The Arab Spring and the electoral victories of Islamist parties in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have led to increased optimism among Algerian Islamists. Determined to profit from the regional dynamics and pursue a more prominent role in the future, Algerian Islamist parties are now doing their best to mobilise voters. However, they cannot assume that they will automatically benefit from the changing mood of the region.
Bitter internal divisions and a political elite bent on barring Islamists from political power effectively diminish the prospects of a radical change in the status quo. After nearly two decades of participation in the
political process as legal parties, Algerian Islamists have few concrete results concrete to show voters. Like all political parties in the country, they face widespread voter apathy that threatens to undermine the credibility of all official institutions. A majority of the non-voters adhere to the rapidly growing da’wa Salafi currents, which reject all forms of modern political institutions and instead focus on individual Islamisation. Although these currents for the moment appear to be non-political, da’wa Salafism represents the largest political challenge in Algeria, both to the legal Islamist parties and to the Algerian political system at large.
Islamist mobilisation and prospects for change in the upcoming Algerian parliamentary elections
Jenny Holmsen
Jenny Holmsen is an adviser at the International Law and Policy Institute. She holds an MPhil in peace and conflict studies and a bachelor’s degree in European and American studies. She was a researcher in the research project Faultlines of Islamism: Negotiating Progress, Participation and Patriarchy at the University of Oslo and wrote her dissertation on the political strategies of female Islamists in Algeria. Her main research interests include political development in North Africa, Islamism, gender issues, and the protection and participation of vulnerable groups during political transitions. She has fieldwork experience in Algeria and France, and speaks fluent English, French and Spanish.
N O R E F A r t i c l e
March 2012
Executive summary
Islamist mobilisation and prospects for change in the upcoming Algerian parliamentary elections
Introduction
As of March 2012 Algeria is the only North African country that appears to be largely untouched by the Arab Spring. Yet regional developments are nonetheless altering the political dynamics in Algeria and the upcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for May 10th, are much anticipated. The Islamist movements in particular appear to be extraordinarily confident after the electoral successes of their Moroccan, Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. Algeria’s largest legal Islamist party, the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP), is confident that it will emerge as the prime political force in the country if the elections are not rigged.
In an attempt to increase its credibility among conservative Islamist voters, the MSP has recently withdrawn from the presidential alliance and called for the establishment of a united Islamist front.
The Algerian Islamists, however, will have to overcome substantial obstacles in order to effectively increase their political influence.
Unlike its neighbouring peers, the Algerian Islamist movement is deeply divided, most notably as a result of the civil war of the 1990s and its positioning vis-à-vis the Algerian state. Moreover, even if the Islamists were able to win the elections and form a majority in the National Assembly, their level of actual influence is likely to remain limited, because the current system of government is designed specifically to avoid a potential Islamist take- over. This article provides a brief assessment of the Algerian political context, the strategies of the most relevant Islamist contenders and their prospects for success.
The state of the state
Algeria is the Arab country where Islamists have been closest to seizing political power through elections before the Arab Spring. After liberation from the French in 1962, the military- backed Front de la Libération Nationale (FLN)1
1 The FLN was the main revolutionary body that fought the War of Independence against the French. The movement was later con- verted into the state party in a one-party system, until the political opening in 1989.
monopolised the political scene until popular uprisings forced a political opening in 1989.
The Islamist party Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) quickly arose as the main opposition party, prompting a military-led coup d’état and subsequent civil war costing more than 200,000 lives. The regime won the conflict, but its ferocious fight to eradicate its Islamist contenders has had high costs in terms of political pluralism and democratic practices. On paper, Algeria is a multi-party democracy, yet the army and security forces continue to play a decisive role in the distribution of political and economic power. The Department of Intelligence and Security manages security- related matters and controls the country’s revenue, and the army appoints the president and his staff. Elections are held regularly, but fraud is massive.2
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in office since 1999, is supported by a presidential alliance consisting of the FLN (of which he is a member), the conservative Rassemblement Nationale Démocratique and the Islamist MSP.
The influence of political parties other than the FLN, however, remains minimal because the constitution provides for strict executive control over parliament.3 It is the president that appoints the prime minister and forms a government, and the Senate can effectively block all legislation from the National Assembly. One of the results of this continuing monopolisation of political power by the president and FLN is an official abstention rate of 65% during elections.
The Islamist opposition
The Algerian Islamist opposition groupings can be divided into two different currents according to their position vis-à-vis the regime. In the first current one finds the scattered remnants of the FIS electorate. Disillusioned with formal politics after the failure of the FIS’s participatory strategy, the leading trend among these conservative segments is da’wa Salafism. This non-political,
2 Amel Boubekeur, Countries at Crossroad 2011: Algeria, Freedom House Report, pp 1-2, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/coun- tries-crossroads-2011/algeria.
3 The constitution was revised in 1996 to avoid a repeat of the FIS victory.
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Islamist mobilisation and prospects for change in the upcoming Algerian parliamentary elections
Saudi-inspired Salafi current opposes all forms of political activity, but accepts the Algerian state as a political concession necessary for co-existence.4 Since they do not directly challenge the state and actually channel much radical Islamist opposition in an apolitical and non-violent direction, da’wa Salafis have largely been tolerated by the regime. Still, this current represents a great political challenge, due both to its large number of followers and implicit uncompromising rejection of modern political institutions. Its large political potential was recently demonstrated in Egypt, when a Salafi coalition headed by the da’wa Salafi party Al-Nour suddenly emerged as the second strongest political force in the country. For the moment, Algerian da’wa Salafism is essentially a network-based social movement lacking leadership and organisation. However, the possibility that the da’wa Salafis may decide to enter the political scene in Algeria cannot be ruled out.
The second current consists of the legalist, moderate parties that continued to co-operate with the regime after the banning of the FIS (the MSP, Ennahda and El-Islah).5 These parties have long advocated a more moderate and gradualist transition towards an Islamic society than the FIS, and were tolerated by the regime as a means to co-opt elements of the Islamist constituency. In general, they are headed by pragmatic, professional politicians who downplay the issue of establishing an Islamic state and focus on less controversial topics such as democratic reform and social welfare.
These parties justify their participation in the political process by arguing that it is a viable means for the religious currents to pursue their ends peacefully and effectively. However, as a result of their highly limited political influence within the present framework, the participating Islamist movements are constantly split over
4 See Amel Boubekeur, ”Salafism and radical politics in post-conflict Algeria”, Carnegie Paper, September 2008, http://www.carnegieen- dowment.org/files/salafism_radical_politics_algeria.pdf.
5 Due to the dramatic and bloody recent history of Algeria, the mutu- al bitterness between these currents naturally runs deeper than in other countries with similar features. The MSP’s decision to remain a legal political organisation and participate in elections organised by the state – boycotted by the ex-FIS and other Islamist factions – cost the MSP the lives of nearly 50 senior party members, who were killed in terrorist acts between 1992 and 1996.
their relationship with the regime and whether co-operation should continue. Moreover, their close affiliations with the political establishment have jeopardised much of their contact with and influence among the Islamic grassroots movements. As such, the regime’s strategy to include elements of the Islamist opposition has effectively led to the fragmentation and depoliticisation of what would otherwise be a mass constituency for Algerian Islamist parties.
The electoral victories of Islamist parties in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have led to heightened expectations among participating Algerian Islamists, in particular within the MSP.
In early January 2012 MSP leader Bougerra Soltani pulled his party out of the presidential alliance and called for the establishment of a united Islamist front. The MSP’s decision to abandon its previous regime-friendly, co- operative strategy is an interesting indicator of a changing domestic power balance. Soltani, however, will meet fierce competition in his attempt to unite the Islamist vote. In particular, Islamist leaders Abdullah Djaballah (Front pour la Justice et le Développement) and Abdelmadjid Menasra (Front du Changement)6 are forces to be reckoned with, because conservative voters consider both of them more eligible than Soltani. Advocating a pur et dur version of Islamism, Djaballah has founded and headed the most right wing and socio-religiously conservative of Algeria’s legal and participatory Islamist parties. Even if his political ideology is close to that of the Muslim Brotherhood, his independence and less compromising attitudes put his opposition credentials beyond doubt.
Islamist leader Menasra – a former MSP vice president and the man behind a split in 20097 – might also pose a considerable challenge to Soltani.
6 Both parties were recently approved by the government and al- lowed to run in elections.
7 At the 2009 MSP party congress, Menasra accused Soltani of hav- ing an overly compromising attitude to the regime and left the party to create his own movement.
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Islamist mobilisation and prospects for change in the upcoming Algerian parliamentary elections
Concluding remarks
It is not unlikely that Algerian Islamist parties will benefit from the changing mood of the region and increase their political representation after the elections on May 10th. However, both internal divisions and a political elite bent on reducing Islamist influence to a minimum diminish the chances of a ‘watershed’ election or a radical redistribution of political power.
The largest and best-organised Islamist party, the MSP, has a long way to go to position itself at the head of a united Islamist front. The party’s longstanding affiliation with the regime has effectively weakened its opposition credentials.
Even if the party is currently pursuing an increasingly emboldened separatist strategy, it is far from certain that it can acquire the
‘‘freshness’’ needed to mobilise a united Islamist vote. The growing number of competing legal Islamist parties headed by leaders with strong interpersonal disagreements further complicates the prospects for constructive Islamist co-operation.
A second obstacle on the Algerian Islamists’ road to power is the current system of government, which yields little possibility for opposition parties – even with a parliamentary majority – to institutionalise genuine political change. A
central objective of the legal Islamist parties has been to replace the presidential system with a parliamentary one. However, if the Islamists win the upcoming elections, it is more unlikely than ever that the regime will agree to give up executive control over parliament. Within the present political framework, the Islamists thus need to take over the presidency in order to ‘truly’ seize power. Since the upcoming elections are parliamentary, not presidential, this will have to wait until the next presidential elections, scheduled for 2014.
The largest challenge facing both the Islamist parties and the Algerian political system as a whole is the massive abstention rate during elections. This threatens to delegitimise the entire political system and undermine the credibility of official institutions. A large part of this ‘silent majority’ of non-voters adheres to the rapidly growing da’wa Salafi currents. These currents are presently non-political, but due to their mobilisation potential and implicit, radical anti-state ideology, they represent an enormous political challenge to the Algerian state. The critical question is whether the Salafis will remain apolitical if the rules of the political game change. The Egyptian experience certainly suggests that they will not. This appears to be a real possibility that the Algerian political establishment needs to prepare for.
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