B.3 Alternative Benchmarks
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.3 Estimation Results
126.96.36.199 Determinants of Credit Spreads at Issuance
In this subsection, we present the results of estimating equation (3.1), which is the model of credit spreads at issuance. Results for syndicated loans are displayed in Table 3.2, while Ta-ble 3.3 summarizes the regression results of the estimation at the individual bond level. In both tables, the first columns show the estimates for all firms, while the subsequent columns display the results for different sub-samples of firms depending on their position in the oil industry’s value chain. The dependent variables in both the bond and the loan estimations are the natural logs of the respective credit spreads in basis points.
Overall, the effects firm characteristics on the credit spreads of loans and bonds at issuance are as to be expected. We find that higher indebted firms have higher cost of debt. For the full sample, an increase inLeverageby 0.1 increases the credit spread by 7 %. When comparing the effects across sub-sectors, the effect is strongest for firms in the midstream segment, at around 14 %, and weakest – and not significant – for downstream firms. The effect of indebtedness is quantitatively similar for bonds when considering the full sample. We find the credit spreads of bonds at issuance increase by 7.8 % if leverage increases by 0.1. As for syndicated loans, the effect of leverage is strongest for midstream firms. This finding is in line with the theory, as higher firm indebtedness increases the risk of default, which translates into a higher risk premium for further debt charged by banks and the capital market.
In the case of loans, we find the expected negative effect of profitability. The only exception are downstream firms for which we do not find any effect. For the full sample, the coefficient of Profitabilityindicates that a 0.1 increase in profitability leads to a reduction of the cost of debt by 9.3 %. When comparing the estimates for the sub-samples, it seems particularly beneficial for midstream firms to increase their profitability, as a 0.1 increase would decrease the bond credit spread by almost 37 %. In the bond credit spread model,Profitabilityhas the expected sign, but is not significant for the full sample. Only in the case of midstream firms, we find a significant negative effect of firm profitability on credit spreads, which is, as in the case of loans, quite high.
In all models, we find highly significant negative effects of firm size, measured by Total Assets, on credit spreads at issuance. This means that larger firms face lower costs of debt on average. This effect remains robust across the whole supply chain, while it is quantitatively larger in the case of bonds. For the full sample, a 1% increase in total assets leads to a decrease in the bond credit spread by almost 0.3%, whereas the loan credit spread increases by about 0.14%. These results are not surprising, since more assets also translate into more potential collateral, which lowers the risk of complete financial loss for the banks.
In addition to the firm-level characteristics, we included bond-level and loan-level controls in the models. With respect to the volume of debt raised, we find that the loan amount has a negative effect on the credit spread for the full sample and the sub-samples with the excep-tion of midstream firms. For bonds, however, the results indicate the opposite: the higher the amount raised by issuing a bond, the higher the bond credit spread. These differing results may be attributable to two opposite effects. On the one hand, a higher volume of debt means higher potential losses for the lender in the event of default, which should translate into higher costs.
On the other hand, higher volumes of debt are likely to be raised by firms that are larger on average, which are likely to be more creditworthy and receive better credit conditions. Thus, the former might be stronger in the case of corporate bonds, while the latter might be more important in the case of syndicated loans. A longer maturity is expected to lead to higher costs of debt, as it increases the debt exposure of the lender. We find this relationship for syndicated loans: an increase of the loan maturity by one month results in an increase of the loan credit spread by 0.3%. This effect is robust across all sub-sectors. In the case of bonds, there is some
TABLE3.2: Determinants of the loan credit spread at issuance.
log(Loan Credit Spread)t
Full Upstream & Midstream Downstream
Sample Support Services
Leveraget−1 0.6812∗∗∗ 0.6596∗∗∗ 1.4373∗∗∗ 0.1994
(0.0628) (0.0678) (0.1453) (0.1782)
Profitabilityt−1 −0.9291∗∗∗ −1.0215∗∗∗ −3.6964∗∗∗ 1.0056
(0.2462) (0.2537) (0.5987) (0.8264)
log(Total Assets)t−1 −0.1379∗∗∗ −0.1521∗∗∗ −0.0687∗∗∗ −0.0841∗∗∗
(0.0076) (0.0104) (0.0153) (0.0165)
log(Loan Amount)t −0.1022∗∗∗ −0.1118∗∗∗ −0.0502∗∗∗ −0.2195∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0132) (0.0186) (0.0245)
Maturityt 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Credit Spreadt 0.3413∗∗∗ 0.3078∗∗∗ 0.2055∗∗∗ 0.4244∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0482) (0.0642) (0.1130)
Term Spreadt 0.1560∗∗∗ 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.2211∗∗∗ 0.1768∗∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0116) (0.0148) (0.0240)
Oil volatilityt −1.5934∗∗∗ −1.1139∗∗ −0.7415 −2.2896∗∗
(0.3785) (0.4888) (0.5993) (0.9386)
log(Oil Price)t 0.2353∗∗∗ 0.2613∗∗∗ 0.1496∗∗∗ 0.2038∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0298) (0.0412) (0.0617)
log(Oil Exports)t 0.1483∗∗∗ 0.1853∗∗∗ 0.1059∗∗∗ 0.1234∗∗∗
(0.0084) (0.0110) (0.0132) (0.0216)
Constant 3.5949∗∗∗ 3.6272∗∗∗ 2.9223∗∗∗ 4.2674∗∗∗
(0.1118) (0.1405) (0.1882) (0.3077)
Observations 3848 1860 1498 490
R2 0.3463 0.4367 0.2779 0.4231
Adjusted R2 0.3446 0.4337 0.2730 0.4110
F-Statistic 203.2854∗∗∗ 143.3645∗∗∗ 57.2198∗∗∗ 35.1278∗∗∗
(df = 10; 3837) (df = 10; 1849) (df = 10; 1487) (df = 10; 479) Note:∗p<0.1;∗∗p<0.05;∗∗∗p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses.
evidence that maturity has a positive effect on credit spreads for downstream and midstream firms, while the coefficient ofMaturityis not significant for the full sample.
The variables measuring the overall macroeconomic risk environment have the expected effects on the credit spread of newly issued loans. Both theCredit Spreadand theTerm Spread have a positive and highly significant effects. In the corporate bond models, a higher Credit Spreadalso leads to higher credit spreads faced by firms in the oil industry. The term spread, however, only increases the credit spreads of bonds issued by downstream firms.
We now turn to the variables of interest in the models, i.e. various measures of oil prices. As the oil price is expressed in logs, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The results for the oil price itself are qualitatively the same in the bond and the loan models: in both cases we find that positive and significant coefficients oflog(Oil Price)across all specifications. For the whole sample, we find that a 1% increase in the WTI spot price yields a 0.24% increase in the loan credit spread. This effect is robust across all sub-samples and quantitatively the highest for upstream firms. The findings for bonds at issuance are very similar, whereas the effects are marginally smaller. When considering all firms, the credit spread of bonds at issuance increase by 0.2% if the oil price increases by 1%. These findings are intuitively plausible in the case of midstream and downstream firms. As crude oil is most likely an input for these firms, higher oil prices mean higher costs for these firms. Hence, their default probability increases, which results in higher premiums on the price of debt charged by banks and the capital market.
TABLE3.3: Determinants of the bond credit spread at issuance.
log(Bond Credit Spread)t
Full Upstream & Midstream Downstream Sample Support Services
Leveraget−1 0.7776∗∗∗ 0.8875∗∗∗ 1.5219∗∗∗ 0.9832∗∗∗
(0.1101) (0.1436) (0.2003) (0.3333)
Profitabilityt−1 −0.6298 −0.3772 −4.0477∗∗∗ 0.9966
(0.4284) (0.4628) (1.3453) (1.6791)
log(Total Assets)t−1 −0.2931∗∗∗ −0.2856∗∗∗ −0.1528∗∗∗ −0.3100∗∗∗
(0.0118) (0.0215) (0.0185) (0.0386)
log(Bond Amount)t 0.2238∗∗∗ 0.1513∗∗∗ 0.1352∗∗∗ 0.2757∗∗∗
(0.0185) (0.0384) (0.0212) (0.0885)
Maturityt −0.0002 0.0000 0.0003∗∗ 0.0007∗
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Credit Spreadt 0.5865∗∗∗ 0.5938∗∗∗ 0.5607∗∗∗ 0.7147∗∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0706) (0.0577) (0.1231)
Term Spreadt 0.0105 −0.0108 −0.0027 0.1474∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0263) (0.0205) (0.0560)
Oil volatilityt 0.0958 0.0688 1.2259∗∗ −2.6959∗
(0.5077) (0.8338) (0.6224) (1.4633)
log(Oil Price)t 0.2080∗∗∗ 0.2393∗∗∗ 0.1883∗∗∗ 0.1456
(0.0392) (0.0682) (0.0470) (0.1220)
log(Oil Exports)t 0.0850∗∗∗ 0.1450∗∗∗ 0.0047 0.1488∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0214) (0.0153) (0.0406)
Constant 1.0579 1.8984∗∗ 1.7191∗∗∗ −0.4880
(0.3730) (0.7674) (0.4286) (1.5529)
Observations 1504 554 743 207
R2 0.4670 0.4844 0.3898 0.5416
Adjusted R2 0.4634 0.4749 0.3815 0.5183
F-Statistic 130.8218∗∗∗ 51.0071∗∗∗ 46.7586∗∗∗ 23.1609∗∗∗
(df = 10; 1493) (df = 10; 543) (df = 10; 732) (df = 10; 196) Note:∗p<0.1;∗∗p<0.05;∗∗∗p<0.01; Standard errors in parentheses.
The results regarding the volatility of oil prices, however, are less robust across industry clas-sifications and sources of debt. We find that the credit spreads of loans decreases with the volatility of the oil price when considering the full samples of firms, while we find no signifi-cant effect for bonds at issuance. When looking at the sub-sectors, the impact of price volatility on credit spreads remains robust (although not significant for midstream firms). For the bonds at issuance, we find a significant positive effect for midstream firms, while the effect is negative (and marginally significant) for downstream firms. Overall, the results for loans indicate that a higher price volatility would not translates into higher uncertainty about oil prices and thus the economic environment of oil firms. This is a surprising result as one would expect banks to charge higher prices for debt in such periods. Finally, we find that the possibility to export to other markets, which was banned until 2015, seems to induce higher costs of debt.
188.8.131.52 Determinants of Credit Spreads on the Secondary Market
This subsection discusses the results of the second empirical approach using data on bond credit spreads on the secondary market. The results of the within-between effects estimation of the model in Equation (3.3) is presented in Table 3.4. The within effects reported in the upper part of the table can be interpreted as the coefficients of a FE estimation. The coefficients capture the impact of the within-firm variation of the independent variables on the variation of the
firms’ bond credit spreads. In contrast, the between effects displayed below measure how cross-sectional variation in the variables, i.e. differences between firms, affect the credit spreads.
With respect to the firm-specific financial variables, the within effects support the previous OLS estimates, i.e. a positive effect ofLeverageand negative effects ofProfitabilityandlog(Total Assets). The latter measure for firm size, however, is statistically not significant. The between effect oflog(Total Assets), however, is negative and significant, which indicates that difference in firms sizes between firms seem to affect the cost of debt in contrast to (within-firm) changes of size. The controls for the macroeconomic environment have opposing directions. While the term spread has the expected positive impact on the calculated bond credit spread, the term spread has the opposite and considerably smaller effect. Thus, an overall increase in the per-ceived macroeconomic risk also increases the risk premium the market implicitly assigns to firms in the oil industry.
The impact of the oil price and its volatility is also statistically significant, however different from the OLS estimates presented above. When accounting for time-invariant firm heterogene-ity, within-between effects estimates indicate that a higher oil price leads to lower financing costs for the firms. Thus, the within-firm effect of oil prices on the cost of debt has the oppo-site direction compared to the pooled OLS estimate. The same is true for the effect of oil price
TABLE 3.4: Within-between effects estimation of the determinants of the bond credit spread on the secondary market for the full sample.
log(Bond Credit Spread)t
est. std. error t-val. d.f. p-val.
Leveraget−1 1.18 0.06 20.99 6435 0.00
Profitabilityt−1 −0.82 0.11 −7.31 6302 0.00
log(Total Assets)t−1 −0.03 0.02 −1.23 6386 0.22
Avg. Months-to-Maturity 0.00 0.00 −0.99 6283 0.32
Credit Spread 0.50 0.02 22.28 6258 0.00
Term Spread −0.17 0.01 −22.20 6276 0.00
Oil Volatility 1.33 0.24 5.45 6243 0.00
log(Oil Price) −0.07 0.03 −2.24 6291 0.03
log(Oil Exports) 0.01 0.01 0.65 6396 0.52
(Intercept) 4.88 1.31 3.72 233 0.00
Leveraget−1 1.21 0.23 5.18 211 0.00
Profitabilityt−1 −2.44 0.95 −2.55 224 0.01
log(Total Assets)t−1 −0.15 0.03 −5.82 201 0.00
Avg. Months-to-Maturity 0.00 0.00 −5.79 199 0.00
Credit Spread 0.00 1.32 0.00 256 1.00
Term Spread −0.02 0.24 −0.07 225 0.95
Oil Volatility 13.94 17.51 0.80 260 0.43
log(Oil Price) 0.28 0.46 0.61 241 0.54
log(Oil Exports) −0.01 0.10 −0.15 240 0.88
Upstream & Support Services 0.43 0.08 5.53 195 0.00
Downstream 0.38 0.10 3.69 194 0.00
log(Oil Price)*Upstream & Support Services −0.31 0.04 −7.44 6352 0.00
log(Oil Price)*Downstream 0.08 0.06 1.36 6376 0.17
Group Parameter Std. Dev.
Firm ID (Intercept) 0.44
Notes: p-values calculated using Satterthwaite d.f.
TABLE3.5: Information on the estimated within-between model.
Model Info & Fit:
Firms 230 Quarters 11-70
Type Linear mixed effects Specification within-between
AIC 11185.42 BIC 11354.85
Pseudo-R2 (fixed effects)
Entity ICC 0.4
volatility. In contrast to the OLS estimates based on syndicated loans, we find that rising uncer-tainty, i.e. higher volatility, within-firm increases of the cost of debt. In contrast to our previous results, we do not find a significant effect for the possibility of exporting to other markets.
The between effects reveal significant differences between the costs of debt for firms in the different industry categories. Both the upstream and support services and the downstream sec-tors indeed face significantly higher financing costs on average – 43% and 38% respectively – compared to midstream firms. Moreover, the interaction effects between the industry classifi-cations and the oil price show that the impact of the oil price on financing costs varies with the industry classification of the firms. The results indicate that the negative impact of an oil price increase on the bond credit spread is much stronger for upstream and support service firms than for midstream firms. By contrast, downstream firms are affected to the same extent. This is in line with our initial expectation: as the oil price affects the revenues and in the upstream sector, it is not surprising that oil price increases reduce the cost of debt of firms active in that sector.