morespecifically,itisworthexploringtheextenttowhichstateactorslearnfrom non-statesactors(andviceversa)whenengaginginco-governanceactivities.Thenewpublicmanagementliterature suggeststhatpublicauthoritieshavelearnedfromprivateactorsandreorganizedtheirprocessesaccordingly(see,e.g., Peters&Pierre,1998).Howisthislearningrelatedtoco-governanceactivities?Anddonon-stateactorslearnfrom public authorities?Thesearetwo questionsthatdeservefarmoreattentioninthe future.

Finally,futurestudiesmayalsoseektoaddresswhatco-governancemeansfortheoverallpolicytableauofstates.

Howlett and Rayner (2007) explicitly address this aspect and inquire into the cohesion and coherence of co- governanceactivities.Forexample,wecouldbroadenourunderstandingbystudyingwhethersimilarproblemsina jurisdictiontendtobeaddressedbysimilarmeansintermsofco-governancerelationshipsorwhetherwecanobserve variationinhow stateandnon-stateactorsinteractwhenfacedwithrelatively similarproblems.

Thecontributionsinthisthemedissueadvanceourknowledgeofco-governance–atopicwhichgoesbymany names and transcends disciplinary boundaries, from political science, public administration, and international relationstosociology,law,environmentalstudies,andeconomics.Whilethestudiesincreaseourunderstandingofthe patternsandinterplaysintherelationshipsbetweenpublicandprivateactors,aswehavediscussedabove,theyalso openupnewsetofquestionsforfutureresearchtoexamine.

Acknowledgements

Thisthemedissueistheoutcomeoftheworkshop‘TheCausesandConsequencesofPrivateGovernance:The ChangingRolesofStateandPrivateActors’heldon6/7November2014attheMannheimCentreforEuropeanSocial Research(MZES).Wegratefully acknowledgefundingfor thisevent bythe COSTActionIS1309 ‘Innovationsin ClimateGovernance:Sources,PatternsandEffects’(INOGOV),MZES,andtheLorenzvonSteinFoundation.We also express our gratitude to all workshop participants for a stimulating discussion and Thomas Hickmann for commentsonanearlier versionofthemanuscript.

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