Status of Europe’s Space Cooperation with Asia
Asia is emerging as an epicentre of global geopolitical and economic activity in the 21st century. The rise of China, India and South Korea, economically and militarily, has been accompanied by advances in their space-related capabilities. Several other Asian countries have space programs as space is increasingly viewed as an essential “force-multiplier” to advance national interests. Europe is conscious of the shift in the state of play resulting from China’s demonstrated capability to undertake human spaceflight, Japan’s recent reorganization of its space mandate and management structure, as well as other important regional developments, and actively cooperates with its Asian counterparts. Europe has not yet achieved, however, a sufficiently structured approach to space developments in the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia and engages with regional partners selectively based primarily on the synergies with its own activities. This ESPI Perspective seeks to provide an overview of the EU’s and ESA’s key policies and activities in Asia as they relate to space, as well as some suggestions for improved cooperation.
1. Introduction
Asia-Pacific countries are undergoing profound regional economic and political changes that have important implications for Europe. Asia’s robust growth is influencing the fundamental structure of the world economy and global politics. The rise of China, India, and South Korea, economically and militarily, has been accompanied by advances in their respective space capabilities. Unlike Europe, there are no established frameworks for peaceful space cooperation across Asia. Bilateral relationships in the region also tend to be more competitive and volatile than counterpart relationships in Europe. However, an opportunity exists to upgrade broader regional dialogue through constructive space-related projects and programs.
This ESPI Perspective first provides a brief overview of the space capabilities of select Asian countries and regional space-related organisations. It then focuses on the EU and ESA’s key priorities and space cooperation activities with Asia. Finally, it provides some suggestions for improved cooperation.
2. Status of Asia’s Space Activities
Asian space powers often have different perspectives with regard to space goals and have largely followed policies of self-reliance rather than of regionalism or multilateralism.1 Japan, India and China have successfully demonstrated indigenous launch capabilities and their engagement in multi-faceted space programs are an example of this regional trend.
The Chinese Shenzhou and Chang’e missions, the Indian Chandrayaan-1 lunar orbiter, the Japanese Kaguya missions and the Kibo space module for the ISS are examples of civilian space projects that are as much about national pride and prestige as they are about scientific or other forms of commercial benefit.2
Besides Japan, India and China, countries such as South-Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, have, or are developing, indigenous capabilities to manufacture, launch and control satellites. In the field of Earth observation, for example, Indonesia is developing two
1 Moltz, James Clay. “Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks.”
New York: Columbia University Press (2011): 2.
2 Ibid: 193-194.
Jana ROBINSON, ESPI Resident Fellow and Fabien EVRARD, ESPI Research Intern
PERSPECTIVES E S P I
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microsatellite carrying EO payloads (i.e. LAPAN A2 and LAPAN A3), Malaysia is in the process of developing its RazakSAT-2 indigenously- manufactured satellite, and Taiwan plans to deploy its Formosat-5 Earth observation satellite next year. Some nations have likewise made strides in developing orbital launch capabilities (e.g. South Korea).
Regional space cooperation is conducted mainly within the framework of two quite different organisations: the China-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) and the Japan-led Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). The mere establishment of these organisations are manifestations of the desire by both China and Japan to project soft power. They represent, among other benefits, diplomatic tools for Beijing and Tokyo to strengthen their regional influence via space.
In addition to China and Japan, India will most likely play a major role in shaping cooperative undertakings in the region. India hosts the headquarters of the Center for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP) under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP).
Beyond APSCO, APRSAF and CSSTEAP, countries engage in space activities also through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Subcommittee on Space Technology and Applications (ASEAN-SCOSA) under the ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology.
Mongolia and Thailand are, for instance, members of both APSCO and CSSTEAP, while Japan is not formally associated with APSCO or CSSTEAP and conducts its regional outreach through APRSAF. This forum allows participants a more flexible approach in participating in its activities.3 SCOSA and ESA are members of the APRSAF. Thailand is the only country that is a full member of all four groups.
For Asian nations which have little or no space infrastructure and limited financial resources for space, engagement through these regional groupings offers an affordable gateway to space-related activities.
3 As of December 2011, 325 organizations from 35 countries and regions and 24 international organizations participate in the APRSAF. Source: “Participants.” APRSAF. (21 May 2012): http://www.aprsaf.org/participants/.
Figure: Space-related capabilities of select Asian countries (source: ESPI)
3. Europe’s Key Priorities and Space Cooperation Activities with Asia European Union
The EU and its member states have been actively pursuing new opportunities associated with Asia’s rise. The European Commission (EC) issued an Asia policy document entitled “Toward a New Asia Strategy” in 1994, later updated by a communication of 2001 entitled “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships”.4 The EC document recognized that if Europe is to maintain a leading economic and political presence globally, it needs to assign higher priority to Asia and raise its profile in the region.
The EU is presently seeking to intensify its partnerships with key Asian nations, including Japan, China, and India. It has also taken steps to establish new partnerships with South Korea and select Southeast Asian countries, mainly through bilateral trade negotiations and agreements.5 To strengthen political and economic ties with individual countries, the EU adopted strategies toward China, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. The regional dimensions of European foreign policy, including the Asia-Pacific theatre, have grown in importance, particularly in light of the implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy.
This involves better understanding of territorial trends and interests, as well as regional development goals to help enable Europe’s economic growth and global competitiveness.
Beyond bilateral exchanges, the principal venues for interaction with Southeast Asia are the ASEAN and the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM). The EU is the largest investor in ASEAN countries with an average annual investment of some €9.1 billion (2000 - 2009).
ASEAN, in turn, is the EU’s third largest external
4 Commission of the European Communities. Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships.
COM (2001) 0469 final of 04 Sep. 2001. Brussels:
European Union.
5 “Asia.” European Union - EEAS (European External Action Service). (29 Mar. 2012):
http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/index_en.htm.
trading partner (following the U.S. and China).6 In 2001 and 2003, the European Commission (EC) published a policy document classifying ASEAN as a key economic and political partner for the EU. ASEAN is not, however, considered a “strategic partner“, although the EU maintains
“strategic partnerships”, for example, with Japan, China, and India. The EU also takes part in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which discusses primarily security issues and consists of the EU and 26 counties, including the U.S., China, Japan and South Korea.
The inauguration of the ASEM in 1996 represented the launch of an important official link between Europe and Asia. ASEM serves as a facilitator of trade and investment that seeks to improve Europe’s share in overall Asian trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). ASEM is viewed as a more flexible tool than ASEAN to explore new economic and other trends, including in the developing ASEAN economies.
ASEM serves as a platform of interaction that is less universal than, for example, the UN, but broader than inter-regional fora such as the EU - ASEAN.7
With regard to space, the forging of an effective policy toward Asian countries requires weighing carefully the region’s geopolitical sensitivities.
Space is viewed by a number of Asian countries as an increasingly important capability to advance national interests.
In Europe, climate change, security, competitiveness and exploration have been identified as priority areas for the EU’s space policy and space is viewed as an integral part of Europe’s 2020 strategy.8 These areas are to be bolstered by the EGNOS, Galileo and GMES programmes. Space industrial policy is being configured to enhance Europe’s competitiveness as space-related manufacturing and technologies stimulate growth and innovation, including in non-space arenas. Strengthened international cooperation should help promote European space technology and services;
6 “ASEAN.” European Commission: Trade. (21 May 2012):
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral- relations/regions/asean/.
7 Milliot, David. “ASEM – A Catalyst for Dialogue and Co- operation: the Case of FEALAC” in “The Eurasian Space:
Far More than Two Continents”, Stokhof, Wim, Velde, Paul, and Yeo Lay Hwee. Singapore: ISEAS Publications (2004):
8 76.
Commission of the European Communities. Communication From The Commission To The Council, The European Parliament, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions: Towards a Space Strategy for the European Union that Benefits its Citizens.
COM (2011) 152final of 04 Apr. 2011: 3. Brussels:
European Union.
The regional dimension of European foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific theatre has grown in importance and involves better understanding of territorial trends and interests to help enable Europe’s economic growth and global competitiveness.
support European values (through projects dealing with environmental protection, climate change, sustainable development and humanitarian activities); and reinforce the EU’s external policy.9
Accordingly, the EU seeks engagement in a number of international space-related initiatives that also involve Asian countries, including a multilateral diplomatic initiative on a draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities to advance space security, officially launched in June 2012.
4. European Space Agency
The European Space Agency (ESA) has been involved in shaping and building most of the necessary infrastructure for pan-European space projects. It has a number of current and planned activities with its key Asian counterparts, Japan, China and India.
ESA and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) have a long track record of cooperation on space science (e.g. Astro-H, ISO, Akari, BepiColombo), Earth observation (ALOS Data Node, EarthCARE), telecommunications (Artemis/OICETS), and as partners in the International Space Station (ISS).
ESA’s cooperation with China has included space science (e.g. the Double Star Project (DSP), Chang'e-1 and Chang'e-2 lunar exploration missions) and Earth observation (e.g. Dragon 1 and Dragon 2 projects, China’s participation in the International Charter “Space and Major Disasters"). In late March 2012, ESA and China discussed future cooperation concerning manned spaceflight.10
With regard to India, Europe launched (on its Ariane 3 rocket) India’s first geostationary satellite, Apple. Chandrayaan-1, India’s first lunar mission, included three European instruments (provided by UK, Germany, and Sweden through ESA). India and ESA cooperated on ESA’s first public-private partnership initiative in a full satellite system, the
9 Ibid: 3-12.
10 Svitak, Amy. “ESA And China Discuss Shenzhou Docking With ISS.” 23 March 2012. Aviation Week (30 Apr. 2012):
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/
awx/2012/03/23/awx_03_23_2012_p0-
439989.xml&headline=ESA,%20China%20Discuss%20She nzhou%20Docking%20At%20ISS&channel=space.
Highly Adaptable Satellite (Hylas)-1 satellite, built as a joint venture between ISRO’s Antrix commercial company and Astrium Satellites Europe.
Other countries in the region have their own satellites, communications or other types. ESA is seeking to identify appropriate cooperative endeavours with them. With regard to South Korea, for example, ESA served as a third party in the Kompsat-2 mission of the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), launched in 2006, to provide Earth observation. In 2011, KARI became a member of the International Charter “Space and Major Disasters”. In this connection, cooperative mechanisms established within the International Charter
“Space and Major Disasters” are an important aspect of Europe’s relations with Asia, including through the cooperation with Sentinel Asia.
ESA is likewise seeking to find cooperative ventures with the emerging Asian space-faring nations in the areas of remote-sensing applications, satellite communications and navigation for sustainable development. ESA, for example, cooperates, through a “Third Party Programme”, with several emerging Asian space-faring countries on acquiring, processing, distributing and archiving EO data coming from their satellites (e.g. Taiwan’s Formosat-2 or Thailand’s THEOS satellites).11 The agency is also involved in personnel training activities (e.g.
with Vietnam).
In sum, Europe is fully cognisant of the shift in the state of play resulting from China’s demonstrated capability to undertake human spaceflight, Japan’s recent reorganization of its space mandate and management structure, as well as other important regional developments. It has not yet achieved, however, a sufficiently structured approach to space developments in the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia and engages with regional partners selectively based on the synergies with its own activities.
.
For more ambitious collaborative projects, ESA is dependent on a “green light” from its member states. Moreover, the technology transfers and other security-related issues associated with
11 “Third Party Missions overview.” European Space Agency.
(15 May 2012):
http://www.esa.int/esaEO/SEMP5R2VQUD_index_0_m.htm l.
ESA-EU relations are key to Europe’s space cooperation with international partners.
Europe engages with regional partners in Asia selectively based on the synergies with its own activities.
space will remain a challenge for Europe’s expanded cooperation with Asia.
5. Conclusions
As evidenced by the various space-related agreements and collaborative undertakings, Europe and Asia have already embarked on building closer relations, including in space.
Space, as an important diplomatic and foreign policy tool, will be increasingly applied to address climate change issues, sustainable development, environmental protection, disaster management, and national security concerns. To use this tool more effectively, financial, technological, scientific and industrial capabilities will likely be acquired individually to demonstrate autonomous capabilities to international partners. The skilful crafting of groundbreaking cooperative space endeavours will be key to the advancement of the broader political goals of space actors.
To help navigate these partnerships, civil space cooperation should be discussed together with regional security concerns. Regional economic development using space technology helps advance common security and stability.
Accordingly, high-level political support should accompany future cooperative scientific, Earth observation and space applications activities. As mentioned earlier, there is also a need to tackle sensitive technology transfers and other security-related concerns that today impede somewhat Europe’s expanded cooperation with Asia.
Cooperation can advance diplomatic goals, such as active engagement of Europe and Asia in constructing an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities or assistance to the developing countries. It can also help achieve programmatic objectives, such as mutual exchanges on space exploration, human spaceflight and better utilisation of space applications. Resource constraints should be viewed as an impetus to improve bilateral and multilateral coordination that would, in turn, fuel the impressive rise of the Asia-Pacific region and give Europe a stake in this.
Future interest of Europe and Asian countries in enhanced space collaboration will be closely linked to their national and foreign policy priorities.
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Short title: ESPI Perspectives 61 Published in July 2012
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