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Mechanism Design and Social Choice - Winter Term 2015 Preliminary Syllabus

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Albin Erlanson

aerlanso(at)uni-bonn.de

C´edric Wasser cedric.wasser(at)uni-bonn.de

Mechanism Design and Social Choice - Winter Term 2015 Preliminary Syllabus

This course introduces students to the ideas and concepts of social choice and mechanism design theory.

Prerequisites:Knowledge of topics covered in the basic master module Microeconomics will be assumed.

Lectures: Tuesday and Thursday 12-14 in H¨orsaal F

Grading:Grades will be based solely on performance in one final exam (closed book).

Course outline: We plan to cover the following topics.

Part I: Social Choice Theory (Albin) – 7 lectures

• Social welfare functions

– Arrow’s impossibility theorem

– Restricted environments (May’s Theorem, Median Voter Theorem)

• Social Choice functions

– The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem – Connection to Arrow’s Theorem

– Restricted environments, e.g., single-peaked preferences Part II: Mechanism Design Theory (C´edric) – 14 lectures

• Implementation in dominant strategies / in Bayesian Nash equilibrium

• The Revelation Principle

• Quasi-linear environments

– Efficiency: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms

– Efficiency and Budget Balance: Expected externality mechanism – Characterization of Bayesian incentive compatibility

– Participation constraints

• Optimal auctions

• Bilateral trade and the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem Part III: Matching and multi-object auctions (Albin) – 7 lectures

• Matching (without money), e.g., school choice and house allocation

• Matching with money and multi-object auctions

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