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Mathematical and computational models of language evolution

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Mathematical and computational models of language evolution

Gerhard Jäger

Institute of Linguistics, Tübingen University

DGfS Summer School August 13, 2013

Gerhard Jäger (UTübingen) Language Evolution 8-13-2013 1 / 4

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Programming session: Genetic drift

We assume a simplied model of evolution, ignoring the intricacies of sexual reproduction.

There is a population of N alleles, each being either A or B.

At time 0, there is an equal number of A-alleles and B-alleles.

Population size remains constant.

Each allele in the ospring generation inherits its type from a randomly selected allele in the parent generation.

Gerhard Jäger (UTübingen) Language Evolution 8-13-2013 2 / 4

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Programming session: Genetic drift

Programming tasks:

Implement this model, starting with N <- 10. How long does it take until the population is monomorphic, i.e. consists only of one type of allele?

Repeat the simulation 1,000 times. How is the running time till xation (the rst monomorphic generation) distributed? Visualize this distribution.

What is the mean time till xation?

Now let N loop from 2 to 50 and estimate the mean time till xation for each value of N. Visualize the mean time till xation as a function of N.

Give a mathematical expression for this function.

Gerhard Jäger (UTübingen) Language Evolution 8-13-2013 3 / 4

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Programming session: Selection

Repeat the previous experiment, but let us now assume that each A-allele have on average twice as many ospring than B-alleles.

How often does the population converge to a monomorphic A-state?

What is the average time to xation into a monomorphic A-state and into a monomorphic B-state?

Repeat this experiment with dierent tness ratios.

Gerhard Jäger (UTübingen) Language Evolution 8-13-2013 4 / 4

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